“To be global, Spain needs to think about the world through Eurasia”

Luis Martínez Montes, a member of the diplomatic corps who is currently a Counsellor in the Spanish Permanent Representation to the OSCE, an organisation presided over by Spain in 2007, reflected on the role of Eurasia in an interview granted to the CIDOB Foundation. Martínez Montes, who combines his work as a diplomat with the writing of essays in which he reflects on burning issues in the international situation, is the author of España, Eurasia y el nuevo teatro del mundo [Spain, Eurasia and the New World Theatre], a recently published CIDOB Document in which he proposes drawing up a plan in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation to give a response to a new emerging reality: Eurasia. Your study, España, Eurasia y el nuevo teatro del mundo, revolves around the emergence of Eurasia. Is the emergence of new centres of world attention one of the international keys today? There exists a fascination, tinted with a certain anxiety, in front of the rise of countries like China and India; or in front of the “energetic” reassertion of Russia and the nuclear ambitions of Iran. Octavio Paz, a visionary poet, used to say that the sign of our time is not “revolution” but “revolt”: a change which is a return to origins. The emergence of these new centres of world power in our days constitutes a return to a situation of the international relations prior to the bipolar era and even prior to the hegemony of the West.

At the same time, we find ourselves before a completely new phenomenon, since the emerging powers have at their disposal resources and instruments of power that were unknown in the past and are now provided by the converging forces of geopolitics and globalisation. That is, precisely, the ultimate meaning of the concept “emergence”: the apparition of new properties in a system or set of systems stemming from pre-existing realities. This explains that ambiguous and disconcerting mixture of familiarity and surprise that we feel when we observe and analyse today’s world. On the one hand, we contemplate the irruption of the past into the present, whether it be in the form of renewed religious or national identities or in the resurrection of seemingly petrified civilisations that now are on their way to becoming alternative poles of world power. On the other hand, this same revived past is transformed in contact with forces and currents that already prefigure the future. And this future, whether or not it pleases those in West who, up until now, aimed at holding the monopoly on historical interpretation, is going to be a plural one. What meaning does the emergence of Eurasia have? How are the different European powers reacting in the face of this phenomenon? The emergence of Eurasia is the result of the convergence of the two large forces that constitute the fabric of our world. En the geopolitical area – the changes in the spatial distribution of power – is the result of the fragmentation and internal recomposition of the two large blocs that dominated the macro-continent during the Cold War. 

In regard to globalisation, the opening up of markets that had been previously closed to the flows of capital, energy and information are causing important transformations and movements in the portfolios of resources of the different Eurasian actors. At the same time, the crisis that the supranational project of the European Union is going through is at the origin of the re-apparition of hegemony project among the traditional great powers, such as Great Britain, Germany and France. The difference with the past is that now, in their calculations, they have to take into account the (re)emerging powers – Russia, China and India – and the new actors that have arisen from the implosion of the Soviet Union. The republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia have discovered the influence granted to them by being countries of origin and transit of such resources as gas and oil, as well as possessing important deposits of strategic minerals, and they are not inclined to passively accept being the victims of a new Grand Game. Entering into the topic of Spanish foreign policy, what would the proposal to establish a Eurasia Plan be like? How could this Plan mesh with other already-existing ones and with the rest of Spanish foreign policy? For historical reasons, Spain has followed a foreign policy focusing on three “axes”, Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean / Middle East. I do not dispute that these are priority areas for our country. But, thinking and acting as if they were autonomous spheres disconnected from the global context is not realistic. 

Returning to the example of Eurasia, the reassertion of the traditional powers and the activism of the emerging ones in regions that are increasingly far from their immediate vicinity is decisively changing the balances in each of our privileged areas of action. Let us think about India’s growing interests in European companies, Russia’s interests in Algeria, or China’s in Morocco, not to talk about China’s investments in Latin America or in sub-Saharan Africa. We must be conscious that, for a country that has reached the magnitude of Spain, it is no longer sustainable to conceive of and execute a foreign policy characteristic of a “mid-sized regional power”. In today’s world, the only ones that will have capacity for autonomous action and decision will be the actors that think and act in global terms and are able to explore and take advantage of the multiple networks that connect formerly separated geographic and thematic areas. The era of hermetically-sealed compartments and areas of influence is giving way to that of communicating vessels, that of networks. This is why, in order for it to have a global presence, Spain needs to think about the world through Eurasia. We already have a defined path, which should be constantly adapted to the new realities, in areas such as the EU, Latin America and the Mediterranean. We have also recently provided ourselves with specific geographic plans, such as the Asia Plan and the Africa Plan. The principal added value of a Eurasia Plan would lie precisely in its highlighting the central role of the macro-continent in the growing interconnection among apparently distant and disparate realities. For example, whoever is focused on following events in Venezuela, Morocco or the Sudan would thus have access, in real time, to how decisions adopted in Beijing, Moscow, Astana or Brussels instantly affect their respective areas of interest. 

On the other hand, a Eurasia Plan should place special attention on inner Eurasia, that is, on the actors and dynamics that interweave in the post-Soviet space, above allin the Caucasus and Central Asia. These are areas to which, up until now, we had not given the attention they deserve, in contrast to our more active neighbours, who do have a global vision. In sum, a Eurasia Plan, added to the existing ones and incorporated into a Foreign Policy Strategy, would have to contribute to this leap in quality that would allow Spain to go from being a (tri)regional power to being a mid-sized global power with capacities of a large power in regional spheres selected in accordance with our interests. It is a challenge which, as a society, I believe we can consider in a realistic way during the course of this generation. Our future, and I would almost dare say our present, depends on it. Conscious of your interest in fuelling debates and reflections in the sphere of international relations, what projects are you currently working on? The Document recently published by CIDOB forms part of a broader intellectual endeavour and life’s work. 

I have always tried to follow the advice that Krishna gave to the archer, Arjuna, in the Bhagavad Gita, one of the books of wisdom that should form part of a cosmopolitan spiritual baggage: knowledge is superior to action, and action is superior to inaction. Knowledge and action are one and the same path. Thus, I conceive of intellectual investigation on the nature of Eurasia or on the power variations in other areas of the world as part of my practical work as a diplomat. In addition, I sincerely believe that the dissemination of knowledge and the incitement to debate in terms characteristic of international relations constitute not only a civil responsibility but also an indispensable requirement for establishing a foreign policy on solid foundations. An ignorant public opinion is a public opinion which is disoriented and susceptible of falling into extreme oscillations. To this is added the fact that, due to well-known reasons, our country still lacks an established tradition of reflection oriented toward action on entire regions of the world. My future projects go a little in this direction. 

For example, I have just finished another essay for CIDOB on the implications of the rise of China on the hegemony of the United States. The next step would be to complete an overview of the new world theatre, placing attention on particular dynamics but with a global scope. Focusing on Eurasia, I am interested in the relations between China and Japan; the function of Central Asia as a historic crossroads and the triangular relations among Russia, China and the EU. I am aware that these are broad projects that surpass my capacities and require a group contribution, such as that which can be provided by foundations such as CIDOB, Casa Asia, the universities and the excellent business schools our country has. *The interviewed wishes to make clear that these comments are made in his personal capacity. >> Consult Documentos CIDOB Asia 15 >> Consult the news item, “In the face of the European crisis, the solution is to open up to Eurasia”