India’s foreign policy reconfiguration: from non-alignment to multi-alignment

Patrizia Cogo Morales was the winner of the Junior Visiting Fellowship, launched by CIDOB and the Banco Sabadell Foundation as part of the 4th edition of the “Programa Talent Global”.

Indian foreign policy has shifted from non-alignment during the Cold War to strategic autonomy in the post-Cold War era, and now, to multi-alignment. 

Modi’s foreign policy represents continuity more than change, with redoubled efforts to cultivate a diverse network of partnerships and collaborators. This strategy has enabled India to balance relations with Russia, China and the United States (US), while diversifying partnerships to navigate an increasingly volatile world order. 

Given this scenario, key questions remain. How much will Russia contribute to India’s present and future priorities as a rising power? What limits are there to this new rapprochement with China? And how far can India actually trust the US?

India has emerged as a key (f)actor in today’s shifting global order. As the world’s most populous country and its fifth-largest economy – with projections to become the third-largest by 2030 – New Delhi is playing an increasingly important role in addressing global challenges, from rethinking supply chains to setting tech standards and advancing climate goals. It also has the world’s second-largest military and has stepped up as a leading voice for the Global South. In a global context marked by heightened strategic competition and growing transactionalism, India’s distinct foreign policy is drawing critical interest in Asia and beyond.

At the heart of this approach lies the principle of non-alignment, considered the cornerstone of Indian diplomacy during the Cold War. Since achieving independence in 1947, India has walked a tightrope of non-alignment, often eschewing formal security alliances to uphold its national autonomy. Yet this principle was notably circumvented by India’s de facto alignment with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, a partnership forged out of strategic necessity in response to the United States’ tilt posturing towards Pakistan and China, and facilitated by favourable views of socialist policies by Indian elites at the time.

Today, non-alignment is an obsolete framework for understanding Indian foreign policy. As India’s influence increases, understanding the logic behind its external action becomes more urgent, and to do that, we need to understand its past. How has India’s approach towards major powers evolved since its independence? This article examines the progress of India’s foreign policy from the Cold War to the present by focusing on its relations with the Soviet Union/Russia, the US and China. It argues Indian foreign policy has evolved steadily through three major strategic approaches: from (a) the principle of non-alignment as the guiding star of  Delhi’s external action after its independence (1947–1991); passing through (b) strategic autonomy after the end of the Cold War (1991–2014); to (c) finally embracing multi-alignment in a shifting multipolar world (2014–present). 

As such, India has moved from simply navigating great power relations to actively shaping them from a more confident and equal standing. This reflects not only changing global dynamics but also a gradual reconfiguration of the principles guiding India’s foreign policy. And, in the context of a growing multipolar world and the pressures of strategic competition, India’s multi-alignment and strategic autonomy has the potential to once again become an example or alternative for other countries seeking to navigate an increasingly volatile world between great powers.

The era of non-alignment and the genesis of India’s foreign policy (1947–1991)

The genesis of India’s foreign policy is rooted in the transformations of the post-Second World War era, a time when newly independent postcolonial countries were carving out their place as a third front amidst the global rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. Emerging from a history of colonial rule under the British Raj, which informed a political culture that cherished national sovereignty, this approach to relations among states stemmed from a postcolonial ethos. India’s worldview after the Second World War was shaped by its colonial past, dividing states into “pro-colonial” and “anti-colonial” blocs. That is why it can be said that anticolonialism was a core policy of the time, a policy which was “independent of the leaders who strive to work with it. Its roots are to be found in cultural attitudes and chains of events” (Fontera, 1960: 421). Indeed, the principal architect of India’s foreign policy, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, initially advocated for non-alignment, understood as a policy that was intended to offer a “third way” to all those countries that sought to avoid being drawn into bipolar dynamics – in many cases, postcolonial states. Nehru became a key figure at the Bandung Conference of 1955, which brought together newly independent countries from Asia and Africa advocating opposition to colonialism. This eventually paved the way for the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, a gathering of countries that was formally established to counterbalance the bipolarisation of the system during the Cold War.

Yet non-alignment should not be confused with neutralism, particularly in the case of India. Although India did not align itself with either major power bloc during the Cold War, it was neither neutral nor indifferent on all matters of foreign policy. Disputes related to the territorial integrity of the country, for instance with Pakistan over Kashmir or the border disputes with China, as well as US promotion of a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which included Pakistan, pushed India to lean towards a position that allowed alignment with the Soviet Union to protect its sovereignty and independence. 

While the struggle for independence from British rule made Indian society more politically conscious, it was the 1962 Sino-Indian War that marked a turning point in foreign policy. This war had its origins in the unresolved disputes over colonial-era borders, specifically concerning two territories: Arunachal Pradesh – also called “South Tibet” by China – and Aksai Chin, located in the eastern and western sectors, respectively, of India’s borders. Until then, Indian foreign policy had been characterised by three prevalent features: (i) a significant role in multilateral institutions (particularly in UN peacekeeping operations); (ii) being a proponent of the non-aligned movement at global level; and (iii) contributing significantly to the process of decolonisation of many Asian and African countries. Nehru’s idealism allowed flexibility outside Cold War dynamics but also led to naive policies such as limiting defence spending, which contributed to India’s traumatic defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. In its aftermath, Indian foreign policy started to gradually embrace a more pragmatic approach, reflected in the development of Indian military capabilities and a security-driven view towards China. 

The next defining moment in Indian foreign policy came with the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. While India faced a “persistent anxiety” about China’s potential threat, including its close ties with Pakistan, two interrelated elements accelerated the signing of the treaty, which had been under negotiation for years. First, the start of the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 heightened India’s sense of insecurity. Secondly, US efforts for rapprochement with China took precedence over US-India relations and increased concerns over a “US-China-Pakistan partnership” in the middle of the ongoing conflict. Besides this, the rather idealistic and romantic ideological view in India of the Soviet Union as a supporter of newly independent nations, and Indira Gandhi’s strong domestic support at the time, meant there was a lack of public resistance to the deal. As such, despite India’s formal adherence to, and pretence of, non-alignment, this choice eroded its commitment to declining to take sides in practice, ultimately siding with Moscow as Delhi saw the Soviet Union as an “insurance policy” amidst the turbulence in the 1970s. 

By the end of the Bangladesh Liberation War, which saw the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, India emerged as the dominant power in South Asia, but had hostile, estranged or indifferent relations with China, Pakistan and the US. This led to India’s pursuit of self-reliance through a nuclear programme and indigenous capabilities, while also pushing to stabilise its relations with China and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. With the US, while the Carter administration recognised India’s “key role in Asia”, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 shifted Washington’s focus to Pakistan, delaying – once again – the rapprochement between the two countries. 

India’s foreign policy orientation began to shift under the tenure of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1984–1989), which marked an “attitudinal change” in policy and anticipated the major changes of the early 1990s. Encouraged by the Soviet Union’s quest for normalisation with the US and China, India followed suit. First, Rajiv Gandhi placed high priority on expanding relations with the US so as to have access to advanced technology, continuing Indira Gandhi’s efforts. Secondly, he preserved the importance of the Soviet Union for India as both an economic and defence partner capable of balancing India’s relations with Washington, Beijing and Islamabad. Finally, despite recurrent tensions at the border – including the 1987 Sumdorong Chu standoff – and with border demarcation talks delivering little to no results, Rajiv Gandhi prioritised stabilising relations with Beijing, aiming to benefit from China’s rapid economic growth and to lessen India’s fiscal burden of maintaining a militarised border. With his visit to Beijing in 1988 – the first by an Indian prime minister in 34 years – India’s China policy found “a new beginning”. However, systemic changes would end up redefining the three relations just a few years later. 

New beginnings: the switch to the principle of strategic autonomy (1991–2014)

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991 served as catalysts for India to fundamentally reorient its foreign policy. The principle of non-alignment, once a cornerstone of India’s international engagement, lost its relevance and ceased to make much sense in a new international unipolar order. No longer able to rely in the same way on the Soviet Union, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991–1996) abandoned “anti-Western” inclinations in foreign policy and opened India to the world politically and economically. 

These structural changes, as well as India’s redefinition of its own role in the post-Cold War system, paved the way for a new approach to Delhi’s foreign relations: the quest for strategic autonomy and the establishment of “strategic partnerships” as a key feature of its diplomatic endeavours. India’s concept of strategic autonomy is fundamentally transactional, in content and in nature. It aims to provide India with sufficient leeway when making decisions related to national security, without constraints from external pressures or alliance obligations. Because of India’s disregard of military alliances due to its historical and philosophical aversion to blocs, strategic partnerships are its preferred modus operandi as they offer flexible forms of collaboration with countries to advance its interests. 

During the 1990s, India experienced a transitioning and transformative period marked by economic liberalisation, which also influenced this fundamental shift in its foreign policy. As Russia experienced a deep economic crisis, hindering prospects of sustained cooperation beyond defence, Delhi became more receptive to exploring other possibilities for engagement with the US and China – as major sources of technology and market access – and new possibilities of arrangements with countries such as Japan, Australia or France, which offered further opportunities in terms of trade and supported India’s growing role in the Asia-Pacific. Similarly, it launched its “Look East Policy” towards Southeast Asia to access the region’s expanding markets in a moment when its own economic growth was a priority.

Against this backdrop, India’s nuclear diplomacy marked its foreign relations in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. In May 1998, India carried out a series of nuclear tests, announcing its arrival as a nuclear state. Delhi justified this as a response to the security threat posed by China, with Prime Minister Vajpayee explicitly linking it to the 1962 war and Beijing’s nuclear capabilities. While this decision initially heightened tensions with the international community – in particular with China and the US – it also set the stage for a gradual rapprochement with Washington in a moment of American unipolarity. 

After India’s 1998 nuclear tests, key discussions were arranged by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh, which laid the foundations for US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000, helping to end five decades of estrangement. Under the tenure of the George W. Bush administration (2001–2009), these bilateral relations accelerated with the signing of the 2006 Indo-US nuclear deal, which would mark a turning point for both sides while effectively rewriting the norms of nuclear proliferation by rewarding the rule-breaker in return for strategic realignment. Yet tensions between India and the US persisted. First, after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Washington prioritised its partnership with Islamabad again as part of the “war on terror”, to Delhi’s displeasure. Second, despite improvements in US-India relations, there were still limits to the scope of cooperation, especially in the defence sector. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained India’s main arms supplier, despite Delhi’s willingness to diversify and pursue defence cooperation with other countries, such as France. 

Beyond nuclear and defence politics, however, India and the United States expanded their cooperation together with Japan and Australia, most notably after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami when the four countries effectively coordinated emergency response and humanitarian assistance after the disaster. This cooperation formed the basis for the short-lived “Quad 1.0” under the leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, which was established in 2007 but came apart in 2008. Besides political changes in member countries, one of the factors that influenced its demise was India’s aversion to tensions with Beijing, despite its growing security concerns regarding its neighbour. 

Indeed, in this period, India’s relations with China continued the trend of normalisation initiated under Rajiv Gandhi’s leadership in the late 1980s, especially in the economic domain.  Despite the rise in military presence at the borders, two more agreements were signed in 2012 and 2013, which added measures designed to improve mutual trust and control the territorial disputes to prevent them permeating other areas of bilateral relations. Trade also grew rapidly: from $117m in 1987 to $38bn in 2007, and $74bn by 2011, making China one of India’s largest trading partners in goods. This economic interdependence made Indian elites more conscious of antagonising Beijing in the framework of the Quad. However, while the deepening of economic cooperation was initially seen in a positive light, this surge soon turned into a burden due to the growing trade imbalance and competition with local industries.

A rising India: The era of multi-alignment (2014–present)

After Narendra Modi was elected prime minister in May 2014, there were high expectations of a change in India’s foreign policy. The fact that he was able to command a clear majority in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, after an overwhelming general election triumph – not seen since 1984 – strengthened his political position. From the start of his tenure, Modi’s personal style and his own identification with the ideology of the Hindutva movement, which pursues the establishment of Hindu hegemony within India, have played a role in characterising Indian foreign policy, giving it a certain Modi stamp. 

A closer examination, though, shows that Modi represents a continuation of his predecessors and the current principles guiding Indian foreign policy, especially the transactional nature of strategic autonomy which seems to help navigate the emerging multipolar system amidst escalating US-China rivalry. The difference, however, lies in the intensification and reinforcement of multi-alignment, one of the dimensions of strategic autonomy, facilitated by Delhi’s increasing relevance in the international system as a rising power and leading voice of the Global South. 

While strategic autonomy entails securing room to manoeuvre when making decisions with national security implications, multi-alignment reinforces this space through cultivating a diverse network of strategic partnerships and relations. In other words, these two non-exclusionary concepts capture India’s proactive, non-isolating and versatile approach to international relations, and reflect the evolution of Indian foreign policy since its independence. Multi-alignment in particular helps skilfully navigate the complex web of often competing interests by choosing suitable partners in different issues or domains, reinforcing Delhi’s degree of adaptability to evolving circumstances. In the words of Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar (2020: 10), “[t]his is a time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support”. 

United States

Over the last decade, US-India relations have seen positive developments, especially in trade, technology and military cooperation – evidence of this readiness to “engage America”. Shared concerns about China have been a key factor in this deepening cooperation. India’s growing mistrust towards China, aggravated by the 2020 standoff in Ladakh, coincided with the escalation of US-China rivalry and Washington’s willingness to bring other countries closer to outcompete China, India being a central partner in that goal. By 2020, both countries had signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) to share sensitive information, including geospatial data, to contribute to the upgrading of India’s military capabilities. In 2023, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET)_¹ was established with the objective to expand collaboration at the intersection of technology and defence. This was later enhanced with the launch of the US-India Strategic Trade Dialogue.

An additional layer of this partnership between Washington and Delhi is the Indo-Pacific, where both countries, together with Japan and Australia, participate in the Quad, an initiative aimed at promoting “regional peace, stability, security and prosperity”. Since its revival in 2017, and after rising tensions with China in 2020, India has deepened its involvement as the minilateral has broadened its agenda to encompass resilient supply chains, critical and emerging technologies, and even space cooperation – focusing more on non-traditional security than its original mandate of maritime security. 

However, ties have recently come under strain. Initially, Delhi welcomed Trump’s second term and hoped for a quick trade deal with its largest trading partner. Modi went to Washington in February 2025 to ease relations and try to secure favourable treatment on tariffs, even amid backlash over the harsh deportation of Indian nationals by US authorities. However, two things have soured relations, stalled negotiations and revived Indian concerns about US reliability. First, Trump’s repeated claims of mediating a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May 2025 after the Pahalgam attack were firmly rejected by Delhi. Second, at the end of August 2025, Trump’s 50% tariffs on India, linked to its purchases of Russian oil, have triggered an unprecedented downturn in relations after decades of steady progress. As a result, the sixth round of US-India trade talks scheduled for late August were postponed, raising doubts about whether a deal could be reached this autumn, as was originally programmed during Modi’s visit to Washington last February. Growing frustration with Trump’s tariffs and rhetoric is pushing India to tilt away from the US, while cautiously improving ties with China and preserving its partnership with Russia.

China

When it comes to China, serious border standoffs in 2013, 2014, 2017 and 2020 have burdened bilateral relations, as they are symbolically charged – stirring memories and reopening wounds of the 1962 Sino-Indian war – and strategically important for India. The 2020 Galwan clash in particular, which claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops, underscored the volatility of the borders and marked a turning point in Sino-Indian relations, making Beijing a major, if not the primary, threat for Delhi. However, beyond border disputes on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), further contentious issues have sown deeper mistrust in Delhi. For instance, China’s close ties with Pakistan and its growing presence and influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have raised concerns in India of a potential containment strategy by Beijing, which explains India’s reticence and refusal to join the BRI. 

These security concerns over China’s growing challenge and the rising asymmetry of power between the two actors have also reached other domains, including economic relations and technology, leading to an increasing securitisation of relations in these areas. Indeed, India has been increasingly scrutinising economic ties with China through the lens of a larger national security architecture that puts economic security at its core. In economic terms, India’s largest trade deficit is with China, which had reached $99.2bn by 2024. Entire sectors of India’s industry, including generic drugs and electronics, are now heavily dependent on Chinese supplies, to the point that in order to continue developing India’s export sector it requires more imports from China. This dynamic turns the economic relationship into both a necessity and a grievance, especially as economic reliance happens in parallel with ongoing border disputes. To address these vulnerabilities, India restricted Chinese investments, limited access to Indian public procurement, banned several Chinese apps such as TikTok, and excluded Chinese companies from participating in India’s 5G network. Besides domestic measures, Delhi has searched for new partners to strengthen its defence and technological capabilities, notably with the US and France. 

However, in October 2024, signals of change in the relationship began to emerge. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Modi met for the first time in five years on the sidelines of the BRICS+ Summit in Russia, reopening dialogue at the highest level. More recently, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India in late August 2025 – almost at the same time as Trump threatened Delhi with sanctions – both sides agreed to “facilitate trade and investment flows”, resume direct flights and improve visa procedures to boost people-to-people ties, putting – to some extent – the border disputes aside. In fact, in 2025 some Chinese investments have started to pick up again in India, including in sectors such as consumer electronics. The Indian business community has played a major role in pressuring Modi’s government to ease restrictions on China. Modi’s participation at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Tianjin further reaffirmed the shift in relations while also sending signals to the US about India’s alternative partners. However, it remains to be seen how fundamental tensions, including Sino-Pakistani relations and growing Chinese presence in India’s neighbourhood, influence this push towards stabilisation in the post-Galwan 2020 era. 

Russia

When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, India’s reaction reflected a closeness to Russian sensitivities, as National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon acknowledged Russia’s “legitimate interests” in Crimea. Furthermore, in March 2014, India abstained in the UNGA resolution on Ukraine’s territorial integrity. This laid the precedent for 2022: when Russia invaded Ukraine, India did not condemn Moscow and abstained in key UNGA votes on this issue – again. Sympathy for Moscow’s narrative regarding the war – framing NATO expansion as a key cause – exists within parts of India. As Chelsea Ngoc Nguyen argues, ultimately the relationship between Delhi and Moscow is not simply geopolitics, but also about “affectionate politics”: India’s partnership with Russia is perceived both as a legacy of the Cold War and a key asset in supporting India’s strategic autonomy and its national security goals more broadly. The dependence nurtured over decades cannot be dismantled in a matter of a few years; issues with changing systems, adapting to new standards and cost efficiency are factors to take into account. Plus, decades of exposure to the Soviet Union cannot be ignored that easily either. In the words of Jaishankar, India is not “unsentimentally transactional”, and this still influences India’s worldview, particularly when it comes to its relations with Western nations, including the US and various European countries. 

Despite this, Delhi has tried to reduce its dependence on Moscow in the security realm since 2014. According to SIPRI, Russia represented 36% of India’s total arms imports in the period 2020–2024, a significant reduction when compared to 55% in 2015–2019 and 72% in 2010–2014. Three reasons explain this: the “China factor” in bilateral relations; its push towards self-reliance; and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. First, Russia’s deepening relations with China, which presents a multi-dimensional challenge to India, have led to the inclusion of the “China factor” in the relationship with Moscow. In the past, the relationship with Russia offered reassurance and support for India to offset regional security challenges from China and Pakistan. Today, Moscow’s closer alignment with Beijing is changing India’s strategic calculus of the relationship with Russia, raising doubts about its role in India’s long-term security. Second, the policy framework of “Aatmanirbhar Bharat”, translated as “self-reliant India” and first introduced in 2020, guides India’s ambition to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers, diversify partners and build up its own industries, including defence. Finally, on Russia’s war in Ukraine, the conflict has exposed limitations to Moscow’s military capabilities and defence industry, and, consequently, has raised questions about its reliability as a defence supplier for India. As a result, multi-alignment in defence has led to a diversification of arms imports, with France, Israel and the US becoming key suppliers for Delhi. 

Energy cooperation, meanwhile, has become an important pillar in India-Russia ties. Discounted Russian crude oil increased from less than 2% of India’s imports before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to over 40% in June 2024. And, beyond fossil fuels, both sides are also cooperating on civil nuclear energy, with recent plans to build six civil nuclear power plants in Tamil Nadu. The intertwining of these tensions reflects India’s multi-alignment strategy, where the India-Russia partnership remains a cornerstone and will likely continue to be for the foreseeable future, even if its centrality diminishes over time as Delhi reduces its overdependence through diversification and strengthening its own capabilities.

Futures perspectives on India’s multi-alignment

Through the evolution of Indian foreign policy from the Cold War to the present, and more specifically, through the analysis of its relations with the Soviet Union/Russia, China and the US, we can better understand the connections and ramifications of the three strategic approaches to international relations that are at the root of India’s grand strategy.

First, non-alignment brings us back to India’s Cold War position of not formally siding with either the US or the Soviet Union. Second, strategic autonomy refers to having the necessary leeway to navigate and make decisions that best serve its national interests. Third, multi-alignment refers to India’s intensification of diverse partnerships. However, despite their variances, non-alignment and multi-alignment represent two sides of the same coin: a conscious and proactive decision by India to tread its own path despite prevailing great power dynamics. During the Cold War era, global politics were split into two vast spheres of influence between the US and the Soviet Union; presently, although there is a semblance of the great power dynamics of the last century in the US-China rivalry, it coexists alongside an emerging multipolar order where power is more widely dispersed. The contemporary landscape demands India keep a wide range of options open at any given time, which it achieves through its multi-alignment strategy. 

Over the last few years, India has made efforts to strengthen ties with the West to reduce its long-standing dependency on Russia and de facto enhance its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the threats posed by China, including Beijing’s strong ties with Moscow and Islamabad. Now we are witnessing a shift: India is cautiously cultivating relations with China while keeping Russia close. Looking ahead, key questions remain: how much will Russia contribute to India’s present and future priorities as a rising power; what limits exist in this new rapprochement with China; and how far can India actually trust the US? At the same time, India continues to deepen relations with other key partners such as the EU, Japan and Australia, so as to broaden its options. 

What is clear is that Delhi left the “survival mode” of great power relations from the Cold War long ago. Today, it approaches them from a more confident and equal footing, with multi-alignment as the answer in times of perpetual volatility. In a way, just as India was once a leading light at the Bandung Conference and in the Non-Alignment Movement, it may again serve as an example to Global South countries who prefer not to be drawn into US-China confrontations. 

References

Fontera, R. M. (1960). “Anti-Colonialism as a Basic Indian Foreign Policy”. Western Political Quarterly, 13(2), 421–432. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591296001300209. 

Ganguly, S. & Pardesi, Manjeet S. (2009) “Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy”, India Review, 8:1, 4–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480802665162. 

Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World. Harper Collins India.

Tanvi, M. (2020). Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War. Brookings Institution Press.

Notes:

1- iCET is now known as “TRUST” (Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology). The nomenclature was introduced in the India-U.S. joint statement issued on February 13, 2025, following the first meeting between Trump and Modi. 

E-ISSN: 2013-4428

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2025/324/en

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