THE SAME BUT DIFFERENT?
Codevelopment policies in France, Germany, Spain and the institutions of the European Union from a comparative perspective

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Introduction. Does codevelopment exist?

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In November 1991, *DCIDOB* Journal no. 28 was titled *"Immigration"*, and it discussed with commendable precociousness Spain's status as a host country for immigrants. In that year, according to data from the journal, Spain had 400,000 foreign residents, 66% of whom were from European countries. Even though immigration was not numerically important in 1991, it received attention because of its sudden increase and because of the novelty of the visibility of immigrants in the public spaces of Spanish cities, especially those who came from developing countries. Thus it was no surprise that immigration should become a subject for analysis. Yet it was even more surprising to find in the aforementioned issue a chapter titled *"Cooperation: the solution to migration?"*. This chapter argued, well in advance of the many posterior debates that are taking place nowadays, that migrations was one of the two sectors (the other one being the environment) in which the problems of the relations between north and south could be addressed due to the mutual interest in these problems.

Today, this profile has changed, with Spain having close to four and half million foreigners, of whom only 43% are from Europe (CIDOB International Yearbook 2009). And it is interesting to read again how, almost 20 years ago, the field of cooperation, which was very incipient at that point, was undergoing a process of critical reaffirmation. This process consisted in establishing the broad meaning of the term "development cooperation" as something that goes beyond unidirectional financial support, and defying the concept of "development" as something more than the simple possession of goods, including the cultural and social enrichment that results from the coexistence and integration of people from different origins. In other words, migrations were being viewed as just another element of human development, and they were linked to cooperation.

Interest in the link between migrations and development has been increasing since then, and currently it is one of the areas of greatest interest on the international agenda. Consequently, the UNDP has dedicated its 2009 Human Development Report to migrations and development. Both the brief reflection from 1991 in the pages of Dcidob and the 150-page UNDP 2009 report address the nexus between migration and development based on the approach that *migration is development*. Yet the two texts have another common element – the word *codevelopment* does not appear even once in either of them. This is reasonable for the first text, given that the concept had not yet been coined in political or academic circles. But, it is much more surprising that it does not appear in the UNDP report.

The fact that international texts do not use the term codevelopment is basically due to the need to evade the vagueness of the term. But it is also because of the different interpretations that have been made of it, in addition to the French origin of the term that is broadly identified with policies to control migration flows and with the promotion of returns.

Nonetheless, the term is employed in Spain following the example of neighbouring France. Even though the initial use of the term. The term was initially used to refer to different areas of work, ranging from the exchange of development aid for migratory control, to the promotion of remittances, circular migrations, or of development projects originated by the diasporas. But with the passing of time and with the work of academics, public administration, and civil society, its use has been limited to define those actions in which the migrant population promotes the development of their countries of origin. This greater specificity seems to distance the term from the study and implementation of migration policies and to bring it closer to the field of development cooperation.

However, the strength with which the theory and the practice of codevelopment are being developed in Spain will cause some friction within the field of development cooperation. This criticism can be understood from different perspectives, both because of its theoretical terms and its practices.

The impetus with which codevelopment is born and grows, and the ease with which it begins to occupy space and resources carries with it a "typical sin of youth". There is a certain arrogance in codevelopment by presenting itself as if it were an enhanced traditional development cooperation, and by claiming to overcome certain practices that are outdated, antiquated and have not shown to be significantly efficient in more than 50 years. Contributors to this argument include academia and public administrations, as well as certain associations and institutions

Aware of this impetus and given the danger of a certain absorption, the European Commission –as far back as 2005– reminds us of the irreplaceability of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Likewise, the UNDP, in the aforementioned Human Development Report of 2009, reminds us of that same aspect. And one year before, in 2008, CONCORD also highlighted the dangers of codevelopment.[1]

In Spain, the increasing interest in the term, both in its theoretical implications and in its practical applications, was heightened by three processes that coincided in time; one in the international context, and the other two more limited to the Spanish level. Firstly, because it arose in a moment of crisis of the so-called "traditional" development cooperation, and in spite of the efforts of multiple actors, the evidence of a reduced impact on development, just like the so-called "donor fatigue", started an entire process of revision of the efficiency of aid, of a new institutional architecture, and of new instruments for cooperation.

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1. Olivier Consolo, Director of CONCORD, in the press release on 10 July 2008, with the occasion of the presentation of the draft of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum by the French Presidency of the EU, said: "Linking development and migrations policies represents a clear risk of undermining attention on the objective of eradicating poverty and inequality in the poorest countries. Europe cannot link the destination of aid for developing countries with the advances made in legal or illegal migration and readmissions. Though the Member States of the European Union might reach migration agreements with other countries, these should not be a condition for development cooperation".

The last methodological death rattles of classical development cooperation, such as management for results, a greater role of and attention to coherence, impact and appropriation, were proof, of the need for new approaches and of the assumption of a certain failure of the cooperation implemented so far, or at least, of its dubious relevance, and with more than doubtful impacts. The distance that exists between the working context of any development NGO technician, in his or her office located in any Spanish city, with the social, political, and economic processes of the countries that it cooperates with are partly to blame. But so is a certain distance from the changing processes in the international agenda for cooperation, and the coexistence of criticisms towards anti-cooperation forces, together with an absence of criticism of the results and methods of work itself. This lack of impact does not not produce correction mechanisms, and results, at best, in mini-processes of reflection and self-assessment that do not lead to any change. These are characteristics of the crisis that the development cooperation sector is going through. Yet part of the blame must also be taken by the mistake of attributing to development cooperation results, objectives, and impacts that do not fall within its true capacity for action.

The other two processes that coincided in time, and which were more focused on the Spanish context, were the rapid growth of migration and the process of political decentralisation. An increase in immigration flows led to a reorientation of priorities in the political and administrative spheres and in the research area. Additionally, the growing decentralisation meant a stronger role for the autonomous communities and local entities, with their responsibilities in the management of migration and in social coexistence at a local level and a quest for a greater role abroad through international development cooperation. Therefore, co-development was seen as a very juicy opportunity to combine development cooperation, migration management and the international influence sought by the decentralised administrations.

The government machinery, NGOs and the academia started, in a manner that was not very often seen in sectors related to development cooperation, a frantic race to research the practice of codevelopment. In this context, we could point out the theorising on co-development meaning, the writing of reports and opinions, its inclusion in the priorities of cooperation, and the availability of focused subsidies, even the creation of training courses, manuals and guides about it.

Every new report, every new text, every new regulation should start by establishing its meaning for codevelopment, or at the very minimum by compiling the diverse meanings available to deduce which approach is employed.[2] As for terminological efforts, the establishing of two types of codevelopment deserves to be highlighted. On the one hand, the official term codevelopment is used to refer to the control of borders and migratory flows, which is also referred to as codevelopment from above, since it involves state and supra-state powers. On the other hand, actions organised by migrant communities to foster development in their regions of origin are known as codevelopment from below, or spontaneous codevelopment, which takes place in a space closer to the competencies of the decentralised administration, though also of those of the state.

2. Thus, in certain studies (Giménez Romero et al., 2006) a review is made of the conceptual use of the term according to the type of actor involved; in others (Malgesini, 2001) the author opts for the concept of spontaneous codevelopment as that which arises from the initiative of migrant communities; others prefer to consider the conceptual construction based on the different practices studied (Fernández et al., 2008); some merely carry out a review of the different meanings applied to the concept (Gómez Gil, 2008); and finally, others directly refrain from defining it and proceed to establish ways of turning their proposals into practice (Ochoa, 2009).

What elements of anti-cooperation does codevelopment possess?

The use of the same term to refer to actions as different as return policies, the control of flows and of borders, remittances or transnational relations has been one of the principal problems of codevelopment. And this has also been the basis for the apprehension shown by certain sectors towards development cooperation. They have seen in codevelopment the utilisation of well-intentioned, useful actions as a shield behind which other darker, unpopular interests are hidden such as a migration control (based exclusively on the host countries interests and paying no attention to human rights). In the cooperation field, the use of the concept as a development cooperation initiative to gain social legitimacy but linked to migration control policies has been criticised. The result has been a clear example of incoherent policies, and hence some have even considered codevelopment to represent anti-cooperation.[3]

Considering that cooperation is a marginal flow that takes place in an adverse context to achieve its objectives,, policy coherence studies are trying to identify practices and actions that are negative or which neutralise development cooperation. There is no doubt that codevelopment, when seen as flows control and border protection, is one of these undesired practices, along with the promotion of high skilled migration and its adverse effects in countries of origin. To these elements we need to add as anti-cooperation the overvaluation of the concept. The growth of content and responsibilities is useful and it may fill the responsibility vacuum of what should be the central focus of public policy.

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3. The concept "anti-cooperation" is being examined by David Llistar i Bosch, co-founder of the Observatory on Debt in Globalisation (ODG) of the UNESCO Chair of Sustainability at the UPC. For further information, see "Anti-cooperación. Interferencias Norte-Sur. Los problemas del Sur Global no se resuelven con más ayuda internacional", Icaria.

The terminological evolution has helped to correct the legacy of the most controversial political content, and today it seems like the concept of codevelopment is limited to the group of practices that link migrant communities with the development of areas of origin. This brings the concept much closer to the development cooperation field, and reduces its burden of being anti-cooperation. Yet this closeness is not exempt from a certain controversy, since some academic and practical projects in codevelopment seem to be making efforts to consider codevelopment as a model and as a conceptual and methodological practice that is different from the traditional development cooperation.

This determination to differentiate terms is accompanied by certain criticism of the traditional concepts and practices of cooperation. In this respect, it is said that development cooperation is too unidirectional, too focused on the North's interests, too paternalistic, and consequently inefficient. On the contrary, as we have pointed out before, those who have criticised codevelopment argue that it utilises development cooperation to control migratory flows and other unpopular agendas, aside from exaggerating the role of the role of migrants as agents for development (Mosangini, 2007).

It is the so-called 'spontaneous' codevelopment – the one that situates immigrants as central actors in the development process and that is making efforts to differentiate itself from development cooperation – that is causing greater confusion. A review of the empirical studies, manuals, and guides published in Spain in the last few years show a certain tension between what codevelopment claims to be and what it really is. In its attempt to present itself as a new approach which is better than traditional cooperation, codevelopment poses three questions on three different levels: its supposed methodological innovations, the results of its practical application, and the conceptual premises on which it is based.

Where are the methodological innovations?

Arguments defending codevelopment as a new methodology clash head on with the contents of guides and manuals which are no more than reiterations of traditional methods for development cooperation. Hence, we should conclude that no new methodology exists for actions to promote development.

The guides and manuals published on codevelopment, such as the basic guide to codevelopment published by CIDEAL in 2007, repeat the same techniques as development cooperation projects: the logical framework approach, with participative diagnosis, brainstorming, etc. The participation of immigrant communities, the implementation of activities in countries of origin and destination, and activities of a transnational and transcultural nature are presented as innovations. But development cooperation has, for decades, been carrying out projects which involve activities in both countries of origin and destination, through education for development, awareness-raising, and political impact. Likewise, the execution of transnational, transcultural, and translocal activities is nothing new in cooperation, even though they have not been conceptualised in this way before. An example of the latter is the almost 30 years of twinning activities between municipalities of the north and south, and the interchanges produced. It is also said that codevelopment enriches host societies because it brings them closer to a range of cultural expressions, knowledge, philosophies, practices, skills, and the reality of human development in the countries of origin. But doesn't cooperation do exactly the same thing? Therefore, the only methodological innovation of codevelopment is that migrant communities are the driving force behind the actions.

The guide to practical orientation on codevelopment that CIDEAL is publishing again in 2009 concludes that the execution of codevelopment follows the same way of thinking and methods as development cooperation, and that codevelopment's only unique features are the

necessary participation of migrants and the inclusion of a transnational perspective for designing the objectives, activities and results. Hence, determining the difference between codevelopment and development cooperation should be left for the theoretical level to work out.

But let us return to the supposedly new methodologies. Other material providing orientation on best practices for codevelopment, such as the work of Caritas Mallorca (Oliver, 2008), also creates quite a few doubts about the innovative nature of codevelopment. In this case, the publication outlines a macro-project on codevelopment which is no more than the merging of four components into one single logical framework: traditional development, social integration, awareness-raising and sustainability, which is linked to the previous three and basically deals with preparing the continuity of the macro-project for subsequent phases. Once again, we must conclude that the only new element is that the actors who are in charge of the implementation are migrants; it does not seem sufficient for us to consider that we are looking at a new methodology or an initiative that is different to traditional development cooperation, or to the traditional organisations who work for the social inclusion of migrants. Furthermore, while the macro-project mentions that the participation of the project's beneficiaries should represent part of its evaluation, this is a methodology of classic cooperation projects, and therefore is not new, irrespective of whether it is implemented or not. Thus, we should now turn to the theoretical basis for codevelopment.

Are the conceptual premises politically pertinent?

The conceptual bases of codevelopment practices are highly questionable from a development-based approach. It is true that codevelopment engages in a pertinent criticism of the fundamentals of cooperation, yet its practices and results lead to the conclusion that codevelopment makes the same mistakes that it criticises. Given the methodological similarity between the two, it seems that the main difference lies conceptually in

the presence of migrants as the main actors, and hence in the basis of codevelopment on the theory of migrants as agents of development. Another conceptual premise is that precisely these migrant communities, being a 'bridge' between the north and south, are the key element to establish horizontal relationships, differently from the traditional cooperation and its north-to-south approach.

Even though it is said that codevelopment breaks with the traditional hierarchical north-to-south approach, , it seems that its implementation has the same problems than cooperation. And that's because its focus, like cooperation, is more on aid than on *co-operation*. In any case, codevelopment includes a south-to-north element which development cooperation has discarded, but it is a causal variable of the project. Development cooperation has discarded this element because it has chosen a clear focus on aid. Nevertheless, south-to-north links (or bidirectional ones) promoted by cooperation thru education for development, awareness-raising on global development must not be underestimated. These elements, along with the global networks links between associations of the north and south are part of the increasingly common global development agenda.

According to Malgesini (2007: 67), cooperation and codevelopment projects share their promotion of human development, based on solidarity. But they are differentiated in the horizontal nature of codevelopment's links with the top-down (donor-receptor, north-south) of traditional cooperation. In fact, codevelopment would seek the joint development of both societies, so the host society would also be enriched by the initiatives. Nevertheless, an empirical analysis of the connections established between migrants and communities of origin[4] poses serious doubts on the horitzonal-nature

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4. A good example could be the research project carried out by the Interuniversity Network for Research on Development Cooperation in Madrid on the Ecuadorian, Moroccan, and Senegalese communities,

theory of codevelopment, as we will see further on. Also, the connections between migrant communities and origin communities does not seem to be so pertinent, since they not always have the same objectives, neither do they have the same perceptions on development, which usually results in an imposition of the north-south cooperation hierarchy. As a result, we see how codevelopment, which starts criticising the north-south approach in development cooperation, actually repeats those same parameters in its application. And that's because the objective of development in the south is the priority, thus leaving the social integration of migrants and improving their life conditions as a secondary objective. Likewise, the migrant is only seen as a valuable asset when s/he resides on the North and could help to the South. Thus, the north-south approach is similar in cooperation and in codevelopment.

The conceptual doubts could be summed up by the fact that in 2003, during the conferences on co-development promoted by the former Office for Planning and Evaluation of the Secretary of State for International Cooperation, Luis Miguel Puerto, stated that "One is not an agent of development simply by being a migrant". [5] We would argue that it would be more suitable to consider a migrant an agent for development as long as s/he is a citizen, just like all the other citizens of the origin and destination societies. In our opinion, specifically treating the migrant as an agent of development will not help to consider development as a global and shared responsibility. The role of the migrant as an agent of development should not be due to his/her categorisation as a migrant, but as a human being. And his/her role will be important for the development of origin

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5. Puerto also pointed out that codevelopment was "significantly dangerous" when it was focused on the role of cooperation linked with migration: "We should not ask cooperation to carry out things that it cannot produce, it cannot produce global solutions for global problems. The impact of projects is reduced. Incorporating a new facet into cooperation, such as migrants, does not mean that it will contribute anything positive".

or destination countries, depending on the nature of the action taken and on the context in which it is developed.

If we carried out the exercise of substituting the word 'migrant' for 'citizen' on the texts written on codevelopment, we would get closer to a concept that could help to define what development cooperation should have been. In other words, it would describe the common responsibility towards global development. Codevelopment is a form of development cooperation which makes reference to and focuses on the participation of a specific category of citizens: migrants. Is it necessary to create this new category? If we considered migrants as citizens, should we distinguish their roles and their efforts towards human development from that of the rest of society?

At a time when social participation is at a low, providing institutional support only to development and to promoting the participation of migrant communities, without a more comprehensive perspective, will not encourage the spreading of universally acquired rights. If these policies are not matched with a more coherent policy approach of other policies with a greater impact, then codevelopment will be a new and wasted form of cooperation.

According the 2009 Human Development report figures, around 70 million people have migrated from developing countries to developed ones. Since the world population stands at around 6,800 million of people, we are talking about just 1% of the global population. Taking these figures into account, it is hard to consider this small percentage of the population as a motor for development. Once again, promoting migrants as agents of development loses its meaning if it is not inserted into a global framework to construct citizenship as a true agent for global development.

Another basis for the defence of the virtues of codevelopment and the role of migrants as opposed to traditional cooperation, and more concretely to Official Development Assistance, is the volume of its economic flows. Ever since codevelopment became known, a comparison is commonly made between the flows and volumes of foreign direct investment, remittances,

and official development assistance. Certainly, ODA is considerably smaller than either of the previous two, but its objective, and its whole investment is targeted, *a priori*, on human development and on poverty reduction. Both elements do not necessarily happen in the cases of FDI and remittances. For example, Latin America seems to be the region which receives the largest amount of remittances relative to its GDP, yet it is also the region where inequalities have been reduced the least. Before, only ODA could be compared with national budgets, with the objective of observing its size relative to national public investment, given the similar nature of the two flows. If we compare remittances with FDI, we will see that they are also not able to stand the comparison.[6]

This criticism is not accidental, since it is being produced at a time of reflection on the role of Official Development Assistance. Today, people talk about the end of the ODA era, which has been widely surpassed by other economic flows such as Foreign Direct Investment, Commercial Relationships and remittances from migrants, in a new and fully-comprehensive concept called Global Policy Finance (GPF) (Severino and Ray, 2009). GPF refers to the funding of global development policies by a range of actors through Global Public Policies. It is worth mentioning that these comparisons, which are all too common in the literature, are reduced to a purely numeric comparison of volumes, but there is no qualitative comparison that analyses the use and final destination of these flows, neither their benefit to development. In other words, they fail to determine which FDI percentage contributes to development and to poverty reduction, or the percentage of remittances that promote development or reduce poverty.

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6. The Human Development Report for 2009 does compare (in Box E of the Statistical Appendix) all the international financial flows. Only in Ecuador, Nepal, Haiti, Senegal and certain micro-states, remittances represent more than 10% of Direct Foreign Investment. In general they do not reach 1%.

Nowadays, it is worth remembering that the official objectives of most of the development cooperation activities are destined to poverty eradication and not to the promotion of development as such. In other words, benefiting the poorest people has been established as a priority for development cooperation, and hence its activities focus on developing and strengthening skills to enable the poor to escape from poverty. The activities that are part of development promotion, on the other hand, can be aimed at any sector of the population, and in some cases they go towards strengthening the middle classes.

Thus, the value of Official Development Assistance, as one of the forms of cooperation – quite possibly the best-known – does not lie in its volume, but rather in its qualitative characteristics and its objectives. While FDI can generate wealth, encourage economic development and reduce poverty through the creation of jobs, its objective is not to promote development, but rather to invest by taking advantage of favourable conditions in order to obtain increasing and faster financial benefits over time. And while much has been written and talked about remittances, their uses are very varied and different studies show that they are not aimed at poverty reduction, but at financing basic needs and increasing good-consumption. It is also important to note another non-numeric value of ODA: it is a public inflow, while remittances and FDI are private. For those of us who, without underestimating the role of private initiatives and of public-private partnerships in development, consider that public administrations should play the lead role in promoting development and improving the living conditions of the population, this is not a minor difference, and should be taken into account.

Nonetheless, the objective of this study is not to defend ODA at a time when development cooperation is debating and reflecting on its results, which have without a doubt been quite limited. It is more interesting to analyse how these limited results can also be found after an analysis of the initiatives of the so-called spontaneous, bottom-up codevelopment or, simply, codevelopment.

What kind of development does codevelopment promote?

Even though it is too early to reach a conclusion based on the different evaluations of codevelopment initiatives, some empirical studies provide us with some first impressions. The analyses on the practical results of codevelopment initiatives are not very encouraging, or at least no more than traditional cooperation projects. Thus, in general terms, it could be argued that codevelopment initiatives repeat the errors and bad practices of traditional development initiatives, and judging from the evaluations available, its actions are not so efficient, either.

The study carried out by the Red Universitaria de Investigación sobre Cooperación para el Desarrollo Madrid[7] (University Network for Research on Development Cooperation, Madrid) on experiences of codevelopment with Ecuadorian, Moroccan and Senegalese communities in the Spanish capital is fairly conclusive. A lack of relevance can be observed precisely in the category of actors, through the difficulties due to the role of migrant communities as principal agents of codevelopment. Relevance is one of the main elements in the success of cooperation projects, as are the links between partners. Other key element is the acknowledgement of beneficiaries that their community has certain needs, and that they are aware of this need and aim to achieve it. Codevelopment projects are not always achieved, in the same way that cooperation is not always achieved. The role of the migrant does not have to be useful for developing his/her region of origin. Thus, mistakes are being repeated because there is a certain level of 'guardianship' by organizations and by traditional cooperation philosophies.

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7. In 2005, Madrid City Council signed an agreement with five universities in the city with the aim of promoting research in the field of development cooperation. Within the framework of this agreement, the City Council suggested the issue of codevelopment to the network, and the result of this were the books published in 2006 and 2008. The latter volume, edited by Mercedes Fernández, Carlos Giménez and Luis Miguel Puerto, is particularly interesting owing to its analysis of the practical activities that have been implemented.

This is observed in the analysis of the cases of projects in Ecuador and Morocco and, to a lesser degree, Senegal. It appears that the creation of migrants' associations is being forced with the aim that they should participate in codevelopment interventions, when sometimes non-formalised spontaneous initiatives exist and are already functioning. In our opinion, this approach is more or less appropriate according to the community and country case, in the same way that a cooperation project can be appropriate only in specific contexts. Another finding to be noted is that actions are mainly implemented in countries of origin, thus losing the supposed bi-directionality that characterises codevelopment, and turning them, de facto, into traditional cooperation projects.

In the Ecuador case, for example, there are no actions implemented in the destination, as a result of which codevelopment projects become just another channel of cooperation, with no translocal approach. Differences can also be observed with respect to the role of migrants. Thus, while in Spain the fundamental weight that migrants and their associations must possess in codevelopment projects is reiterated, in Ecuador the role of migrants is perceived in a more controversial, confused way, and there is not a coherent discourse about the role that they have to play or how they are connected –once they leave– with the place of origin and the projects developed there. Finally, a lack of knowledge about Ecuadorian networks, and a weakness in the mobilisation and participation of migrants should also be noticed. Consequently, we are dealing with actions that are, to a certain extent, forced and that have not emerged spontaneously.

In Morocco, the findings are similar, and perhaps even more definitive. One can even observe a mutual distrust between the communities of origin and destination[8], as well as between these communities and the

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8. This extreme situation was dealt with by Joaquín Eguren (2006) in his study on the internal conflicts and tensions of Morocco's transnational Rifi community: "To what extent residents in Morocco are prepared to accept the proposals of their emigrants when sometimes a latent conflict can be observed between emigrants and resident society".

Spanish organisations promoting codevelopment. A gradual loss of interest on the development of the country of origin can be observed as as migration becomes consolidated in Spain. Some concerns were expressed on whether codevelopment responds to the Spanish NGOs' associative interests or if it is a opportunistic formulation or even if it is a way to obtain funds for certain projects.

The case of Senegal, in contrast, seems to be the most successful one. The conclusions reached by the study suggest that codevelopment functions here not because of formal codevelopment projects but thanks to the diaspora's informal contacts with their country of origin, linked with religious brotherhoods such as the *mouride*. As expected, cultural differences with other countries is a key element. The African concept of development and the sense of community are the elements that make a difference. Solidarity is a basic principle for African societies (it is even present in the Banjul Charter[9]), and it is a key element in the African diasporas in Europe. In contrast, one particularly noteworthy factor is the still-scarce participation of the Senegalese diaspora in more institutionalised projects, which do not arise from the migrant group and attempt to involve it afterwards.

According the development cooperation approach, to link different and disconnected components into one single logic of intervention also reveals weak relevance. In the case of the aforementioned macro-project by Caritas Mallorca, implemented in the Balearic Islands, Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia, the evaluation process carried out by DARA concludes that a clear model of intervention could not be done due to

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9. According to Art. 29 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, also known as the Banjul Charter, "The individual shall also have the duty: 1. to preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need"

its enormous territorial and functional diversity.[10] In fact, the evaluation notes a lack of horizontal-transnational relations between the migrant communities and their communities of origin, a situation also noted in the comparative study on Ecuador, Morocco and Senegal. At the same time, the evaluations states that there is a need for codevelopment projects to have partners with expertise and experience, and a need to include them into local development programmes. That's a reminder that migrants' associations and migrants' families need to be involved with traditional agents of development in the framework of public policies on development. This latter aspect brings us back to another conceptual problem of codevelopment: the criteria of selecting beneficiaries according to their family relations with migrants.

Conclusions

Organisations and (mainly regional and local) governments are encouraging codevelopment projects on the basis of these new experiences. The aforementioned lack of relevance of many of these actions could be seen in the search for associations capable of implementing these institutionalised codevelopment projects, regardless of the rigor and nature of these actions, and thus managing to force changes in statutes of associations to be able to receive this kind of funds. Development NGOs and other associations have also look for funding, with the aim of enlarging and diversifying their activities and income. In short, a bad practice that has already been identified in development cooperation is being repeated and enlarged.

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10. The 2008 External Assessment Plan, available on the website of the Department of Coo-peration of the Government of the Balearic Islands, includes a summary of the evaluation carried out by DARA in 2008. The Autonomous Community of the Balearic Islands is one of the few that maintains a policy of transparency when publishing its evaluations of deve-lopment cooperation.

From a human development approach, it is certainly important to design and promote policies and actions that will boost migration's contribution to development and minimise its negative aspects. But it is much more important to promote public policies on development in countries of origin. And in countries of destination, it is key to strengthen the civil society, to improve its exigency to its political representatives.

Many codevelopment discourses seem to be aimed at taking away responsibility from policies and institutions. It is not acceptable that institutions that do not fulfil their obligations to promote development through public policies (in origin and destination) vehemently defend remittances as being the most effective channel for development, or migrant communities as being the most appropriate actors for encouraging global development, thereby attempting to replace their public obligations with private funding. These are the same institutions that don't afford the question of recognising the rights of migrants and their families. More than ever, we must remember the need for public policies that promote state-funding development, through fiscal reform, corporate social responsibility and the reinvestment of the profits of many transnational enterprises into impoverished countries, and by promoting south-south cooperation to create new international financial institutions.

We should study how codevelopment impacts favourably on the creation of public policies on development in countries of origin. And it should be particularly remembered that policies will not be so positive or negative because of who participates, but because of the interests and objectives of the policies. We would thus have to reduce the importance given to actors in codevelopment, and to reorient the attention to the objectives that they propose. For example, neither Spain nor any other migrant-receiving country has signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, a key document passed in 1990 and which came into force in 2003 following its 20th ratification. Would

it not be more appropriate to dedicate efforts and to cooperate on the political impact with the aim that an international text such as this could be ratified 20 years after it was created, and six years after it came into force? International agreements and other legal text on human rights should be the priority basis for all approaches to, and analysis of the migrations development nexus. It would be the finest contribution for the benefit and human development of migrants and their societies of origin. According to Gómez Gil (2008, 14):

"Cooperation policies emerged time ago, among other reasons, as a response to a fear of the poor that were situated on the periphery of capitalist countries. Maybe the current deployment around codevelopment that is taking places in different regions and cities from our country is a response to a fear of immigrants who want to reach their promised land in the West".

The other great characteristic associated with codevelopment is the promotion of communitarian participation. Here it would be a good idea to encourage the mutual exchange of knowledge and experiences, given that the greatest deficit exists in Europe and not in Latin America. In this sense, some codevelopment actions should be focused on strengthening communitarian participation in Spain, with the support and skills of the Latin American migrant population. Well-planned development cooperation would also encourage this mutual learning process.

Certainly, there is a strategic need to continue studying codevelopment. For those of us who still believe in the global objective of global human development, the research hypotheses should focus on confirming that we are dealing with a form of cooperation that does not deserve greater institutional and practical development than other forms of development cooperation. Furthermore, the main question could be how actions should be reoriented toward a greater relevance.

In short, official codevelopment (or top-down codevelopment) could be considered anti-cooperation action when is used as an alibi to stop migrations and obstruct the free exercising of human rights. On the

other hand, spontaneous codevelopment (or bottom-up codevelopment) presents quite a few doubts with respect to its conceptual basis, its methodological innovation and the practical relevance of these actions. Codevelopment is not only nothing new, but its practice is so similar to that of development cooperation that it should be categorised as just another approach among the many diverse ones existing in development cooperation: multilateral aid, debt operations, education for development, municipal twinning, and so on.

Codevelopment is reactivating debates and reflections on basic issues, and is helping to revitalise a sector: the NGOs development cooperation one, which was at a low ebb at that time. This reactivation is also helped by new concepts such as de-growth and anti-cooperation. Cooperation seems to be re-adapting itself after having over-exploited its significance (a similar process to the one codevelopment is going through), focusing in relation to other international flows and relations on development. The emergence of new approaches that tend to globalise –instead of compartmentalise– the human right to development is also being fuelled by the growing role of the migrations-development nexus on the political, social and academic agenda. Furthermore, the anti-globalisation movement has raised awareness among people as to how they can participate and promote sustainable human development without having to get involved in classic development cooperation: by simply using all the means of citizen participation, as political beings –men and women– within a society, on the local, national, regional and international level. Without any doubt, this is the best concept of codevelopment that can be promoted.

In the same way that a terminological evolution has taken place to confine the concept of codevelopment, it is highly probable that over time, this supposed separation between codevelopment and cooperation will disappear, resulting in the assumption of the practices described as codevelopment as being just another form of development cooperation. This is not only probable, but also highly desirable.

This would allow to re-focus the debate to where the greatest incoherencies in development policy are taking place. Codevelopment and migrations should contribute to the global debate with concepts like transnationality, international citizenship, and the globalisation of the free exercising of social, cultural, civil and political economic rights.

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Stefan Möhl's study "The same but different? Codevelopment policies in France, Germany, Spain and the EU from a comparative perspective" is focused specifically on tackling top-down codevelopment in a comparative perspective. It means the codevelopment promoted by national and supra-national governments according to their powers. It is the closest to the original concept of *co-développement*, which uses and abuses the objective of development to control and manage migration flows, always for the benefit of the receiving country. In the research, we will see different characteristics of the codevelopment concept in three European countries, France, Germany and Spain and in the EU itself. The genesis and meaning of the concept in each country, and the associated topics (remittances, circular migrations, brain drain, labour markets needs, return aid, migration management and border control, etc.) will be also discussed. The study will help to identify incoherent elements, or those which, at least, could neutralise foreign policy on development cooperation and its central objective of reducing poverty.

Finally, the study will identify the characteristics and specific tools that protect, to a greater or lesser extent, the particular interests of the EU countries and those that are more or less relevant to the interests of the South.

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Codevelopment?

During the last two decades the migration and development nexus raised great interest among academia and was seized by (inter-) national policy agendas (Engberg-Pedersen, Nyberg-Sørensen & Van Hear 2002). Transnational engagement of migrants was (re)discovered[1] as a positive source for development and poverty reduction concerning an increased north-south circulation of financial and social remittances such as knowledge and political ideas (Faist 2008). The upsurge of the issue was reflected by high-ranking endeavors such as the founding of the Global Commission on International Migration in 2003, the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (UNHLDMD) in 2006, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development in 2007. The UN Report by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan 'International migration and development' states that:

In sum, international migration today, as in earlier times, is intrinsically linked to the development of both receiving and sending countries. Migration is an ideal means of promoting codevelopment, that is, the coordinated or concerted improvement of economic and social conditions at both origin and destination based on the complementarities between the two countries. Migration plays a positive role by providing the workers to satisfy the labour demand in advanced economies and in the dynamic developing economies, while at the same time reducing unemployment and underemployment in countries of origin and, in the process, generating remittances, savings and know-how for the benefit of the latter. (UN 2006, 22)

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1. Indeed, migration and development policy refers to a long-standing history. For a detailed description of migration and development policies, consult de Haas (2007).

As in the cited paragraph, related policies were often labelled *codevelopment*, a concept which evolved during the 1990s in France as a preventive strategy against immigration. Codevelopment rapidly gained international recognition and made its way into the European Union's (EU) official policy process. Especially among EU Member States the strategy was related to policy fields of migration management, reducing irregular migration, integration and cooperation with developing countries (Fauser 2007, 4). It was celebrated as a smart strategy favouring a 'win-win-win' situation for the countries of origin, destiny and the migrants themselves.

After initial steps in France and Brussels, Mediterranean EU members started to implement their own codevelopment policies. Some explanatory factors are their geographical, economic and social proximity to developing countries and, until recently, their booming economy and related high demand for cheap labour. Mediterranean EU countries became a major pole of immigration from developing countries. At the same time they lacked a political tradition of managing the issue. This is especially true for Spain. The country advanced to a precursor of codevelopment policy by identifying the concept as a key strategy within its nascent immigration and development policy. On the other side, also 'traditional' immigration countries of the EU (for instance, the political heavyweight Germany) started to design strategies with codevelopment perspectives.

Considering the various administrations and governments referring to codevelopment, the term runs the risk of appearing inflationary today because it is used for a variety of quite different political concepts. Moreover, there is cause for concern that codevelopment as a new political buzzword is being applied to camouflage unpopular political agendas; for instance, to externalise migration control measures, or to diminish official development aid (Solidar 2007). At the same time, immigration policy became an object of the EU policy-making process. Since the Tampere Treaty we have witnessed a top-down Europeanization process

of national migration policy[2] (Ette & Faist 2007) that is increasingly the codevelopment nexus. However, codevelopment stands for somewhat similar but intrinsically different (supra-) national strategies which often remain imprecise in their meaning and interpretation.

This study aims to contribute to the debate on codevelopment by shedding light on the diverse understanding and application of codevelopment in politics. For instance, some initial questions are: what does codevelopment mean and what is actually done in practical terms? Has the understanding of codevelopment changed over time? Are the implemented programmes coherent with the political strategies they refer to? Finally, are there different concepts advocated by European governments and, if so, do they show linkages? Bearing these questions in mind, the study takes the political concept(s) of codevelopment as a starting point and traces its evolution through European governments and institutions. Thus, it critically compares the different (supra-) national approaches of France, Germany, Spain and the EU institutions in terms of content and following implementations. The comparison basically deals with similarities by questioning mutual influences between national and supranational concepts and diversities, taking the different socio-economic embeddings of codevelopment policies into account.

The comparison of these different aspects provides interesting insights and outcomes. Firstly, a tentative categorisation of the different (supra-) national approaches is made. According to this a *codéveloppement*- (France), a *knowledge*- (Germany), a *separate*d- (Spain) and a *control and management*- (EU) approach can be distinguished. Secondly, the analysis results in a classification of European codevelopment policy within three common phases: First, the appearance of development-oriented return policies (1980-1997); second, the rise of national codevelopment

2. Migration policy understood here in a wider sense of the term, covering the issues of immigration, migration management and control as well as emigration policy.

policies (1997-2005); and thirdly, the emergence of a dominant Europeanization and instrumentalisation of national codevelopment policies under the broader framework of EU migration management and migration control policies (since 2005).

Analytical and Conceptual Framework

The following paragraphs display the scope and limits of this work in order to provide a more precise image of the referred research object. Basically, the research presents evidence from a national level from France, Germany and Spain. Additionally, it takes the supranational EU level into account. That means that the following actors are reviewed: national and EU governmental institutions, ministries and agencies that are directly involved with codevelopment policy-making and implementation.

Primarily, the work examines the national cases separately from each other, i.e. first France, second Germany, third Spain and fourth the supra-national case of the EU. Finally, it concludes with a global perspective by taking all four cases into account. The selection of these actors was motivated by the interesting strategies these countries developed considering codevelopment as well as the differences and linkages they reveal. France accounts for the origin of national codevelopment policy in Europe, and shaped the European debate considerably. An analysis of European codevelopment policy should consider the French case. In contrary, Germany is commonly regarded as a backbencher in designing and implementing codevelopment policies, and thus remains a rarely-studied case. This is striking because it actually provides some instructive and comparatively old examples of combining migration and development policy. Furthermore, Germany is an active policy setter within the EU policy-making process, which makes this case an important object of study. Spain is a further interesting case, and was actually a precursor in designing and implementing codevelopment policies. It accounts for a certain Mediterranean perspective on the issue, which is insightful in comparison with those of western European countries like France and Germany. Since the national policies on migration and development issues are embedded in the broader EU framework, the incorporation of the EU Institutions as a further object of study seemed meaningful.

Outlining the limits of this work, first I must say that it is explorative in nature. It does not claim to be generalised for all of Europe. For instance, the study disregards the important European cases of Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the study is not representative of other levels than the national one of the respective countries. This means that the French *Départements*, the German *Bundesländer* or the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* do not form part of the analysis. Although the local debate on the issue is of great interest, its incorporation would go beyond the scope of this work. Additionally, the study does not embrace the broad area of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and migrant organisations which autonomously engage in codevelopment. In this respect, only cases were considered where NGO engagement considerably shaped national policy, i.e. in France. However, the overall focus of the work is on national and EU governmental commitment.

Methodology

Regarding methodological procedure, this study follows the principles of an analysis of public policy. Firstly, public policy will be briefly explained through the following citation. Although there might be diverging definitions, the conceptualisation presented here contains the fundamental elements of public policy.

In any society, governmental entities enact laws, make policies, and allocate resources. This is true at all levels. Public policy can be generally defined as a system of laws, regulatory measures, courses of action, and funding priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a governmental entity or its representatives.[3]

Following this definition, I must say that the analysis of public policy is structured by the trichotomoy of the identification of the institutional setting (polity) and the analysis of the processual dimension (politics) and contextual dimension (policy). In my case, the institutional setting was framed by national and EU governmental institutions, ministries and agencies directly engaged with codevelopment policy. The further analysis of politics and policy was done with official documents of these entities. These documents embrace communications between the entities, strategy papers of the entities, speeches of the entities' representatives and bilateral and multilateral governmental agreements. All documents available referring to codevelopment were collected and reviewed during an intensive exploratory phase in autumn and winter 2008. At the same time the relevant academic literature on the issue was reviewed in order to gain a general overview on the topic. In a second stage, up to spring 2009, the national and EU documents were ordered into a chronological list whereby key documents were identified for further examination. The analysis of the key documents was aimed at identify-

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3.   http://www.musc.edu/vawprevention/policy/definition.shtml/

ing their particular understanding of codevelopment. Paying attention to the procedural character of politics, each interpretation was compared with the latter one. In order to identify a particular actor's discourse on codevelopment, the parts dedicated to the cases of France, Germany, Spain and the EU conclude with a paragraph that brings all the findings together. A discourse should be understood here as an institutionally consolidated way of speaking which influences or determines action and which exercises power. Finally, the analysis concludes with a comparison of the particular actor's discourses in order to demonstrate their similarities and differences.

The work is structured in five parts. The following four parts are dedicated to the cases of France, Germany, Spain and the EU; finally, the fifth part concludes with a joint perspective on the outcomes.

France

France's geo-political position has affected its immigration pattern. With its strong cultural, economic and colonial linkages to North Africa, it registered high immigration rates from prior colonies during the post-war economic upturn between the 1950s and 70s. In particular, Algerians enjoyed great freedom to immigrate into France (Weil 1999, 167). Additionally, the government contracted guest workers in the Maghreb states and southern Europe to meet the French industry's demand for labour. As in other European countries, the oil crisis and the subsequent slowdown of economic growth led to more restrictive immigration policies. There was a perception that ongoing immigration could harm the country's economy and thus the political objective was to reduce the migrant population in France (de Haas 2006, 76; Weil 1999, 167). Guest worker recruitment was stopped and borders were generally closed for low-skilled immigrants. Additionally, the government designed return programmes which granted financial support and professional training for those who wished to go back home. The *Aide au Retour* (Assisted Return, 1977-80) and *Aide à la Réinsertion* (Assisted Re-insertion, 1980-83) programmes mainly targeted African immigrants, for instance, Senegalese and Algerians. However, the major beneficiaries were Spanish and Portuguese guest workers who returned to their home countries, where the political and economic situation had improved significantly. Finally, the programme was not widely accepted and therefore did not achieve its objective. The financial support was criticised as too marginal, as it only partly covered the return expenses. In addition, possible return candidates feared that once they returned there would be no way for them to come back to France. This situation in turn motivated many migrants to settle permanently in France (Muynck 2006, 1; de Haas 2006, 68).

This long-lasting immigration into France enabled the formation of migrant associations with a comparatively high degree of formalisation and institutionalisation. In France, development-oriented migrant associations are known as *Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des*

Migrations (OSIMs) (Migrant organisations of international solidarity). In some cases they reach a high organisational level, able to implement and fund their own development projects.

The *Programme Développement Local Migration* (PDLM, Migration and Local Development Programme) is a combined programme of assisted return and local development. It is sponsored by the *Ministère de la Coopération* (MC, French Ministry of Cooperation), the *Ministère du Travail et des Affaires sociales* (MTAS, French Ministry of Work and Social Affairs) and the *Office des Migrations Internationales* (OMI, French Agency on International Migration) and OSIMs. The government's decision to launch the PDLM came as a result of a reassessment of the return policy. It was intended to meet requirements for OSIM support schemes and to make return more attractive. In 1991 the government appointed an inter-ministerial officer to deal with matters of reintegration and cooperation within the prime minister's office. In 1995, the PDLM was created as a successive measure that provided micro-finance schemes and assistance with planning and marketing for returnees who wished to set up small-scale enterprises. Funding is limited to Senegalese, Moroccans, Mauritanians and Rumanians (since 1999) and has a maximum of €3,600. About 100 returnees participate each year in the PDLM (ERN, 2009).

With the PDLM, France took its first step towards a development-oriented migration policy. The ambitious aim was twofold. On the one hand, the migrant population resident in France should be reduced via the return of immigrants. Although this aim was not articulated outright, it is self-evident since return was obligatory for participants. On the other hand, the co-financed enterprises of these returnees were thought to improve the economic situation abroad and to create opportunities to stay there, instead of emigrating. Hence, emigration from the targeted countries would be curbed as well, via local development initiated by the returnees. Therewith, local development advanced to an instrument and a legitimation for migration management policy in France. This logic paved the way further towards a French and European codevelopment policy.

With the shift to development-oriented return policies, OSIMs also gained more governmental attention. The *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* (MAE, French Foreign Ministry) and the MTAS engaged more closely with OSIMs and created the joint working group on Migration and Displaced Populations, in 1996. Additionally, on the initiative of NGOs, the *Assises de la Coopération et de la Solidarité Internationale* (Symposium on International Cooperation and Solidarity) were held with the support of the MAE and the MC, in 1997. Both the working group and the symposium highlighted migrants' positive role in development cooperation and called for closer governmental engagement with OSIMs without a return obligation. In line with these recommendations, a *codéveloppement*[4] working group was created within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). The working group published the influential '*Rapport de bilan et d'orientation sur la politique de codéveloppement liée aux flux migratoires'* (Nair 1997) (Final report and orientation on the policy of codevelopment aligned with migratory flows). The report argued that the migratory process could be beneficial for all parties involved, namely the receiving and sending society as well as the migrants themselves. *Codéveloppement* policy should envisage instruments enabling the management of migratory flows and the development of source countries in order to diminish emigration pressure. The incorporation of OSIMs in the planning of development policy as well as supporting their projects was regarded as an additional aspect of *codéveloppement* policy in order to foster their socio-economic integration into France. The report gained national and international attention since it was the first political concept of *codéveloppement*, framing the term theoretically as well as postulating objectives and concrete measures.

In order to implement a *codéveloppement* policy, the government created the *Mission interministérielle au codéveloppement et aux migrations interna-*

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4. *Codéveloppement* is the French term for codevelopment. In what follows, I use codéveloppement to refer to the specific French concept.

tionales (MICOMI, Inter-ministerial mission on codevelopment and international migration) in 1998. The MICOMI was an inter-ministerial office combining the powers of the MAE, the *Ministère de l'Intérieur* (MI, French Ministry of Interior) and the MTAS. However, its strategy did not cover the *codéveloppement* programme outlined in the 1997 report and finally did not enjoy great acceptance (de Haas 2006, 70; Muynck 2006, 6). The instruments were *codéveloppement* conventions generally offering micro-finance schemes for business plans for returnees and voluntary return agreements with third countries, the so-called *Contrats de Réinsertion dans le Pays d'Origine* (CRPO, Agreement of Reinsertion into the Country of Origin). Thus MICOMI's strategy focused on return schemes already known from the PDLM and the management of migratory flows via bilateral cooperation. The political and social integration of migrants and OSIMs in France remained an officially declared but not approached objective within MICOMI's mission.

First steps towards a political integration of OSIMs were taken in 1999. After the governmental recognition of the positive role of migrants and OSIMs in the development of their home countries, OSIMs succeeded in gaining representation in the advisory councils of French development policy, namely the *Comité interministériel de la coopération internationale et du développement* (CICID, Inter-ministerial committee of international cooperation and development) and the *Haut Conseil de la Coopération Internationale* (HCCI, High Council of International Cooperation). The work done by these councils initiated a stronger discourse between OSIMs and state departments. However, cooperation resulted difficult since there was no official OSIM umbrella organisation. In 2000 a joint action by CICID members created the *Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations* (FORIM, Forum of Migrant Organisations of International Solidarity) as a contact address for governmental bodies who wished to engage with migrant associations**.** Today it represents approximately 700 organisations and has the aim of 'associating all components of French civil society

in order to promote the integration of populations with a migration background, to reinforce exchanges between France and countries of origin and to contribute to the development of regions of origin'[5]. The FORIM's objectives can be summarised by three points: Firstly, the forum is dedicated to unifying and networking its members and to providing assistance in terms of information and consultancy. A second important role of the FORIM is lobbying OSIMs interests in politics; for instance, the president of the forum forms part of the CICID and the HCCI. A third pillar of FORIM is lobbying migrants among the public in terms of raising awareness about the positive role of OSIMs in integration and development cooperation. Additionally, together with the development NGO *Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement* (CCFD, French Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development), FORIM runs the *Programme d'Appui aux Organisations de Solidarité Issues des Migrations* (PRA/OSIM, Support Programme for Migrant Organisations of International Solidarity) offering financial support for small-scale OSIM-based development projects (up to €15,000). FORIM has a limited annual budget of approximately €300,000, half-donated by the MAE and the MTAS.

The creation of FORIM was an important step towards the political integration and representation of OSIMs at a national level. Whereas previously any criticism by OSIMs faded away unheard, the forum conferred a political voice and power for migrant's interests. This affected the subsequent national policy on *codéveloppement* which changed, partly meeting the concerns of migrant and civil society actors.

In 2001, the operators of PDLM founded the *Programme migration, développement et initiatives économiques* (PMIE, Migration, development and investment programme) as an additional support programme for migrant entrepreneurs. In contrast to prior governmental programmes, PMIE

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5.   http://www.forim.net/, accessed on 16 July 2009; cited in de Haas (2006, 73)

was created in order to support all kinds of entrepreneurial migrant engagements in their country of origin, instead of being limited to return projects. PMIE support instruments cover monetary grants of up to €3700, assistance with business planning and the establishing of contacts with donors and partners. The work of the PMIE assembled partner organisations supporting economic ventures of migrants, which created the network *Groupe d'Appui à la Micro Entreprise* (GAME, Small-scale enterprise support group), financed by the MAE and the MTAS. GAME forms part of PMIE and is a network of organisations pooling experiences in micro-credit funding and migrant return assistance. GAME 'brings together international solidarity associations, migrants' associations and representatives of public authorities in order to reflect on the support that can be offered for migrants' economic projects' (PMIE 2009). In addition, GAME also became itself a drop-in centre for migrant entrepreneurs and returnees seeking advice and financial support for their business plans. Currently, 18 organisations in seven French departments are taking part in the network, providing assistance to around one thousand clients each year.

With the support of PMIE, French *codéveloppement* policy became partly reshaped. Since the PDLM and MICOMI were both under suspicion of camouflaging return policies and migration management measures behind a smoke screen of development cooperation, within PMIE one abdicates any return obligation. Furthermore, in contrast to prior governmental programmes, the PMIE was conceptualised as an OSIM-run organisation[6]. This would not have been possible without the prior political integration of OSIMs on a national level.

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6. PMIE and GAME are both coordinated by the Paris-based NGO Ps-Eau. The NGO is a network of French and foreign organisations dealing with water, sanitation and international solidarity. Its principal mission is to link up actors in the field of water, in order to enhance joint projects and to stimulate knowledge exchange between France and the South. Since the mid-1980s, Ps-Eau worked extensively in the Senegal River basin assisting migrant organisations with hydraulic engineering projects .

After the presidential elections of 2007 the government created the *Ministère de l'immigration, de l'integration, de l'identité nationale et du codéveloppment* (IMINIDOC, French Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Codevelopment). The new ministry combines displaced powers of the MTAS, the MAE and the MI. The main mission is the management of migratory flows (IMINIDOC 2009). Specifically, three fields of work are mentioned: firstly, the control of immigration, the fight against illegal immigration and the improving of the legal immigration procedure. Secondly, the ministry is responsible for the integration of immigrants and the promoting of a national identity. Thirdly, the ministry engages in *codéveloppement.*

The inauguration of the IMINIDOC ministry surely constitutes a crucial step towards a national *codéveloppement* policy in France, as well as mainstreaming *codéveloppement* matters into neighbouring policy fields. With regard to content, the ministry continues a restrictive policy of curbing immigration flows and improving migration management. *Codéveloppement* forms an integral part of this policy since it is approached as providing southern states and their citizens the means to trust themselves and to build a future on their own territory. It will primarily consist of mobilising the tools allowing migrants to act in the interest of their country of origin. It will also need to ensure that co-operation and development policies of the countries of origin pay greater attention to immigration control.[7]

French *codéveloppement* policy can be considered as the most established and developed codevelopment policy in Europe. France was the birthplace of codevelopment and the sole European country with a ministry dedicated to designing and implementing codevelopment policy. Nonetheless, the concept of *codéveloppement* remains unclear, since diverse engaged actors have different understandings of what *codéveloppe-*

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7. http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_det_org&numrubrique=311&numarticle=1331, accessed on 16 July 2009

ment should be. Since it came into existence in 1997, *codéveloppement* has merged instruments of migration management and control with the idea of promoting migrants as transnational actors for the development of their home countries. Regarding the further political process, one can discern a process of differentiation of *codéveloppement* policy in France.

First of all, the French policy on *codéveloppement* is characterised by a constant struggle between OSIMs and state agencies of the central government. On the one hand, the centralistic shaped French policy on development collaboration traditionally did not maintain strong links with civil society actors. Bilateral negotiations at governmental level or with the elites of the recipient country were favoured. On the other hand, OSIMs did not match the traditional image of development NGOs (Muesekamp 2008, 9). For instance, it was not until 1981 that immigrants were allowed to form independent organisations at all. The government's reluctance to collaborate with OSIMs often constrained their funding to 'second-hand' options, for instance, support from bigger non-migrant NGOs (de Haas 2006, 74).

Due to successful lobbying at governmental levels on the behalf of OSIMs and other NGOs, migrants' associations are nowadays represented in the councils of French development policy. Furthermore, they establish their own networks supported by the government, for instance PMIE, GAME and FORIM, in order to promote and support transnational developmental engagement of migrants in their countries of origin. Therewith, a decentralisation process was initiated, transferring responsibilities and powers from national state agencies to civil society networks and OSIM actors, often working on the local level. On the one hand, there are central state organisations and programmes, for instance, the IMNIDOC, which aim to improve the control and management of migratory flows via programmes such as PDLM and MICOMI. De facto, *codéveloppement* became reduced to these aspects, while development cooperation is rather mentioned as an instrument or legitimation for migration management. Additionally, return instead of transnational engagement of immigrants is clearly favoured.

Germany

In Germany, the first linkages between migration and development policy can already be found in relation to the guest worker programmes during the 1950s and '60s. Through the *Bundesanstalt für Arbeit* (BA, German Federal Employment Office) and the *Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales* (German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) the opinion was held that the insourcing of foreign labour was a most important contribution of German cooperation for development. It was argued that a return later on would initiate transfers of savings and achieve professional expertise (Kleiner-Liebau 2008, 7). In reality, these programmes did not focus on international solidarity but on national interest. Principally it represented the provision of a mobile labour force to support Germany's economic upturn without generating any further social or cultural inconveniences. To put it bluntly, Germany 'imported labour but not people' (Castles 2006, 2-3).

The Oil Crisis in 1973 brought an abrupt end to the recruitment of foreign employees and restricted the immigration flow via more severe entry requirements. Economic slow-down and the emergence of unemployment asserted the perspective that a high migrant inflow would be unsustainable for the German welfare state system (Castles, Hansen & Schierup 2006, 143). Return programmes were set up, such as the Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum-Seekers in Germany (REAG) and the Government Assisted Repatriation Programme (GARP) which still run nowadays. However, the migrant population grew and immigration prevailed in high numbers due to economic needs, demographical concerns and family reunifications (Castles 2006, 4-8). In addition, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the admission of the so-called *Aussiedler* (resettlers), asylum seekers and refugees coming from the Balkans increased considerably.

During the 1980 migrants and refugees attracted the attention of German development policy. The idea that returnees could play an impor-

tant part in the development of their countries of origin appeared once again (Kleiner-Liebau 2008, 9). In line with BMI's return efforts, the *Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* (BMZ, German Federal Ministry of economic Cooperation and Development) set up agencies responsible for development-oriented return programmes for highly skilled migrants. Firstly, in 1980 BMZ, together with the *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ, Society for Technical Cooperation) launched the *Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung* (CIM, Centre for International Migration and Development) which is still running. It is a placement office for highly-skilled professionals from developing countries that provides assistance in terms of networking, education and finance. The main objective is to enable a north-south knowledge transfer. On the one hand, CIM runs the project Integrated Experts, which is open to all, irrespective of their nationality. According to CIM's information, it sponsors 800 professionals at present[8]. On the other hand, CIM runs the project Return Experts. Thereby it assists the return of highly-skilled migrants to their home countries aiming at 'making international migration processes sustainable in terms of employment and development policy.' [9] Currently 60 migrants are taking part in this programme.

Secondly, the *Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Bereich der Migration und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit* (AGEF, Development and Experts Working Group on Issues of Migration and Development) was set up in 1992. AGEF is a working group of experts in the field of migration and development return policies. With a yearly budget of up to 18 million Euros, at the moment AGEF employs 30 staff members in Germany and about 500 local employees in the respective countries. AGEF aims to mobilise the developmental potential of refugees, stu-

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8. http://www.cimonline.de/de/profil/59.asp, accessed on 16 July 2009
9. http://www.cimonline.de/en/55.asp, accessed on 16 July 2009

dents, working men and highly-skilled migrants for their countries of origin (mainly in Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, Asia and the Middle East). However, the programmes achieved so far have focused on return migration and re-integration assistance. In addition, AGEF conducts policy-oriented research.

Germany is often regarded as a latecomer in combining migration and development policies. However, from a comparative perspective it is interesting that a political acknowledgment of development cooperation as a preventive instrument against immigration took place in Germany at about the same time as in France. In 1993 the German Parliament's 9th Report on Development Policy considers poverty as being a major cause for emigration. Development cooperation here is identified as a factor generating opportunities and incentives for people to stay, instead of to migrate (Kleiner-Liebau 2008, 8). Furthermore, German development-oriented return programmes of CIM and AGEF appeared even before the French ones, bearing in mind that the PLDM was launched in 1995. In contrast to the PDLM in France, the German programmes were designed and organised within the field of development cooperation policy. They do not concentrate on the management or control of migratory flows, since they only attain a small number of returnees of higher education and formation. They focus on aspects of brain drain and brain gain rather than on local development and micro-finance schemes, such as the PDLM.

Reunification and the demolishing of the Iron Curtain enabled Germany to build closer ties with Eastern Europe. 'New guest worker recruitment programmes' (Castles 2006, 25) were launched through the BMI and the BA, hiring labour mainly for the agriculture and construction sector. In order to avoid the prior experiences with permanent settlement, one agreed upon bilateral contracts based on employment specific needs allowing about 330,000 persons per year a seasonal entry (of about 90 days). These programmes claimed to enable synergy effects of circular migration, for instance, through reducing underemployment and poverty in the countries of origin.

In my opinion, it would be a pitfall from a developmental perspective. For instance, there were no co-finance instruments provided to top up earnings, etc. Poverty reduction was mentioned as a legitimation rather than as a purpose. The main intention of the recruitment schemes was to set up effective migration control mechanisms in order to provide cheap labour on a temporary basis. In this vein most of the contracted workers were already employed in their country of origin and covered by their national insurance systems in order to save costs for their German employees (Newland, Ranveig Agunias & Terrazas 2008, 9). With the East European enlargement in 2004 and the later integration of the East European members into the Schengen Area, such bilateral programmes ran out. However, since 2006, the German and French governments are lobbying circular migration schemes at the EU level (Angenendt 2007, 1).

Apart from the recruitment of low-skilled labour, the government campaigned for highly-skilled migrants in around the mid-'90s. Most other European (and North American) countries already implemented schemes facilitating and attracting the entry of well-trained professionals (Castles 2006, 13). It was concerned that Germany might fall by the wayside in competing for the smartest brains[10]. The issues were broached during the election campaign in 1998. In 2000 the victorious red-green government under Chancellor Schröder launched the Green Card initiative providing 20,000 working permits for IT-specialists. Besides its name, the German Green Card did not have much in common with the American role model, considering that the stay was on a temporary basis, and prohibiting family reunifications. Indeed, the initiative did not succeed in attracting many IT experts (around 5,000) but it did promote public and political debate on issues of immigration. More and more, Germany's self-perception as a country of immigration became asserted within the public. This was ac-

10. Germany attracts among 4.9% of the total stock of skilled migrants. In comparison, France receives approximately 3%, the United States around 50% (MG&P 2006: 2)

companied by the passing of the *Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* (German Citizenship Act) in 2000, and the first *Einwanderungsgesetz* (German Immigration Law) in 2004, aiming at facilitating the entry of skilled migrants.

In the field of development cooperation policy, cautious efforts to explore the linkages of migration and development were undertaken. In 2003, the GTZ launched the BMZ-sponsored Migration and Development Project (MDP) with the appointment of one staff member and one senior consultant working in this field. The general intention was to 'mainstream migration issues into the development programme of the Federal government' (de Haas 2006, 86). The project encompassed three thematic periods: The 1st phase was dedicated to exploring the current state of affairs and to raise political awareness on the issue. Therefore, two conferences were held in Berlin. The first one in 2003, titled Immigration of the highly skilled: Brain Drain or Development Engine for countries of Origin, followed by an expert meeting under the title of Migration and Development – Working with the diaspora in Berlin, in collaboration with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), in 2004. In the 2nd phase, concrete mechanisms enforcing the developmental impact of migration should be analysed through specific sending countries. In this course, the study 'Skills and remittances: The case of Afghan, Egyptian, and Serbian immigrants in Germany' (Vadean 2007) was published. Then the 3rd phase was started, aiming at co-financing migrant-led development projects. Indeed, by order of the BMZ, the GTZ is currently sponsoring pilot projects in Afghanistan, Serbia and Senegal. The focus lies on renewable energy, youth encouragement and education. The respective projects are on a small-scale basis and are receiving up to €25,000 (maximum 50 per cent of the total budget) (GTZ 2008).

The MDP continues the BMZ's policy line on skills and knowledge transfer which was already prominent in the aforementioned programmes of CIM and AGEF, but in a different way. The MDP supports the transnational engagement of diaspora communities in their countries of origin and could be considered as the most concrete step

taken by the national government towards codevelopment. However, it is striking that MDP documents do not refer to codevelopment, since the motivations and instruments are partly similar to codevelopment programmes in France (PMIE, GAME). Additionally, it is doubtful as to whether the size of the programme will possess the capability to achieve the ambitious intention to mainstream migration and development issues into national development policy. The MDP is an explorative pilot project rather than a guiding part of German development cooperation. Furthermore, there are missing cross-links to actors holding powers in relevant policy fields, for instance, with the BMI or the *Auswärtiges Amt* (AA, German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

In addition, the BMZ financed the project *Interkulturelle Kompetenz-bildung in deutschen Kommunen, Zusammenarbeit mit Diasporen* (IKDK, Creating of Intercultural Competence in German Municipalities, Cooperation with Disaporas). The project forms part of the *Servicestelle Kommunen in der einen Welt* (Service point: Communities in the One World) of the *Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung GmbH* (InWent, International further Education and Development Organisation) dedicated to human resources and organisational development in international cooperation. IKDK is a three-year runtime pilot project assisting German towns in implementing diaspora collaboration schemes. For instance, several conferences were organised focusing on communal cooperation for development, brain gain/drain and migrants as agents for the development of their country of origin. In 2008 a study on Migration and Communal Cooperation for Development (Held & Wilhelmy 2008) was published providing an initial investigation of the developmental activities of migrant organisations in Germany. It articulates first strategies for cities and towns to support these actions. For instance, besides the generating of financial resources and networking of migrant organisations with other relevant public actors, the report highlights the crucial role of integration.

IKDK gives an example of how policies on encouraging diaspora organisation for the development of their home countries are becoming an

increasingly popular subject for local and regional level policies. This is even underpinned by current efforts of the *Bundesland Nordrhein-Westfalen* (Federal state of North Rhine Westphalia) (Faist, Fauser & Sieveking 2008) which has set up a migration and development department within its newly-established *Ministerium für Generationen, Familien, Frauen und Integration* (Ministry of Generations, Family, Women and Integration). With pilot programmes such as IKDK, the BMZ encourages further decentralisation and localisation of codevelopment schemes in Germany on a national level.

Generally, the German codevelopment approach is characterised by a strong focus on issues related to knowledge (knowledge transfer, brain drain/gain). Starting with development-oriented return programmes such as CIM and AGEF, which focused on instruments enabling north-south knowledge transfer, related aspects were incorporated in the programmes that followed. This differs with conceptions held in France and Spain favouring local and private development via micro-finance schemes, etc. The GTZ's MDP could be understood as an approximation to French (as well as Spanish) conceptions. Yet, most of the co-financed projects still have an educational background or support capacity building in the educational sector. In addition, initiatives related to migration management and demand-driven entry control were related to the issues of brain drain and gain, for instance, the Green Card programme or the Immigration Law.

However, strictly speaking there is no coherent concept of codevelopment policy at a national level in Germany. Actually, the term codevelopment neither appears in policy documents nor was it translated into the German language. One important reason for the conceptual weakness of codevelopment in Germany might be the low level of interministerial collaboration. Most of the programmes are issued either by the BMZ or the BMI. Besides the joint website project geldtransfair.de[11]

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11. www.geldtransfair.de provides information for money transfers north-south and aims in facilitating migrants' remittances. The website was launched in the aftermath of the BMF's high-level meeting on the topic of Remittances in 2007. Accessed on 16 July 2009

of the BMZ and the *Bundesministerium der Finanzen* (German Federal Ministry of Finance), there were no partnerships found. Furthermore, current trends show an increased prominence of codevelopment schemes at the regional and local level, and not at the national one. Finally, it is interesting that there were different long-time resident policy ventures at the national level in order to combine migration and development policies. Some of these were even older than efforts made in France or Spain. Although the German attempts might appear somehow isolated, the focus on issues related to knowledge continues to be a guideline.

Spain

Recently, the country experienced a crucial socio-economic transition which strongly affected the Spanish migration pattern. In the 1960s, Spain was exporting labour in considerable amounts to countries in northern Europe, i.e. France and Germany. In turn, within the last three decades, the country became a major 'pole of attraction' (Angela & Dietz 2005, 21) for immigrants out of (South-Eastern) Europe, Central America and Northern Africa. Primarily, this change is related to Spain's EU membership since 1986, which made the country a 'gateway to Europe' (Agrela & Dietz 2005, 21), considering its strategic position at the south-western frontier of the Union. Moreover, until recently the country profited from a booming economy that demanded cheap labour, mainly in the construction-, agricultural- and tourism sectors. Meanwhile, Spain reported the highest immigration rates within the EU (Kleiner-Liebau 2008, 13).

In contrast to older guest worker migration in north European countries, these flows were often unregulated and primarily emerged from so-called developing countries. Due to historical, often colonial, relations with these countries of origin, Spain among other southern European countries attempted to combine its migration and development cooperation policy. Inspired by France, *codesarrollo*[12] also became a popular concept in Spain (Fauser 2007, 4).

In contrast to the French experience, the Spanish concept was not initially introduced by the central government. The emergence of national *codesarrollo* policy is better understood as a result from two distinct sources: On the one hand there was the emergence of an EU policy on migration advocating the reducing of migration pressure through devel-

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12. *Codesarrollo* is the Spanish term for codevelopment. In the following paragraphs, I use *codesarrollo* to refer to the specific Spanish concept.

opment aid in the countries of origin. On the other hand there was an increasing appearance of local and regional responses to the growing immigration into Spain. Being directly confronted with the phenomenon, civil society and regional administrations developed various strategies to combine local integration with promoting migrants as agents for development for their countries of origin. Both sources pressured the national administration to develop a concept to tackle the immigration phenomenon with strong linkages to development policy (Pinyol & Royo 2008, 10). In Spain, *codesarrollo* always remained a concept that was mutually influenced by two distinct policy fields: of migration on the one hand and development cooperation on the other, which in turn created a need for coherence and consensus.

During the second legislature of the *Partido Popular* (PP, Spanish Conservative Party) from 2000 to 2004, the term *codesarrollo* entered into national policy for the first time. During this time, migration management and combatting illegal migration were at the forefront of migration policy. Security concerns overshadowed the political and public debate on immigration. In this vein, an immigration act was approved in 2000. Agreements about joint border controls and retransfer of illegal immigrants were signed with neighbouring sending countries. In terms of development policy, it was considered a preventive instrument in order to diminish emigration pressure in sending countries (Kleiner-Liebau 2008, 15).

The *Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de la Extranjería e Inmigración 2001 – 2004* (*Plan GRECO,* Global Regulation Programme for the Coordination of Immigration) was the first official national policy paper addressing *codesarrollo*. The paper was issued by the *Ministerio del Interior* (2001) (MI, Spanish Ministry of Interior) as well as the *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación* (MAEC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation) and referred to the EU Tampere Summit. It explicitly linked Spain's membership of the European Union with the therewith undertaken obligations concerning immigration

control. The general focus was on controlling borders and implementing severe entry regulations (Angela & Dietz 2005, 22). In this context the term *codesarrollo* was introduced for the first time in an official national document. Codesarrollo is defined as follows '*codesarrollo, entendiendo como tal el desarrollo compartido por los sujetos participantes, se realizarán acuerdos y programas diversos para lograr la incorporación a sus lugares de origen de la población inmigrante que desee regresar.*' (Ministerio del Interior 2001, 13). This could be translated as a mutual development of the participants involved, as the migrants who implement agreements and programmes in their country of origin, where they wish to return to, as well as the development of beneficiaries. The suggested implementations of the Plan GRECO had a strong return component, and resemble French PDLM measures. Suggested instruments were educational programmes for returnees, assisted return programmes, micro-credit funding for productive activities and technical assistance in source countries as well as channelling migrant remittances into productive investments. In the end, the programme did not come into force since it was criticised for disregarding the engagement of civil society and promoting return schemes instead of circular migration. Nonetheless, the programme influenced the subsequent debate on *codesarrollo* and became a point of origin for further policy approaches.

The presidential elections in March 2004 changed the political landscape in Spain. The *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE, Socialist Labour Party of Spain) prevailed over the conservative party and constituted a new government, which also affected migration policies. New policy strategies focused on the social and economic integration of immigrants residing in Spain. For instance, in 2005 the government initiated a legalisation campaign that turned 570,000 illegal immigrants into legal ones. Additionally, a €182 million fund supporting regional integration projects was set up (Kleiner-Liebau 2008, 17), and one year later the *Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración* 2006-2009 (Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration) was published.

Considering *codesarrollo,* the PSOE government set a new approach. After the unsuccessful Plan GRECO, *codesarrollo* became the subject of the policy field of development cooperation, instead of immigration (Pinyol & Royo 2008, 11). In 2004, the *Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo* (AECID, Spanish Agency for International Cooperation; the agency is attached to the MAEC) published the *Plan Director de la Cooperación Española* 2005-2008 (PDCE, General Plan of Spanish Cooperation) in which *codesarrollo* is approached as 'a multilateral model based on migratory flows as a source of wealth for the countries of origin and destination, and codevelopment as an area of multicultural and transnational activity.' (MAEC 2005a, 118). The report highlights measures such as micro-credits, the funding of small-scale enterprises and the channelling of remittances into productive investments. In addition, *codesarrollo* is regarded as a medium for determining priority regions for Spanish international cooperation. The suggested instruments were:

– Support of *codesarrollo* projects in sending countries, paying special attention to micro-credits, small-scale enterprises and the institutional strengthening of the productive sector.
– Enabling coherence and cooperation between Spanish development actors in the nexus of *codesarrollo.*
– Incorporating migrants as agents for development.
– *Codesarrollo* as a medium for determining priority regions for Spanish international cooperation and to establish exchange programmes with these countries.
– Enhancing the developmental impact of migrant remittances.
– Enriching the international debate on migration and development, as well as seeking multilateral solutions. (MAEC 2005a, 118)

With the shift to the field of development cooperation policy, *codesarrollo* is basically displayed in a different way than in the Plan GRECO. Although, some elements were adopted, such as facilitating remittances

and micro-credit funding, in general, the former elements of migration management and control were replaced by development-oriented instruments. For instance, the return obligation for migrants was replaced by the promotion of transnational engagement of migrants. For example , the PDCE 2005-2008 suggests the incorporation of migrants and migrant organisation as agents for development for their home countries. Yet, their specific role in *codesarrollo* remains unclear. The broad definition of *codesarrollo* allows labelling various projects as *codesarrollo* as long as they are somehow connected either to migration or development. In addition, the suggested instruments were generally and continue to be isolated from each other. For instance, it remains unclear what the differences are between *codesarrollo* and classic development cooperation policy, since aspects of both were suggested without visible interrelations. In the end, the PDCE 2005-2008 did not succeed in offering a precise conceptualisation of *codesarrollo* policy.

In 2005, the *Consejo de Cooperación al Desarrollo* (CCD, Advisory Committee for Development) appointed a working group with the mission of reaching consensus and further policy coherence with respect to *codesarrollo*. In 2007, the CCD published their recommendations in the *Documento de Consenso* (Consensus Document). The paper did not meet the expectations. Instead of spearheading the political and academic debate on *codesarrollo*, the recommendations hampered the progress made until then. For instance, rather than truly combining the fields of migration and development the document continued to discuss these fields as separate areas. The objective of *codesarrollo* remains in general terms to facilitate sustainable and human development as well as to enable integration and prosperity (MAEC 2005b, 10). These shortcomings limited the impact of the *Documento de Consenso*. On the other hand, the document addressed the important role of social and economic integration of migrants in Spain. This point can be considered as a productive extension of the previous approaches. This way, the paper kept the national discussion on *codesarrollo* alive and got approved in February 2008 by the *Dirección General de Plan-*

ificación y Evaluación de Políticas de Desarrollo (DGPOLDE, Department of Planning and Evaluation of Development Policy, part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation).

Following the *Documento de Consenso*, the DGPOLDE published the strategy paper *Principales líneas de actuación en Migración y Desarrollo* (PGMD, Principal Lines of Action for Migration and Development) in 2008. It represents the most current principal guidelines for Spanish migration and development policies. It identified four areas of intervention: The approval of sound development policies, the support and approval of public policies on migration matters, humanitarian aid and engagement in multilateral discussions. In light of the second point (the support and approval of public policies on migration matters), *codesarrollo* appears as one of five strategy guidelines: 'Estimular la vinculación y contribución de las diásporas y asociaciones de inmigrantes en los países de acogida al desarrollo de sus países de origen, a través de medidas de codesarrollo.' (MAEC 2008, 3). This could be translated as stimulating the linkages and contributions of diaspora associations of immigrants in their countries of origin by means of codevelopment instruments. With this strategy paper, *codesarrollo* became subordinated under the broader framework of migration and development. This did not take place in the documents mentioned before, and may have been inspired by the *Documento de Consenso*. The suggested instruments were coherent with prior *codesarrollo* approaches (strengthening synergy effects between migration and development; facilitating transnational social networks; improving public awareness on issues of migration and development and improving professional skills of migrants) (Pinyol & Royo 2008, 14). However, these instruments were not directly connected with *codesarrollo*. *Codesarrollo* became subsequently reduced to an instrument which facilitated the engagement of Diaspora associations with the development of their country of origin.

In general, Spanish *codesarrollo* policy features common components such as migration control and management, as well as the Plan GRECO and aspects of development cooperation, for instance, the PDCE 2005-

2008. Since *codesarrollo* became the object of the development coopera-tion policy field, the promotion of transnational engagement of Diaspora members in their countries of origin was favoured over migration control and management measures. However, national Spanish *codesarrollo* policy suffers from a conceptual weakness by remaining imprecise in the defini-tion and outlining of *codesarrollo* instruments. On the one hand this might be a result of insufficient policy coherence between the MAEC (and the respective AECID) which principally coordinates matters of *codesarrollo* and other relevant ministries, such as the *Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales* (MTAS, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) with its *Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración* (State Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration). However, the instruments of fields other than the de-velopmental one remain imprecise. Furthermore, the role of migrants in these projects is not clearly stated, which makes it difficult to differentiate development projects from *codesarrollo* ones. These points could be inter-preted as characteristics of a relatively young political concept which is just being formed. At the same time we are witnessing the fact that *codesarrollo* is actually disappearing at the national level, to be replaced by a broader migration and development discourse, which is visible, for instance, in the PGMD. Design, implementation and reflection on *codesarrollo* mainly takes place in the regions and municipalities of Spain (de Haas 2006, 89; Pinyol & Royo 2008), for instance, through the governments and civil society actors in Catalonia and Madrid, and also in Valencia, Andalusia and Basque country. Thus nowadays, *codesarrollo* is a fiercely-discussed policy at the regional level.

The European Union

Codevelopment at the EU level evolved within the emergence of a common European migration policy agenda. Since the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, migration has become a major pillar of EU policy. In particular, immigration policy, asylum procedure, external border control and rules for visa regulations became objects of the European Council decision-making process (Articles 73i,j,k,l,o)[13]. This incorporation was mainly based on the concern that the total immigration inflow had reached intolerable dimensions, challenging Member States' social welfare systems, economies, labour markets and common security. Illegal immigration was perceived as especially harmful. In turn, one expected that common EU migration management could decrease the total immigration inflow as well as alter the entrances through a more demand-driven approach. Cooperation with third countries, essentially with sending countries, was identified as a key strategy for achieving these objectives. The basic idea was that immigration pressure from sending countries could be reduced through development aid.

In order to design action plans for transit and sending countries of migrants and asylum-seekers, the Commission set up a High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWGAM) in 1998**.** The action plans searched for preventive measures tackling the so-called *root causes of emigration*. Therefore, the political, economic and human rights situation in specific countries was reviewed and political recommendations posed to the effect of combining trade and development cooperation policy with the management of migration flows out of these countries. The action plans were subjected to harsh criticism that revealed the EU´s migration and asylum policy as repressive and imperialistic (Castles 2004, 219). For instance, several concerned third countries were indignant that instead of develop-

13. Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, 26 – 27, accessed at http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf (16July 2009)

ment cooperation, EU home security concerns were at the fore. Besides, it was queried that human rights situations were constantly disregarded in favour of rejecting asylum seekers. Furthermore, there were criticisms that the action plans suggested externalising migration control measures abroad, for instance, via readmission agreements.

With the Tampere Council in 1999, codevelopment appeared for the first time at the EU level. This paved the way for codevelopment policy later on. The aforementioned elements of the Amsterdam Treaty and the ensuing HLWGAM formed the background for the following codevelopment discourse. For instance, collaboration with sending countries in order to reduce emigration pressure and the implementation of mechanisms of migration management remained as components of the main strategy. On the other hand, the aforementioned critique that EU migration and development policy camouflages repressive measures curbing migration would be an accompanying concern to academic and civil society in the debate that followed.

The resolutions in the Amsterdam Treaty were perceived as too vague to concentrate political voice and power on migration issues in Brussels. Indeed, the harmonisation of the different national policies proved just as tenacious (Castles 2004, 220). In order to agree upon more concrete steps that would bring together Member States' policies on immigration and asylum, the Tampere Council was held in 1999. Principally the harmonisation of border controls and the fight against illegal migration, human trafficking, terrorism and organised crime formed part of the agenda (de Haas 2006, 26). Again, collaboration with countries of origin evolved as a principal instrument to achieve these objectives. Furthermore, in the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere Programme, the term codevelopment appeared for the first time at EU level[14] (Pinyol

14. The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights,

& Royo 2008, 3). Critics highlighted that the vague Tampere Summit has resulted in a backward and impracticable codevelopment definition, in contrast to the advanced debate outside EU institutions, (Pinyol & Royo 2008, 4). Indeed, the presidency conclusions of the Tampere Summit are far from a conception of codevelopment. However, the ambience in which a future policy should take place is well outlined and very close to the HLWGAM's mission. Basically, the draft programme identifies development engagement as a preventive instrument against emigration in line with measures against illegal migration and migration management. Codevelopment is thus directly connected to that end.

The latter interpretation is backed up by the preparatory measures (project funding schemes) taken between 2001 and 2003. Financed by the budget line B7-667, the measures were designed to assist Non-EU Member Countries in their efforts to manage migratory flows better. (COM 2006). Funded projects focused on the fight against illegal migration and on further preventive measures. Some of the projects supported had a development perspective aimed at improving the developmental impact of migration, for instance, via the return of highly-skilled migrants or by facilitating remittances. (de Haas 2006, 31; Laganà 2007, 5).

At the Council's meeting in Seville 2002, the EU's perspective on development as an instrument for curbing migration flows was reinforced, stating that: 'closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the

in particular rights of minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development.
Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 Presedency Conclusions, accessed at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#a (16 July 2009)

underlying causes of migration flows' (Council 2002, 10). Similar to the Tampere conclusions, the Seville Summit did not make progress in concretizing codevelopment; yet, its frame of reference became enlarged, to include measures for externalising migration management and combating illegal migration. Actually, there was discussion as to whether it would be possible to exclude those sending countries from EU development aid which were reluctant to collaborate in terms of migration management and combating illegal migration (Castles 2004, 220). Even so, the adopted programme declined to dictate these conditions for development aid. Under the points 'Common Security and Foreign Policy', so-called 'regulatory measures' were envisaged in the event of 'persistent and unjustified denial of such collaborations' (Castles 2004, 220). Such statements fuelled concerns that EU instrumentalises codevelopment schemes for repressive and imperialistic policy.

The Tampere and Seville summits initiated a fierce policy debate between relevant European institutions about migration and development affairs which showed up in the Rabat Process. The main institutions involved were the Commission, as the EU's highest political initiator, the Council and the Parliament, which enjoys the final arbitrage of EU policy process. We can retrace the evolution of this debate by scrutinising some key policy documents. In most cases these were communications between the aforementioned actors.

In order to mainstream the Seville summit's recommendations, the Commission launched the policy guideline Integration of immigration policy into the Union's relations with third countries (COM 2002). The paper gave some recommendations such as the systematic incorporation of the migration and development nexus into the Union's policy dialogue; actions against brain drain; further negotiations on readmission agreements with third countries and the incorporation of migration management schemes into the regional and country strategy papers which are the basis of EU development cooperation. The communication also recommended codevelopment schemes which are understood

as assistance by migrants contributing to the development of their country of origin (COM 2002, 16). However, the support remained unclear in scope and content.

The communication came under criticism from the Council for being too vague and for not going far enough[15]. Regarding cooperation with third countries, the Council demanded an explicit programme on migration management, joint border control and irregular migration. On the subject of development, it asked for concrete measures concerning remittances and voluntary return. On the other hand an additional part of the communication which analysed the financial resources available for policies on asylum immigration and management of external frontiers was well accepted. On this basis a successive funding line for financial and technical cooperation with third countries was opened. The so-called AENEAS programme[16] was established in March 2004 (for the period 2004-2007 with a total budget of €250m). General support was granted for projects to improve third countries' ability to manage migratory flows, with certain references to development engagement (de Haas 2006, 30). Codevelopment was mentioned in the context of channelling remittances for productive investment (Laganà 2007, 5).

The Commission met the Council's request in October 2005 with the communication Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations (COM 2005). The paper identified the urgent demand for a respective EU policy. This demand was reflected by international efforts such as the publication of the report by the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) or the organising of UNHLDMD. The communication was aimed at providing policy guidelines for a EU strategy on migration and development. Three main fields of action were

15. Council conclusions on the Commission communication concerning integration of migration issues in the European Union's relations with third countries, accessed at http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200305/p104006.htm (16 July 2009)
16. For a detailed project list, see COM 2006, 15-24.

identified: Firstly, migrant remittances, where it proposes actions for facilitating remittances in terms of charges, transmission times and security. An additional objective was the increase of the developmental impact of migrant remittances on their countries of origin. Secondly, the role of development-oriented diasporas members should be strengthened. In this regard the paper suggests assistance by sending countries in identifying their diasporas and in establishing (institutional) linkages. Thirdly, it was suggested that support be given to circular migration schemes in order to set up knowledge and competence transfers with development countries. Under this point of return-migration, in case also virtual or temporal migration programmes are envisaged for support. A last point concerned the reduction of negative impacts of brain drain, for instance, via directives for Member States contracting labour migrants. In addition, actions for improving the labour market knowledge of developing countries and for setting up stronger institutional cooperation between EU Member States and third countries were envisaged. Concerning codevelopment, the communication claims to 'refine the concept of codevelopment' (COM 2005, 2). Indeed, the outlined programme goes beyond the narrow framework of prior works on migration management and remittances. In addition, the Commission recognises the diasporas as a factor for development. However, the concept remains vague, since codevelopment is directly approached only in terms of co-funding schemes and advantaging remittances, which target development actions. In addition, other underlying objectives, for instance, discouraging the permanent settlement of migrants and reducing total amounts of immigration, did persist. Altogether, the communication Migration and Development can be viewed in the following way: certain concrete orientations represent a crucial step towards a coherent EU approach on combining migration and development policy. The programme was the most explicit one at the EU level and contributed an important part of the EU's position at the UNHLDMD in September 2006. Therewith, the Union was disposed to actively implement concrete measures on

codevelopment in negotiations with African source countries. This took place during the Rabat Process.

In January 2006, even before the Rabat Process, the basis for a consecutive funding for the AENEAS programme was laid with the Thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (COM 2006) projected for the period 2007 - 2013. With a curtailed budget (€205m over the first three years) the programme basically follows the funding priorities of its precursor. In the aftermath of the UNHLDMD, the additional Joint Migration and Development Initiative[17] of EU and UN was launched, with emphasis given to codevelopment projects (projects headed by migrant associations in partnership with local associations and authorities in the countries of origin). However, the limited budget of the programme (€10m) somewhat undermines its global scope.

In July 2006, the Spanish, French and Moroccan governments held the First Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat. The EU 25 plus Switzerland, Romania and Bulgaria negotiated with 26 northern, western and central African States upon a cooperation guideline strongly aligned with migration management:

This partnership between the countries of origin, transit and destination aims to offer a concrete and appropriate response to the fundamental issue of controlling migratory flows, and is based on the strong conviction that the management of migration between Africa and Europe must be carried out within the context of a partnership to combat poverty and promote sustainable development and codevelopment. (Rabat Declaration 2006)

Thematic instruments were suggested for the thematic fields of migration and development, legal migration, illegal migration and cooperation in police and justice affairs. Within the first sphere, financial instru-

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17. http://www.migration4development.org/about/, accessed at 16 July 2009

ments favourable to codevelopment, co-finance schemes for remittances and the provision of funding lines for diaspora development projects were suggested. The main part of the action plan considered preventive measures towards readmission agreements and technical and logical assistance by African states in terms of border control (Laganà 2007, 6).

In 2008, three subsequent expert meetings (Rabat in March; Ouagadougou in May; Dakar in July) proceeded with the initiated Rabat process. Finally, the 2nd Euro-African Conference on migration and development (2008) was held in Paris, in November 2008. The outcome was a three-year cooperation programme for 2009 – 2011, providing the basis for multilateral or bilateral actions conducted by the countries and the institution party to the Euro-African Process. The treaty is currently the latest and most advanced step by the EU concerning codevelopment. Its outcome illustrates the continuous linking of migration management and development policy. The treaty covered three thematic fields: firstly, organisation of legal migration, secondly, fighting irregular migration and and thirdly, the migration-development nexus. These points concentrated on objectives concerning migration control and management. Suggested instruments focused on externalising migration control measures via readmission agreements and the development of African governments' management capacities. Further instruments were aimed at strengthening the institutional collaboration of African and European governments and making immigration more demand-driven, for instance, by assessing labour market needs. The third thematic field was dedicated to the synergies between migration and development. Under this point three objectives were formulated: the economic development of source countries, the facilitation of remittances and the strengthening of the relationship between diasporas, countries of origin and destination countries. Under the last objective the following instruments were suggested: supporting migrant business activities in countries of origin, the networking of relevant authorities and the development of the institutional capacities of diasporas.

Codevelopment policy at EU level is strongly characterised by a discourse on improving migration control and migration management via collaboration with source countries. The idea to combine migration policy with foreign cooperation policy was first formulated in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Over the following years the concept was constantly developed under the broader framework of migration and development policies. Codevelopment was included relatively early, at the Tampere summit, as a vague and undefined strategy on collaboration with third countries. Mainly the Commission's communication "Migration and Development, some concrete orientations" conceptualised codevelopment as an approach to promote and support migrants as agents for development. At the same time, codevelopment was constantly linked to measures of migration control and management, for instance in the treaty of the 2nd Euro-African Conference. This means that bilateral cooperation agreements on codevelopment must incorporate elements of migration control and management. In light of this, codevelopment schemes could be understood as appeals for source countries to support the Union's restrictive immigration management. In some cases it was questioned as to whether one should enforce development cooperation in general on the cooperation with third countries in terms of migration management, for instance at the Seville Summit. In addition, the externalisation of migration control measures in source countries, such as the donation of border surveillance equipment or payments for the repatriation of refugees and migrants in transfer countries became partly labelled as developmental cooperation. In this light, the Union's codevelopment policy runs the risk of supporting an imperialistic foreign policy and camouflaging unpopular political agendas.

The concepts and phases of codevelopment policy in Europe

The experiences of France, Germany, Spain and the EU with codevelopment policies demonstrate the particular approaches and terminological applications of codevelopment. Each concept refers to a different political (as well as social and geographical) context, where it developed in its own particular way. In the case of France, the analysis has shown that its conceptualization of codevelopment is the strongest, with a high degree of institutionalisation. Here, *codéveloppement* is understood as a combined strategy to enable effective migration management along with local and private development of source countries. Close inter-ministerial collaboration in terms of *codéveloppement* allowed the implementation of instruments from different policy fields. The main ones were the integration of migrants in the process of development policy planning and the provision of support schemes for migrant business plans in their countries of origin. An additional important aspect in France was the close inter-ministerial collaboration in terms of *codéveloppement*. Given that the French government was the first administration to apply the term *codéveloppement*, I call the French concept a *codéveloppement approach* which is characterised by the aspects just mentioned.

The German case offered a different perspective on the issue. Codevelopment never developed as a self-contained policy at the national level as it did in France. There were efforts to combine migration management with development policy and to engage diaspora members in the development of their home countries. However, the respective programmes were issued without the cooperation of different ministries. Depending on the ministry in charge, they highlighted either aspects of migration management or development. Yet, apart from the institutional weakness of codevelopment in Germany there is a striking and continuous thematic orientation of the latter with a focus on knowledge flows. This point leads me to speak of a *knowledge approach* applied in Germany.

In Spain *codesarrollo* entered the national level comparatively late, but with high expectations. The concept was partly considered as a key strategy in the country's development cooperation, migration and integration policy. Indeed, one can find references to these three thematic aspects in the Spanish approach. However, since the concept is clearly defined and established upon an inter-ministerial cooperation integrating the relevant offices, it has serious limitations. Indeed, the term is applied for a variety of different strategies and runs the risk of being used in a inflationary way. Thereby, it often remains unclear what distinguishes *codesarrollo* from classic development projects. In my opinion, the national *codesarrollo* policy in Spain continues to be divided into particular thematic fields which characterise it as a *segmented approach*.

The EU integrated the term codevelopment in its emerging migration policy. First, codevelopment was loosely defined as a cooperation strategy with source countries. Later on, support schemes were set up supporting the establishment of (institutional-) relationships between source countries and their diaspora in Europe as well as Member States projects with a codevelopment perspective. Supported projects often had a strong focus on migration management. Additionally, today the support is negotiated in bilateral contracts as acknowledgement for third countries' cooperation in terms of migration control and fighting against irregular migration. The contracts are based on the outcome of the 2nd Euro-African Conference. Therewith, codevelopment advanced to become an integral instrument of the Union's efforts to effectively externalise control measures and involve third countries in the management of common borders. On the basis of this perception I shall call the Union's codevelopment concept a *control and management approach*.

	Phase	Discourse		Instruments	Programmes	
1980 - 1997	Development-oriented return Programmes	- Brain gain		- Return assistance and education	- CIM (1980 GER) - AGEF (1992 GER)	
		- Combating root causes		- Return assistance and micro-credit schemes	- PDLM (1990 FR)	
1997 - 2005	National Codevelopment concepts	- Enabling Migrants as agents for the development of their country of origin	- Combating root causes	- Facilitating remittances - Financial, technical and advisory support of migrant's transnational engagement - Facilitation of mobility	- PSF (2003 FR) - Migration and Development Project GTZ (2003 GER) - Codesarrollo Pilot Projects (2005 SP)	- Measures under MICOMI and ADC (1997, FR)
			- Brain Circulation			
			- Integration			
		- Improve Migration Control via collaboration with sending countries	- Reduce irregular Migration	- Readmission Agreements - Technical and advisory assistance for migration management capacities.	- HLWGAM (1998, EU) - Preparatory measures (1999, EU) - AENEAS (2002, EU)	
			- Improve border control capacities			
2005 –today	European Harmonisation of codevelopment schemes	- Mainstream Codevelopment policies under the broader EU´s approach on a coherent approach on migration		- Subordination of the national codevelopment policies under a broader migration management approach	- Thematic Programme Third Countries (2006 EU) - 1st African Conference on Migration & Development (2006 EU) - 2nd Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development (2008 EU)	
				- Multilateral roadmap on bilateral migration control agreements with codevelopment perspective		

Abbreviations:
ADC: Ambassadeur Délégué au Co-Développement
AGEF: Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Breich Migration und Entwicklung
HLWGAM: High Level Working Group on Asylum and CIM - Centrum Für Migration und Entwicklung Migration
MICOMI: Mission interministérielle au PDLM - Programme Développement Locale Migration codéveloppement et aux migrations
PSF: Fonds de solidarité prioritaire internationales
FR: France
GER: Germany
SP: Spain
EU: European Union

Apart from their differences, the concepts of France, Germany, Spain and the EU also feature mutual influences which reveal important similarities. Based on the chronological analysis of the concepts, I became aware that one could classify the common policies in three particular phases which have similar discourses, instruments and programmes referring to codevelopment. I have summarised the main outcomes with a table.

As we see in the above table, the first phase started in the 1980s with development-oriented return programmes in France and Germany. Mainly, the discourses focused on brain drain and gain, for instance in the German programmes CIM and AGEF, and on combating the root causes of migration, as was the case in the French PDLM. In the second phase, (supra-) national concepts of codevelopment emerged. It started in 1997 with the publication of the Report *Rapport de bilan et d'orientation sur la politique de codéveloppement liée aux flux migratoires* of Sami Nair (1997) in France and continued with the incorporation of codevelopment into the *Presidency Conclusions* of the EU Tampere summit in 1999; the initiation of the GTZ's *Migration and Development Project* in Germany in 2003 and the outlining of a codevelopment concept in the *Plan Director de la Cooperación Española* in 2005. In the second phase the prior discourses were elaborated and partly taken on board. Two main discourses can be distinguished. The first could be described as enabling migrants as agents for the development of their country of origin, with an emphasis on combating the root causes of migration, enabling brain circulation and facilitate integration. These aspects can be found in the first codevelopment pilot projects in France, Spain and Germany. The second main discourse was aimed at improving migration control via collaboration with sending countries with special focus on the fight against irregular migration and the development of border control capacities. This argumentation refers mainly to EU-initiated programmes such as the HLWGAM, the *Preparatory Measures* and the ANEAS Programme. The measures under the MICOMI in France could be regarded as promoting both discourses.

Finally, the third phase is characterised by a continuous harmonisation of codevelopment policies. It started with the publication of the communication *Migration and Development, some concrete orientations* of the EU Commission in 2005. This communication was a turning point, since national concepts began to converge into a coherent European strategy rather than to separate from one another. Since then, national codevelopment policies have been mainstreamed under the broader EU's approach on migration control and management, which culminated in the *Second Euro-African Conference* in 2008.

The suggested phases should not be regarded as being strictly separated within clear constraints. On the contrary, the phases have mutual influences and are comprehensive. For instance, the programmes of the first phase of development-oriented return programmes still run nowadays. In addition, the harmonisation process of European codevelopment policy certainly started with the Tampere summit. The given dates should be understood as turning points, indicating an approximate point of time, when one phase gained superiority over the others.

My final remarks consider a cautious outlook on the future of (supra-)national European codevelopment policy. In line with the increasing orientation on migration control and management measures, political discussions on codevelopment have decreased or been replaced by the term *migration and development* at the national level in France, Germany and Spain since 2005. On the contrary, at the regional level, codevelopment strategies are experiencing a growing interest. Federal regions, cities and civil society actors are discussing and implementing codevelopment projects in all three countries. The concept has been recognised as a strategy to cooperate actively with migrant communities and to approach the problem of integration. It would be interesting to analyse whether this tendency can be verified and if codevelopment develops into a mainly trans-local strategy to both perform integration work and provide development aid.

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Resumen / Abstract

¿Lo mismo, pero diferente? Políticas de Codesarrollo en Francia, Alemania, España, y en las instituciones de la Unión Europea desde una perpectiva comparativa
Stefan Möhl

En términos generales, el co-desarrollo se ha entendido como la combinación de las políticas de migración y cooperación al desarrollo, y la promoción de los emigrantes como agentes para el desarrollo de su país de origen. Nacido en los años 90 en Francia, el concepto fue ganando un rápido reconocimiento internacional, y se ha entendido como una estrategia "win-win-win" que proporciona efectos positivos a los países de origen, a los de destino y a los propios inmigrantes. Aun así, en la actualidad el término corre el riesgo de estar siendo utilizado de manera abusiva, y existe la preocupación porque acciones denominadas de co-desarrollo sirvan para frenar la inmigración y disminuir la ayuda oficial al desarrollo. Este Documento examina el uso que diferentes países europeos y la propia Unión Europea hacen del concepto de codesarrollo, y analiza críticamente las políticas y resultados derivados.

Palabras claves: migraciones, políticas migratorias, codesarrollo, unión europea

The Same But Different? Codevelopment policies in France, Germany, Spain and the institutions of the European Union from a comparative perspective
Stefan Möhl

Codevelopment has generally been understood as a combination of migration policies and development cooperation, and as the promotion of immigrants as agents for the development of their countries of origin. Coined in the 90s in France, this concept was quick to gain international recognition, and it has been regarded as a 'win-win-win' strategy that benefits the countries of origin, the host countries, and immigrants themselves. However, today the term faces the risk of being used in an abusive manner, and there is a concern that actions that are being classified as codevelopment are actually being used to stop immigration or to diminish the amount of official development assistance. This study examines the definition given to the concept of codevelopment by different European countries and by the European Union itself; and critically analyses the politics and outcomes of these diverse conceptualizations of the term.

Key words: migrations, migration policies, codevelopment, European Union