# ATLANTIC FUTURE

## 13

# Geometries of Human Mobility in the Atlantic Space

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## ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with tracking trends in international migration within the Atlantic basin between 1990 and 2013 and the historical patterns characterizing Atlantic mobility on which these two decades build. The means of tracking migration, of regulating it, and of requesting migrants' political and cultural commitment to their host countries have shifted with global economic reconfigurations. Before proceeding to global patterns and concerns around migration and a brief overview of the history of the Atlantic basin as a social space structured by mobility, I reflect on the conceptual tools and analytic strategies which current quantitative sources on human mobility take for granted. For example, historical trajectories and political context are absent from the analyses. Policy driven databases produced by various agencies of international governance afford a vast yet superficial grasp of global mobility patterns, which can be complemented and complicated through smaller scale and longitudinal projects that provide qualitative depth to our understanding of human mobility. Human movement is crucially structured by economic differentials and opportunity, but also by shared colonial histories that sowed specific linguistic skills and social aspirations as they unified political boundaries.

# ATLANTIC FUTURE SCIENTIFIC PAPER

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# 1.    Introduction

This paper is concerned with tracking trends in international migration within the Atlantic basin between 1990 and 2013 and the historical patterns characterizing Atlantic mobility on which these two decades build. Current human mobility is reminiscent of the intense Atlantic mobility found in the late nineteenth century, as numerous scholars have noted. However, the patterns have changed significantly, as have the means of tracking migration, of regulating it, and of requesting migrants' political and cultural commitment to their host countries. Before proceeding to global patterns, the concerns surrounding migration, and a brief overview of the history of the Atlantic basin as a social space structured by mobility, I will reflect on the conceptual tools and analytic strategies which current quantitative sources on human mobility take for granted.

Policy driven databases produced by various agencies of international governance afford a vast yet superficial grasp of global mobility patterns, which can be complemented and complicated through smaller scale and longitudinal projects that provide qualitative depth to our understanding of human mobility. Internal migration and movement within geographic regions constitutes as a part of the larger part of mobility across the globe. This paper will concentrate on international migration but when estimates of illegal migration are presented they will be addressed, but the bulk of data on which the following analysis is based tracks mobility through legal channels. The questions of illegal migration and intra-regional mobility are fundamental to the full understanding of mobility, yet they stand beyond the scope of this paper.

Public policy regarding international migration is a contentious issue for countries of origin, transit and destination. In the preferred areas of destination as well as in countries of origin, changes in policy are minutely negotiated and much publicized by authorities to appease local constituencies. They are the source of public debate and a salient issue for public opinion. Migrants are often the targets of social fears in contracting economies and are systematically scapegoated by downwardly mobile sectors. Since the late 1960's, the racial reconfiguration of Western Europe and the United States due to postcolonial migrations, have been a source of tensions within working class neighborhoods.

Authorities sometimes choose to mobilize such fears into moral panics, as has been the case in the UK and France since the 1970's, and more recently in Spain and the United States (Hall, Gilroy, Silverstein). The state and the media become complicit in building new exclusionary nationalisms nostalgic for an imagined racial and religious homogeneity to be reestablished; defending dangerously xenophobic projects that target non-whites and Muslims in particular. In this context, authorities across the political spectrum in countries of destination have chosen and legitimated the increasing securitization of migration, especially since 2001. Both the US Homeland Security Act and the establishment of migrant detention camps across Europe constitute examples of policies that repeal fundamental notions of human rights in the name of national security, identify migrants as threats and criminalize circulation.

The Atlantic basin as such does not organize movement, but common South-North mobility and a shared history may provide the basis for further Atlantic integration. In order to be sustainable in a world of mobility in which Asia, as a region, is the most dynamic with the fastest growing rate of both emigration - South Asia - and the largest percentages of migrant residents - the Arab Gulf -; and given that the Gulf now constitutes one of the three main global remittance source regions, Atlantic integration would require a new political vision. Many Atlantic futures are conceivable. Atlantic poles of wealth - the North Atlantic, South Africa and Brazil, could forge stronger North-South ties and attempt to control Atlantic processes. A sustainable Atlantic basin would

require rebuilding Atlantic relations so that historical hierarchies and current economic gaps are transformed into economic ties that are satisfactory to all partners.

## 2.    Mobility at Large

As a growing phenomenon that constantly reshapes global horizons of possibility, human mobility has received increasing attention in the past three decades. Though we know that much mobility occurs on small scales and that most international migration happens within rather that across world regions, international mobility in particular has been the object of much empirical research and many estimates and projections. International governance agencies like the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund attempt to provide global mappings of circulations to enable unifying policies, while individual states concerned with tracking outflows and remittance patterns or with better documenting and administrating inflows attempt to improve their record keeping and accountability regarding human mobility. High level forums to facilitate cooperation and reduce the negative consequences of migration are increasingly frequent; the most recent one was held at UN headquarters in October 2013, and a coordination meeting held in New York in February 2014, intended as "important occasions…to harness the benefits of migration, to address migration challenges, and to improve the global governance of migration".[1]

As new tools are devised, new analytic strategies become available and qualitative and quantitative analyses are produced, our understanding of migratory patterns has grown enormously since the early efforts at systematically documenting mobility prompted in 1951 by labor organizations. The United Nations Population Division "Trends in International Migrant Stock International Migration Revision 2013" for example, boasts accumulating census rounds for 1990, 2000 and 2010, along with significantly increased coverage in Africa, Europe and Latin America, the Middle East and Central Asia. Mobility from and within one of the world's demographic giants, China sometimes remains unaddressed given unavailable statistics.[2]

The increasingly reliable databases compiled in the past two decades have allowed for new questions to be posed and indexing changing needs in the administration of migrants. These include gender disaggregation, which reflects a growing feminization of migration, with women now accounting for 48 percent of international migrants (52 percent in the global north and 43 percent in the global south); though the trends and proportions of migrant women are highly variable and sometimes contradictory.[3] Changes in the migratory behavior of women began in the 1980's and 1990's with growing service sector employment and the growing need for teachers and nurses. Women are now increasingly migrating on their own or as heads of households and principal wage earners for themselves and their families.[4]

Age disaggregation allows attention to the differential concerns around children and youth as migrants, the contribution of the working age migrant labor force to host and home countries and the dynamics and demands of ageing migrant populations, among which women are overrepresented given their comparative longevity. Young migrants

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[1] http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/index.html
[2] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSA2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?mtotals
[3] International Migration Wallcharts 2013 UN Population Division DESA, migration/documents/Graphs_and_Maps.pdf at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/index.html
[4] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/g_Ch_1.pdf#zoom=100

often migrate in relation to important life events, such as pursuing higher education, entering the job market or contracting marriage. They pose a number of administrative challenges given the variability across states in regulations regarding age of majority, age for legal admission, family reunification, contractual labor, sexual consent and marriage.[5]

Disaggregation efforts are also underway towards more detailed tracking of average distances in migration, the size of transnational communities and diasporas, and the flows of South-South and intra-regional migration.[6] Questions about transnational fields, migrant networks and associations, community boundaries and the construction of "diasporic" practices are best answered through qualitative research however, and in fact were introduced by ethnographers of migration like Clifford, Glick Schiller et al, Kearney, Rouse, and Ong in the mid 1990's. Their work has called attention to remittances not only as economic, but also social and cultural aspect as they imply the transmission of many kinds of resources to home communities – including religious transfers for example. The growing field of transnational studies promises to enhance our understanding of many migratory dynamics that have gone undocumented, tracking the logic of mobility according to the practice of mobile subjects themselves rather than assuming the centrality of institutions attempting to regulate their circulation.[7]

# 3.    Analytic Trends

Public access databases are both immensely rich and thoroughly frustrating as sources on human mobility. They tend to be designed according to categories defined in pragmatic terms that reflect the concerns of international governance and assume universal institutions that would generate comparable data collection processes and therefore comparable data. The task of imagining a common Atlantic future shifts the terms of debate. Though we will map human mobility over the past two decades using the available sources, thinking through the Atlantic presents particular challenges. Basic data needs to be analyzed so that connections across the basin become intelligible. Current global sources are organized according to analytic constructions that complicate rather than facilitate this process.

Available databases of global scope are built through methodological choices that conceptualize human mobility in terms of quantifiable stocks, flows and trends, which map migratory phenomena as bilateral, regional, North-South, North-North, South-South, or South-North. When mobility is conceived in terms of regional geographies beyond the North-South divide, regions are defined as continentally continuous. The main blocks being Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Europe and Oceania; these may be further disaggregates into 21 sub-regions. Making Atlantic connections and comparisons with the available data proves to be challenging because Atlantic data is dispersed across most of the continental regions defined and analyzed by global migration databases. Their textbook geography of mobility tells us little about how regions are created through human choice and how history constrains the choices available to those on the move.

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[5] Population Division, Technical Paper No. 2011/1. International Migration in a Globalizing World: The role of Youth. UN, New York, 2011
[6] Menozzi, Clare. International migration: Recent levels, trends and prospects. Eleventh Coordintaion Meeting on International Migration, NYC February 2013
[7] See Levitt et al. Transnational Studies Reader for a sample of current work.

Beyond elementary geographic parceling, migratory circuits are also habitually classified as movement between regions defined and evaluated according to the criteria of development theory. The analytic weight in these cases is on models of development, as well as degrees and strategies of development. Regions and states are tagged as more developed, less developed and least developed.[8] Among the relevant processes or indices identified are urbanization, characterized by rural to urban migrations and de-concentration, which should result in the demographic dynamism of medium-sized cities rather than large or historically centralizing cities.[9]

The developmental model, besides having been widely problematized for at least a decade even within its mother discipline of economics, fails to incorporate some of the more productive theorizing offered by human geography and ethnography of migration. For example, on the crucial role played by global cities in funneling migration and investment flows (Sassen, see also Appadurai). It also obscures some of the most important emergent empirical dynamics, such as the huge leap in migration to the Arab Gulf and emergent Asian economies like Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, classified as not developed given the political characteristics of the region, yet economically rivaling North America and Europe.

Migration is habitually tracked through processes that reflect the interaction of mobile subjects with institutions regulating human flows. In this vein, legal instruments facilitating or obstructing particular flows, the regulations and facilitation of labor migration, and questions pertaining to migrant rights, human trafficking, refugee and asylum seeking are paramount. The economic and social integration of migrants in their host countries are the focus.[10] Migratory movement is thus most often documented as an international phenomenon- it is of most concern to global governance when people move across the political boundaries defined by states.

An issue often raised by governments but difficult to study statistically, are the large flows of undocumented migration that disregard international borders; to which host countries have responded by alternately offering regularization amnesties, enforcing deportations, militarizing borders and criminalizing smuggling or 'human trafficking'. Illegal migrants residing in the United States are estimated at 11.7 million, while those in Europe amount to 3.8 million at most, and those in the Russian Federation to between 5 and 6 million.[11] It is also important to differentiate between statistics offered as international migrant stock, which refer to estimates and projections produced by agencies, and empirical data compiled on international migrant flows.[12]

Migrant stock figures - not empirical data but projections are cumulative of mobility over time, enforcing the administration of the foreign born and holders of other citizenships as 'migrants' regardless of their mobility practices and economic, political and cultural commitments to places of origin, transit and residence. Phenomena like circulation, return migration, and the cultivation of transnational fields studied by historians and sociologists, are largely absent though there is increasing policy attention to what the literature calls temporary migration.[13] Migration flows refer to

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[8] See for example the International Migration Report 2009: A Global Assessment. Economic and Social Affairs, UN
[9] Rodriguez 2007
[10] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004
[11] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/k_Ch_5.pdf
[12] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004, see Annex on the status of the collection of international migration statistics.
[13] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004, section V, Temporary migration and its relation to trade in services;

empirical mobility, but they are not often available in comparable form. The differential institutional histories across states and regions become evident very quickly when researchers try to cull numerical data on mobility from individual state sources- data on human entries and exits is not recorded in the same way or for the same purposes.

Finally, historical trajectories and political context are absent from the analyses. Population movement within states and within regions has acquired new patterns since 1970. The processes structuring these patterns have different logics, channeling mobility in various directions. The changes in state-led development in the 1980's that affected much of Latin America have propitiated new routes and intensified mobility as they intensified inequality. Human movement is crucially structured by economic differentials and opportunity, but also by shared colonial histories that sowed specific linguistic skills and social aspirations as they unified political boundaries.

# 4.    Global Patterns and Concerns: 1990 to 2013

Though the bulk of the world population does not migrate internationally, given the enormity of human population numbers, net human mobility has increased dramatically since 1990. As a percentage of the total world population the numbers appear unimpressive, rising from 2.9 in 1990 to 3.2 in 2013. The increase is slightly higher in this period for the world male population, at 3.3, than the female population at 3.1. Migration is often a transit towards wealthier, politically more stable regions- where migrants make up an increasing percentage of the population, rising from 7.2 in 1990 to 10.8 in 2013, with women a slightly higher 10.9. Percentages of migrants resident in less wealthy regions have remained remarkably stable, hovering around 1.7 and 1.6 throughout the period.[14] In early 2013, the Migrant Section of the Population Division/DESA of the UN estimated an increase in international migrants from 156 million in 1990 to 214 million in 2010[15] and other UN sources estimated 232 million by 2013.[16]

Human flows in the late twentieth century most often respond to income differentials and their fluctuations, not surprising given that 74 percent of international migrants are of working age, between 20 and 64 years old.[17] The three sharpest differential 'borders' across which migrants flow are the Mexico-US border since the 1940's, the Mediterranean since the 1960's, and the Arab Gulf since the 1970's. These three poles, North America, Western Europe and the Gulf countries, are the sources of most of global remittances.[18] It is also notable that within the African continent, South Africa plays a special role, attracting migrants from surrounding countries in spite of its segregated labor market and its racial state. This pattern increased in the post-Apartheid period, with migrants rising from 3.8 of the total population in 1990 to 4.5 percent by 2013.[19] What the literature calls more developed countries tend to have had

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigration Policies2013/Report%20PDFs/h_Ch_2.pdf

[14] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSA2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?mtotals

[15] Menozzi, 2013

[16] International Migration and Development, Report of the Secretary General. UN General Assembly 25 July 2013; http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Chapter1.pdf

[17] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm

[18] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004 p. 109

[19] United Nations Population Division "Trends in International Migrant Stock International Migration Revision 2013".

significantly more programs to integrate non-nationals, slightly less restrictive naturalization policies for immigrants and more programs to screen entries by skill levels between 1996 and 2011.[20]

While remittances are a welcome bolster to developing economies, skill filters generate selective movement of highly educated migrants that threaten less wealthy regions with 'brain drain'. India, with the highest human outflow at 14.2 million facilitates home investment and harnesses remittances through the figure of the Non Resident Indian (NRI). Mexico, with the second highest stock of emigrants, has tried to address the social costs of emigration by promoting sustainable development in sending regions, prioritizing development in emerging sending regions and stimulating the repatriation of migrants travelling to complete higher education programs.[21] The government also campaigns for migrant registration in consular posts abroad, facilitates remittance transfer and recognizes sustained mobility through novel official categories and policies, such as the trans-migrant. China, the fourth highest with 9.3 million, offers attractive labor conditions on return to its highly skilled abroad.

In the period between 1990 and 2013, the United States received 23 million migrants, remaining the most popular single country destination and hosting a total of 45.8 million migrants. Europe is the favorite region destination, with 72 million migrants in 2013, mostly concentrated in Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain. However, Asia presents the fastest growing destination, especially the oil rich Arab Gulf- Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are among the ten countries with most migrants worldwide, with 9.1 million and 7.9 million respectively. More than the net numbers, the percentage of the population which expatriate labor represents in the Gulf is staggering, fluctuating between 55 percent in Bahrain to 60 in Kuwait, 74 in Qatar and between 84 and 88 percent in the United Arab Emirates, sparking efforts to reduce immigration by 2011.[22] Along with the growing economies of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, Gulf countries have hosted an increase of 20 million migrants between 2000 and 2013, for a total of 71 million international migrants in Asia, an important receptor of service sector labor and increasingly of students.[23]

Countries which function as important transit space for economic migration, concentrating migrants who are trying to bridge differential borders, present migrant concentrations similar to those of the intended destination countries. In 2010, Mexico in the case of the Americas, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Turkey in the case of the southern Mediterranean, and Yemen in the southern Arabian peninsula display concentrations closer to those of the target destinations than of the surrounding region, facing some of the issues that destination countries highlight- such as concerns around undocumented mobility, human trafficking, and the often precarious living conditions of transit. This dynamic is mirrored within countries, with migrants concentrating along borders that will provide passage to intended destinations.[24]

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[20]http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/i_Ch_3.pdf
[21]http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/j_Ch_4.pdf
[22]http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/h_Ch_2.pdf
[23] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm
[24] Rodriguez, Jorge. "Spatial distribution of the population, internal migration and development in Latin America and the Caribbean. United Nations expert group meeting on population distribution, urbanization, internal migration and development". Population Division/DESA, 2007. See Map 2.

Yet sustained flows which had gained momentum after 2000, migration from all regions to Spain for example, collapsed in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and the many economic adjustments it forced in place, with Ecuadorian and Colombian migration tumbling down by 85 and 65 percent, to resemble the negligible pre-1995 levels.[25] While the outflow of foreigners in such situations is spectacular, crises also prompt citizens to seek better prospects abroad, reorganizing global diversity patterns. In the case of Spain, citizens travelled to those geographic areas that had been the main source of immigration immediately before the crisis- Latin America and Europe.

It is important to note that such patterns also reflect the growing process of citizenship acquisition by resident migrant populations. Thus, part of the 'disappearance' of Equadorian and Colombian migrants in Spain is due to their joining the ranks of Spanish citizens. Many of the Spaniards who migrated to Latin America after the 2008 crisis were dual citizenship holders with transnational kin ties in the countries they migrated to. This emerging pattern of a migrant preference for holding multiple citizenships has been noted by numerous ethnographers of migration- Aihwa Ong for Chinese elites circulating in the Pacific Rim and Pastor for recent migrants from the Eastern Mediterranean to Mexico and Central America. Such multiple nationality holders are best placed to move towards opportunity and relocate their centers of gravity in response to global and regional crises.

Political upheavals are responsible for a minority pattern of mobility - that of refugees. According to UN statistics, refugees stay disproportionately in less wealthy and less politically stable regions when they migrate internationally, with the global South hosting 87 percent of global refugees in 2013.[26] This suggests that being suddenly displaced by political violence, they move with fewer resources and cross the nearest international border. Escaping violence, but remaining close by and perhaps awaiting political stabilization to return to their homes. The current Syrian crisis illustrates this pattern, with the bulk of the 2.2 million registered Syrian international refugees clustering in camps across the border in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan as of December 2013.[27]

Refugees have decreased significantly as a percentage of international migrants stock, dropping from 12.1 in 1990 to 6.8 in 2013. This drop is particularly noticeable in less privileged regions, which went from receiving 23.1 of refugees as a percentage of international migrant stock to 14.2; while wealthier countries dropped from 2.4 to 1.5.[28] The swift changes in refugee concentrations provide the pulse of political unrest across the globe, with the 1990's reflecting displacements generated by the political crises, military governments and civil wars of the 1980's in Central America and Eastern Africa. Some areas with large refugee inflows in 1990 later became politically complicated, perhaps as a result, for example the Sudan, Iran and Pakistan. Mounting numbers of refugees to Jordan and the Palestinian territories reflect the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict but also its aggravation during the two intifadas; while migration into Syria and Lebanon between 2000 and 2010 speaks of the US invasion of Iraq and the resulting instability there.

Given the tendency for migrants to flow towards opportunity, in areas with ageing citizen populations and slower population growth they can contribute to population

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[25] Menozzi, 2013

[26] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSA2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?mtotals; http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigration Policies2013/Report%20PDFs/k_Ch_5.pdf

[27] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrati onPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/k_Ch_5.pdf

[28] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSA2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?mtotals

change both through arrivals and through higher numbers of births than locals. It is often noted that migrants bring with them a different culture of fertility. Only a few countries display population increase mainly as the result of net migration between 1990 and 2010, notably Canada, Australia, Spain and Portugal, Italy, Great Britain, Germany, Greece and Scandinavian countries. Except in the case of Canada and Australia, this trend speaks more of the declining fertility rates of citizens, which have been decreasing since 1950 and dropped dramatically between 1980 and 2000, than of enormous migrant inflows.[29] While migration can be quickly curtailed by political means or reversed by economic trends, declining fertility reflects cultural transformations in family structure and lifestyle choices that are slower and more difficult to reverse.


# 5. Historical Overview of Atlantic Mobility

Mobility in the Atlantic has a long history, since the region was integrated by colonial economies with a shared center of gravity in Western Europe. The orientation and density of human flows has been shaped by economic differentials across this common space since the sixteenth century. Initially a triangular trade, it shuttled African populations to the American continent in order to produce commodities to be sold for profit in European markets. Millions of Africans were forcibly displaced and a few Europeans travelled for the purposes of trade and administration in circuits closely guarded by imperial interests. Only small European settler colonies emerged in North America. This order of things was dismantled during the nineteenth century, when American states emerged as independent polities and European powers focused on a more intense colonial presence in South Asia and Africa, launching migratory processes of an unprecedented scale.

The demographic displacements of industrializing Europe extended to the Americas where new industrial ventures attracted millions of Europeans and Asians fleeing famine, rural poverty and religious scapegoating. Europeans also settled the southern shores of the Mediterranean and other colonial territories. Expanding imperial frontiers reconfigured mobility and colonial enterprise encouraged or forced redistributions of laborers, taking South Asians to Africa and the Caribbean. Decolonization shifted mobility into what is still recognizably a South-North flow on either side of the Atlantic.

The shift was institutionalized in postwar guest worker programs, which provided seasonal employment in industry and agriculture, for example Mexicans in California and Turks in Germany. In the 1960's, postcolonial subjects moved to their former metropolis in growing numbers, benefiting from language skills and sometimes citizenship or commonwealth rights. In these new logics, people migrate across the three great economic frontiers of the twentieth century, which run along the Mexico-US border, the Mediterranean, and around the Arab Gulf.

The intensifying surveillance and militarization of these immense and therefore inevitably porous borders has generated some South-South movement across the Atlantic, with Africans travelling to the Americas and Latin Americans finding employment niches in Europe- for example Ecuadorian care workers in Spain. In the past two decades, states in the North Atlantic have liberalized trade and population flows among themselves to bolster a strategic and economic alliance, unfortunately excluding, through policy and repeated moral panics, people they define as culturally

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[29] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSA2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?mtotals

and racially other. Recent trends are easily reversed by global crises however, for example the 2008 financial crisis.

# 6.    Atlantic Analysis of Databases

The total number of estimated registered international migrants climbed steadily during the second half of the twentieth century, from 75.9 million in 1960, to 81.5 million in 1970, 99.8 in 1980, 154 in 1990 to 174.9 by 2000 and 232 million in 2013. This means that in the period between 1990 and 2013, international migration rose by 50 percent, with much of that growth occurring between 2000 and 2010.[30] While the number of migrants to Latin America remained eerily stable during this four decade period, hovering around 6 million, the number of migrants to North America practically quadrupled- rising from 12.5 to 40.8 million, while migrants to Western Europe nearly tripled, rising from 14 to 32.8 million. The global North gained 69 percent of the 77 million migrants added worldwide, but the annual growth rate of international migrant stock in the South outpaced that of the North; the annual growth rate for both regions slowed down after 2010.

The global North draws most of international migration, home to 136 million international migrants in 2013.[31] Of these, 54 million, about 40 percent, were born in the North. South-South migration has increased rapidly however, with 96 million migrants established in what the literature calls less developed countries. It is important to note as well that of international migrants born in the global South, 82.3 million settled in the South while 81.9 settled in the global North.[32] Of the 96 million international migrants living in the global South, about 14 million, 14 percent of migrants, were born in the North and settled in the South.[33] Of the 53 million migrants added in the North between 1990 and 2013, 78 percent were born in the South while 22 percent originated in the North.[34]

The countries of origin of international migrants have diversified over the past two decades. In 2013, India (14 million), Mexico (13 million), the Russian Federation (11 million), China (9 million) and Bangladesh (8 million) are the top five emigration countries.[35] International migration remains concentrated in a small cluster of receiving countries. In 2013, of the 232 million international migrants worldwide, more than half were living in just 10 countries- the United States (46 million), the Russian Federation (11 million), Germany (10 million), Saudi Arabia (9 million), the United Arab Emirates (8 million), the United Kingdom (8 million), France (7 million), Canada (7 million), Australia (6 million) and Spain (6 million).[36] Again, it is important to note that South Africa was also one of the world's leading countries of annual net immigration, climbing from 8th

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[30] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Chapter1.pdf
[31] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm
[32] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm
[33] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Chapter1.pdf
[34] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Chapter1.pdf
[35] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/g_Ch_1.pdf
[36] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/g_Ch_1.pdf

place in the period between 1990 and 2000 to 6th in the period between 2000 and 2010.[37]

Against this backdrop of vast mobility largely organized by North-South income differentials, how does mobility around and across the Atlantic pattern? What becomes quickly evident is that in contrast to the 'first global century', between 1840 and 1940, when the Atlantic economy was the engine of world migration, after 1990 a politically multipolar world corresponds to the diversification of economic poles of attraction for migrants. This new world order significantly alters earlier migratory circuits and establishes mounting trends with centers of gravity other than the Atlantic space in the foreseeable future. Some important continuities and the historical weight of the Atlantic order suggest that an Atlantic 'balance' to the emerging Pacific and Gulf regions could be concerted.

The Atlantic basin includes two of the three main migration destination poles, North America and Western Europe; and the home countries of one of the two largest diaspora groups, Latin Americans, estimated at 26 million living in North America. International migrants originating in Central America, including Mexico, represent one or the largest groups living outside their home region, estimated at 17.4 million. They clearly cluster in the United States, home to 16.3 million of them in 2013. The Atlantic basin includes one of the top five emigration countries globally - Mexico, with 13 million emigrants.[38]

The largest global diaspora today are Asians, however accounting for 19 million migrants living in Europe, 16 million in North America and 3 million in Oceania. In 2013, South Asians were the largest component in these migrations. Of the 36 million international migrants from South Asian, 13.5 resided in oil-producing countries in Western Asia.[39] Though the Americas have a long history of receiving migrations from the Eastern Mediterranean, they appear to be largely marginal so far to the South Asian-Arab Gulf circuit. This circuit includes an important contingent of female migrants who travel to be employed in domestic service; in countries like the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Indonesia up to 70 percent of labor emigration permits are granted to prospective female migrants.[40]

Large numbers of migrants correlate with high remittances. Global remittances to developing countries, which had remained constant between 1980 and 1990, saw a steep increase, from 40 billion US dollars to 80 billion by 2002.[41] The EU as source rose from 15 billion US dollars in 1980 to 34 billion in 2002; and the US from 1 billion to 32 in the same period. The only other comparable global pole as remittance source is the Middle East, which went from 5 to 21 billion in this time period.[42] A number of Atlantic basin countries were among the world's most important recipients of remittances in 2002, with Mexico receiving 11 billion US dollars, Morocco about 3

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[37]http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Chapter2.pdf
[38]http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/g_Ch_1.pdf
[39] http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm

[40]http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/g_Ch_1.pdf
[41] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004
[42] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004 p. 109

billion, and Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala abut 2 billion each.[43]

Africa has remarkably low remittances, whether North Africa whose remittance total rose from 5 to 6.5 million in this period, or Sub-saharan Africa which went from 1 to 1.5, though migration into Africa rose from 9 to 16 million. This may indicate that migrants have no one left behind to whom they wish to transfer resources- a likely situation for those fleeing war torn areas, supported by the fact that Africa has been the region with the largest percentage of refugees in the world- with 25.6 percent in 1980 and 33 percent in 1990.[44] Latin Americans have been among the most mobile and the most committed to transferring resources to their place of origin, with remittances rising from around two million dollars in 1980 to roughly 27 million by 2002, accounting for 20.5% of the world total.[45] This investment in the home country and in social networks there is indicative of a trend increasingly recognized by migration scholarship- the creation and cultivation of transnational social fields. What is crucial to the transnational analytic is the fact that migration has ceased to be a one-way trip, as often happened before the 1960's, and is increasingly characterized by the circulation of subjects rather than their settlement and incorporation in destination polities.


# 7.    Politics and Numbers

Given the large numbers of people on the move, individual states have devised policies to regulate mobility and these have evolved over the past century according to changing political and economic projects. The colonial history of both poles of the global North has shaped migratory flows to them, as well as the kinds of regulations negotiated with populations that were once spheres of influence or colonial territories that achieved decolonization between the 1940's and the 1980's. The colonial expansion of the global North in the nineteenth century afforded the economic accumulation in those regions that resulted in the income differentials characteristic of the twentieth century. Distinctions between former colonial citizens and subjects have provided the cultural material with which to shape new exclusions in the past two decades. The boundaries of 'fortress Europe' in particular are now cast as intractable racial or religious difference, as scholars of race in Britain and of religion in France and Germany have amply documented (see in particular the work of Stuart Hall and his students, Gilroy, Silverstein).

That political and social links between former metropoles and colonies organize population flows during the postcolonial period is clear from the regions that provide the largest sources of migrants to Europe and the United States. Migration to the United States, historically a settler colony, was reinvigorated by the inflow of Eastern and Southern European workers from 1840 through the catastrophe of the First World War, which interrupted Atlantic migrations. Those generations were assumed to be permanent settlers and they were selected to be 'assailable' within a nation that defined itself as racially and culturally European. The Great Depression, its economic repercussions and the many policies devised to isolate and protect newly conceived 'national' economies in its wake, complicated Atlantic migration in the interwar period. Between 1940 and the 1960's a new, contractual, seasonal migration intended to provide agricultural labor to the southern United Sates without incurring permanent settling by undesirable nationals, was instated through the bracero program in

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[43] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004 p. 108
[44] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004 p. 43
[45] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004 p. 107

California. Facilitated by a history of border traffic and a shared linguistic history in large portions of the southern US, which had been part of Mexico until the mid nineteenth century.

In the 1960's, traditional countries of immigration- the United States, Australia, and Canada, reformulated their immigration policies, moving away from the racial model of 'white nations' and reimagining themselves as multi-ethnic or multicultural. The United Sates lifted the system of quotas that restricted non-European migration, with important diversification of the demographics of migration. Migration to the United States was greatly diversified in the post 65 period, patterned on an increasingly global American interventionism. Some of the new arrivals were refugees from American wars in Central America and Asia- Vietnamese collaborators and wealthy Iranians fleeing the Clerical revolution with their fortunes, among others. The long history of Latin America as political and economic 'backyard' of the United States, subject to the Monroe doctrine, is reflected in today's statistics. Of the 25 million migrants that arrived in North America between 1990 and 2013, 57 percent of them came from Latin America and the Caribbean, 35 percent in Asia and 6 percent in Africa.

Great Britain and France, which concentrated their colonial efforts in Asia and Africa, received greater proportional migration form those regions, especially in the 1990s. Of the 23 million international migrants gained by Europe during this period, 43 per cent were born in Europe, 22 per cent in Asia, 18 percent in Africa and 14 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean. A notable case is that of Algerians, who made up 98.4 of all immigrants in France in 2000.[46] The Arab Gulf receives two categories of migrants. On the one hand unprivileged service migrants from South Asia and the Middle East mostly share the region's religious tradition; though Pakistani drivers and Lebanese carpenters and pastry cooks are discursively welcomed as Muslims, their conditions of life and labor are extremely precarious. On the other, specialist expats- Lebanese engineers, European and American advisers have access to lives of luxury but are socially rejected as 'Western' or 'liberal' in their cultural practice. All migrants are strictly excluded in terms of citizenship, and independent enterprise curtailed by the institution of the required business *wali*- a citizen partner and sponsor.

For Asia the pattern was less diversified, with 87 per cent of the 21 million migrants gained by that major area between 1990 and 2013 originating within Asia itself, followed by Africa (8 per cent).[47] During the period 2010-2013, North America added nearly half as many international migrants as Asia or Europe. In 2013, the majority of all migration occurred within major areas rather than across major areas. The majority of all international migrants residing in Africa (82 per cent), Asia (76 per cent), Europe (52 per cent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (64 per cent) were also born in that major area. In contrast, only 2 per cent and 14 per cent of all international migrants in Northern America and Oceania had migrated within their major area of birth, respectively.

With changes in admissions criteria and the inflow of former colonial subjects with linguistic affinities and partial political rights cultivated by former metropoles through the friendly ties of international cooperation, commonwealth and francophonie, receiving countries began to stress new criteria to channel mobility. Starting in the 1960's but with visible consequences by the 1980's, changing global labor markets resulted in a transformation of labor recruitment strategies. The global North was reconfigured as a

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[46] UN World Economic and Social Survey 2004 p. 46
[47] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Chapter1.pdf

service economy by the outsourcing of production to the global South, however attempts at repatriating migrant labor were largely unsuccessful. Family ties, language proficiency, educational qualifications, job skills and other desirable attributes became the means to filter new migration petitions.

The large labor migratory movements to Europe and North America of the 60's and 70's were dominated by male migrants, with women and children migrating as dependents or joining their menfolk in later decades through various programs of family reunification.[48] It is notable that while the category of family reunification accounted for more than half of immigrants and long-tern migrant admissions between 1991 and 2001, Northern Europe received a strong percentage of refugees, while the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the US received much higher proportions of workers. In fact in Canada, the UK and the US, immigrants are increasingly screened by skills, and the percentage of migrants admitted as temporary workers or immigrants under skill based categories increased dramatically between 1991 and 200x1; rising from 7 to 32% of immigrants in to the UK, from 18 to 55% in Canada and from 143 thousand to 505 thousand temporary workers admitted to the US.

# 8.   Conclusions

The Atlantic basin as such does not organize movement, but common South-North mobility and a shared history may provide the basis for further Atlantic integration. In order to be sustainable in a world of mobility in which Asia as a region is the most dynamic - with the fastest growing rate of both emigration - South Asia - and the largest percentages of migrant residents - the Arab Gulf -; and given that the Gulf now constitutes one of the thee main global remittance source regions, Atlantic integration would require a new political vision. Many Atlantic futures are conceivable. Atlantic poles of wealth- the North Atlantic, South Africa and Brazil, could forge stronger North-South ties and attempt to control Atlantic processes. A sustainable Atlantic basin would require rebuilding Atlantic relations so that historical hierarchies and current economic gaps are transformed into economic ties that are satisfactory to all partners.

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[48]http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/g_Ch_1.pdf

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