Migrant Communities and the Internal and External Dynamics of Integration: The Potential Role of Migrants in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

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Acknowledgements

This study was conducted under the auspices of the Centre d’Études et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (CERSS), Rabat, the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), Barcelona, the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI-Sciences Po), Paris, and the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI), Paris. Dr. Gemma Aubarell is a Program Director at the IEMed, Xavier Aragall is a Researcher at the IEMed, Mohamed-Ali Adraoui is a Researcher at the CERSS, Dr. Eva Østergaard is a Political Scientist at the UAB, Dr. Jordi Moreras is the Director of the magazine Transits, and Abdelhak Saaf is a Teacher and Researcher at the CERSS.
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Summary

According to the report of the United Nations Global Commission on International Migration, due to widespread human migration movements, the emergence of routes that break with the classic dichotomy between emigration and immigration countries, and the strengthening of migrant communities in every continent, a change in the way we perceive migration in general is necessary. Whereas migration flows in the 60’s and 70’s meant for many migrants a break with the country of origin, at the turn of the 21st century migration occurs in a context where communication among individuals is easier and where human mobility is also greater. Today, this worldwide process encompasses not only the arrival of people in rich societies but also the presence of transnational communities almost everywhere around the world.

Furthermore, as argued in the EuroMeSCo Barcelona Plus report, the presence of migrant communities in the European Union may potentially help revamping the concept of national citizenship and reforming decision-making institutions, since immigrants may well become significant actors in the promotion of democracy and social justice. Thus “transnationality” is the key-element of this analysis on the complexity and the dynamism of migration flows in the Mediterranean area.

The role of communities is a result of the dynamics of their practices and of the social, economic, civic or political networks they form, as well as of their strength and that of the networks formed between different migrant communities and diasporas. This research project focuses on the role of migrant communities, in host countries as well as in countries of origin, and particularly on the crucial role they may come to play within the EMP.
In the past ten years migration management in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) encompassed two different dynamics: external relations and home affairs.

In the external relations field, a number of commitments were made and agreements reached regarding co-responsibility due to the need to manage migration with the south. The Euro-African summit recently held in Rabat is an example of north-south cooperation in this area.

Surprisingly, consensus was not reached in the field of home affairs. Indeed, a joint vision on migration integration should be a consequence of the considerable impact of migration flow management on the EMP and the fact that Mediterranean migration in the European Union (EU) is a common problem.

Since a clear tension between the two dimensions exists, a balanced approach to migration management comprising the following elements could be envisaged:

• Migration should be included in the external relations agenda;

• It should be acknowledged that security issues are at stake in migration control;

• For the EU, a key-challenge would be committing to migration management in the face of a multicultural reality; and integrating settled migrant communities, particularly in light of the ongoing “communitarisation” process and the transfer of areas from the third to the first pillar.

In spite of this, we believe that the specificity of the Euro-Mediterranean migration system presents an opportunity to analyse whether full integration in the host society may improve relations between sending and receiving countries. We consider that migrant communities play a key role in this respect. Indeed, we view them as social, economic, civic or political networks that have an effect both on the country of origin and the host country.

Moreover, the EuroMeSCo Barcelona Plus report shows that the presence of migrant communities in Europe requires a redefinition of the key concepts of citizenship, identity and democracy. The report also indicates that migration plays a role in demographic complementarity and solidarity between the north and the south, while at the same time minimizing perceptions of threat.

Communities thus emerge as useful tools to enhance external relations between EMP member countries. The question remains, nevertheless, whether those communities are in a position to fully grasp and to participate in the Partnership.

For these reasons, the starting point of this report is that the greater the integration, i.e., the more managed migration is accepted, the greater the ability of members of migrant communities to become actors in the EMP.

Based on this idea, we examine the specific case of the Moroccan migrant communities settled in two different countries, France and Spain. For both cases we analyse four indicators that allow us to determine, among other elements, the degree of integration of those communities in each country along with their strengths and weaknesses.

Throughout this study we will bear in mind one of the key aspects of migration according to the above-mentioned EuroMeSCo report: the transnational dimension of migrant communities. Moreover, attention will be brought on the fact that the presence of migrant communities in the European Union may potentially help revamping the concept of national citizenship and reforming decision-making institutions, since immigrants may well become significant actors in the promotion of democracy and social justice. Thus “transnationality” is the key element of this analysis on the complexity and the dynamism of migration flows in the Mediterranean area.

Finally, this report aims to formulate operational proposals on the basis of Partnership instruments such as association agreements or the five-year work plan adopted during the last Euro-Mediterranean Summit celebrating the 10th anniversary of the EMP. Furthermore, it will analyse how the EMP will be linked with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the latter's new instruments.

Three meetings were organised to coordinate this report. The first one, which took place in March, was aimed at creating a research group composed of three teams – one dealing with Spain, another with France, and a third one with Morocco – , at identifying and surveying the issues to be studied and selecting case studies (countries and communities).
The second meeting was held in the margins of the 2nd preparatory meeting of the EuroMeSCo 2006 Annual Conference (April 2006 - Paris), focusing on both the reasoning and main elements of this research project. The participants of the working group on Migrants and their communities as actors in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also contributed to this discussion.

A final meeting was held in June, in Barcelona, with a view to compiling the three reports prepared by the teams and drawing the main conclusions thereof.

The Spanish team met twice with representatives of Moroccan associations in Spain, in Barcelona and later in Madrid during the “Transnational debate on Moroccan Immigration” organised by the Al Monadara group, an organisation bringing together Moroccan communities from different countries of the EU.

Another meeting with Moroccan associations took place in Meknès during the sub-regional seminar Civil Society, Human Rights and Democracy, organised by EuroMeSCo with the cooperation of the “Forum Civil Démocratique Marocain”. The project as well as its first results were presented and discussed during the session on migrant rights.

Why Migrant Communities?

According to the report of the United Nations Global Commission on International Migration, due to widespread human migration movements, the emergence of routes that break with the classic dichotomy between emigration and immigration countries, and the strengthening of migrant communities in every continent, a change in the way we perceive migration in general is necessary. Whereas migration flows in the 60’s and 70’s meant for many migrants a break with the country of origin, at the turn of the 21st century migration occurs in a context where communication among individuals is easier and where human mobility is also greater. Today, this worldwide process encompasses not only the arrival of people in rich societies but also the presence of transnational communities almost everywhere around the world, as well as the emergence of new lifestyles in and around cities.

The role of communities is a result of the dynamics of their practices and of the social, economic, civic or political networks they form, as well as of their strength and that of the networks formed between different migrant communities and diasporas. This research project focuses on the role of migrant communities, in host countries as well as in countries of origin, and particularly on the crucial role they may come to play within the EMP.

The interests of northern and southern governments converge on one topic: integration in host societies, i.e., adequate treatment of third-country nationals. The principle of non-discrimination, as put forward in both the Tampere and Hague work programmes, as well as in the five-year work-plan mentioned above, is considered to be of key importance for migration policies at the EU level. Measures such as access to citizenship of the host countries and cultural diversity management play a key role in the promotion of the status of the migrant, encourage dialogue and respect among cultures and religions, and contribute to the fight against xenophobia and intolerance. In this context, the crisis brought about by the cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad once again confirmed the existence of negative perceptions of the “other” (displays of xenophobia were documented) and showed that migrant communities can emerge and play an active role in this field.

Selected Case Studies

We chose to lead a largely comparative but also transversal study to avoid giving in to the simplicity of monographic methods. Moreover, we decided to focus our research efforts mostly on Moroccan immigration in France and in Spain for at least three reasons.

Indeed, applying a comparative and transversal approach to three different countries – though with similar views on migration phenomena – allows us to maximise the extension of the theoretical and practical field of study while at the same time underlining the assets and the challenges that characterise each of these societies.

In the case of France we are dealing with a society historically marked by immigration from the Maghreb since the beginning of the 20th century. Muslim and African influence on French history, particularly on colonial history, in the past two and a half centuries, must be noted. In this respect, even though there are millions of North Africans in France,
it seems as though the issue of immigration, still frequently making the headlines, has since long given way to a collective public questioning on how the children of the first migrants arriving from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia integrated. At the same time, given that the period under consideration is much longer than that of immigration in Spain, nowadays the French case appears to be the illustration of what for the most part is a controlled migration phenomenon. Today, the focus is on the actions of the generations stemming from these waves of immigration rather than on the practical organisation of migration flows themselves.

The Moroccan community in Spain is the most numerous and the most successful in terms of territorial integration considering how long it has been present in the country. Regarding the social perception of immigration, the stereotype of the migrant corresponded for a long time to the image of the Moroccan. This perception evolved in light of the changing profile of immigration in Spain since the beginning of the year 2000, with the arrival of other communities, particularly Latin American and Eastern European.

Furthermore, among migrant communities, it is one of those that show the most obvious signs of settlement, but its level of integration in Spanish society is still in question. Indeed, in spite of the clear indications of its substantial integration, doubts still exist as to its will and/or capacity to adapt to Spanish society. This argument is based on the widespread notion that a distinction can be drawn between migrant communities on the basis of their degree of “integrability”.

Finally, a study of Morocco's situation and expectations is extremely useful because both government and society want to keep close links with “Moroccans living abroad”. Their presence in several European countries (e.g. France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, and Sweden) is undoubtedly an opportunity for Moroccans to develop a true “community-oriented diplomacy” aimed at strengthening relations between the motherland and “children” born and/or living abroad.

The decision to focus on four kinds of topics intended to shed light on the reality and the imaginative universe of migrants and their families is based on a transversal logic. This logic is meant to bring about new views on the national treatment of migration phenomena and integration issues (in the religious, social, political and economic spheres).

In light of this, the following issues must be stressed. The first indicator should give us the impressions and conceptual tools needed to measure and define discrimination, the major challenge that migrants are subjected to. It undoubtedly constitutes the most difficult problem under analysis inasmuch as it is both subjective and objective, depending on whether one considers the perspective of a migrant or a citizen of origin. In addition, it is the issue that is most responsible for compromising the current and future integration of migrants, many of which have since long become or are in the process of becoming citizens.

Discrimination remains a major indicator of integration because it is linked to three key elements of the EMP: opportunities for socio-economic mobility; generation issues (second and third generations); and, finally, the exercise of an active citizenship.

Migrant religiosity is an element linked to discrimination. This topic raises extremely complex and delicate issues because, on the one hand, migrants have a real feeling of frustration toward their most common denomination, Islam. On the other hand, Islam is a source of pride in their identity and, for many of those seeking to develop a citizenship based on religion, rather than on ethnic or social elements, it is a factor of mobilization. Given that Islam and cultural diversity are closely linked to intercultural dialogue, religiosity is a truly important variable in the Euro-Mediterranean process.

Community mobilisation is a further indicator meant to shed light on the state of advancement of migrant communities in their local institutionalisation process and dynamic. By and large, the nature of their interaction with civil society and with the government of the host country is widely limited by the resources (cultural, financial, symbolic, etc.) and the project of the representatives of those migrant communities.

This indicator informs us on the migrants’ potential role on key aspects of the EMP: political reform, spread and development of democracy, and progressive implementation of a political and rights-based citizenship in host societies.

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Selected Indicators

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1 In fact, this topic seems to arise cyclically in the French public and political debate, surprisingly in electoral or pre-electoral periods. 2 One of the latest avatars of this was undoubtedly expressed through Nicolas Sarkozy’s words, Interior Minister and likely future candidate to the 2007 presidential elections, who hardly hesitated before positioning himself as a source of inspiration of a new model of immigration for French society. “chosen immigration” rather than the passivity that allegedly has characterised national policies for years (“immigration France is subjected to”). 3 Indeed, Moroccans and Turks are the two main migrant communities represented in Europe. The future creation of the Council for Moroccans Residing Abroad is another initiative aimed at reaching out to Moroccans and people born of Moroccan emigration.
Transnationalism as a Methodology

The transnational perspective is particularly helpful when dealing with the kinds and degrees of relationships developed between migrants and their societies of origin. These relationships facilitate cross-border cultural, political and economic exchange and consolidate the link between the country of origin and the communities settled in several host countries. This is of particular interest because it introduces a new element in the analysis of the incorporation of migrant communities in host societies and focuses on one of the dynamics (sovereignty and citizenship) that shifts the emphasis from the nation State logic. Indeed, participation in the daily life of two or more nations challenges migration policies that consider migration as a single and one-way journey. In addition, due to the economic and even political role that migrants and diasporas can play, these practices create an interesting range of opportunities for sending countries.

There are undoubtedly several lessons to be drawn from the transnational dimension of migrants with regards to a possible migration project in the Euro-Mediterranean framework. Transnationality may perhaps even help promote individual and collective needs of migrants. For the time being, this phenomenon is relatively limited, but given that the rules in this area seem to be under review (rules brought about by new co-development opportunities, namely for certain countries of the southern bank of the Mediterranean) and after empirical observation of a number of local dynamics (commercial, cultural, etc.) under way for a few years, it can be argued that these trends will be confirmed and perhaps deepened in the near future.

We are of the view that the concept of co-development should recognize the impact of migration on mobility as well as the positive effects of mobility itself on development. Co-development strategy must necessarily include three actors: the country of origin, the host country and the migrant itself. This idea is based on the fact that development must be understood in its human rather than economic dimension.

It should be stressed that in this transnational view on co-development the migrant must be accepted as an agent of international cooperation and able to intervene as a citizen in the country of origin and of destination.

Perspectives Stemming From the New Instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy

The ENP introduced a new framework to study Europe's relations with its eastern and southern neighbours as well as its role in regions such as the Mediterranean. As a result, it urges the EU to put in place mechanisms to facilitate movement of nationals from neighbouring third-countries, particularly from those countries that take part in the EU's programmes or activities. In order to promote greater mobility of people living within the EU and its neighbouring countries, a reappraisal of visa policies is needed. This report argues that the ENP should be sustained by measures aimed at reinforcing integration of third-country residents in EU territory, and particularly legal residents.

Perhaps this could be an opportunity to “mediterranise” the Euro-Mediterranean political agenda and to contribute to the implementation of migration policies. Most importantly, it is an occasion to analyse to what extent the ENP has anything to add to the EMP in the area of migration. Within the ENP, migration was included in the chapter on development and the idea of a commitment of all members to migration management was introduced. Furthermore, it envisages an ad hoc approach to migration management based on differentiation and a principle of progressiveness (i.e., the increase in aid is linked with increase in migration management expenses).

The main issue at stake is whether the EMP was given a new meaning or will have to be reformed because of the ENP's new model of interdependence between the EU and MENA region countries. On the one hand, it can be argued that migration now represents the core of any north-south collaboration or partnership, in spite of the fact that security issues increasingly prevail to the detriment of development concerns. Indeed, in-depth development implies that the north needs the south, and vice versa. Thanks to this view, a number of actors gained considerable importance and the south is now in a position to put in place a proactive agenda focused on its own priorities.

On the other hand, the five-year work plan adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Barcelona considered that, regarding migration, the EMP reinforces cooperation in a number of areas, which could help promote a comprehensive and integrated approach to migration. Among these is the advancement of methods for more secure, simpler and less expensive channels for efficient transfer of remittances, which encourages active involve-
ment of expatriate communities in the development of their country of origin. The impact of financial flows between communities on the relationship between migration and development should also be explored.

The Euro-African conference should result in the adoption of specific short and long-term measures targeting migration routes. New instruments are expected to emerge from the conference to complement those already in place within the EMP. The goal of these instruments is to promote a new cooperation model between Africa and Europe focused on setting up specific initiatives in the area of migration policy and development. This would contribute to optimising the benefits and lowering the risks of migration for all parties at stake, particularly migrants.

The proposed action-plan must be a global and urgent response to migration issues between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and it should be based on a partnership between host, origin and transit countries. Among other issues, it should address capacity-building in countries of origin and transit to help manage migration flows and the implementation of an active policy of integration and fight against exclusion of migrant populations and diasporas, as these factors can contribute to the development, modernisation and innovation of societies of origin.
Faced by North Africans

Types of Discrimination Faced by North Africans

France

Mohamed-Ali Adraoui

Often said to be a challenging type of migration for French society, the presence of North Africans in France and their integration in society constitute a dense and complex reflection topic for decision-makers, researchers and opinion-makers alike who wonder what different public policies dealing with migrants should encompass (urban, immigration, integration policies, etc.).

Migration from North Africa and the ensuing presence of a new kind of citizen on French soil are of increasing concern for French media and voices in public debate. It is thus more than ever necessary and even beneficial to dwell on a detailed analysis of the multiple dynamics that affect the so-called French stemming from North African migration.

France has many features among which the presence of the biggest Muslim community in Europe, the political primacy of the principle of secularism of legislation and jurisdiction, as well as the difficulties faced by many French co-citizens in having access to full citizenship. Thus, time is ripe for the adoption of a plural approach focusing on issues that will help deepen a reflection on the role of migrant groups from the Maghreb in structuring and stimulating the Euro-Mediterranean area. For that reason we chose to dwell on how these communities perceive transnationality and the Euro-Mediterranean framework with a view to drawing the necessary lessons and proposals that could influence a new ENP agenda on relations with the southern bank of the mare nostrum.

With this in mind, we chose to examine the situation of North Africans in France in a macro sociological and macro political perspective. Beyond migrants’ relationship with religion and bearing in mind the discrimination many of them are subject to, this social panorama must be complemented with rather local realities. This includes the importance for many migrants and their descendants of belonging to associations inasmuch as this element gives us an indication of their true views on integration, and most importantly their children’s views on it.

4. Last year, for instance, a number of key figures attempted more or less successfully, an ethnic, or perhaps even denominational interpretation of important events that shook French society, such as the urban riots in a few of the country’s banlieues or the hostage taking of French journalists in Iraq.

5. In fact this is one of the reasons why in the past years a dread of communitarianism emerged in public debate, for fear of the creation of social groups being at odds with the rest of social environment. This real or imagined rupture is supposed to reflect the wish these populations have to recreate for themselves a space of religious, cultural and social homogeneity, a real reproduction of North African societies (mosque, oriental trade, dress modes, social codes, etc.).

6. In fact, while a few years ago the main personification of otherness in France was embodied by the image of the migrant, today it has been replaced by the image of a Muslim, or even more often by that of a Muslim Arab.


On the right interpretation of discrimination faced by North Africans in France

As noted by Jean-Paul Fitoussi, the problem of economic and social inequality in France, as well as urban and territorial segregation phenomena that have targeted part of the population living in outlying areas, both symbolically and effectively living on the fringe of French cities, is first of all linked to the mass unemployment that has featured in France for over three decades.

In other words, if too often there is a notion that North African migrants are almost exclusively affected by discrimination it is because they appear both in the unemployment and the social ghettos maps. Indeed, a notion of “ethnicisation” of unemployment can be derived from the fact that this phenomenon mainly touches on categories of the population who suffered from the effects of the crisis that started in the mid-1970’s and that because among those North-African milieus are statistically overrepresented compared to the national average. During the years of growth and full employment these populations were employed in sectors that since then have greatly suffered from economic and industrial restructuring, most of the times leading to deskilling, social downgrading and long-term, or even permanent, loss of their employability, and to an always increasing vulnerability.

However, it must be noted that objective economic and social difficulties faced by migrants and their families coexist with phenomena that amplify discriminations. These phenomena can be explained by the stigmatization migrant populations are subject to, inasmuch as they are perceived as being unable to integrate, foreign in several ways (Islam is seen as an essentially obscurantist religion, their culture is seen as archaic, an excessive traditionalism is perceived as making coexistence with the rest of society difficult, etc.) and too distant (these populations concentrate in specific neighbourhoods). Unfortunately for North Africans, this combination of several factors makes their objective situation more difficult than that of other components of national diversity:

“Domination relies on a specific process: stigmatization, alongside with denial of individual features to the advantage of a collective stereotype (...) stigmatization is a process aimed at discrediting a person or group of persons”.

Identity, discrimination and ethnicity

Suffering from the negative glance of the predominating group in society (the “white French”) and from the fact that its socio-ethnic membership becomes a “wounded identity” in this
context, we notice that a change of category is taking place. North African migrants, formerly seen as a migrant community, i.e., as a social group with a temporary status, are becoming an ethnic minority whose relationship with its social environment is increasingly marked by discrimination, mistrust and problematic relations with the rest of the national community:

"Indeed a paradox exists in France: on the one hand, there is an invisibility injunction on migrant communities, while on the other hand, there is a permanent consignment to otherness through language, as migration is still discussed when speaking about populations who have long been settled, who are often French and born in France".

In the discourse of certain opinion leaders, as well as in the stance taken by a number of actors (politicians, decision-makers, etc.), this association of fears goes as far as setting the North African community up as the archetype of the “new dangerous classes” to be countered, or, at least, to be kept under surveillance in contemporary France.

Levels of discrimination

Be it in school, in the job market, when seeking housing, in the access to certain forms of entertainment (night clubs, etc.), in Islamophobia or in relations with the police, it is practically impossible to deny that severe types of discrimination exist vis-à-vis people of North African origin, alongside with subjective types of racist phenomena (popular racism, invectives, insults...). This is in fact one of the reasons for the build-up of a *banlieue* culture in France that gathers almost all the social handicaps visible today in this country.

In schools, on the one hand, without going as far as accepting the existence of a state of organised segregation, we cannot but back up the thesis according to which the French education system works at different speeds. In this framework, a mediocre education system developed for children born in ghettoes marked by unemployment, an identity crisis and where the primacy of republican allegiance is called into question.

To a great extent, this explains the investment in short study courses that theoretically provide quicker and easier access to the job market. It therefore makes sense to speak of a “spiral of discrimination”*, as employers are reluctant to recruit people susceptible of being unsuitable for their customers or supposedly having flaws that make the good performance of their functions impossible (due to lack of seriousness, or adroitness, difficult relations vis-à-vis authority...). Unemployment and de-skilling, which feed subjective feelings of frustration but also lead to objective phenomena of ghettoisation, result in an isolation complex that externally could be perceived as communitarianism.

From the outset, this combination of elements constitutes an explanatory guide for situations of discrimination linked to relations with the police, geographic confinement and to the image conveyed by inhabitants of the *banlieues* (especially if they are of immigrant origin, in general, and North African, in particular) to the rest of co-citizens.

*The French mechanism for the fight against this type of discrimination must continue to adopt*

For a long time, the French Republic took for granted both the practical efficacy of legal mechanisms criminalising discriminatory acts and equality before the law and of treatment of its citizens.

However, in the past few years a relative consensus seems to have been reached among public decision-makers. Current mechanisms for the treatment and fight against inequalities are no longer sufficient. From supporters of a type of positive discrimination “à la française”, to those who push for a revision of the national social contract based on the concept of solidarity, French public debate is currently rich in attempts to fight against economic inequalities and discrimination, both of populations of immigrant origin and of those living in areas that paid the price of recent urban and social evolutions. In this respect, the legal framework, as well as the para-state entity (either the HALDE, High Authority of Fight Against Discrimination and for Equality) or its predecessor, the GELD (Study and Fight Against Discrimination Group), whose mission is to study the objective reality of discrimination and think of ways to reduce it), must continue to play a key role in the legal and discretionary mechanisms in the fight for greater fairness.
North African Migrants’ Perceptions on the Country of Origin, the Host Society and the Transmediterranean Space

As an example, article XIII of the Amsterdam Treaty represents the Community acquires in matters of fight against discrimination. It namely specifies that no one can be excluded from the job market on the basis of origin, religion or nationality. The measures implemented by leftist and rightist governments since 1997 can be read in the light of this European legal framework. One of the main points to be stressed is that rather than integration of migrants, and especially of migrants’ children, these measures must focus on a full acceptance of what from now on will be the irreversible multicultural dimension of French society.

The majority of migrants envisage their transnationality as a force for change of their country of origin

Even though the reasons and motivations that led numerous Moroccans to reach Europe, and France in particular, are of an economic nature, inasmuch as the desired goal was to better their material well being, firstly, and then to allow their family to benefit from education, protection and opportunities of social advancement, few migrants severed their links entirely with the Moroccan Kingdom. This is essentially due, on the one hand, to the geographical proximity between France and Morocco that allows migrants to regularly meet their family circle and to renew ties with a mostly mythicised image of the bled (mostly during the summer). On the other hand, it is also a result of the perpetuation of a certain degree of “national spirit” within French society in the framework of which Moroccan families, because of the fact that they share a common origin, try, unconsciously or not, to revive the daily life left across the Mediterranean. Finally, it is a result of active policies implemented by Moroccan authorities with a view to reviving the “marocconness” of these migrants and their descendants (by sending Arab language teachers to France, financing cultural or sports events, through publicity aimed at favouring investment in Morocco or the purchase of real-estate...).

In a number of homes, the image of Morocco is idealised to such an extent and the “lost paradise” syndrome is so present that a true difficulty in fully integrating the notion of “Frenchity” can be perceived (for instance, in children). Indeed, they have the feeling of belonging to two nations and to two cultures that are eminently perceived as mutually exclusive. For thousands of Moroccan migrants and their children, this explains, in a recent phase, the growing interest in economic, commercial and market opportunities between the two banks of the mare nostrum. Considering the progress made in long-term integration, the description of these trends must be complemented by the perpetuation of cultural codes that continue to have an effect on a number of Moroccan homes (endogamy, international solidarity, etc...).

For the host country, Moroccan immigration purports to constitute a cultural opening factor and an element of social and political modernisation

After close observation of the daily life of several families of Moroccan origin we noticed that the weight of image, perception and opinion matters greatly. This could be the result, first of all, of a particular sensitivity of these social groups to clichés, value judgements and collective impressions conveyed by a specific press, but also from the remarks made by a few opinion-makers on the essentially foreign nature of these populations which denies them any future of full citizenship in French society. In addition, it could stem from the relative electoral importance of populist and/or extreme-right parties.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that, to a great extent, Moroccan migrants and French nationals born of Moroccan migration have a generally positive image of French society, expressed in their imaginary world as well as in their discourse. Perceived and, most of all, conceived of as the country of opportunity and future, for a number of Moroccans France still represents (even if it would be convenient to replace it in the framework of international competition and globalisation of political, social and cultural dynamics) a significant point of reference, perhaps even a real model society in many aspects.
One of the difficulties felt by Moroccan migrants – and even more so by their descendants – is an “antagonistic allegiance”, or perhaps an individual and sometimes even collective schizophrenia in the relationship with their identity. This problem is expressed in the self-perception of the migrant as a *homo politicus*. Indeed, when it comes to political socialisation of the migrant, even if the essential elements of political conscience and of a possible politicisation are still by and large determined by social membership, status in society or sensitivity to discourse on the necessary fight against discrimination and inequality, there seems to be a growing interest in what is at stake in the international scene, as well as in the position of French politicians on the great issues taking place worldwide, and particularly what their views are on relations with the Muslim world.

**Perceptions of the Euro-Mediterranean community**

Given its role in bringing people together, the transnational community of Moroccan origin seems to think and organise itself (at least the members of that community who can and who think their citizenship and of their future as henceforth permanently integrated in this transnational, multicultural and plurilingual universe) as, to a certain extent, an “avant garde”. The latter understood, learnt and assimilated economic and commercial modernity and could become part of this “would be elite” very soon.

It is feared, and often rightly so, that the process of making this space dynamic again is, if not neglected, at least of limited interest to the dominating power of the Mediterranean perimeter, whose domestic (immigration laws) and foreign (neighbourhood policy) policies determine, structure and design the current and future face of the transmediterranean community of interests.

Seen at the same time as having stake and as actors, the trader, intellectual, academic, industrial, financial, economic and political Moroccan elites, from Morocco, or with a specific affinity to this country, legitimately wish to play a role that they seem entitled to in the heart of the Euro-Mediterranean area.

**A more pronounced identification with the sacred and a more acute religious feeling**

While the Muslim dogma is without a doubt the hegemonic religious *credo* within migrant populations from North Africa, in practice the feeling of identification to Islamic tradition varies according to the way in which rather profane criteria (region of origin in the Maghreb, socio-professional category, education level) mitigate the idea that religion is the only source of the faith of these migrants and their families. The “Muslim” condition must be understood as a real act of faith, but also as the fact of belonging to a social group, which is often defined externally through a set of ethical, social and cultural values shared by its members:

“Consciously or unconsciously, the term “Muslim”, in the way it is used in France, refers to a system of customs rather than to a theological content.”

A “re-enchantment of the world” appears to be less effective in the case of the first migrants from North Africa that chose to settle permanently or temporarily in French territory. These migrants came from societies where the reference and consideration given to the sacred elements of Islam are essential to social organisation and represent the basis of collective identity. Because French society is greatly characterised by the relegation of the religious field into the private sphere and a certain distrust toward all “irrational” explanations of the world, the main issue at stake for these migrants when settling in France immediately becomes the preservation of the their capacity as Muslim believers. Consequently, religion becomes the stage for potential antagonisms between groups of migrants and the host society. Lastly, it would appear that the conditions to exercise Islam in France today greatly depend on the migrants’ socialisation within that society. While the desire to cultivate a feeling of religious allegiance to Islam is to a great extent elusive, the sense of this allegiance and the way to convert it into cultural, economic and social practices is largely influenced by more objective factors.

**What is the Religiosity of North African Migrants?**

15 For this reason, while there is still a clear leaning for the discourse of left-wing parties and for political programmes defined within this political family (namely, and mostly in economic and social matters), it must be noted that a certain sympathy for the President of the Republic, Jacques Chirac, exists, as his vision of international events and crisis is seen as “pro-Arab”.
16 In fact, often accepted as such.
17 It must be noted that a number of French decision-makers (politicians: Dominique de Villepin, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Elisabeth Guigou; journalists: Bernard Guetta, people in show business: Arthur, Gad Elmaleh) were born and/or raised in Morocco, and some of them have Moroccan nationality.
18 Islam can be understood as a religion synonymous with voluntary release induced by entrusting the aim of one’s existence and the ways to live it with a view to reaching peace (salam, a term that shares the same linguistic root with “Islam”) and osmosis between one’s self and the universe, to a single and merciful divinity. This spirituality almost exclusively constitutes the reference point of most migrants of Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian origin, even though the feeling of religious membership must be put in perspective when it comes to younger generations and in light of the advancement of evangelical proselytism from North America. On the relative respect of Muslims’ sacred principles and injunctions within French society, see the following work: François comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébîne, africaine et turque, supra note 12.
The role of religion in the mobilisation process: between identity affirmation and connection with secularisation

A number of commonplace along with the political instrumentalisation of the difficulties of integration contribute to the endorsement of the thesis that Islam is incompatible with life in the host society. However, a closer analysis of the links between the way Islam is practised and citizenship show that the link to religion is determined at the individual rather than at the community level.

Furthermore, a look at the social dynamics currently under way within North African communities in France shows that Islam plays a positive role in providing incentives for social success. Indeed, religion appears as the basis of a new personal morality that encourages individuals to break with defeatism in order to honour their spiritual heritage, providing them with reasons to work for further respect and social prestige. In this respect, not only Islam is not viewed as an obstacle to integration, but also it is often perceived as the ideological corpus behind Muslims’ sense of associative, personal or political commitment.

This explains why Muslims, and especially if they are practicing Muslims, wonder about or are particularly concerned with the viability and the free exercise of religion as full-fledged members of French society. Indeed, not only “Islam is not a factor of withdrawal from French society” but in many cases advancing the fact of belonging to a religion is also one of the basis for commitment to the economic, political, citizen or social fabric. Thus namely in the Moroccan case, religious organisations have a growing importance and are often set up with the blessing of Moroccan national authorities that wish to ensure ways to stay in touch with their emigrants through them.

The practice of Islam by North African immigrants involves a number of dimensions that reflect the problems of integration, such as the wish to settle, but also the fact of not benefiting from the same rights than the rest of the national community in terms of religious and cultural freedom.

It is in this context that the undeniable associative dynamics under way among Muslims in France for the past fifteen years must be understood. Its main goals are to bring Islam in France from “the cave into the mosque” in order to provide believers with a place of prayer that can live up to their aspirations, and to bring it from “the shade into the light” in terms of institutionalisation and acceptance by the authorities of the Republic. Finally, this “transplanted Islam” must definitely settle and manage its rapport with French laicity, often presented as fundamentally opposed to public visibility of religion, in general, and to membership to the Muslim community, in particular.

Links with political Islamism?

The issue of a massive reislamisation of North African migrants and their offspring (who were not religiously socialised in the country of origin, unlike their parents), which would mainly, and perhaps exclusively, benefit political groups interested in developing a project of political and social militancy based on the mobilisation of an Islamic dimension, has been much debated in France, where society is characterised by a dynamic of collective questioning with regards to its identity. At first sight, there is really no practical reason why Muslims (and/or people influenced by the common cultural legacy of societies marked by the acceptance of the apostolate of Prophet Muhammad) would not experience the problems and evolutions observable in Muslim countries, like the Maghreb countries. In France though, the relations between the practise of Islam and integration are rather calm.

Indeed, there seems to be a relative interest for supporters of a socially aware Islam, emptied of all colonial complex and reflex, and based on an acknowledgment of France’s new confessional face. Conversely, there are only thousands of supporters of radical groups and maybe only hundreds of advocates of violent militancy.

The role of the community device and its function with regards to integration

For many migrants, joining associations is the means to fully access a legal and political citizenship, while at the same time often maintaining a degree of cultural otherness. The associative sector is of particular importance to strategies of collective inclusion of numerous migrant populations of North African origin and their descendants. Furthermore, the associative dynamic must be understood as a
response to acts of racism, discrimination, condemnation and stigmatisation vis-à-vis migrants and their families. One of the goals of these associations is the promotion of “class solidarity” meant to help migrants protect themselves and react at many levels (legal, political, social and symbolic) against this situation.

The specific associative life of the North African migrant community seems to be characterised by an interest in the issues at stake in French society. Moreover, empirical observation of this reality shows that the meaning and reach of associative militancy vary according to the interest shown and the view on how this community fares in the process of integration in French society, as well as its degree of investment in the elements that allow it to settle. A distinction can be made between three types of associative militancy on the basis of the migrants’ length of stay in France. However, there is a common feature to all these types of militancy: associations must first of all be part of a durable and perennial effort to integrate migrant communities in the French legal, social and political framework, thus helping these social groups, who expect social advancement, to become the equivalent to Anglo-Saxon “would be elites”:

“Three generations stand out (...): “migrant” associativeness, marked by class fight, migration and the workforce world (...); “beur” associativeness, definitely led by generations born of migration, with a tendency for opposition and opportunism; and, finally, social associativeness, divided in a moral associativeness with a national and a local dimension.”

Institutionalisation and quest for a “frenchity” for one’s “Islamity”

The presence of migrants and Muslims in France is an accepted fact (as North Africans are entirely part of the national community). The issue of “Islam from France” and its institutionalisation is inseparable from the fact that it has become more visible and that for the past twenty years migrant milieus in France have been growingly taken into account (at the political, cultural and social levels). Thus, Islam is becoming more and more linked to integration as it becomes less linked to migration, and this phenomenon is undoubtedly due to reinforce itself in the future:

“The presence of Islam (...) is definitely very directly linked to migration flows originating in Muslim societies sustained since the beginning of the 1960’s. Once the religion of workers, (...), from now on Islam is part of European citizenship as a result of the naturalization of the generations born from the first migrants, as well as of different migration movements that support the demographic growth of that population.***

Institutionalisation takes place through a number of channels that lead to a specific interaction and which, depending on their nature, facilitate or complicate acceptance and mutual trust between State and migrants. Moreover, it often depends on actors’ strategies, on the content of inherent challenges to mechanisms that structure French Islam and on the public policies in the field of associative organisation. Looking into the ways of integrating new migrants in the legal fabric meant to manage cultural associations in French society, even though state neutrality is kept as a normative and political principle, it would perhaps be desirable, in certain contexts, to introduce legal reforms so that migrants interested in the associative field are placed at the same level as other components of French society:

“The recognition of denominations is (...) compatible with neutrality as long as the former are treated in an equal manner. In practice, States that have a “recognition” system for religions succeed in translating it into a relatively clear institutional framework, but the Muslim religion is still unequally treated.”

Transnationalism and transnationality in the Euro-Mediterranean framework

Migrants of North African origin have taken for granted that their existence will, in the near but also the far future, result in a relatively strong intertwining in different social contexts (mainly transmediterranean). As a result, they aspire to a transnational role through which “the force of the weak link” plays an important role in the creation of networks that should allow them to benefit from their assets.**

20 Indeed, one can clearly speak of a “re-enchantment of the world” which would follow a phase of “disenchantment” of the world, according to Max Weber in the case of North African societies, where the main geographic and cultural origin of migration flows to France for over four decades. This means that the religious element has always played a central role in the Maghrebian community (in the hands of the King of Morocco), of redefinition (legacy of the colonial period) or of “objectification” (political Islam).

21 Given that the principle of strict separation between the political organisation of life in the city and the consideration given to religious norms (secularism) is one of the basis of the French state, one can say that Islamism is not compatible with neutrality as long as the same level as other components of French society:

22 Islam is indeed the cement of a “wound out,” “hurt identity,” (Jann Maalouf), or even “under siege”, for many migrants whose vision of the world is still partly conditioned by religious considerations.

23 It is therefore best to avoid all temptations to have an “essentially attaches” view, which would explain the attitudes, positions and ideals of migrants from North Africa, while systematically overestimating the Islamic element. Rather, dwelling on the extra religious variables that have an impact on the values of migrant populations (family history, relative position in the mechanisms of social promotion, nature of integration in French society...) can be much more fruitful.

24 The latter can in fact be seen as the fact of having faith for personal reasons, but because of the will to develop an “identity of rejection” vis-à-vis the French social environment, perceived as hostile.

25 Thus, not much can be expected from explanations that stress the “creeping islamisation” of France and/or its banlieues and where an international Islamist movement responds to the wishes to re-Islamise felt by men and women lost to the cause of integration.

26 Even if this phenomenon largely depends on the state of advancement in the process of integration and identification with cultural values and norms in force in the French social space, a discontinuous internationalisation and culture growingly prevails in France. Conversely, in the migrants’ country of origin there was respect for religious laws and it went hand in hand with a cultural reference point in itself largely determined by the acknowledgment of the Islamic fact.

27 Français comme les autres, op. cit., note 12, p. 32.

28 To which, incidentally, one remains more or less true to privatism.

29 Frequently this is the case at the local level.

30 Presented across the Mediterranean as MRE (Moroccan Residents Abroad) they represent, along with tourism, the two sources of transfer (Moroccan Residents Abroad) they represent, along with tourism, the two sources of transfer for its attachment to Morocco.

31 Not mentioning the places of ritual slaughterhouses for ‘Adl al Adha, or the “Muslim squares” in cemeteries; the mosque is rather a greater symbol as it constitutes the most visible sign of the permanent settling of Islam in France, as it becomes part to the city’s urbanism and architecture.

32 The representativity of Muslim actors at the national level and the organisation of the Muslim religion, entrusted to the CFCM (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman) since 2003 are the issues at stake. The CFCM is often criticized in France for being the space where realities between countries of origin of Muslim migrants take place. In this respect, the Paris Mosque (Maison des Musulmans de France) is attacked for its attachment to Morocco.
The Euro-Mediterranean space thus tends to be seen as transnational and as a universe of opportunities. For many migrant entrepreneurs, this results in an integrated vision of this space and a multicultural stance (the purely state-national framework is then quickly replaced because it is considered obsolete, and citizenship becomes, to a certain extent, post national (Yasmine Soysal)). These real transnational communities are the first to benefit from legal (first of all, in the field of Community law) or technological (computer, transport) reform and from the economic windows of opportunity created by the different levels of development and maturity in many sectors in the north and in the south. For this reason, one can also speak, namely in the case of Moroccans living in France, of a “flexible citizenship”, of quasi-diaspora and of the creation of an extraterritorial membership:

“(...) in the context of globalisation, many new migrants build spaces and social networks that run across geographic, political and cultural boundaries. In this context, transnationalism refers to the body of processes through which migrants weave and maintain social relations of a different nature, thereby linking their society of origin with the society they settled in. These networks are the basis of transnational communities”.46
In 2005 there were 493,114 Moroccan residents in Spain, making it the most numerous migrant group in the country. Moroccans are also the group with the widest representation in the territory and are among the oldest in the country (they have been present at least since the mid-1960’s). For a long time, Moroccans were viewed in Spanish society as embodying the stereotype of the migrant. However, as a result of the arrival of new groups, in particular from Latin America and Eastern Europe, the profile of migration in Spain changed, and so did the perception of migration in society.

Indicators show that among migrant communities, the Moroccan one indicates the clearest signs of settlement, but its real integration in Spanish society is still called into question. Indeed, in spite of the clear signs of its substantial integration, there is still a critical view as to its will and/or capacity to adapt to Spanish society. This argument is based on the discourse repeated in Spain in the past few years according to which a distinction can be drawn between migrant communities on the basis of their degree of “integrability”.

Hence the reason why the Moroccan community, alongside with the fact that the majority of its members are Muslim and that it experiences difficulties in adjusting to the local language, is categorised as being “more difficult to integrate in Spanish society” than, for instance, Latin American communities with whom the Spanish share cultural, linguistic or religious elements (Moreras, 2005).

Even though Moroccans have been present in Spain for almost four decades, most of these migrants arrived there more recently than in other countries, namely France. The different migration routes chosen, as well as the different political contexts found in Spain/Catalonia, as opposed to those found in other European countries, not only have an effect on migrants’ integration but also on their ability to influence and create political networks at a local and transnational level. Because transnationality plays a part in the definition of new and wider migration contexts (which no longer only link European societies to those of origin, but also to third societies), and because migrant communities have been calling for a new role as social actors, there is a need to envisage how the Euro-Mediterranean framework could contribute to stimulating a more inclusive environment for migrants as actors in a transnational Euro-Mediterranean area.

Migration brought about new political and social actors to Spanish society, thereby opening new perspectives for their acknowledgment and their full participation in this society’s specific areas. For this to happen, however, public migration policies in Spain should change the way they define migrants (not only Moroccan migrants). The latter have been perceived as persons in need of assistance through several measures whose goal is to confer them a good level of integration, both socially and professionally. This projected on them an image of assisted and dependent communities (Provansal, 1993), thereby making their acknowledgment as independent social and political actors more difficult (Pero, 2005). The fact that Spanish society predefined the way migrants express through associations, the latter being seen as ways of working toward integration, but without explaining what social and political participation encompass, only complicates matters more.

Although this scenario appears to be evolving, so far it has only rarely been studied. This is due to the fact that indicators showing the Moroccan community’s transformation in Spain into a social and political actor, with a key role to play in the EMP, only recently started catching the attention of the academic world.

Migration flows to Spain are much more recent than to other countries such as France, the Netherlands or Belgium. In fact, Spain and particularly Catalonia were viewed by North African, as well as generally by African migrants, as a stage in the route that was meant to take them to other European countries. Their destination was the rest of Europe and they only spent a mere few days or even hours in Spain, and more specifically in Catalonia.

Restrictions imposed on the entry of foreign labour force, at the beginning of the 70’s, during the oil crisis, transformed Spain from a transit country into one where first professional projects could be tried before continuing on originally planned paths. This temporary type of migration later became more stable as soon as the Spanish labour market started to employ this labour force in sectors such as agriculture, industry, construction or great scale communication infrastructures. As a result, Spain became appealing for many migrants, which from then on chose to settle in the Madrid or Barcelona, as well as in the Valencia and, in turn, the Andalusia regions, rather than to continue their routes toward other locations in Europe. Nevertheless, Moroccans did not begin to consider Spain as a preferential destination for migration projects until the mid-1990’s.
In Catalonia, the settlement of Moroccans became significant when family units were rebuilt, new generations emerged and associative and commercial initiatives developed (Group IOÉ, 1994; Moreras, 2004). While in 1986 there were 3,471 Moroccans in this autonomous community, at the beginning of January 2006 there were 194,874, which amounts to a third of the Moroccan population in Spain, making Catalonia the region hosting the largest number of Moroccan residents. The demographic profile of Moroccans in Catalonia is evolving through a greater degree of feminisation and the emergence of a second generation. In spite of this, the Moroccan migrant community is predominantly composed of single men (Generalitat of Catalonia Opinion Study Centre [CEO], 2006).

Moroccan migrants residing in Spain as local and transnational actors

The Moroccan associative fabric is developing in a way that could be interpreted as a transition from a traditional model of associative expression, to one that adopts elements of Spanish political culture. One form of associative expression that quickly developed in the context of migration was the opening of Muslim prayer areas. Later on, more collective initiatives were created with different socio-cultural contents and similar to other civil associations in Spain.

The creation in Catalonia of more associations with a religious rather than a social or cultural content, until the end of the 1990’s, has often been viewed as the result of the absence of an associative tradition in this community. Even though, in truth, western-type of associations only began appearing in Morocco in the 1990’s (Roqué, 2002; Denoeux, 2002; Núñez et al., 2004), this is a rather ethnocentric view, since areas of collective religious expression have an undeniable associative content.

Furthermore, this interpretation fails to take into account how the replacement of a political culture had an impact on Moroccans’ associative expression. Originally, associations in Morocco were ways of reacting toward collective policies. However, the country maintained a policy of restriction of public and political freedoms through which public administration controlled the actions and speech of citizens, beyond what was necessary for the management of the public good. This brought about suspicion and mistrust vis-à-vis any initiative whose goal was to gather the community. Indeed, because of suspicions that such initiatives had political aspirations, a number of legitimate associative proposals were turned down by the authorities, while prayer areas, whose activities remained clear, where not.

The spectacular growth in the number of Moroccan associations created in Spain in the past years could be viewed as a sign that the generalised mistrust toward such collective associations was overcome. On the other hand, it could also indicate the development of an associative expression meant not only for the community itself but also aimed at taking into account the expectations that emerged in these communities in contact with Spanish society.

By and large, Moroccans in Catalonia are barred from participating in electoral processes because they are not EU citizens and, accordingly, they are not entitled to any political right, be it at the local, national or European level. Nevertheless, they are increasingly visible in civil society. A number of associations with different levels of institutionalisation were created with the goal of representing and defending the interests and rights of Moroccans in Spain and Catalonia. These organisations base their actions on a series of elements (political, ethnic and religious) which are then used to define and legally categorise them (as political groupings, cultural associations or religious organisations). In fact, namely because of their interaction with Spanish society, such collective initiatives are active on various areas. The way they are interpreted and categorised in society is therefore in need of revision.

Given that migrants themselves do not enjoy political rights, Moroccan associations play the important role of representing the migrant community as a whole. The panorama of Moroccan associations, of their networks and influence is rather diverse, though a minority of associations indeed have resources and dominate this scene (for instance, the ATIME – Association of Moroccan Migrant Workers in Spain, based in Madrid, and the Ibn Batuta Association, from Barcelona). Previous studies identified numerous divisions among Moroccan migrant associations with respect to Moroccan politics, particularly between those that are critical of, as opposed to those that back the Moroccan political establishment (Danese, 1998; Moren-Alegret, 2001).

Many members of the Moroccan community in Spain, and particularly in Catalonia, are of Amazigh origin. While this had previously not found a clear expression in the associative...
area, in the past years a significant number of organisations focused on an ethnic Amazigh identity emerged.

The first item on their agenda is the situation of migrants in Catalonia and, more generally, in Spain. These associations work on specific issues such as settlement of migrants, discrimination, the role of Islam in the public space, and the situation of children in the Spanish or Catalan education system. According to a recent study made by the Generalitat of Catalonia, Moroccans suffer from a higher level of unemployment than other migrant groups such as Ecuadorians and Romanians, as well as from a higher level of “contractual precariousness”. Moroccans feel they are subjected to discrimination much more than members of other groups, and they complain more about racism by Catalans: indeed, 38% of Moroccans claim they were discriminated because of their origin (CEO, 2006). This very same idea that Moroccans are somewhat rejected by the host society has been documented by other studies, who also evaluated its impact on the on-going process of social integration of these communities (Martín Muñoz, 2003; Aparicio, 2005).

The number of religious associations is growing (approximately a hundred and sixty prayer areas exist in Catalonia, 81% of which are managed by Moroccans), and they attract a great deal of Moroccan migrants (a fact that, to a certain extent, is seen as a missed opportunity by political migrant associations, as religious associations are less incorporated in society and less active in the field of integration). Regardless of their contribution, these associations are important for Moroccan migrants.

The role that Moroccan migrants play in their country of origin’s economy can hardly be underestimated (Moré, 2004; Lacomba, 2004; Haas, 2005). Official remittances sent by Moroccan residents in Spain have more than quadrupled between the years 2000 and 2005. In fact, Moroccan migrants sent 5,142 billion dirham to their country of origin in 2005, thus making Spain the second country in terms of remittances (Exchange Division, 2006). Another example of migrant activities with a transnational dimension can be seen in small-scale exchange that entrepreneurial initiatives developed by migrants engage in with the support of family or friendship networks in their country of origin. There is empirical evidence of the increase in initiatives of this sort, but their impact on the country of origin or on the links developed with third countries (primarily in Europe, López García-Cabello-Moreras, 2002) have not yet been analysed.

Moroccan communities in Spain lag behind those in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as other migrant communities in Spain, in terms of collective transnational commitment to development and democratisation. Nevertheless, these associations have been working on a growing number of activities, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Network for Cooperation in Development (REMCODE) set up by the ATIME association, covering the whole country and dedicated to migration and development projects. The ATIME association and its REMCODE network planned seven projects in total, mainly aimed at improving infrastructure, particularly water and education/teaching services, as well as associative activities. In addition, they participated in cultural exchange programmes with their Moroccan partners.

In Catalonia, the number of projects involving migrant associations is rapidly growing. By and large, these projects are financed by the regional government’s development budget. In addition, the local development agency, the Catalan Fund for Development Cooperation, has three co-development projects under way in Morocco51 largely focused on urban or rural “development” and concerning, for instance, local infrastructure and health services improvement, children and youth. These projects almost always include a dimension of emancipation of local populations, aimed at stimulating them (namely through local and transnational networks) to put together projects that may improve their economic life (Østergaard-Nielsen, forthcoming).

This relative weakness in commitment is not due to the lack of a policy of encouragement for Moroccan participation in co-development. A public political framework for co-development in Spain is under way and in fact Spanish and Catalan political documents on migration and development refer to a transnational co-development and migration agency, while a certain number of local governments and NGOs have already started financing and implementing projects in this area, respectively. Morocco is a priority at the national and at the regional level. Information and updating programmes developed by Catalan NGOs are aimed at motivating Moroccan migrants as well as their associations by informing them on existing possibilities and perspectives and raising awareness on the impact co-development projects could have on themselves and on their native towns (Østergaard-Nielsen, forthcoming).

51 On this matter, see the following webpage: http://www.atime.es/cooperacion2.html.
52 For more on this, see the following webpage: http://www.fonscatala.org.
The transnational dimension remains the weak point of the Moroccan associative world in Spain. Different organisations admit that their international links with other European or North African associations are only sporadic and circumstantial. The need to develop and maintain these links calls for an organisational capacity and human and economic resources that these associations not always have at their disposal.

In spite of this, Moroccan associations in Spain participate in three areas of transnational linkage, which could be the basis for a more active involvement in the future. First of all, attention must be brought on the existence of different initiatives at the European level whose goal is to put Moroccan associations, including those in Spain, in touch with each other and to facilitate cooperation among them. A significant fact stimulated the creation of such federative initiatives. In his November 6, 2005 speech, King Muhammad VI announced two innovative initiatives that mentioned Moroccan citizens living abroad: on the one hand, access to the right to vote and to be elected to the Chamber of Representatives and, on the other hand, the creation of a High Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad (HCCME).

Previously called for by Moroccan communities in Europe, these two initiatives are meant to grant them the rights to vote and to stand for election. Two major initiatives favouring these demands emerged in the past years: the World Congress of Citizens of Moroccan Origin (created in Tangiers, in November 2005) and the Transnational Debate on Moroccan Immigration, Al Monadara (created in January 2006). The latter initiative held its latest meeting in Madrid, in June, and was organised by the Spanish organisation ATIME. These two initiatives are an answer to the claims made by some members of the Moroccan associative world on the need to promote political debate on their country of origin.

However, the fact that in late June a press release issued by the Moroccan Interior Ministry noting that the issue of the emigrants’ right to vote was postponed until after the legislative elections due to take place in 2007 means that this process is, for the time being, on hold. This attitude was criticised by a part of leading instances as well as by human rights movements in Morocco.

A second type of associations is identified by their specific Amazigh-related ethnic demands. These associations have been particularly effective in activating transnational links with other organisations in Morocco and Europe. Amazigh associations have carried out numerous initiatives in Spain (the World Amazigh Congress was held in Almeria, in August 2005) that have been welcomed by the Spanish institutions that support them.

Finally, attention must be paid to associative expressions based on Islamic doctrine. The presence in Spain of different Islamic doctrinal currents facilitates contact with other like-minded communities and is on the basis of a significant number of connections that part of European public opinion started viewing with a certain degree of mistrust in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in New York.

Geographic proximity to the Maghreb favours the development of transnational mobility of, for instance, itinerant preachers that visit Muslim communities under programmed circuits and preach Islamic doctrine. The expressions of this “micro-transnationality”, as in the case of tabligh missionaries, prompt the debate on Islamic authority in Muslim communities. The active spreading of a stricter doctrinal and salafist-inspired Islam is reflected in the type of Islam practised in Europe and Spain.

Moroccans in Catalonia seem to welcome the idea of engaging in development and civil society projects in their native towns. The relatively weak commitment to transnational activities among Moroccans in Catalonia can be explained by three factors described below.

On the one hand, the migration flow of Moroccan origin is relatively recent in Catalonia and Moroccans lack time and resources, integration and savoir-faire that would allow them to conceive and carry through development projects. Indeed, Moroccan migrants work long hours, often in poor conditions.

On the other hand, because of the previously stated reason, Moroccan immigrant associations are mainly concerned with the situation of their members in Catalonia, namely on matters of discrimination and conditions of the labour market.

The third set of reasons for this lack of transnational commitment, suggested by Moroccans themselves, is linked to their own relationship with Morocco and their views on that country: their lack of trust vis-à-vis public institutions and Moroccan politics, as well as toward
development and democratisation processes (Østergaard-Nielsen, forthcoming). This was also visible in a survey conducted by the Generalitat of Catalonia Opinion Study Centre (CEO, 2006), where Moroccans expressed a clear lack of trust vis-à-vis their country’s political class.

It must be noted that the Moroccan migrant community is divided on Morocco, some associations being rather in favour, while others are extremely critical of the political regime in their country of origin. For instance, with respect to political issues concerning the diaspora, Moroccan associations in Catalonia supported the Moroccan government’s position on the end of the Sahara conflict, while associations led by migrants from northern regions (for example the Rif) were critical of the Rabat political establishment.

As migrants settled in the host society, their views on it evolved. Their views were readjusted and contextualised through each migrant’s personal experience. A good indicator of the migrant’s perception of the host society is his or her will to remain living there. Rather surprisingly, and contrarily to the “myth of return” identified among first generation migrants in other locations in Europe, 64% of Moroccans stated in a recent study their wish to settle permanently in Catalonia and to have their closer family join them46. This is an indication that the Moroccan migrant community will become a permanent feature of Catalan society. However, there is no reason to think that Moroccans will stop identifying with Morocco and committing themselves to it through economic, social and cultural activities. Thus political decision-makers on both sides of the Mediterranean face a clear challenge in the future. Indeed, they must set up a public policy that facilitates settlement without impairing commitment to transnationalism, in order to encourage migrants’ potential role in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Islam in Spain displays various features that make it unique vis-à-vis other European realities. For one, Spain possesses a vast legal framework for the recognition of Islam (perhaps the most comprehensive at the European level), in effect since 1992, but that for almost fourteen years has virtually not been applied. Secondly, this legal framework also defines the representative organ of Islam in Spain (the Islamic Commission in Spain). When this Commission was recognised as such, hardly any migrant communities had joined it. Thirdly, Moroccans represent the most numerous Muslim community (almost 78%) but they are not represented in the governing board of the two great Islamic federations in Spain. Fourthly, the controversies generated around the Muslim presence in Spain had less public impact than in other societies. In spite of this, any expression of Islam still elicits a discourse mixing mistrust and suspicion among the Spanish public, as a result of the impact of the attacks that took place in Madrid on March 11, 200445.

The fact that true socio-cultural organisations include elements of a religious nature in their discourse is perhaps not due to a previous decision regarding their associative ideology. Rather, it is a result of the way public discourse persistently refers to the link between the Moroccan community and religion. After September 11, and particularly after March 11, organisations that had previously come forth as the voice of the Moroccan community started dwelling on the issue of integration of Islam and Muslims in Spain. This debate opened to new actors who seek to establish and reinforce their legitimacy as representatives of the community through declarations and strategic and contextual propositions46.

Another trend emerged in the course of the last years encouraging organisations that manage prayer areas to carry out social or cultural activities. It has been argued that Muslim prayer areas must become “cultural and Islamic centres”, that there is a need for such collective initiatives to develop in a much vaster perspective, rather than just limiting themselves to the doctrinal sector. Accordingly, they should develop a much more intense and proactive relationship with the social context they find themselves in, thereby contributing to reducing social tensions that emerged when they opened.

Thus far, religious practises of the Moroccan community in Spain have not been studied in detail. However, in a recent survey conducted by the Catalonia Institute for Statistics (IDESCAT, 2006), reference was made to how frequently Moroccans attend religious services. The sample shows that 18.3% of Moroccans claim they are very observant, 43.2% observant, 29.1% not very observant and 7.8% non-observant. Apart from these very general percentages, only a few indicators of the ways in which this observance is expressed exist.

Religiosity

In a panorama of doctrinal heterogeneity, many Moroccans are linked to Islamic orientation rather than exclusively national or cultural. For instance, the remarks made by ATOME leaders in April 2004 regarding the debate on the degree of influence exerted by imams on migrant communities: they argued for the end of “tolerance toward the visionaries that preach in garages” (31 Pals, April 7, 2004).

46 This does not mean that they give up on their mobility (which they keep in a transnational context) but that their stay in Spain becomes a permanent residence from which they develop relationships with the society of origin. In this new context, the myth of the return is postponed (for many Moroccans, until repatriation upon death!) and is only re-activated temporarily and sporadically during annual holidays.

45 In addition, this feeling was kept alive as a result of the fact that Spain is the European country where more members of Islamist cells were detained in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11 and that, between 1995 and 2005, ninety Moroccans were captured (Jordon-Horbury, 2006).

46 See, for instance, the remarks made by ATOME leaders in April 2004 regarding the debate on the degree of influence exerted by imams on migrant communities: they argued for the end of “tolerance toward the visionaries that preach in garages” (31 Pals, April 7, 2004).

57 It must be reminded that younger generations are much less dependant nationally and culturally to their country of origin.
Within the Moroccan community, some members are observant by habit (for them, religious observance stems from socialisation with a cultural background), while others, are so-called cultural Muslims (they are similar to the former but their religious practise is much less frequent and concentrates around certain moments of the Islamic calendar, as, for instance, the Ramadan).

Additionally, some members of this community follow stricter interpretations of Islam while others express a clear distance from it. The most orthodox interpretations insist on the observance of religious practises as a way of drawing a distinction between themselves and western society. Members who support this current are of the view that a certain distance must be kept from the latter to avoid its secularising influence. On the other hand, supporters of secular currents do not publicly plead for the rejection of faith, but rather for the abandonment of religious practise, without necessarily giving up the cultural factor it entails.

The influence of international debates on Islam, as well as the effect of the presence of conservative currents in Spanish and Catalan Islam, has led to a process of re-traditionalisation of actions and discourses within Muslim communities. This, in turn, results in contexts where new socially legitimised moral conduct models are elaborated and applied. The existence of transnational links between Muslim communities of Moroccan origin and other groups and movements opens the door to specific Islamic doctrinal readings, be it through the frequent visits of preachers to Moroccan communities, the intense consumption of audiovisual products with doctrinal contents, as well as the use of mass media by these communities.

Some leaders of the Moroccan associative world in Catalonia are keen on having a greater importance in local as well as transnational political processes. For the time being, the local often has a priority over the transnational (or translocal), but as the right to vote in Morocco is granted to Moroccans living abroad priorities may change.

**Conclusion**

More importantly, the process through which migrant associations in Catalonia and across Spain are gradually becoming more active in associative European or Moroccan networks must be recognized and supported. It is generally acknowledged in the literature on transnational practises of migrant populations that local and transnational dimensions of migrant participation may be linked. In addition, working on migrant integration and transnational commitment in the country of origin’s politics are not mutually exclusive goals (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The work of migrant community networks on issues related to co-development or on topics regarding integration or discrimination interweaves and can contribute to reinforcing the position of Moroccan migrant associations in the local and transnational political context.

The improvement of conditions for enjoyment of social, economic and political rights by Moroccan migrants in Catalonia, as well as the reinforcement of associative infrastructure and dialogue with political decision-makers and institutions could be a starting point. Nevertheless, Moroccan associations in Spain fare poorly in terms of associative participation. In the CEO survey, nearly half of respondents declared they never or almost never participate in the activities of any association (cultural, sportive and charitable). In order for these associations to be able to promote participation and social integration they should combine the functionality of services they offer with activities and sufficiently appealing propositions for these communities. Furthermore, Moroccan associative life in Spain must also adapt to the changing realities. Promoting local and transnational levels of networking, sharing resources among migrant associations and dealing with partners in civil society and with political actors in Mediterranean sending and host countries could create a legacy. In light of this, the Euro-Mediterranean framework could be a satisfactory tool for dialogue and action on these issues.

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Morocco

Introduction

Moroccan emigration to Europe was carried out in two phases: the first one, mainly during the “trente glorieuses”, to countries like France, Belgium, the Netherlands or Germany; the second one, more recently, to countries in the south of Europe, mainly Spain, Italy and Portugal, that had themselves been countries of emigration.

Today, the Moroccan community is strongly present in the countries of the European Union. According to statistical data made available by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, among the 3.15 million Moroccans living abroad, i.e., 10% of the legal Moroccan population, 84.6% are settled in Europe (Hassan II Foundation). Furthermore, according to OCDE statistics, the number of Moroccans settled in OCDE countries amounted to 1,181 million in 2001, when they were 971,000 and 690,000, in 1990 and 1985-6, respectively (OCDE, 2002).

The presence in Europe of migrant communities from different societies and with different cultures, namely from the southern bank of the Mediterranean, including from Morocco, has raised concerns among authorities in countries of origin as well as EU institutions in the area of migration management policies.

The example of Moroccan migrants in France and Spain is the best case in point to evaluate migration management policies implemented in the Euro-Mediterranean space by both countries of the north and the south bank of the Mediterranean, receivers and issuers of migration flows.

Moroccan migrants in these two countries stand out first of all for their quantitative importance. Indeed, in 2002 France numbered approximately 1,024,766 Moroccans, while Spain had 493,114, amounting to 46.9% and approximately 18% of the Moroccan population in Europe, respectively.

A further reason for analysing the situation of Moroccans in these two countries is that France is a country of old and Spain one of recent migration.

Discrimination: Partial Citizenship in the Host Country and in the Country of Origin

MRE (Moroccans residing in Europe) are doubly discriminated: in host countries, because they do not enjoy a number of fundamental civil, economic and political rights and thus live as second-class citizens, marginalised from life in society; and in countries of origin, as a result of the suspension of their political rights, which, again, makes them marginal citizens. This double level of discrimination results in a partial citizenship that impairs the role sought for MRE, namely after the Barcelona summit of 1995.

For numerous reasons, migrants and migrant groups are vulnerable in host countries. On the one hand, they are negatively viewed in host countries, a fact that partly accounts for their inferior status in society. Like other migrants, Moroccans endure these discriminatory practises in their daily lives, both at the institutional and social level.

At the institutional level, discrimination is namely seen in laws and other measures that fail to grant the same rights to, and recognise the equality of migrants vis-à-vis other nationals. Different laws and measures enacted by a variety of governments had strong provisions on migrants such as, for instance, the Pasqua and Juppé laws, in France. In addition, a discriminatory attitude from public powers toward migrants was visible in the context of the 2000 operation of regularisation of illegal residents, whereby 50% of Moroccans, Algerians and Pakistanis were denied regularisation, while 76% of Latin Americans had their claims approved.

For a long time, the absence of enjoyment and exercise of political rights by MRE in host countries was considered to be the natural consequence of the fact that the King considered them to be his subjects, even when they naturalised, given that Moroccan nationality is not lost upon the adoption of another nationality. Late King Hassan II was opposed to participation of MRE in the political life of host countries. Could this be explained by the fear of how this participation could impact on a political regime that was then resistant to European democratic values?

At the social level, discrimination is visible in discourse and degrading treatment both coming from politicians and a number of social milieux of different cultural levels, and in practical daily life: in administration, commerce and public transport.
In France, discrimination can be seen in most aspects of life, such as in housing, education, employment and work and justice (with blatant impunity or, at least, light sentences being given to perpetrators of racist crimes).

In Spain, the racist attacks against Moroccan migrants living in the El Ejido slum, in February 2000, the refusal by farmers from Andalusia to hire Moroccans for the strawberry picking, in 2002, or the “Islamic veil” case, in the same year, are examples of this.

**Discrimination in the country of origin: suspension of political rights – MRE’s partial citizenship**

In public discourse, MRE are permanently spoken of as “our citizens” from abroad. The Strategy of the Delegate Minister in Charge of the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad, adopted by the Moroccan Government Council on March 13, 2003, clearly states the need to “guarantee the right to full citizenship through a better political participation of the Moroccan community residing abroad”.

To be fair, in terms of rights and duties, the law does not discriminate MRE vis-à-vis Moroccan citizens residing in Morocco. At a practical level, it must be acknowledged that Moroccan authorities adopted numerous measures aimed at allowing MRE to exercise the rights that are already recognised to them by law. In addition, numerous measures were implemented to avoid them from being treated differently on account of their expatriate condition. In this respect, significant progress was achieved in the improvement of transit, stay and administrative services.

However, when it comes to the actual exercise of the right to political participation, particularly their representation in public institutions, MRE are not present in government, parliament or any State institution. Bearing in mind their attachment to the country of origin, their commitment to the defence of national causes in host countries and their substantial contribution to the national economy, MRE do not enjoy the same full citizenship as nationals that reside in Morocco.

Before 1984, there were few MRE and their economic contribution was reduced, which explains the lack of political will to allow participation of MRE in the country's politics. From then on, it was believed that the need to consolidate links with MRE would lead Moroccan authorities to include them in political life. Thus the “alternance” government was expected to take measures to allow this community to participate in the September 27, 2002 legislative elections, in the context of an announced democratic transition. Much to the disappointment of MRE, no action was taken, thereby maintaining MRE outside national political life.

MRE associations expressed their great dissatisfaction at the situation and went as far as claiming their right to participation before the courts (action brought by the Conseil de l’Union des associations des Professions Libérales des Marocains en France and the Collectif des Marocains de l’Île de France et des autres régions de France, as well as the Sahraouis Marocains associations in France and Europe and the Groupe Fayole Marocain).

The claim to the full exercise of their right to political participation has since then been continuously advanced. It finally found echo in the November 6, 2005 speech during which the King unambiguously announced the will to allow MRE to participate in the coming 2007 elections. The Moroccan community abroad was quick to think that a new era had begun and that the citizenship of Moroccans residing abroad would be fully and irreversibly restored.

The Head of State’s announcement on the future participation of MRE in elections created a dynamic in Morocco as well as among the Moroccan community abroad. Internally, political parties began working with the aim of guaranteeing the votes of the Moroccan electorate residing abroad and finding potential candidates to represent them and secure seats in Parliament in 2007. Numerous political leaders, namely of Istiqlal, Rassemblement National des Indépendants and the Parti de la Justice et du Développement, travelled to Europe and other locations to meet MRE. At the same time, the issue of representation of MRE in Parliament as well as in the High Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad resurfaced in the media with great strength.

Abroad, members of the Moroccan community expressed great enthusiasm at the idea that justice would be delivered coupled with a strong desire to take part in the 2007 elections. This can be seen, for instance, in the results of a survey conducted by the Yabiladi.com website, according to which 68% of the youth intends to vote in the 2007 elections.
In Morocco as well as in host countries, MRE associative networks were reactivated. This is the case of the Al Monadara group, which recently organised a “Transnational debate on Moroccan migration” regarding participation in the 2007 elections. Activities such as communications, meetings with political leaders and lobbying proliferated since the royal announcement, in a background of competition among different associative actors of the Moroccan diaspora.

The question of how to reconcile a double political allegiance, a situation where the right to political participation is simultaneously guaranteed in the host country and in the country of origin, remains to be solved. Opinions diverge on this point, but it nevertheless seems possible to overcome a chauvinistic vision of matters and to view this double political participation as the realization of a supranational citizenship, the Euro-Mediterranean citizenship.

A necessary condition to allow migrants to play a key role in EMP lies in accepting equality in the enjoyment of rights and duties to extra-communitarian migrants. Moreover, it is necessary to accept a different culture and, namely, different religious practises.

While religiosity of Moroccan migrants lies at the heart of the debate on integration in host countries, it is also of great interest to the country of origin. This is due to the fact that religion is generally considered to be an important element of one’s identity. This is true of nationals, and even more so of migrants coming from foreign countries and from societies with different cultures. This is the case of migrants coming from countries such as Morocco, where no separation exists between the spiritual and the temporal. According to the Kingdom’s Constitution Islam is the State religion and the Head of State is the “commander of believers”.

In Morocco, Muslim religion is practised in a coherent social environment characterised by the unity of the rite, in this case the orthodox Malikite rite. Unlike in EU countries, religion is not relegated to the private sphere, a difference that makes religiosity of MRE problematic in their relations with authorities and societies in the countries of residence but also in their relations with the country of origin.

According to what until now has been the dominant view in European countries, North African migrants’ specific culture and particularly their religion, Islam, is an obstacle to their integration. This view is reflected not only on EU member countries’ migrant policies but also in society, through demonstrations of hostility toward Arab migrants, identified with extremist and terrorist Muslims advocating violence.

These demonstrations of hostility, resulting from different causes, raise fear among Muslim migrants, like Moroccans, that they will not be able to freely practise their religion. Understandably, one of the main concerns of the first generation of migrants in Europe was to guarantee they could practise their religion freely and peacefully in such a different social environment and thus be able to preserve their cultural identity, which lies in their “Moroccanity” but also in their Islamity.

In practise, MRE living in EU countries have always faced great difficulties to freely and peacefully practise Muslim faith with all the rituals that are imposed on them. On the one hand, few prayer areas exist, as local authorities belonging to nationalist political currents and opposed to diversity (such as, for instance, the Front National, in France), often denied or made difficult obtaining authorisation to open them. Secondly, specific political currents manifest their mistrust or even hostility toward Islam in every election. Indeed, according to their electoral strategies, Islam is one of the main topics of mobilisation of the electorate. The media, in turn, have a pernicious tendency to associate Islam with terrorism, fanaticism, integrism, extremism, or simply criminality. All these factors concocted a negative image of Islam and MRE, identified in the collective conscience of local populations by their religion. Islamophobia also gained weight in specific currents of society in EU countries, which translated in racist and xenophobic behaviour toward MRE.

Excluded and marginalised by host societies on account of their religion, MRE were driven to an attitude of identity-based withdrawal, finding in Islam and the inherited culture of their country of origin a refuge as well as a factor of social mobility. Indeed Islam, as any religious system, produces a social link by including followers in a tradition of belief. In addition, by uniting them in a moral community, it generates a sense of adherence to a community and thus supplies them with a basis for identification.
The first migrants did not adopt this attitude of withdrawal, since due to their low level of education, rural origin and socio-economic conditions they had little basis to integrate in host society in the first place. Rather, their offspring, the second and third generations, adopted this attitude as a way of reacting to the policies of marginalisation and exclusion they have been subjected to.

This attitude of withdrawal can be interpreted as a “(...) substitute of a denied citizenship, as the search for an identity inasmuch as more than an act of faith, it reflects the sense of belonging to a social group, frequently defined from the outside as sharing among its members a set of ethical, social and cultural values (...)”.

Because of the need to maintain and consolidate the links with the Moroccan community abroad, it has ceaselessly been stated in Morocco that its goal is to preserve the culture and faith of its citizens living abroad. Through the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad, an institution dedicated to the Moroccan community abroad, Arab language and Moroccan civilisation teachers, as well as preachers were sent to Europe. Nevertheless, the assessment of these efforts shows that they have been insufficient. Not only was the number of teachers and preachers sent far from covering the whole community, but also they were given inadequate training on the European context where the members of the Moroccan community live.

Bearing in mind the context of progression of religious conservatism within Moroccan society, Moroccan authorities only realised the urgent need to adequately frame the religiosity of MRE after the attacks that took place in Morocco, namely in Marrakech in 1984 and, more importantly, in Casablanca on May 16, 2001, to which young members born of Moroccan migration in Europe where linked.

Furthermore, it has been argued that a close watch should be kept on a number of migrants integration projects based on the “laicisation” of Islam in host countries. These projects aim at cutting the migrants from their national roots by advocating that their allegiance to the religious authorities of their countries of origin is coerced rather than free. (Belguendouz, 2004)

However, the problem does not appear to lie in Islam but instead in the narrow perception host societies have of the followers of Islam (reduced to their ethnic aspect), and in their contempt toward the right to difference.

The Euro-Mediterranean space cannot be a cooperation space without the acceptance of one another’s differences. Cultural and religious diversity must be understood as a source of enrichment rather than as a distortion factor, as long as values such as dialogue, tolerance and opening to the other prevail. Collaboration among partners is vital in order for this to happen.

The dynamics, priorities and processes under way in the religious chapter differ on each side of the Mediterranean. In the north, attempts have been made to control what became a major social phenomenon (in France) and that is central to the debate on society. This was done through a search for representatives (of Muslims) to act as an intermediary between the political power and the Muslim community.

In the south, advancing a religious frame has been a priority. The goal is to protect MRE from the influence of extremist doctrines that could lead them to act against their own country.

Legitimate as they are, the interventions from States on both sides of the Mediterranean are not concerned with harmonisation. As a result, not enough is done to create a model of Islam where, in line with the Barcelona Declaration, MRE could be politically mobilised.

The idea that transnationalism is linked with attitudes, behaviours and activities as well as with cultural, social and religious identities developing across political borders and aimed at maintaining the links with the countries of origin (Aubarell and Aragall, 2003) is fully confirmed by the case of MRE in the Euro-Mediterranean space.

Indeed, Moroccans living abroad distinctively remain strongly attached to the motherland, contributing to its development through different behaviours and actions while working toward the prosperity of the country they inhabit.
The contribution of MRE to the country of origin: an underdeveloped and badly exploited contribution

Numerous attitudes and behaviours of Moroccan migrants attest to their strong attachment to the motherland and their contribution to its development.

Contribution of MRE as individuals

One of the major signs of MRE’s attachment to their country of origin lies in the periodical and regular mass return to Morocco, namely during the summer holidays or for religious celebrations. To some extent, Moroccans residing abroad feel a need for physical contact with their country of origin, and so every year more and more of them return to their roots in Morocco. According to statistics by the National Commission with the Prime Minister in charge of welcoming migrants, created in 1996, among the approximately 3.1 million Moroccans residing abroad, 2.8 millions have visited Morocco (Muhammad V Foundation for Solidarity, Report on the transit of MRE, 2005). Far from decreasing, as could be expected following their settlement process, family reunification and massive naturalisation, the number of MRE returning to visit Morocco is clearly increasing. In addition, the first migrants as well as the second or third generations are part of this periodic return.

Another indicator of the transnational behaviour of Moroccan migrants in the EU showing their attachment to their country is the transfer of funds to Morocco. Moroccan migrants left their country with the idea of returning only after having saved money in host countries. In truth, migration was and remains an economic project aimed at collecting as much savings as possible.

Similarly to numerous countries, remittances of workers residing abroad represent the main source of foreign financing for Morocco (J. Bouhaghaegbe, 2004), greatly surpassing the income from tourism. In a range of 25 years it represented on average 6% of the GDP (source: World Bank and IMF, 2003). Lately, this manna amounted to 9.63% of the GDP, 29% of the import rate and 45% of the export rate (Al Maghreb Bank, (Morocco); World Bank: World Development Report, 2000-2001). There was an estimated increase of 11.1% in remittances by MRE between 1970 and 2004. The amount of remittances from MRE to Morocco is expected to reach 47 billion dirham by 2025 (Bouyiaour, 2005).

In addition, most MRE remittances are made through known formal circuits such as banks and post offices, the remaining being operated through informal circuits, which escape official statistics, such as compensations between co-nationals and the commodities migrants bring along with them on their visits to Morocco.

MRE not only transfer currency but also goods which are estimated to be worth between 20% and 30% of transfers (according to a survey covering two main emigration sources: Nador, in the north of Morocco, and Tadla, in the centre). These goods gave rise to a true formal trade in certain Moroccan cities.

The problem in Morocco today is to find the best way to optimise the use of MRE remittances, given that until now the first migrants preferred to invest in unproductive sectors, thus having little impact on the country’s development. Indeed, there is a clear trend to invest in real-estate. The latest updated survey (INSEA, 2000) shows that 84% of households invested in houses, 7% in agriculture, 5% in commerce and 1.4% in tourism.

Little changed in this behaviour, and MRE continued to invest mostly in their region of origin. In fact, according to the conclusions of a colloquium held in Settat (south of Casablanca) in 2004, 80 to 90% of MRE investments are located in their region of origin and this is also expressed in the breakdown of bank deposits. Again, according to the INSEA study, 57% of respondents said they were interested in investing in Morocco, while 14% expressed their wish to invest in their host country.

In recent times, a new generation of MRE investors emerged. Generally educated, more aware than their ancestors and more up to date with international economic and financial matters, they invest in novel areas and in more competitive sectors such as new technologies.

Nowadays, the issue at stake in Morocco is to know how to benefit from the manna of remittances annually transferred by its citizens residing abroad with a view to, on the one hand, avoiding it from drying up and, on the other hand, channelling it toward the sectors with the most significant side-effects in the economy as a whole (Bouyiaour, 2005).
Contribution of MRE to networks

After decades marked by a strong politicisation of the Moroccan associative fabric, migrant communities finally acknowledged in the beginning of the 1990’s, that the permanent nature of migration gives another dimension to associative work, both in the host country and the country of origin. Thus new motivations drive a great number of newly-created MRE associations working in different areas. As they gradually got involved in different development projects in the country of origin, the need emerged for them to develop new rapport with Moroccan public powers and to become intermediaries between the former and members of the Moroccan community.

A significant aspect of Moroccan associative life in European countries lies in the fact that Moroccan elites, which are more and more numerous among the migrant population, are gathering in associations with a scientific nature, aimed at contributing to the transfer of scientific and technical knowledge to the country of origin, such as the Savoir et Développement” association, created in 1999, in France, and the “Caravane, association des marocains des grandes écoles”, or the “Migration and Développement” association (V. Bouayiour, 2005). At the same time, Moroccan entrepreneurs created associations to facilitate carrying out their investments in Morocco, such as the “Club des Investisseurs Marocains à l’Étranger”, created in 1996.

Another aspect of transnationalism in MRE behaviour which has not been sufficiently studied lies in small-scale commercial exchange involving entrepreneurial initiatives developed by migrants, with the support of their family or friend networks in the country of origin (Lopes, Garcia, Moreras, 2002). It would be interesting to measure the impact of such activities in the country of origin.

Based on the available data, the contribution of MRE to the country of origin and to its development is thus significant but could be even more so if the conditions laid down by the authorities of the host country and the country of origin were more satisfactory, and if civil society were more resourceful. Indeed, an array of legal, administrative and financial measures could allow migrants to develop their transnational performance as a way of benefiting the Euro-Mediterranean area.

MRE based in EU countries have long acknowledged the economic role they play both where they live and where they came from. They are proud of this role and claim they want and can do more as long as they have the means for it. Nevertheless, they are frustrated about the fact that, on the one hand, they have a second-class citizen status in the north of the Mediterranean due to the discriminatory acts they are subjected to, and, on the other hand, that they’re deprived from participating in the political life of their country of origin, in the south. They feel diminished in their rights and status in both countries.

Furthermore, the stereotyped image that in the north pictures them as a source of manual or intellectual work, and in the south as agents of fund transfers is also troubling for them. This stereotyped image has been fought with more and more intensity by elites engaged in associative action, as MRE aspire to be citizens placed on an equal footing with other nationals in terms of rights and duties.

MRE admire host countries for their democratic system where rights and liberties are guaranteed, as well as for the technical and scientific advancement that allowed a high degree of comfort and well-being to develop. At the same time, though, they feel they are treated unfairly because they are often discriminated.

MRE are also strongly attached to Morocco and they stand by its main causes. However, they are disappointed by the attitude of Moroccan authorities based on an almost exclusively utilitarian conception, whereby only their economic contribution is recognised, while their right to participation in political life is denied.

Part of the Moroccan community abroad undoubtedly still maintains the image of the so-called “années de plomb” when an authoritarian political regime that restricted fundamental rights and liberties and adopted a suspicious stance, viewing them as potential opponents. This image no longer matches reality since the new phase inaugurated in Morocco at the end of Hassan II’s reign. The will to democratis the country, to install the rule of law and build institutions changed the traditional image engraved in the collective conscience of MRE. Indeed, the attitude of MRE has been changing in the last few years, namely through
greater involvement of associative organisations in development projects, particularly in their region of origin. This involvement should be deepened to the extent that the processes of elaboration of public policies in numerous areas is currently based on the principle of dialogue and is open to sectors of society, among which MRE associations.

In addition, in spite of the geographical distance to Morocco, of the fact that they took roots in the host country, of a massive naturalisation process and integration policies, MRE continue to identify with their country of origin, with its culture and its religion, and are still involved in development projects. They see themselves as a link between the countries where they live and the country of origin when it comes to scientific and technological knowledge transfer needed for the development of the latter (see, for instance, the activities of Moroccan scientific associations abroad). As a result, they act as transnational actors because they work across the borders of at least two countries.

Nevertheless, the idea of MRE perceiving themselves as Euro-Mediterranean citizens, conscious of the responsibility to develop this common area on the basis of a Partnership grounded on the values of democracy, freedom and respect for human rights, has a long way to go. This gives those in charge of the PEM in the different countries of the Partnership the duty to grant a redefined citizenship to migrants and to promote their transnationalism so that they can truly play a key role in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

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Migrant communities and the internal and external dynamics of integration: The potential role of migrants in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Final Conclusions

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is particularly aimed at the linkage between the EU and EMP member countries and, until recently, focused little on the Mediterranean population present in the European Union. Indeed, even though 5 million persons from the southern bank of the Mediterranean live in EU countries, the significance of this reality has been overlooked. The importance of migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean agenda should be stressed, and this must entail the acknowledgment of migrants' potential as actors of the Partnership.

When dealing with the potential role of migrants in the EMP this report chose to single out two aspects: migrant communities and transnational dynamics.

1. The problem of finding a definition of migrants immediately arises when studying migrant communities. Studies made in France and Spain offer quite different typologies. While a definition may be agreed upon (residents born abroad with a foreign nationality at birth) and there is a specific legal definition, this study shows that a number of sociological aspects and social conditions specific to each migrant (time of stay, migrant project, links to the country of origin, etc.) must also be taken into consideration.

In France, persons who have resided in the country for decades, and even French nationals born in France, continue to be viewed as migrants. In Spain, the debate on the ability of this community to integrate is followed by a constant comparison to the integration of other migrant communities (such as South Americans and Eastern Europeans).

As a result of the fact that long-term migration exists in France, currently the debate no longer revolves around the integration of migrants and their children but rather on the full acceptance of the multicultural dimension of society. In Spain, since the Moroccan community is not yet fully settled, this issue is treated differently.

It must thus be noted that in spite of the need to define political rights on clearly identified topics, the complex elements of migration must always be taken into consideration, hence the importance of migrant communities.

2. The importance of associative activity as an element of inclusion must be stressed when analysing migrant communities. Migrant associations can be divided into three categories: firstly, so-called ethnic associations aimed at defending collective rights; civic associations, dedicated to the promotion of integration and to the protection of common social rights in the host society; and, finally, associations with a potential role on the development of societies of origin whose main goal is promoting development or modernisation of the country of origin.

Once again, the difference between France and Spain in this aspect is noteworthy. In France, migrant associations have a social character and must be understood in the background of the reactions migrants brought about in French society (racism, discrimination and stigmatisation). Also, they reflect that migration has been present for a long time and they are often the work of members of the second generation of migrants. However, the Moroccan report showed how France has also seen the rise of elites or “beurgoisie”, whose associative activity has an important impact on the country of origin. On the contrary, in Spain migrant associations are still weak and are ethnically, religiously, and sometimes even politically oriented, while at the same time influenced by the Moroccan government.

- A dynamic associative life exists in several EU countries where Moroccan communities can also be found. These associations are active at different levels: internally (developing the inclusion potential of migrant communities); and externally (their actions impact on the country of origin).

3. Transnational dynamics have an impact on the migrant's own views on citizenship. On the one hand, it brings about a certain amount of flexibility (being a citizen in the north or the south of the Mediterranean). On the other hand, extraterritoriality means that the migrant can be an actor in both societies, which gives a new meaning to the concept of citizenship itself.

According to the report, the nature of networks differs according to the country under analysis. While in the case of the Moroccan community in France one can speak of a transnational dimension (for instance, some associations are committed to the development and democratisation of Morocco in coordination with Moroccan communities in different EU countries), in Spain networks operate at a rather translocal level. Indeed, their goal is to influence the regions of origin, but because of an insufficiently strong organisational structure they are not connected with Moroccan communities from other European countries.
4. The remaining aspect of this issue is the feeling of national belonging of migrant communities. In this regard, on the one hand there is a feeling that goes beyond the nation, a national feeling determined by extraterritoriality and, on the other hand, a closer feeling, a “Marocanity” often lived more intensely than the policies of the Moroccan state vis-à-vis MRE. The study on Morocco stresses the need to link active instruments and policies that have a real impact on MRE.

- Thus national policies of the sending country and European policies regarding host countries must absolutely be linked.

5. Finally, geographic proximity (at least between the countries under analysis) must also be considered as a key factor and as an opportunity to enhance economic and commercial exchange through networks, i.e., a system that mobilises collective social capital. In addition, the fact that these countries are neighbours must allow access to Euro-Mediterranean instruments and the new instruments being carried out in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy must also be taken into consideration.

- Transnationality has a specific potential given the shared “mediterraneity” of the north and the south.

Discrimination is a key factor with a clear influence on migrant communities in Europe. The studies included in this report suggest the need to denounce discriminatory practices (expressed mainly in education systems and labour markets). However, the political dimension has a greater impact on the EMP agenda.

In this regard, means need to be found to publicize the benefits and possibilities of mutual enrichment brought about by migration (cross-border work mobility, etc.). More must be done to show the positive side of migration by arguing that regardless of the reasons that led people to move, migration flows enrich cultures and societies and have a positive economic impact.

Mechanisms are under way in Europe to promote political rights of migrants. On the one hand, the concept of civic citizenship is under discussion. This requires the EU to acknowledge a set of rights (for instance, by way of the directives on family reunification and long stay) that add further to the rights already recognised in Member-States (for instance, the right to vote in local elections in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland). Nevertheless, this is an internal debate within the EU that unfolds on the fringe of the EMP.

Within the EMP, migration is perceived by some as an opportunity to reform the concept of citizenship. Indeed, residence is seen as an element that legitimizes membership to a political community. This policy tries to benefit populations settled for long periods by supporting integration and co-responsibility and promoting citizenship as a horizon. It thus tries to tackle the problem of lack of citizenship but also to dignify political participation.

In addition, the Moroccan report mentions the existence of obstacles to political participation in the north as well as in the south. Indeed, the suspension of political rights of MRE by Morocco (migrants therefore have partial or incomplete citizenship) must be added to political discrimination of MRE in host countries.

Answers must be found for migrants’ lack of political rights in the context of the EMP, i.e., in a regional Euro-Mediterranean perspective. The Partnership should support the concept of residency-based political citizenship, namely by showing support for a migrants’ rights charter, particularly in the context of Euro-Mediterranean conferences on freedom, justice and home affairs.

Recommendations
In a non-Muslim country, religion becomes the resonance chamber of potential antagonisms between the host society and migrant communities. The way in which Islam is practised (observance and loyalty to religious values) depends on the socialisation of migrants within the host society. In a social environment where Islam is perceived as a hostile element, religious loyalty may drift into a refuge-identity.

In the past few years religious elements have been incorporated in non-religious organs. The report shows that this is due not so much to a previous decision but rather to a public discourse in which the religious point of reference has become increasingly meaningful. Since September 11th, the March 11th attacks in Madrid and the July 7th attacks in London, the general debate on integration of Islam and Muslims in Europe (see, for instance, the cartoons crisis) required organs that voiced the concerns of the Moroccan community to take a stance.

In this framework, the equation between religious membership and citizenship could be solved with the replacement of migrants’ status as Muslim migrants for that of European Muslims. Islam could then become an actor on major issues such as the integration of religion in the public space, in a background of laicisation of European society. It could also respond to the emergence of internationally organised religious radicalism that negatively impacts on its image, and thus on its coexistence with the host society.

Another significant aspect to be stressed is the potential of this citizen-centred Islam to become a political actor and take part in cultural dialogue. Instruments such as the Anna Lindh Foundation, that aims to encourage dialogue among cultures in the framework of the EMP, should bear in mind the potential role of migrant communities in structuring cultural dialogue.

The potential for development that migrant communities represent in the context of the EMP must be also underlined. Two areas are of particular interest in this context: on the one hand, individual initiatives in the private sphere such as remittances and productive investments; and, on the other hand, international cooperation, thanks to which administrations can influence the role of migrants in activities in the cooperation for development area.

In the first case, what is at stake is maximising the efficacy of remittances and productive investments. The Euromed agenda should make existing (FEMIP) or future financing instruments of the Partnership more dynamic. In this respect, it must be noted that geographic proximity between host countries and countries of origin should inspire tools aimed at channelling the growing commercial and economic interests created by the presence of settled migrant communities in Europe.

In the specific area of international cooperation, co-development is a way of linking migration and development. Nowadays, the migrant must be seen as a potential agent for development, capable of contributing to the reinforcement of cooperation relations between societies of origin and host societies. Migration can contribute to development thanks to capital transfer, investment and consumption, as well as to the introduction of new knowledge and entrepreneurial activities. Furthermore, these actions can also set the ground for democracy and greater respect for human rights.

The last issue stressed by this report is the potential of associative mobilisation. Indeed, it has become a key aspect for the exercise of citizenship, both internally, in the host country, and externally, in the country of origin. Migrant associations are important internally because they are engaged in debates on immigration and integration policies, and externally due to their effect on migration policies as well as on reform and political modernisation. Action at a transnational level calls for migrant communities such as those present in several EU countries, prepared to formulate specific request that can have an innovative or transformative impact on the political debate in the country of origin.

As a result, the EMP agenda should promote and support initiatives with a Euro-Mediterranean dimension (such as the non governmental EuroMed network on migration) as useful tools for dialogue between migrant groups and governments. Encouraging reflection is one of the network’s goals (created in the framework of the EuroMed civil forum) on current migration policies with a view to making sure that they take economic, social and political rights of migrants into consideration.

The issue at stake is the important role to be played by migrants in the Partnership with regards to issues on migration, as well as the EMP agenda, in order to establish full-citizenship at the Euro-Mediterranean level.


