An Overview of Migration Governance in Ethiopia
Zoë Ogahara and Katie Kuschminder

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction ................................................................. p.5

2. Country Context .......................................................... p.7

3. Migration Outcomes ...................................................... p.8
   3.1. Refugee Hosting
   3.2. Emigration
   3.3. Return to Ethiopia
   3.4. Internal Displacement
   3.5. Human Trafficking

   4.1. The Government of Ethiopia
   4.2. International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations

5. Migration Actors .......................................................... p.25
   5.1. Key National Agencies and Institutions
   5.2. International Actors

6. Conclusion ................................................................. p.28

7. References ................................................................. p.30

8. Appendices ................................................................. p.35
   8.1. Key Legislation Concerning Migration
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AICS</td>
<td>Italian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARRA</td>
<td>Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs</td>
</tr>
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<td>AVR</td>
<td>Assisted Voluntary Return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Danish Church Aid</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTF</td>
<td>EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Development Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>iDE</td>
<td>International Development Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoWCY</td>
<td>Ministry of Women, Children and Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>UN Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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</table>
1. Introduction

The ADMiGOV project seeks to develop a definition of good migration governance that is grounded in data from fieldwork and is consistent with the New York Declaration and Sustainable Development Goals. This includes: i) following a bottom-up perspective centred on practices ii) being consistent with the complex multi-dimensional nature of migration governance, and iii) taking seriously the interests of migrants and countries of origin, considering the principles of protection and sustainable development. As such, an initial definition of migration governance is “a multilevel configuration of actors, relations, resources, policies and practices that regulate international migrations”. Migration outcomes are shaped by these elements of governance (Pasetti, 2019). At the same time, these factors and outcomes can be seen as constantly interacting to steer the regulation of migration. One of the main challenges regarding migration governance is delineating which actors and policies are relevant to migration and how various actors and policies interact with non-migration policies to affect migration outcomes; migration trends may be influenced by various kinds of events and actions, such as economic policies or conflict.

This background paper is structured by the aspects of migration governance highlighted in the definition above using the case study of Ethiopia. These analytical ‘building blocks’ are intended to form an accurate impression of the current state of migration governance in Ethiopia. It is noted, however, that migration governance is continually evolving, particularly in complex migration environments such as Ethiopia, and this paper therefore provides an overview of the situation in the spring of 2019. This background paper begins with migration outcomes, which provide a context for describing the migration policies, practices, and actors that govern the outcomes.

Ethiopia is a significant country of emigration, refugee hosting, return migration, and internal displacement. It is important to note that there are major subnational differences in the drivers and dynamics of migration in Ethiopia. The government of Ethiopia in partnership with multiple international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other actors have actively been working to improve the governance of migration to and from Ethiopia. Major recent changes in the field of migration include the following events:

- The Ethiopian Government’s nine pledges to improve the lives of refugees following the New York Declaration in 2016. Ethiopia is one of 15 countries currently participating in the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), an agreed plan to implement the New York Declaration.
- A ban on low-skilled labour migration to the Middle East was lifted in January 2018.
- The temporary opening of the border with Eritrea in September 2018, following the conclusion of a peace agreement in July 2018, saw large numbers of Eritreans entering Ethiopia. Since January 2019 the land border has been periodically closed, although the air border has remained open.
• A National Reintegration Directive was endorsed at Ministerial level in September 2018. This serves as a legal document to reinforce the use of common methods and approaches for the reintegration of returnees at the national level.

• In January 2019, the Refugee Proclamation was passed by the national parliament. This legislation will allow refugees to live outside of camp settings and participate in the formal labour market.

Additionally, migration dynamics in Ethiopia have recently been affected by a range of social, political and economic challenges; particularly ongoing ethnic conflict and drought in the southern and western regions, which is contributing to increasing food insecurity.

This report was written in May 2019, based on desk research and interviews in March 2019 with 17 stakeholders from 13 different UN agencies and NGOs in Addis Ababa. It is not intended as an exhaustive description of migration-related issues in Ethiopia, but an introduction to current challenges, trends and migration governance in Ethiopia. It examines three main areas of migration governance: 1) current migration policies and practices, 2) migration-related actors, and 3) a more limited analysis of the availability of resources and the relationships that contribute to regulating international migration to and from Ethiopia.
2. Country Context

Ethiopia is situated in the Horn of Africa, bordering Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. In July 2018 the population was estimated to be almost 110 million, making Ethiopia the most populous country in Africa after Nigeria. The majority of Ethiopians live in rural areas; only 20.8 percent of Ethiopians live in urban areas (World Bank, 2019). Ethiopia has a young population with 63.4 percent under 24 years old (CIA World Factbook, 2019). As a result of rapid population growth, there are over three million young people joining the workforce each year. The population is composed of distinct ethnic groups, of which the largest are Oromo (34.4 percent), Amhara (27 percent), Somali (6.2 percent), and Tigray (6.1 percent) (CIA World Factbook, 2019).

Since 2005, Ethiopia has experienced GDP growth of between 7.5 percent and 13.6 percent, and is thus one of the fastest growing economies in the world (World Bank, 2019). Despite this growth, in 2018 Ethiopia was still classified as a country with overall low human development (0.463) (UNDP, 2018b). From 2001 to 2016, the headcount poverty rate declined from 45.5 percent in 2000 to 23.5 percent, although this still represents 22 million people in Ethiopia living under the international poverty line (UNDP, 2018a).

Schewel and Legass Bahir (2019) identify three overarching migration trends since the 1960s; the sedentarization of nomadic and semi-nomadic populations, increasing urbanisation, and a steady increase and diversification in international migration trajectories.

International migration trends can be categorised in four waves: Before 1974, largely an Ethiopian elite went abroad for education and then returned. Between 1982-1991, many refugees fled the Marxist military Derg regime. In the third wave, between 1982-1991, many families joined those who had initially fled the regime. After 1991 the Derg regime was defeated and in 1994 Ethiopia held democratic elections (Lyons, 2007). The final wave of migration from Ethiopia can be characterised as that from 1991 to today where there have been shifts from refugee to labour migration, increasing south-south migration, and the feminization of migration in Ethiopia (Kuschminder, Andersson and Siegel, 2012, p. 33).
3. Migration Outcomes

3.1 Refugee Hosting

Ethiopia maintains an open-door asylum policy and is the second largest refugee hosting country in Africa, with 905,831 refugees registered as residing in the country as of August 2018 (UNHCR, 2018d). Even though this represents less than one percent of the total population, refugees are typically hosted in underdeveloped regions and in some cases, for instance in the Gambella region, refugees outnumber the host community. There are four main groups of refugees that are hosted in different regions of Ethiopia; Eritreans (Tigray and Afar), South Sudanese (Gambella), Sudanese (Benishangul-Gumuz) and Somalis (Somali).

As can be seen in Figure 3 (below), the largest refugee population comes from South Sudan, followed by Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. Whilst the contexts of their displacement differ, these are all protracted refugee situations that have been active for two decades or more (UNHCR, 2018b). There are 26 refugee camps in Ethiopia that are run by the government’s Agency for Refugee and Returnees Affairs (ARRA), in partnership UNHCR and NGOs. There are also substantial refugee populations living in urban areas. Those who moved under the 2010 Out of Camp policy are registered with ARRA and UNHCR, although the majority in urban areas are not registered. Refugees also make up part of the outflows from Ethiopia, as they migrate internationally to join their families or seek better work opportunities.
3.1.1 New Refugee Arrivals from Eritrea in late 2018

On the 9th July 2018, the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea that had begun in 1998 was formally ended. As part of the resumption of diplomatic relations, the border crossing between the two countries was opened on 11th September 2018. Following the reopening of the border, there was a major influx of Eritreans fleeing to Ethiopia in what multiple NGO and IGO respondents described as a ‘silent emergency’. By the 20th October, UNHCR reported that there were 14,107 newly registered refugees, of whom 90 percent were women and children, in contrast to the majority of residents in the refugee camps in the Tigray border region, who were male (UNHCR, 2018e). According to UNHCR, 74% of the new arrivals cited family reunification as a secondary motive for their cross-border movement (UNHCR, 2018e). Many soon moved on from the Tigray region to join their families elsewhere in Ethiopia or abroad. The borders have unilaterally been opened and closed by the Eritrean government, and from the first quarter of 2019, only occasionally open. New inflows into Ethiopia therefore continue, although the volume of new arrivals fluctuates in accordance with the border controls in place. In March 2019, there were reportedly an average of 300 arrivals per day (Interview 27/03/2019). Because these events took place after August 2018, these figures are not included in the refugee data in Figures 2 and 3.
3.2 Emigration

Historically many Ethiopians emigrated in order to escape political instability: During the 1974 revolution and subsequent conflict under the Communist Marxist-Leninist Derg regime until 1987, many people fled the country for safety and for better opportunities. During the Derg regime, exiting the country was highly controlled. The 1990s led to a new era as Ethiopia’s borders were opened and emigration became more accessible. With recovery and change occurring in Ethiopia, migration to the Middle East became an opportunity for economic migration, and this has continued to increase. The precise numbers of emigrants from Ethiopia are not known. Emigration occurs today in multiple ways including: highly skilled migration and student migration, and low-skilled migration. Each of these is discussed further below.

3.2.1 Highly Skilled Migration

More skilled Ethiopians have migrated to countries in the Global North, particularly the US, Italy and Canada for education and employment opportunities (Semela and Cochrane, 2019). This is a particular concern among health workers; reportedly Ethiopia trained 4629 physicians (including 1153 specialists) between 1987 and 2006, but the public sector retained only 20 percent, or 932 professionals in the same period (Tamrat, 2019). A 2012 study from Addis Ababa University found that 53 percent of medical students hoped to emigrate after graduation (Deressa and Azazh, 2012). It has been estimated that less than four percent of Ethiopian emigrants travel abroad on student visas for the purpose of their tertiary education; largely to the US, South Africa and Sweden (Kuschminder, Andersson and Siegel, 2012).

3.2.2 Low Skilled Migration

Lower skilled migrants, on the other hand, travel to the Global South, especially the Middle East and Africa. As can be seen in Figure 4, Saudi Arabia has the largest Ethiopian migrant stock after the US. It has been estimated that as much as 60-70 percent of labour migration from Ethiopia is irregular (Fernandez, 2013). In the Middle East, women almost exclusively undertake domestic work, whereas men work as guards, day labourers and in agriculture (De Regt and Tafesse, 2016). As there are more opportunities for women to migrate legally, they are more likely to be able to travel directly to the Middle East than undertake the dangerous journey through transit countries, notably crossing the Gulf of Aden. It has been found that the main cited motivation for women to travel abroad is to improve the economic situation of the family, followed by gaining enough financial capital to enable starting a business in Ethiopia (Nisrane et al., 2017; Schewel, 2018a). In addition, women may seek to delay marriage after their education is complete or cannot be continued (Schewel, 2018b). In some cases, secondary students reportedly aspire to migrate rather than succeed in their final exams or attend tertiary education because the salaries for skilled jobs in Ethiopia are lower than unskilled jobs abroad (Semela and Cochrane, 2019).
There are reportedly frequent instances of abuse of both regular and irregular migrant workers in the Middle East. Research has demonstrated that legality provides little protection for domestic workers in the Middle East (Kuschminder, 2016). The *kafala* (visa sponsorship) system means that workers are legally regarded as the responsibility of the employer, who must give written consent to change employer or leave the country. To do so without permission renders the migrant an irregular migrant. Migrant workers are vulnerable to a range of abuses, including the withholding of wages or important documents, such as passports, food deprivation, and psychological, physical or sexual abuse (Fernandez, 2013; Kuschminder, 2016). Migrants are additionally vulnerable to abuse while in detention (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019b). Countries that use the *kafala* system include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Due to the vulnerable position of Ethiopian migrants in the Gulf States, between October 2013 and January 2018 Ethiopian legislation forbade Ethiopian nationals travelling to the Gulf States in search of low-skilled work. However, this is believed to have contributed to higher rates of irregular migration to the region.

### 3.2.3 Refugees and Asylum Seekers

In recent years, Ethiopians are increasingly regarded as economic migrants rather than forced migrants (Horwood, 2015). Globally, in 2018 there were 92,172 Ethiopian refugees and 133,240 asylum seekers. Compared to 2016, the number of refugees has decreased from 96,394, whereas the number of asylum seekers has increased from 107,047 (UNHCR, 2019d). The main countries of destination for Ethiopian forced migrants are Kenya, South Africa and the United States (see Table 1).
Table 1 Ethiopian Refugees and Asylum Seekers by Countries of Residence in 2018 (UNHCR, 2019d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>18115</td>
<td>9584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>17726</td>
<td>49347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>9635</td>
<td>5679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>6448</td>
<td>7213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6045</td>
<td>7517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4780</td>
<td>6730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>4203</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3981</td>
<td>16067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3814</td>
<td>12117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2360</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15065</td>
<td>17806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>92172</strong></td>
<td><strong>133240</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although precise data is unavailable, there is evidence that it is common for refugees from other countries in Ethiopia to migrate onwards to other countries or urban areas of Ethiopia, particularly for Eritreans. In 2016, a UNHCR food distribution monitoring exercise found that there were 81,000 Eritrean refugees who were absent from the camps in Ethiopia (UNHCR and DRC, 2016). Eritreans are recognised *prime facie* as refugees in most European countries and many seek to migrate onwards to Europe. A survey conducted by the World Bank in 2017 found that over 60 percent of Eritrean respondents want to move to another country (World Bank, 2018, p. 42). Some Eritreans are able to migrate through legal means; largely through family reunification and a very small minority through resettlement (in 2016 the resettlement target was 6,465, 0.09 percent of the refugee population). However, most migrate out of Ethiopia by irregular means (UNHCR and DRC, 2016).

### 3.2.4 Migration Routes

There are three main migratory routes for irregular migration out of Ethiopia. Whilst the Northern Route is taken by both Ethiopian nationals and refugees, the Eastern and Southern Routes are largely taken by Ethiopian nationals.

- **The Northern Route** through Sudan and Libya to Europe via the Central Mediterranean.

Data on the number of migrants travelling this route is difficult to collect but can be measured through arrivals to Italy, as well as the number of asylum applications. Figure 5 shows the number of Ethiopian nationals claiming asylum in Italy from 2009 to 2018.
It is well known that with the implementation of the Italy-Libya agreement at the end of 2017 the number of sea arrivals to Italy has significantly decreased. As of 30th November 2019, UNHCR reports that there are 1,058 registered Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers in Libya (UNHCR, 2019c). Most likely the number of Ethiopians in Libya is higher when accounting for those that are not registered. UNHCR has reported that there may be 115,000 refugees and migrants originating from the Horn of Africa in Libya (UNHCR, 2019b).

This route is known as one of the most dangerous in the world. Kuschminder and Triandafyllidou (2019) have demonstrated the systemic kidnapping and extortion of Eritreans entering Libya via the Sudanese border, wherein migrants are extorted and tortured until their families pay for their release. It is likely that a similar situation applies to Ethiopians and Somalis that also enter on this route. With the crackdown on smuggling in the country, East Africa refugees and migrants are increasingly relying on a few highly organised smuggling rings (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 3).

- The Eastern Route through Djibouti and Northern Somalia towards the Arabian Peninsula through Yemen to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Countries.

Due to access constraints there are no official numbers of arrivals in Yemen, although IOM estimates that 159,838 Ethiopians and Somalis arrived in 2018 (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019a). This would be a 60 percent increase on the total number in 2017. Smugglers are taking advantage of reduced policing of irregular migration on this route due to the conflict in Yemen. This route continues to be extremely dangerous; in January 2019 alone, two boats capsized in the Red Sea, killing 58 people (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019). Additionally, migrants have reportedly been targeted by fighters in the Yemen warzone and may be forcibly recruited into armed forces as part of the conflict (Migration Policy Institute, 2019).
• The **Southern Route** through Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and/or Malawi with the final destination as South Africa.

This Global South-South migration route has received relatively less attention but has been a prominent migration route for Ethiopians since the early 2000s. Horwood (2009) illustrated the dangerous journeys Ethiopians undertake on this route with the goal to reach South Africa. In early April 2019 the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania met with the IOM and the EU to create a roadmap to address the issue of migrants stranded along this route (IOM, 2019a). The roadmap also considers alternatives to detention practices and explores better coordination for protection and voluntary return. There are suspected to be large numbers of migrants from the Horn of Africa who are trafficked or in detention along this route, including minors. In early 2019, it was reported that 1,900 Ethiopians in Tanzania were released who had been allegedly held by the Tanzanian authorities (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019).

### 3.3 Return to Ethiopia

#### 3.3.1 Deportation from Saudi Arabia

Large numbers of Ethiopian nationals have been forcibly returned from Saudi Arabia since Saudi Arabia began to implement strong measures to engineer the ‘Saudization’ of the labour market in late 2013 (Frouws, 2014, p. 53). From May 2017 to August 2019, 300,000 Ethiopians, including 22,306 registered minors, are estimated to have been deported to Ethiopia (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019b). Only 14 percent are reported to have returned voluntarily. Nevertheless, returnees commonly aspire to go back to the Middle East.

#### 3.3.2 Assisted Voluntary Returns

In 2018, Ethiopia received the third highest number of return migrants globally who had been assisted through IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) schemes. The majority of the 4,794 Ethiopians who voluntarily returned arrived from African countries, mostly Djibouti (IOM, 2019c). IOM has also reported assisting over 2,000 Ethiopian migrants returning from Yemen in 2019, suggesting that many were stranded on the route to the Middle East (IOM, 2019b). It is notable that 79 per cent of the vulnerable migrants who were assisted from the region were underage and separated children from Ethiopia (IOM, 2019c). Much fewer Ethiopians were returned from European countries; in 2018 there were 307 people returned from Europe for all of the East and Horn of Africa (IOM, 2019c).

**Table 2 Top five host countries/territories from which Ethiopians returned in 2018 (IOM, 2019c)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Country/Territory</th>
<th>Total number of returns to Ethiopia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>3383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.3 Diaspora Engagement and Skilled Return

Since the late 1990s, when Ethiopia was stabilized and borders re-opened, diaspora engagement and skilled return flows have been active. However, there are no official statistics on these flows. One source that has been used to show the growth of diaspora activity is the number of diaspora investment projects per year, which is recorded by the Ethiopian Investment Authority (Kuschminder, 2017). Data from 1994-2010 shows a large increase in the 2000s, with a peak in 2006 and 2007 (Kuschminder, 2017).

Ethiopia’s diaspora has been predominantly located in the United States and Europe, but it is arguably growing in the Middle East with recent flows (Siegel and Kuschminder, 2011). Since the early 2000s, the government of Ethiopia has been developing policies to engage the diaspora. This includes the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs and the Diaspora Coordinating Office of the Ministry of Interior being established in 2002. In 2013, Ethiopia launched its first diaspora policy and has been active in extending rights to the diaspora, such as Yellow Card for expatriate citizens (Kuschminder and Siegel, 2016). In recent years there have also been several diaspora and skilled return programmes in Ethiopia, including the IOM Netherlands Connecting Diaspora for Development Programme. This programme has provided short term assignments to highly skilled diaspora returnees (United Nations University Migration Network, 2016).

3.4 Internal Displacement

Ethiopia now has one of the largest populations of IDPs in the world, with an estimated 3.19 million people forcibly displaced from their homes (OCHA, 2019). The drivers of internal displacement in Ethiopia are complex and interlinked. As noted by the IDMC, “High levels of vulnerability among rural populations exposed to severe drought and floods, political and resource-based conflict and overstretched government capacity create a high-risk environment in which significant new displacements take place each year” (IDMC, 2019).

As noted above, Ethiopia has a primarily rural population, who mostly depend upon agriculture as their source of livelihood. In 2018, it is thought that 296,000 new displacements took place as a result of climate and weather-related phenomena (IDMC, 2019). Whilst in 2018, the majority of these displacements were caused by flooding, in 2016 and 2017 the majority of displacements were caused by drought, primarily in the Somali region.

Resource scarcity, exacerbated by droughts and floods, has fuelled communal tensions and conflict, particularly in the Somali region where the movement of pastoralists has been affected by reduced amount of land for grazing. Ethnic and cultural differences have been raised, with the border dispute between Oromia and Somali regions an ongoing conflict that escalated in 2017. Conflict and displacement was recorded along three of Oromia’s regional borders, with the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR) in the south-west, the Benishangul-Gumuz region in the north-west, and the
Somali region in the east (IDMC, 2019). The majority of new displacements in 2018, 2.9 million people, were due to conflict (IDMC, 2019).

3.5 Human Trafficking

It has been reported that human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Ethiopia, and Ethiopians are also exploited abroad (US Department of State, 2019). In many cases the distinction between human smuggling, human trafficking, and kidnapping and extortion are muddled (see Kuschminder and Triandafyllidou, 2019 for further explanations). Migrants travelling irregularly through Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia or Yemen may be subjected to abuse, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, indefinite detention, debt bondage and unpaid labour during a part of the journey (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2017).

In Ethiopia there has been a tendency to focus on human trafficking, when actually several cases are that of human smuggling, or kidnapping and extortion. For example, in research by Grabska, De Regt and Franco (2019), girls discussed planning their journey with friends, family members, partners or neighbours and then locating a samsara (agent) who would facilitate their cross-border journey. Young women without connections are often persuaded by smugglers who promise work opportunities abroad. Once they are in the country, the smuggler places the women as domestic workers and collects their salaries for the first months. The women may be forced to spend their one day off work a week in the home of the smuggler and subjected to abuse, often rape (Grabska, De Regt and Franco, 2019, p. 110).

In 2018, federal and regional justice officials investigated 535 ongoing cases and convicted 1,028 traffickers under the 2015 anti-trafficking proclamation, of whom 240 were sentenced to prison time (US Department of State, 2019, p. 192). Some of these cases, however, may be more concerned with smuggling. In 2017, 182 traffickers were convicted. No investigations or prosecutions into public officials complicit with trafficking were reported (US Department of State, 2019, p. 192). Federal and regional governments intercepted over 10,100 adults and children in 2018, who were mostly intending to travel to the Middle East of elsewhere in Africa in search of work (US Department of State, 2019, p. 192).

Internal trafficking is believed to be a large problem, although the extent of it is unknown. Local NGOs suggest that it may be a greater problem than external trafficking, especially vulnerable children who are exploited in commercial sex and domestic servitude (US Department of State, 2019).
4. Migration-Specific Policies and Practices

Following from the introduction, migration trends are largely influenced by policies that do not necessarily have a migration intention. In this section, the report focuses upon migration-specific policies; policies that are intended by policy makers to have a migration consequence (seeking to impact migrants or potential migrants) (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011). It is nonetheless acknowledged that there are various migration-relevant policies that have an impact on migration to and from Ethiopia, which do not seek to impact migrants or potential migrants (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011). These policies are not detailed in this report, but may include employment opportunities and conditions, healthcare and educational services. Practices are seen as the measures and processes in the implementation phase, through which policymakers’ goals and policy outputs are brought into practice. It is noted that there may be differences in a stated policy and its implementation and outcomes (Pasetti, 2019).

4.1 The Government of Ethiopia

The following section outlines some of the main policies affecting migration to and from Ethiopia. An overview of key legislation concerning migration is included in 8.1.

4.1.1 Refugees and Asylum Seekers

The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework

On the 19th September 2016, 193 Member States unanimously adopted the New York Declaration at the UN Summit on Addressing Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants. This included core elements of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), an agreed plan for addressing large scale movements of refugees and migrants. During the Refugee Leaders’ Summit the next day, Ethiopia made nine pledges in line with the principles of the CRRF (Table 3). Additionally, the nine pledges are aligned with the Government of Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), and with the current United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Ethiopia is thus regarded as one of the pilot countries for the CRRF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 Government of Ethiopia’s Nine Pledges</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Expansion of the “Out-of-Camp” policy to benefit 10% of the current total refugee population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Increase of enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education to all qualified refugees without discrimination and within the available resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Provision of work permits to refugees and to those with permanent residence ID, within the bounds of domestic law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Provision of work permits to refugees in the areas permitted for foreign workers, by giving priority to qualified refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Making available irrigable land to allow 100,000 people (amongst them refugees and local communities) to engage in crop production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Building industrial parks where a percentage of jobs will be committed to refugees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Provision of other benefits such as issuance of birth certificates to refugee children born in Ethiopia, possibility of opening bank accounts and obtaining driving licenses.

8. Enhance the provision of basic and essential social services.

9. Allowing for local integration for those protracted refugees who have lived for 20 years or more in Ethiopia.

The realization of these pledges is taking place with the cooperation of over 50 operational partners, including government agencies and ministries, development and humanitarian actors, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, the World Bank and the private sector (UNHCR, 2018a, p. 9). The process is governed by a steering committee that provides overall direction, guidance and recommendations. Whilst the steering group was once under the Office of the Prime Minister, it is reportedly now under the responsibilities of ARRA, a less politically prominent position (Interview 26/03/2019). The co-chairs of the steering group are the Deputy Director of ARRA, the State Minister for the FDRE Ministry of Finance and Economic Co-operation (MOFEC), and a UNHCR representative, who are assisted by a developmental advisor assigned from donors. The remainder of the steering group comprises representatives from various line ministries and international organizations. The implementation of the CRRF is also supported by a National CRRF Coordination Unit and technical committees covering the thematic areas of concern. According to an interviewee, the steering committee last met in May 2018, although technical committees and other partners have continued their work within the framework of the CRRF (Interview 26/03/2019).

Figure 6 Governance Structure for the Implementation of the CRRF (FDRE ARRA, 2017, p. 16)

In November 2017, the Government of Ethiopia released The Roadmap for the implementation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Government Pledges and the practical application of the CRRF in Ethiopia, which outlines the responsibilities of
different institutions in implementing the nine pledges, and a basic needs assessment (FDRE ARRA, 2017). A draft National Comprehensive Refugee Response Strategy (NCRRS) 2018-2022 was released in April 2018, and was to be finalized incorporating the input from stakeholders (UNHCR, 2018a). This is not yet available online.

The translation of the pledges into legislation is in progress. Thus far two proclamations have been passed by the Ethiopian parliament within the framework of the CRRF, as can be seen in Table 4. The new laws must further be translated into regional level legislation, regulations and directives. This process has been met with challenges in some regions, for instance in the Gambella region where there are historical tensions between the host and refugee communities, against a background of ongoing resource scarcity (Genest, 2018). Interviewees reported that the regional parliament rejected the proposals for the Refugee Proclamation, and there were riots and other public disturbances in response to the January 2019 Refugee Proclamation (Interviews 27/03/2019, 28/03/2019).

**Table 4 Legislation achieved under the CRRF Framework**

| Reforms to Proclamation 760/2012 - July 2017 | Permits the issuance of civil documentation for refugees |
| Proclamation No. 1110/2019 – January 2019 | The new law replaces the 2004 Refugee Proclamation. This law allows refugees to obtain work permits, access primary education, obtain drivers’ licenses, legally register life events such as births and marriages and opens access to national financial services, such as banking. There are still barriers for refugees to work, however, they will have to apply for work permits and prove that it is a role that an Ethiopian could not fulfill. |

Despite these challenges, there are a large variety of interventions that are taking place under the broad umbrella of the CRRF strategy; almost all respondents made reference to supporting the CRRF or ensuring their programming is ‘CRRF-ready’ (Interviews 26-29/03/2019). Examples of interventions that align with the CRRF include helping refugee parents enrol their children in Ethiopian schools, skills training for refugees to be able to participate in the local labour markets, and supporting integration by providing services for host and refugee communities together.

**Out of Camp Policy**

The Government of Ethiopia aims to gradually phase out the existing encampment policy in the next ten years from 2017, which will see the closing of the 26 refugee camps that are currently active (OCHA, 2017). This will necessitate a transition to out-of-camp refugee services and local integration opportunities. An out-of-camp policy has been active since 2010 but permission can only be granted by ARRA and UNHCR to Eritrean refugees who have an Ethiopian national as a sponsor. Moreover, permission to reside out-of-camp did not initially include legal access to formal wage labour (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). The policy was intended for self-reliant refugees, and thus there has been very little support for refugees who moved to urban areas under the official OCP scheme (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). The January 2019 Refugee Proclamation gives all refugees the right to
reside and access formal work out-of-camp, theoretically ensuring that they may be self-reliant (Tadesse Abebe, 2018). However, the proclamation must be translated into regional law and its implementation thus far remains very limited. Given restrictions on employment include proving that the job cannot be fulfilled by an Ethiopian, this law may make little difference to low-skilled refugees.

Job Opportunities and Educational Scholarships

As part of the Ethiopian Job Compact, which was signed with the World Bank, DFID, the European Investment Bank and the EU in 2018, there are intended to be jobs available for refugees within industrial parks or Special Economic Zones (SEZs). However, there are concerns that the wages offered are too low. Reportedly, in Hawassa Industrial Park, wages of $26 a month leave employees unable to afford decent housing, food, and transportation (Barrett and Baumann-pauly, 2019).

In 2018, there were 830 refugees who were recipients of DAFI scholarships to attend university, the largest country programme in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR, 2019a, p. 20). These scholarships are partly funded by UNHCR and the Government of Ethiopia. Refugees are sometimes able to attend vocational trainings run by TVET colleges together with host communities (GIZ, 2019).

Registration and Statistics

In support of the CRRF, since August 2018 UNHCR and ARRA have implemented the comprehensive registration (level 3) of all refugees, who are then enrolled on the new Biometric Identity Management System (BIMS). Level 3 registration allows refugees to record information on education and professional skills, as well as details of family members located in other countries. This strategy for improved data collection and centralization is intended to aid refugees in accessing services provided by UNHCR, ARRA and NGO partners according to their specific needs. The registration exercise is projected to be completed in the summer of 2019 (UNHCR, 2018d).

4.1.2 Return and Reintegration

There are three main groups of returnees in Ethiopia; those who come from 1) the Middle East; 2) Europe; 3) Libya and other transit countries. The large numbers of returnees from the Gulf States has prompted a humanitarian response. There have been particularly high numbers of forced returnees from Saudi Arabia, from where 163,018 Ethiopians were deported between November 2013 and March 2014, and approximately another 300,000 between May 2017 and August 2019 (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019b). Even though the high rates of deportations are slowing, the number of forced returns remains high: according to a key stakeholder interviewee, February 2019 saw the repatriation of 2600 Ethiopians per week (Interview 27/03/2019). These deportees often arrive in Ethiopia without savings or assets, having been held in some kind of detention facility prior to departure. Many have health problems such as tuberculosis or psychosocial issues (Lecadet and Tafesse Melkamu, 2016).
Up to mid-2018, IOM has run a transit centre where approximately 13,000 returnees have been registered and provided with food, temporary shelter and onward transportation cash assistance (IOM, 2018). Those with medical needs have been referred to various international and national NGOs, including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) or Agar Ethiopia. Responsibilities for receiving the new arrivals are in the process of being transferred to the Agency for Refugee and Returnees Affairs (ARRA). ILO Ethiopia has run further programmes in support of returnees, and which have focused on their psychosocial wellbeing, economic empowerment, awareness-raising among the public, and institutional development. ILO Ethiopia also developed a reintegration proclamation, which was approved by the Government of Ethiopia in October 2018 (Kuschminder and Ricard Guay, 2017).

Returnees from Europe have been addressed under a different framework. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) has awarded €15,150,000 to ARRA for the sustainable reintegration support given to Ethiopian forced and voluntary returnees from Europe (European Commission, 2017). Additionally, support has been provided through the regional EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration (EU-IOM, 2019). Both ARRA and IOM provide services that aim to provide returnees with economic, social and psychosocial support for their sustainable reintegration, targeted at both the individual and community-level, as well as capacity-building activities for relevant local institutions.

The EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration also supports returnees who voluntarily wish to return from Libya, alongside the GIZ initiative Better Migration Management (BMM), which is also partially funded by the EUTF. Although the numbers of voluntary returns are lower than from other regions, 76 people returned from Libya in September 2018, returnees from along this route are likely to face particular challenges related to the high incidence of traumatic experiences on this route, and may be in need of extensive psychosocial support (IOM, 2018). An interviewee indicated that in the future there may be larger numbers of returnees from the so-called Southern Route to South Africa who will require similar psychosocial support (Interview 27/03/2019).

4.1.3 Labour Migration

In a move intended to safeguard the wellbeing of citizens, in October 2013 a ban was put in place that forbade Ethiopians from travelling abroad in search of low-skilled work. Despite the ban, migration to Sudan and the Middle East continued in large numbers through irregular means. The ban was lifted in January 2018 following the introduction of new regulations for employment agencies and the redesign of programmes to prepare potential migrants with the skills they will require abroad. In law, migrants may only travel to work in countries where Ethiopia has concluded a bilateral labour agreement. The Ethiopian Overseas Employment Proclamation No.923/2016 specifies that the agreements must address the issue of working conditions, means and venues of enforcement, among other details (ILO, 2017). Nevertheless, as mentioned above,
opportunities to migrate by regular means are very limited, and irregular labour migration to the Middle East continues in significant numbers.

4.1.4 Smuggling and Trafficking

Proclamation (No.909/2015) defines human trafficking and smuggling, outlines penalties for the offences to strengthen the pre-existing penal code (fines of up to 19,500 USD and, in severe cases, the death penalty) and procedures for investigations. Additionally, Article 40 establishes a National Anti-Trafficking Task Force, which is responsible for designing and implementing policies. The task force sits under the Office for the Attorney General and has 25 members including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs. NGOs are not permitted to participate. *The National Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants* was also released in 2015, drafted by the Government of Ethiopia in cooperation with IOM. Organisations including UNHCR, GIZ and IOM are supporting the task force through actions such as awareness-raising on issues of trafficking, and capacity building for regional level anti-trafficking task forces.

According to the US Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report 2019, Ethiopia remains in Tier 2 as, whilst significant efforts have been made to combat trafficking, these efforts are not sufficient in many key areas. These areas include addressing internal trafficking, including child sex trafficking from rural to urban areas, standard procedures for front-line responders to proactively identify trafficking victims among vulnerable migrants, and sufficient support for male victims. Additionally, Ethiopian officials did not report that funds were allocated for the implementation of the national plan (US Department of State, 2019).

4.2 International Agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations

According to the OECD, Ethiopia received the second largest amount of overseas development aid in 2017 after Syria; US$4117 million in total (OECD, 2019). An overview of key donors is provided in Figure 7. Whilst much of this funding goes through government institutions, there are substantial activities by international agencies and non-governmental organisations that also have a large influence on migration issues. The development interventions by International agencies and NGOs may broadly be categorised as the following, in no particular order.

- Awareness raising of the risks of irregular migration and irregular migrants’ experiences (e.g. UNHCR Telling the Real Story)
- Building the capacity of local government and institutions for migration-related issues, such as training magistrates, police, or counsellors on issues that affect vulnerable migrants and returnees (e.g. GIZ Better Migration Management)
- Advocacy on migrant issues (e.g. ILO for the Reintegration Directive)
- Protection of vulnerable migrants (e.g. UNICEF)
- Agricultural Interventions (including crop and livestock innovations) (e.g. iDE)
• Service Provision (health, education etc.) (e.g. Danish Refugee Council, Plan International)
• Skills Training (sometimes through TVETs) (e.g. ZOA Ethiopia)
• Links to employment or self-employment (e.g. AICS Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia)

Many programmes have an awareness raising component regarding the risks of irregular migration, even if it is not the sole focus of the campaign. A discussion of all activities by international agencies and NGOs is outside the scope of this report. As part of the ADMiGOV project, it will look at the activities funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).

There are hopes that coordination between governmental and non-governmental organisations will improve following the February 2019 Civil Society Proclamation, which permits foreign charities to work in the area of human rights protection, and reduces the restrictions in place on funding sources for Ethiopian charities (Freedom House, 2019).

Figure 7 Total Official Overseas Development Aid Received by Ethiopia in 2017 (OECD, 2019)

4.2.1 EUTF - Development Programming with Migration Objectives

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was established at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015 in response to the so-called ‘migrant crises in Europe. In three years, the fund is worth €4.5 billion, of which €278 million has been spent on projects in Ethiopia (excluding regional projects) (EU Commission, 2019). The objectives of the fund are for “stability and to contribute to better migration management, including by addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular
migration” (EU Commission, 2019). The issue of migration is thus no longer framed in terms of a humanitarian response for refugees in camps or other vulnerable migrants, but rather as a broader developmental issue for both refugee and host communities in the name of ‘addressing root causes’ for irregular and forced migration. Whilst some programmes focus on traditional migration-related issues, such as strengthening border controls and providing protection for victims of trafficking, activities that were once considered as development initiatives are now increasingly justified using a migration lens. Because of the emphasis on migration, most programmes cite their target group as women and youth because they are most likely to migrate. These activities are framed as reducing the desire or need for irregular migration among both the refugee and host communities. This approach can be seen in the ‘Ethiopian Jobs Compact’, for example, to which international donors have pledged a financing package of $550 million to fund the creation of 100,000 new industrial jobs, of which 70% are intended for Ethiopians and 30% for refugees (DFID, 2019).
5. Migration Actors

5.1 Key Institutions and Organizations

Table 5 provides an approximate overview of the responsibilities of different ministries, agencies and organisations related to different groups of people affected by migration. As can be seen, the governance of migration-related issues is fragmented; it has been unclear which government agency has been responsible for cross-cutting issues such as the health and education of refugee women and children, or the integration of youths, refugees, returnees and locals, into the labour market. As shall be elaborated further, whilst organisations such as UNHCR have traditionally focused upon offering services to refugees only, IOs, development organisations, and NGOs including GIZ and ZOA are increasingly aiming to offer ‘integrated’ services and programmes, that is, the same services and programmes for both refugee and Ethiopian nationals together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5 Migration Partners in Ethiopia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia Concerned</td>
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<td>Coordination Structures</td>
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<td>Development and Emergency Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO Partners</td>
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</table>

5.1.1 Increase in Migration-related Agencies and Organisations

Interviewees noted that the number of agencies and NGOs concerned with migration-related issues in Ethiopia has grown in the last five years due to the interest of donors in stemming irregular migration to Europe (Interviews 26/03/2019, 28/03/2019). In some instances, the higher number of actors working on similar issues has resulted in better
coordination between NGOs, for instance the implementation of the Regional Development Protection Programme (RDPP) has involved the cooperation of numerous NGOs. The RDPP has coordinated NGO partners by organizing them into geographic ‘lots’, whereby each ‘lot’ typically shares office space and other resources (European Commission, 2016b). On the other hand, the proliferation of actors involved in providing assistance to vulnerable migrants as well as promoting development in general will require careful management in order to avoid duplication of efforts and/or incoherence. One of the greatest concerns raised by stakeholder interviewees is that the successful achievement of objectives relating to both the reduction of irregular migration and the promotion of economic development may be undermined by the lack of an evidence-based theory of change to guide programming.

5.2 International Actors

5.2.1 Horn of Africa

Ethiopia is part of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which also includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Migration is addressed within the Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF), which was adopted by member states in 2012. Following the RMPF, the IGAD Secretariat has adopted the Migration Action Plan (MAP) 2015-2020. This plan is meant to address the common migration-related challenges and opportunities in the region, including forced displacement and trafficking, as well as mobilising diasporas based in Europe, the Middle East and North America towards development goals (IGAD, 2019). IGAD is supported by the Swiss Development Agency and the EUTF, and works with the Austrian Development Agency and the ILO.

During the IGAD extra-ordinary assembly in January 2017, the project ‘Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas of the Horn of Africa Region’ was launched. This project is mostly financed by the EUTF with contributions from the UNDP and implemented by GIZ and the UNDP. Focusing on cross border areas, including Ethiopia-Sudan, Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia, and Kenya-Ethiopia, the aims of this project is to prevent local conflict, promote cooperation and cross-border coordination, and aid economic development in areas that have been historically marginalized (European Commission, 2016a).

5.2.2 Middle East

According to the Overseas Employment Proclamation 923/2016, low-skilled Ethiopian nationals can only migrate to destination countries with which the Ethiopian government has signed a bilateral agreement. These agreements are designed to protect Ethiopian labour migrants in these countries. Ethiopia has signed Memorandum of Understandings with the following popular destination countries.

- Bahrain (2013)
- Djibouti (2009)
- Jordan (2012)
- Kuwait (2010)
- Lebanon (2014)
- Oman (2013)
- Qatar (2013)
- Saudi Arabia (2017)
- Sudan (2009)
- Sudan (2012)
- United Arab Emirates (2012)

5.2.3 European Union

Ethiopia is a member of the following EU-African mechanisms on migration: The Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy. As part of EU-African relations, the Valletta summit on migration took place in November 2015, bringing together European and African Heads of State and Government to discuss shared challenges and opportunities of migration. The Joint Valletta Action Plan, which was developed by leaders at the summit, included the following objectives (The Khartoum Process, 2016).

1. address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement
2. enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility
3. reinforce the protection of migrants and asylum seekers
4. prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings
5. work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration

Whilst funds have been allocated and efforts have been made to address most of the objectives, progress on improving legal migration routes has been much slower (Interview 27/03/2019).

Additionally, Ethiopia and the EU have committed to an annual Ministerial Meeting and six sectoral dialogues: Governance and Human Rights; Regional Peace and Security; Countering Terrorism and Violent Radicalisation; Migration; Social and Economic Development, Investment and Trade; and Climate Change and Environmental Cooperation. The EU's overall cooperation and humanitarian funds allocated to Ethiopia for 2014-2020 amount to over €1.5 billion, which represents one of the largest sums given to any African country. Ethiopia is also one of the major beneficiaries of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, with €260 million invested in programming between 2015-2018 (EEAS, 2019).
6. Conclusion

Migration governance in Ethiopia is quickly evolving in response to shifting migration dynamics. This report has highlighted some of the challenges of migration management within a highly complex environment. The multi-dimensional nature of migration governance in Ethiopia is notable, incorporating a wide range of policy areas and actors.

There are several migration governance issues in Ethiopia that require further attention. At the national level there is a debate as to whether Ethiopia should establish a comprehensive migration policy or not. A concept note was circulated to the concerned UN agencies regarding a new comprehensive migration policy in 2018, although there have been no developments since this time (Interview 26/03/2019). This may be because government attention has been diverted by recent crises, particularly the IDP crisis. There is an additional question of whether to establish one agency or an inter-departmental body to help coordinate the different organisations that address migration-related issues. These issues, including integration, reintegration and protection for vulnerable migrants, are cross cutting across many ministries, agencies and organisations. However, the Government of Ethiopia has reportedly been resistant to the idea of creating one ministry responsible for migration. Currently, the Anti-Trafficking Task Force is the only inter-departmental body that addresses migration.

The governance of migration in Ethiopia is multi-level with various actors vertically and horizontally related to one another. As a consequence, approaches to migration governance are frequently incoherent. Aligned with EU donor interest in stemming irregular migration to Europe, migration governance in Ethiopia is, at a high-level, supportive of encouraging people to stay and settle in Ethiopia, as outlined in the CRRF strategy. This has also led to several ‘migration prevention’ programmes. It was found by Kuschminder and Ricard-Guay (2017) that, according to implementers on the ground, the participants in migration prevention programmes and reintegration programmes were often the same, as returnees were the most vulnerable group to migration. The migration prevention stance has attracted significant funding in support from the international community, especially from the European Union through the EUTF.

A central piece of pending migration governance is the CRRF. Whilst the CRRF has contributed to creating a more cohesive framework and direction for refugee-related policy, implementation has lagged and it is at risk of losing prominence. Furthermore, local level concerns and grievances must be addressed to ensure that refugees can access the rights that they have been granted in national law. Moreover, with poverty levels remaining high in Ethiopia, there are concerns regarding refugee self-reliance strategies. This is of particular concern regarding the low wages offered in the industrial parks.

The recent proliferation of international and non-governmental organisations that provide a wide variety of services to refugees, returnees and local potential migrants has
mirrored a conceptual change in the framing of migration-related issues to encompass broader developmental needs in Ethiopia, whether for refugee or host communities, in the name of ‘addressing root causes’. This may have positive effects, particularly for integration and inclusive service provision. However, interviewees in dedicated agencies and programmes expressed concerns that this approach may detract from the specific needs of vulnerable migrants, such as children and returnees who suffer trauma related to their experiences. In the push for refugees to be more ‘self-reliant’, there is a danger that support may be withdrawn from those who still need it.

There is a fear that, through donors, migration-related actors at all levels are being steered more towards discouraging migration than making it safer. This can be seen in the efforts that have been made towards ‘addressing root causes’, as opposed to creating more legal routes to Europe or the Middle East. This is concerning as academic research has demonstrated the strong ‘culture of migration’ in Ethiopia, and, as an example, the ban on emigration for domestic work only resulted in more women migrating irregularly from Ethiopia (Kuschminder, 2014). This places emigrants in more vulnerable positions as they lack support abroad and information on their rights to make their migration safer. In addition, there is little evidence that development would stem migration.

It is evident that Ethiopia faces several challenges ahead as it seeks to effectively manage multiple migration movements in the country. Interviewees mentioned that progress is being made in areas such as acknowledging the needs and potential of refugees living in a protracted situation in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, there are several challenges that are yet to be addressed or are likely to become problematic in the near future. This includes: internal trafficking, especially the exploitation of children from rural areas in urban areas; increasing internal displacement due to climate change effects; the protection and reintegration of labour migrants, deportees from Saudi Arabia, returnees from Libya and Yemen, and those who attempt the ‘Southern Route’ for migration to South Africa but are detained in one of the transit countries (Interview 28/03/2019). In addressing migration-related issues, there have been severe problems of chaotic implementation, discrimination of certain ethnic groups and otherwise privileging certain groups over others, whether refugees or locals. The recent investment into migration governance and management in Ethiopia is substantial, and future research and evaluation will be essential to understand the impacts of these funds on potential migrants, refugees, IDPs, and returnees.
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## 8. Appendices

### 8.1 Key legislation concerning migration to and from Ethiopia

#### 8.1.1 Nationality and Travel Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proclamation to Regulate the Issuance of Travel Documents and Visas, and Registration of Foreigners in Ethiopia (No. 271/1969).</th>
<th>“Regulates the entry to and departure from Ethiopia by foreigners. Requires, inter alia, that foreigners be issued with entry visas, transit visas or tourist visas and provides for the appointment of immigration officers.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providing Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin with certain Rights to he Exercised in their Country of Origin Proclamation (No. 270/2002)</td>
<td>Provides for various rights and privileges for foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin to enable them to contribute to Ethiopia’s development and prosperity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Proclamation (No. 354/2003)</td>
<td>Defines conditions for entry into and departure (including deportation) from Ethiopia as well as requirements regarding travel documents, visas, registration and residence permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proclamation on Ethiopian Nationality (No. 378 of 2003)</td>
<td>Defines how Ethiopian nationality is acquired and lost as well as rights of nationality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive Issued to Determine the Residence Status of Eritrean Nationals Residing in Ethiopia</td>
<td>&quot;The objective of this Directive is to provide the means to any person of Eritrean origin who was a resident in Ethiopia when Eritrea became an independent State and has continued maintaining permanent residence in Ethiopia up until this Directive is issued to confirm whether he or she has acquired Eritrean nationality, and to determine his or her status of residence in Ethiopia.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012 Law Requiring Registration of All Births Nationwide</td>
<td>Continuous efforts to implement a uniform national identity card</td>
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### 8.1.2 Labour Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proclamation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment Exchange Services Proclamation (No. 632/2009)</td>
<td>Strengthens labour migration management, expands oversight of private employment agencies and provides for placement of labour attachés in Ethiopian embassies abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Permit and Private Employment Agency Licence Fees Council of Ministers Regulation No. 282/2013</td>
<td>Defines work permit fees and private employment agency license fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Employment Proclamation (No. 923/2016)</td>
<td>Defines recruitment and placement procedures, conditions and costs through governmental organisations and agencies in countries with bilateral labour agreements and prohibits direct recruitment; introduces pre-departure awareness raising through the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; includes provisions on how to solve disputes welfare services and assistance to workers as well as repatriation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.1.3 Refugees and Asylum Seekers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proclamation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Proclamation (No. 409 of 2004)</td>
<td>Provides for rules regarding asylum application and procedure and defines rights and obligations of refugees and asylum seekers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proclamation No. 1110/2019 – January 2019</td>
<td>The new law replaces the 2004 Refugee Proclamation. The new law will allow refugees to obtain work permits, access primary education, obtain drivers’ licenses, legally register life events such as births and marriages and open up access to national financial services, such as banking.</td>
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</tbody>
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### 8.1.4 Smuggling and Trafficking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proclamation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants Proclamation (No.909/2015)</td>
<td>Defines human trafficking and smuggling, determines penalties to strengthen the existing penal code (fines of up to 19,500 USD; severe cases: death penalty) and procedures for investigations; Provides for the assistance, protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking and establishes a fund to combat trafficking and smuggling as well as a national committee to monitor the implementation of the law.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014; Marchand et al., 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2018)