Borders and the mobility of migrants in the EU and Turkey

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Abstract

This comparative report investigates the ways in which the mobility of applicants for international protection, beneficiaries of international protection and irregular migrants intersect with the borders encountered during their trajectories before, during and after their arrival in six EU countries (Greece, Hungary, Germany, Luxembourg, France and Spain) and Turkey. After defining the concept of borders, this study contextualises the securitisation of EU external and internal borders, and it provides some background information on the CEAS and the Dublin Regulation, which are central to this research. Moreover, it engages with the legislative framework in place in the field of asylum in the seven countries on which this report draws. Based on qualitative interviews with a total of 96 asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants, as well as 94 state and non-state actors and ethnographic observation, the empirical part of the study explored the following aspects: experiences and conceptualisations of borders; mobility patterns and trajectories; the interplay between the Schengen zone and the Dublin system; the shortcomings of CEAS; as well as policies and experiences in the fields of housing and employment. The main finding of this comparative report is that while territorial borders cannot always impede human mobility, they are recreated within countries as administrative borders, which can encourage secondary movements.

Keywords: borders, mobility, asylum seekers, refugees, Schengen Agreement, Dublin Regulation, CEAS, EU

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1. Introduction

The 2015 ‘migration crisis’ has called into question the framing and implementation of both the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the European Union (EU) and national asylum systems, as it has highlighted the lack of harmonisation across EU member-states with regards to legislation and asylum process. The Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and Recommendations for Further Development (CEASEVAL) project evaluates the ways in which CEAS operates in various national contexts by analysing the level of coordination between actors at multiple levels and with focus on different perspectives of CEAS.

In this context, this comparative report sets out to analyse the interactions between borders and the mobility of migrants, informed by seven empirical case studies (Turkey, Greece, Hungary, Germany, Luxembourg, France and Spain) which fall under the remit of Work Package 4 (WP4), ‘Borders and the mobility of migrants’ of the CEASEVAL project. To this effect, this study focuses on how bordering processes are implemented in the EU and beyond when confronted with the mobility of migrants at different stages, such as interception before entry into the Schengen area (e.g. at sea or in Turkey); ‘illegal’ entry at external borders; ‘irregular’ transit in the Schengen area; and secondary movements across the Schengen zone after making asylum claims or being granted refugee status. More precisely, WP4 examines the relationship between migrants’ mobility trajectories and their interaction with EU external and internal borders.

Specific objectives of WP4 are:

1. To understand the interactions between Schengen and Dublin;
2. To explore the reasoning behind the participants’ journeys before and in the Schengen area; and

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1 In this research, the term ‘migrants’ encompasses asylum-seekers, refugees and irregular migrants.
2 The seven country reports, on which this comparative report is based, are available at:
To examine the tensions between the determination of responsibility for assessing asylum claims and the respondents’ preferences, choices and trajectories within the Schengen area.

Therefore, this study will contribute to advancing the understanding of the interplay between migrants’ mobility trajectories and the EU internal and external borders encountered during their journeys.

This research seeks to investigate the border (and the ensuing bordering processes) as a site of control and inclusion/exclusion by examining migrants’ journeys and their encounters with borders. Distinctions enhanced by the presence of border can take different forms, such as here-there, us-them, inclusion-exclusion, self-other and inside-outside (Newman 2006). Immigrants (and even more so asylum-seekers, refugees and irregular migrants) are an important case study for the understanding of borders and bordering processes, as they are the embodiments of borders and boundaries (Kearney 1991), since they are constructed as the ‘other’ by national/EU legislation and the mainstream.

The remaining sections of this chapter contextualise the research by laying out the conceptual and methodological dimensions of this study. It is subdivided in three sections. The first section lies out the theoretical concepts underpinning this research. The second part is concerned with the methodology employed in this study and the limitations experienced by each of the national partners. The third and final part introduces the structure of the study.

**1.1. Borders – Definition and Operationalisation**

Borders are processes which are produced and reproduced. In the process, they become materialised in migrants’ daily lives through the actions of different border managers (border/first reception agencies, policymakers/legislators, housing sector/or employment sector actors, etc.), may they be public, private or non-governmental. Likewise, Newman (2006:144) holds the view that borders are lines of separation between political, social and economic spaces. In this study, we should also add legal spaces. For the purpose of this research, geo-political spaces are represented by border agencies, legal spaces are represented by policymakers and legislators, social spaces take the form of the relations and practices in the housing market, while economic spaces refer to the actors involved in the labour market.

In this context, this research is interested in the ways in which borders at various levels (political, legal, economic and social) influence migrants’ mobility before, during and after arrival in the host country (i.e. Germany, Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Greece, Luxembourg and France). As such, by focusing on the interrelations between border studies and mobility studies, this WP brings together two fields which have rarely been studied together, particularly when confronted to asylum seekers and refugees. This is of particular interest both empirically (given the flows of people arriving in Europe) and conceptually (as bordering practices relate to both practices of mobility and border making, as well as border crossing, from an institutional and experiential perspective). Therefore, the fieldwork focused on the ways in which the mobility of migrants influences the creation of (new) borders through bordering practices, and how these borders and bordering practices, in turn, affect the management of mobility and thus peoples’ migratory trajectories.

A considerable amount of literature has investigated the issue of borders (e.g. Agnew 1987, Newman and Paasi 1987, Newman 2006b, Mezzadra 2015, Walters 2006b). According to Walters (2006), there
are three imaginings of borders in Europe. The first one refers to the emergence of the European external frontier and it reflects the emergence of Europe as a nation-state. This is equally supported by studies which suggest that more than half of the deaths taking place at borders in the past ten years occurred at the edge of the EU, which makes it the most dangerous border crossing in the world (Jones 2017:16). For the second imagining, Walters borrows the concept of ‘gated community’ from Pijpers and van Houtum (2005) over that of fortress Europe. This term allows the homeowner-citizen a market-driven conception of security, which operates through the strategic and defensive organisation of space and enacts both the policing of migrants and the creation of social boundaries migrants are subject to. This concept emphasises that borders are not just a set of policies, but that they are part of social, cultural and symbolic fields; it is a reminder of the geopolitical and socioeconomic relations that borders cause, and as such they cannot be dissociated from these (Walters 2006:150). The third vision of the border is that of a firewall. By using this metaphor, Walters wishes to draw our attention to the fact that borders do not always coincide with state frontiers, they are not walls designated to stop trespassers, although fences and walls become more and more common (Collyer and King 2016). Rather, they are dynamic processes taking the form of filters, which “aspire to reconcile high levels of circulation, transmission and movement with high levels of security” (Walters 2006:152). Nevertheless, what all these three aspects have in common, is that they all understand borders as barriers to human mobility which visibilise migratory movements.

The term ‘border’ embodies two main concepts. These are borders as territorial frontiers and boundaries, as internal social categorisations (Fassin 2011). This view is supported by Yuval-Davis (2013), who stresses that borders are of a dual nature: state boundaries and symbolic, social and cultural frontiers of inclusion and exclusion. Importantly, symbolic borders are the recreation of state borders, highlighting who is (not) allowed to be in a given space. She states that borders are thereby conceptualised as “practices that are situated and constituted in the specificity of political negotiations as well as the everyday life performance of them, being shifting and contested between individual and groupings as well as in the constructions of individual subjectivities” (Yuval-Davis 2013:15). In a similar vein, Balibar (2002:84-85) refers to the “ubiquity of borders”, in that borders are not disappearing, rather, they are becoming “a grid ranging over the new social space” instead of being territorial borders outside the nation-state. In this respect, borders have been transferred into the middle of the political space (Balibar 2009:109).

Following this line of thought, land borders are “a continuous line demarcating the territory and sovereign authority of the state, enclosing its domain and protecting its population” (Walters 2006:145). It is a land line marking the end of a territory and of its jurisdictional authority. The role of border institutions is significant in the governing of migrants’ mobility and their ability to cross the border and be allowed entry on the other side of the state (Newman 2003:14). This reflects the inclusionary and exclusionary roles of border agencies and their governing of migrants’ daily experiences on the new territory. More precisely, borders present a dual status, that of nation-state borders, often materialised into border institutions and that of entry points into society, represented by the documents one needs in order to become a part of society, such as access to housing or employment (Walters 2006). In other words, “[b]oundaries controlled by civil servants at the local scale are also part of the (re)construction of the external nation-state borders, and adds to the ongoing criminalization of migrants” (ibid:546). As such, they represent exclusionary mechanisms meant to categorise and differentiate between people.
Nevertheless, while border controls are now intensified through various materialities (such as physical frontiers), they have also become prolific in identity politics. Control mechanisms of migration have thus moved from the outskirts of the territory towards covering the whole territory, represented by the societal level. The focus has thus become twofold: territorial, at the edge of the nation-state, and the politics of boundary production, within the nation-state, leading to the creation of internal borders (Bendixsen 2016:541). To put it differently, borders are temporal, spatial and social and are experienced differently by people depending on their legal status, race, ethnicity, gender, age etc.

In this respect, this research agrees with Newman (2006:148), who argues “borders create (or reflect) difference and constitute the separation line not only between states and geographical spaces, but also between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ‘here’ and ‘there’ and the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’”. Moreover, migrants are surrounded by borders in their everyday lives, which are enacted by various individual actors and institutions and which may allow or prevent migrants from crossing these barriers. As such, borders can often be felt more intensely in migrants’ daily lives rather than at the point of border-crossing. In parallel, the transformation of public and private spaces in border zones is the product of an assemblage of governmental and non-governmental actors involved in migration management (Dines et al 2015:436), which will be further explored with reference to the housing and labour sectors in the final part of this study.

For the purpose of this research, ‘borders’ are defined as the physical state frontiers the migrants first cross when they enter a new territory. The term ‘boundaries’ will be used solely when referring to the social and economic barriers that migrants are affected by in their daily lives depending on the lines of exclusion they are subject to, such as legal status, gender, age, race, ethnicity etc. However, it is worth noting that both physical borders and social boundaries affect social relations and contribute to migrants’ inclusion/exclusion in the receiving country. Since borders categorise and differentiate people on the basis of their social locations, this research understands borders are social signifiers. This suggests that the conceptualisation of migration is inseparable from the conceptualisation of borders as social constructs. This is due to migrants’ lived experiences within the context of inclusion and exclusion.

Borders are widespread in our daily praxis and they rely on the spatial and socio-cultural differentiation of the others. They are performative and thus better captured by the processual verb ‘bordering’.

In this report (and in the research conducted in WP4), the terms bordering process and/or bordering practices mean the spatial, legal, economic and social progression which migrants might go through in the countries of transit and/or receiving countries, and the barriers they might or might not experience during their interactions with state and non-state actors. The main focus of the WP is on the spatial and legal levels, but it will also go beyond and consider the economic and social levels.

The bordering process is present at multiple stages in the trajectories of migrants and is multi-level: arrival into a country (e.g. interactions with border agency), reception (e.g. short-term accommodation, administrative processes), settlement (e.g. long-term accommodation, labour market integration) and further mobilities (e.g. secondary movements). Building upon Newman and Paasi (1998) and Newman’s (2006:144) work, this research indicates that the bordering process is more significant than the border per se in migrants’ daily lives. It is exactly the bordering practices which refer to the ways in which borders are delimited and managed, that is significant to the understanding of borders as both a process and as an institution (Newman 2006:148).
1.2. Methodological considerations

In order to investigate the interplay between mobility and borders, semi-structured qualitative interviews and, where possible, ethnographic observation were employed in the fieldwork conducted by the national partners involved in WP4.

The role of the interviews and ethnography is twofold: to address the meaning of borders and bordering processes as well as that of mobility for both migrants and officials at different stages (interception and smuggling outside EU borders, ‘illegal’ entry at external borders, crossing and reintroduction of internal borders). As such, the meaning of specific episodes and phenomena is of interest to this project, such as interactions during border crossings and inclusion/exclusion in the ‘host’ and/or ‘transit’ country. WP4 interprets the interplay of processes of inclusion and exclusion to refer to the politics of belonging, defined as “the dirty work of boundary maintenance” (Crowley 1999:30) which separates the population between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

In-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted in order to understand the social and political world from the research participants’ points of view and to unfold the meaning of their experiences, be that professional or personal. The empirical component of WP4 relied on the use of:

- A total of 96 semi-structured qualitative interviews with migrants (across the three following groups: asylum seekers, refugees and/or irregular migrants – such as migrants who have lost their asylum status and are in limbo at the time of the interview) who have arrived in the host country after 2014. The interviews reflected the diversity of the population in terms of nationality, ethnicity and gender.
- A total of 94 semi-structured qualitative interviews with institutional actors (state, non-state and/or international actors). The institutional actors interviewed by each national partner are listed in the table below.

### Table 1 Breakdown of state and non-state actors interviewed per country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Border agents</th>
<th>Policy makers/civil servants/ Legislators at EU/national/regional/local level</th>
<th>Representatives of the housing and labour market</th>
<th>Civil society/International organisation actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Access was not always granted for the national partners to conduct interviews with some institutional actors, which, in some cases also resulted in no access to conduct ethnographic observation. Such is the case of the fieldwork conducted in France, where access was not granted to state representatives,
such as the border police. Hungary is another case where conducting ethnographic observation, as well as carrying out interviews was deemed challenging. Since October 2015, Hungary has witnessed the modification of the Penal Code, which, among other changes, banned individuals and NGOs from either providing information to asylum seekers or approaching the border zone, at the risk of incurring a one year imprisonment charge. This, together with the introduction of the martial law due to mass influx in 2015, supposed to end in September 2019, which gives extra powers to the police and military to conduct border checks and use fire arms in the surveillance of the state border, meant that ethnographic observation was not achieved at Hungarian borders, and access to institutional actors as well as migrants was limited. In the Greek case, the Ministry of Migration Policy denied access to the hotspots or to conduct interviews with policymakers within the ministry itself. Moreover, the timing of the research coincided with the vote on the name of North Macedonia, which meant that many Greek MPs were unavailable to take part in the research. In contrast, in Luxembourg, the main challenge encountered during the research consisted of recruiting migrants, and even more so, female migrants, the latter being also reported by the German and Greek partners.

Ethnographic observation is a qualitative research method where researchers observe and/or interact with the participants taking part in the research in their real-life. The interaction with the field is of particular interest, as it allows researchers to get close to people and observe what they do, rather than just reporting what the respondents say about their experiences (see Gans 1999). Where possible, CEASEVAL implemented ethnographic observation to support a deeper understanding of the diverse perspectives and practices of actors involved in bordering processes, and the interplay between them. Ethnographic observation was made mainly amongst border agencies and airports (Luxembourg and Greece), but also at borders (such as the Turkish-Greek border on the Aegean sea) and the police agencies (National Police Office in Barcelona).

Furthermore, it was concluded that the ethnographic observation was rather limited in scope due to the irregular nature of asylum seekers’ border crossings. As such, while the activities of border agents were observed at the Luxembourgish airport or at the Turkish-Greek sea border, the handling of applicants for international protection was not studied due to the irregularity of their actual border crossings, which did not happen during the time the national teams were conducting fieldwork.

1.3. Structure

The overall structure of the study takes the form of seven chapters. The following chapter (Chapter two) engages briefly with the state of the art of the EU framework with regards to borders and asylum, as well as the asylum legislation in the countries in which fieldwork has been conducted. Chapter three highlights the meanings attributed to borders by state actors, as well as migrants’ experiences of border-crossings. The fourth chapter analyses the results of the empirical research with regards to the notion of mobility, while chapter five will consider how the Dublin and Schengen systems interact in each of the countries studied. Chapter six will provide evidence of the barriers encountered by migrants in accessing housing and employment. Finally, the seventh and last chapter discusses the overall findings and conclusion of the research.
2. European and national contexts

2.1. Introduction

This section aims at contextualising the empirical data analysed in the following three chapters. Therefore, the main topics covered in this chapter are the management of EU borders, the CEAS and the legislation in place as well as the main countries of provenience of the asylum seekers in the seven countries which form the basis of this comparative study.

2.2. The management of European Union borders

EU external border areas are as follows: Eastern Europe land border, Southern Europe sea and land border, Mediterranean and Western border and international airports. EU internal borders refer to the common land borders of EU Member States, the airports of EU countries for internal flights, as well as the sea, river and lake ports for EU State ferry connections (European Commission n.d).

According to a briefing issued by the European Parliament, the role of the European Union in the context of external border protection is to “safeguard the freedom of movement within the Schengen area, an area without internal borders, and to ensure efficient monitoring of people who cross both external Schengen borders, as well as the EU’s external borders with countries that are not part of the Schengen area” (Radjenovic 2019:2). The Schengen Borders Code brings together the rules on external border crossings, entry requirements, as well as allowed duration of stay in the Schengen area. Moreover, it brings in border controls for people crossing EU’s external borders (EU nationals included) at entry and exit (ibid.).

The Central authority of EU’s border management is the European Border and Coast Guard, which includes the European Border and Coast Guard agency (FRONTEX), as well as the national authorities of Member States. The summer of 2015 represented an important period in the management of the EU’s external borders, due to the numbers of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU (over 1.2 million applications submitted). This led to the reintroduction of internal borders between EU Member States (as evidenced by Hungary, France and Germany in this report), a capability provided by the Schengen Borders Code. The Schengen system functions in theory on the supposition that a free movement zone can only perform well if the external borders are protected.

Moreover, centralised information systems are also in place and used by both Member States and EU agencies in the field of security, border and migration management, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), as well as the European fingerprint database (EURODAC). The SIS provides information on wanted missing people, as well as lost or stolen objects, such as identification documents. The purpose of VIS is to enable border guards to verify if visa holders are indeed the persons who initially applied for the visas. The main aim of EURODAC is to facilitate the application of the Dublin Regulation, by assisting with the identification of applicants for international protection and third-country nationals apprehended crossing the external border illegally, or found to be staying irregularly on the territories of EU Member States (European Commission n.d). Where possible, before making a EURODAC check, national institutions undertake a fingerprint comparison against the VIS.
2.3. The Common European Asylum System

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) goes back to 1999, when EU member states decided to set up a standard for harmonising asylum systems in Europe. Despite this, EU countries have followed unilateral measures to tackle the influx of asylum seekers on their territories. CEAS is comprised of the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualifications Directive, the Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation (European Union 2014). The CEAS has proved ineffective in creating a convergent mechanism of granting asylum applicants (ie The Qualification Directive), with individuals of the same nationality receiving different forms of international protection, depending on the country in which they apply for asylum, which affects the type of rights they are entitled to (Crepin 2015). Another set of challenges consists of the differences in reception conditions, as well as processing times and access to social rights.

Although not all EU Member States are part of both systems, a key aspect of CEAS is the way in which the Dublin Regulation and the Schengen Agreement act on each other, as both have come under considerable pressure following the migratory events during the summer of 2015. The 2015 ‘migration crisis’ revealed that the states located at EU’s external borders (namely Greece and Italy), which were the main entry points of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU, were left with a disproportionate share of responsibility with regards to the processing of asylum claims. This triggered secondary movements to Western and Northern European countries. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that the Dublin system was never intended to include mechanisms of solidarity-sharing, which points to a structural flaw which needs to be addressed. The efforts undergone by EU Member States, as well as the actions coordinated by the European Commission and EU agencies in the areas of both solidarity and responsibility-sharing mechanisms are further explored in Work Package 6 of CEASEVAL, Rethinking solidarity: from lip service to good service (see Baumgartner and Wagner 2018 and Wagner et al 2018).

The Dublin System of the CEAS was established by the Dublin Convention in 1990, and it was replaced in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation. In 2013, the Dublin III Regulation was adopted, and it is currently still in force. It outlines criteria for determining which Member State is responsible for examining individual asylum applications, by taking into account a variety of criteria such as family unity, possession of residence documents or visas, irregular entry or stay, and visa-waived entry (Radjenovic 2019b). In practice, “the most frequently applied criterion is the irregular entry, meaning that the Member State through which the asylum-seeker first entered the EU is responsible for examining his or her asylum claim.” (ibid:2). Therefore, migrants’ ‘deservingness’, is assessed on the basis of their migratory trajectories from their home countries to the receiving countries (see also Sigona 2018), hence the importance of studying migrants’ mobility patterns. The aim of the Dublin system is twofold: to avoid people applying for asylum in the country of their choice (referred to as ‘asylum shopping’), or being in the EU without any Member State examining their asylum application (see Garces-Mascarenas 2015).

The Dublin Package has been unfit since 2015 due to the unprecedented numbers of arrivals mainly by boat, which means that the reception capacities of Greece and Italy became overwhelmed. Furthermore, Germany suspended the Dublin procedure for Syrian citizens, thus becoming responsible for processing their claims. However, shortly after, border controls were reintroduced at the German - Austrian border. In the same year, Austria, Slovenia, France, Hungary, Sweden and Norway introduced internal border checks. Denmark and Belgium followed in 2016. Currently, the following EU Member States have reintroduced temporary border controls, which are due to end in November.
2019: Norway at all its internal borders; Sweden (potentially) at all its internal border; Denmark at its border with Germany (land and ports with ferry connections), although it may extend to all internal borders; Germany at its land border with Austria; Austria at its land borders with Hungary and Slovenia and France at its internal borders (European Commission n.d b).

At this stage, the question that arises is how long these border controls will continue to exist, in a zone which is characterised by the absence of border checks, curtailing therefore the free movement of both European and non-European citizens alike, which calls into question the core of the European integration project, that of the free movement of citizens. The above countries justify the maintenance of border controls on the basis of the risk posed by the secondary movements of asylum claimants and refugees, since most of the applicants for international protection are still in Greece, the presence of whom cannot be addressed by Dublin without it being reformed following the principle of responsibility-sharing, as previously argued (Somer 2018).

2.4. Country Breakdown

**Greece**

Greece is signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Protocol (1967), as well as the European Convention of Human Rights (1950). The legislation on CEAS has been incorporated into the national legislation via the Law 3386/2005, which focuses on the reception of asylum seekers, asylum procedures and family reunification. With regards to asylum applications, the main authorities are the Ministry of Migration Policy, created in 2016 (the Asylum Service, the Reception and Identification Service, the Appeals Authority) and the Administrative Court of Appeal.

The top three citizenships of first-time asylum applicants in Greece in 2018 were Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans.

**Germany**

After their registration of asylum seekers by the Federal police at the border or by state police or authorities on German territory, asylum seekers are placed in initial reception facilities for the first few months, time during which they cannot go to school or engage in any professional activity. Then, they are relocated to German States, based on a quota. Here, they are given accommodation in initial reception centres and start the asylum procedure, carried out by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, under the legislation in place (German Basic Law, the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the Asylum Law). Once the asylum application is finalised, they are usually redistributed to municipalities. The refugees’ mobility within Germany is somewhat limited, with States or counties having the ability to impose restrictions on refugees’ changes of residency. These restrictions can be lifted if one needs to move to take up job opportunities.

In 2018, the three main nationalities of applicants for asylum were Syrians, Iraqis and Iranians.

**Hungary**

Hungary is signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Protocol (1967), as well as the European Convention of Human Rights (1950). There are three relevant pieces of national legislation in the field of asylum. Firstly, according to the Fundamental Law, since 2018, one cannot be recognized as a refugee if they arrived in Hungary via a safe country or if they can get international protection in a different country responsible for the asylum procedure. Secondly, the Act on Asylum
has limited the procedural guarantees and reception conditions. Thirdly, the State Border Act, has authorised the creation of the Hungarian fence which impedes migrants from arriving in Hungary.

The central authority in asylum matters (such as the management of refugee reception shelters, asylum applications and checks of migrants, in cooperation with the police) is the Office of Immigration and Asylum, within the Ministry of Interior, which opened its doors in January 2000.

Top three nationalities between 2014 and 2018 were Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians.

**Luxembourg**

The current asylum legislation was introduced in 2015, transposing two European Directives into national law, regarding the granting and withdrawing of international protection, and detailing the standards for the reception of applicants for international protection. The asylum process begins on the premises of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, and it consists of the filing, registering and lodging of the application.

The three main nationalities of asylum seekers in 2018 are Eritreans, Syrians and Iraqis.

**France**

The French asylum legislation sits within the framework of the 2019 Asylum Law. According to one of the main changes introduced, rejected asylum seekers who arrived in France after the 1st of January 2019 are not allowed to apply for a residence permit on health grounds any longer. Rather, the application for a residence permit for medical reasons should be lodged at the same time as the asylum application. The process for lodging an asylum claim is comprised of three stages: 1) the initial reception, provided by actors of the civil sector, 2) the recording of the asylum at the ‘single desk’ in the Préfecture and 3) the decision on the asylum claim, made by Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA).

The top three sending countries to France in 2018 were Afghanistan, Albania and Georgia. In Metz, however, the largest group is represented by people from the Balkans (mainly Albania).

**Spain**

The asylum and subsidiary protection legislative framework in place is the Law 12/2009 of 30 October 2009, amended by Law 2/2014 of 25 March 2014. The main institutions in the field of asylum are the Office of Asylum and Refuge (ORA), within the Ministry of Interior, and the General Direction of Migration (GDM), in charge with two distinct stages of asylum. ORA is responsible for the processing of asylum applications, while GDM’s duties are in the area of the reception and integration of international protection applicants and beneficiaries.

The top three nationalities in 2018 for asylum applications were Venezuela, Columbia and Syria.

**Turkey**

Turkish asylum and migration policy is framed by the Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection, which has been in place since 2014. Despite being a signatory of the 1951 UN Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and its Additional Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees of 1967, Turkey presents a ‘geographical limitation’, which only allows European citizens to have refugee status granted. The authority processing asylum applications is the Provincial Directorate of Migration
Management (PDMM), operating locally under the Directorate General for Migration Management. Asylum applications cannot be lodged at the Turkish border, but within country, to PDMM.

The three main nationalities for first instance asylum applications are Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis, with Syrians being entitled to a special Temporary Protection status.

2.5. Conclusion

Despite the Schengen area being a zone characterised by the absence of internal borders, it has been identified that several EU countries have suspended the Schengen agreement and put in place border controls as mainly a result of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. In this context, the CEAS, and more generally the Dublin Regulation have come under criticism as a result of the absence of mechanisms of solidarity and responsibility which would take the burden of the countries located at the external border of the EU, such as Italy and Greece.

Furthermore, this chapter has shown that, with the exception of France, Syria ranked amongst the top three sending countries of asylum applicants in all of the seven national case studies conducted between April 2018 and May 2019. Not unsurprisingly, in Greece and Germany, Syrians represent the largest number of first time asylum applicants. Spain is the only country where the greatest proportion of asylum seekers came from Latin America. One of the issues that emerges is that the interaction between borders and the mobility of the migrants might differ amongst the countries under study, due to the diversity of their countries of origin and thus the different mobility trajectories undertaken.
3. Experiences and conceptualisations of borders

3.1. Introduction

After having contextualised the formal management of EU and national borders, this chapter provides important insights into the concept of borders, as an experienced reality from the perspective of applicants for and beneficiaries of international protection. Their lived experiences are complemented by the understanding of borders by institutional actors, such as border agents and national legislators, or representatives of the civil society. More precisely, it examines the meanings attributed to borders by the respondents interviewed. Across all the national case studies, it emerged that two types of borders were experienced by asylum seekers and refugees throughout their mobility trajectories, namely territorial and administrative borders.

3.2. Maritime borders

Within the EU national case studies, Greece and Spain represent the external border to the EU, making them the ‘gatekeepers’ of the Schengen area, and they present the most convoluted system of borders amongst the six EU countries under study.

The external dimension of Greece takes, in practice, the form of hotspots. The hotspot approach, based at the external borders of the EU in Greece and Italy, consists of “facilities for initial reception, identification, registration and fingerprinting of asylum-seekers and migrants arriving in the EU by sea” Mentzelopoulou and Luyten 2018:2) at the external borders of the EU in Greece and Italy. Here, “the EU aims to better coordinate European aid in areas with high migratory pressure. In addition, hotspots also serve to channel newly-arrived people into procedures such as international protection or return” (ibid.).

During the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, most Syrians reached Greece through the maritime border with Turkey. However, following the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, another maritime border emerged, represented by the islands situated in the Aegean sea, at the Greek-Turkish border, aimed at stopping migrants’ migratory movements to the Greek mainland and, ultimately, the Schengen area. This resulted into the Evros land route being privileged over the sea route, for safety concerns, as shown later. Only beneficiaries of international protection and those exempt from migration procedures on the basis of vulnerable status and/or family reunification are allowed to leave the islands. The securitisation of the maritime border with Italy (Ionian-Adriatic sea), which acts as a transit exit route to Italy and as a result to the Schengen area has translated into increased security checks at the ports of Patras and Igoumanitsa. Thus, many migrants became unable to continue their journey to Italy, transforming Greece from a transit country to a country of destination.

The securitisation of Greek sea borders stands in contrast with the situation at the Spanish maritime borders, which might be attributed to the low numbers of arrivals in Spain via the maritime route. As far as the maritime borders are concerned, they are represented by the mainland ports and the Spanish coast. While the number of entries at the mainland ports is unknown, as many people enter Spain irregularly, and they are not registered, however it is considered to be relatively low. With regards to the Spanish coast, the arrival of migrants takes place in Canary Islands, Balearic Islands, Ceuta, Melilla, or at the sea, where boats are intercepted. Until 2016, this migratory practice tended to be considered irregular, which meant that migrants were sent back to their country of origin, or to the last country of transit, which used to be Morocco. Since 2016, when cases of international
protection have been detected, migrants have been informed about the possibility of lodging an application for international protection, and have been transferred to first reception centres.

3.3. Air borders

Most of the asylum seekers enter the EU by land or sea, with airports receiving low numbers of applicants for international protection. For example, Luxembourg, a land locked country in the Schengen area, presents only one external border, at the Findel airport, where the Border Control Unit of the Police operate. The only flight outside of the EU landing in Luxembourg which is considered a ‘vol à risque’, based on a risk analysis done by FRONTEX, is the Turkish Airlines flight from Istanbul. As explained by border agents, passengers on the Turkish Airlines flight are likely to claim asylum, although the chances are slim, with only seven people having claimed asylum at the airport in 2017.

Contrary to all the countries under study, in Spain, most asylum seekers arrive by plane (at Barajas Airport in Madrid and El Prat Airport in Barcelona) from Central and Southern America. Since these nationals do not need a visa to enter the Schengen zone at the moment, they submit their asylum application from within the Spanish territory (in police stations, immigration offices or in Office of Asylum and Refuge (OAR offices), rather than at the airport. Nevertheless, it is likely that this pattern will change in 2021, when Venezuelans will be required to apply for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System visa online before travelling to Schengen countries.

3.4. Material borders

Within the Hungarian context, the fence built at the Serbian and Croatian borders, is the most material representation of EU borders (with the exception of the Spanish Ceuta and Melilla border fence, on African continent). Since most arrivals have taken place at the Hungarian-Serbian border, the fence represents both a physical and a symbolical border which aims at keeping the migrants out and at protecting the Hungarian nation from strangers. Unsurprisingly the institutional actors conceptualisation of borders is in the form of the fence at the Southern border, which, according to some actors, is efficient in ‘defending’ both Hungary and the EU from irregular migrants.

Material representations of borders are also present in the Turkish case. As a result of negotiations with and the support of the EU, Turkey is undertaking an increasing number of actions to strengthen the control of its borders through the raising of material barriers, such as walls and fences. These borders are moving towards Turkey’s Eastern borders with Syrian, Iran, Iraq, Armenia and Georgia, as it has already been the case for Greece and Bulgaria. The creation of walls is responsible for both preventing peoples’ entry in and exist from Turkey, with migration becoming more permanent, as it stops people from engaging in circular migration.

3.5. Border timing

Depending upon the political circumstances at the time of arrival, timing is crucial in the ways in which borders come into existence and are experienced by those trying to cross them.

In the German case, since the country is part of the Schengen area and it is surrounded by countries belonging to the Schengen area, the only borders where stationary controls exist, in ‘normal circumstances’, at the airports (where most migrants used to arrive before 2015) and sea borders. Dragnet controls are deployed by the federal police within a thirty kilometre area of land borders, where suspicious vehicles can be stopped and checked, or train passengers have their identification
checked. However, as a result of the large numbers of asylum seekers arriving in 2015, Germany first decided to be the country responsible with examining the asylum claims of the Syrians crossing its borders although the first country of entry was Greece. Then, it reintroduced border controls at all its land borders for six months, with controls at the Austrian-Bavarian border being extended until further notice. Indeed, in 2015, 81% of migrants crossed the Austrian-German border, as opposed to 5% who arrived via air borders, and 5% via the German border with the Czech Republic.

The opening and closing of borders by Germany had effects on Greece, with regards to both the routes chosen by asylum seekers to head out of the country, and/or their decisions to remain in Greece. As such, in late 2015 and 2016, as Germany opened its borders, the Greek internal land border with North Macedonia started to gain in importance, as migrants started to head to Germany from Greece. However, as they closed, and the hotspot approach came in, it started to lose its significance, resulting in some migrants staying in Greece, rather than attempting to continue their journeys to the rest of the Schengen area. This shows that the closing of some routes at the external borders as well as border management can prevent secondary movements, which results into traditionally transit countries becoming countries of destination. Similarly, the land border with Turkey (the ‘Evros route’) was often chosen by migrants in the research either after failed attempts via the sea border, or on safety grounds, given the detention facilities on the Greek islands, introduced as a result of the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement.

At the very beginning of the war in Syria, Turkey put into practice an open-door policy, allowing Syrians to enter the country without needing a visa. This situation enabled some Syrians to even reside in Turkey for safety reasons, while engaging in cross-border movement to Syria for professional reasons. However, in January 2016, a more stringent border regime was introduced, reflecting that borders are time dependent, rather than reflecting social categories (such as ethnicity, social class, nationality, vulnerability), with Syrians trying to reach Turkey post 2016 having had to pay in order to get a Turkish visa, or seek smugglers’ help. The same applies for other nationalities, such as Afghans, Iraqis or Somalians, who need an entry visa to Turkey.

Not only does timing influence mobility trajectories, but it is significant in the ensuing experiences of border-crossings. Such is the case in the Hungarian context, where migrants arriving in early 2015 recalled an uneventful border crossing into Hungary, characterised by welcoming police and the absence of a fence (in contrast to Macedonia, were the border police was impeding their mobility). In contrast, those having arrived from late 2015 onwards mentioned extremely unpleasant experiences, namely due to tight security at the border and the violence of the border police, rather than the fence itself.

3.6. Borders as mechanisms of control

In many cases, physical borders are experienced by applicants for international protection as mechanisms of control. Their main role is that of preventing their mobility throughout their trajectories before crossing into the receiving country, mainly with reference to maritime borders or embodied representations, such as border agents.

For example, in terms of physical borders, they emerge as obstacles outside of Europe, and they take the form of the sea (Aegean sea and the Mediterranean sea), which were crossed by migrants with the help of smugglers in order to get to Germany. In Europe, state borders are experienced through the medium of police and security measures, which impede or allow mobility, thus determining their migratory trajectories. Indeed, it was reported that some migrants were told by police in Greece,
Hungary and Italy that they had to leave the countries. For example, an Eritrean asylum seeker residing in France commented that in Italy (the first country of arrival), he was given a piece of paper by the Italian police, mentioning that he had to leave the country within 24 hours. As such, border agents emerge not only as stopping mobility, but also as encouraging it.

For the migrants interviewed, crossing into Germany was not experienced as a major obstacle. Furthermore, once in Germany, most of the migrants interviewed made contact with the police in order to get registered. Rather, the physical and social borders during their migratory trajectories on their way to Germany and within the country itself, were more significant, than the experience of the border at the point of entry into the country. Other than the territorial demarcations that migrants have to cross before arriving in Germany (namely the perilous maritime borders), in Germany, migrants are confronted to various obstacles. For example, the interactions with the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, represent a highly stringent bordering practice. During the Dublin and the asylum interviews, migrants’ status is determined on the basis of their personal stories and migratory trajectories. One of the recurrent barriers mentioned by migrants in Germany and Hungary in their contact with public authorities is attributed to their lack of knowledge of local matters, combined with an absence of interpreters, which makes filling out forms or interacting with the authorities rather challenging.

Similarly, in the Luxembourgish case, when asked to elaborate on their trajectories and the border-crossings before arriving in Luxembourg, the migrants explicitly referred to mechanisms of control represented by natural borders (such as the sea or the mountains), physical materialisations (such as the Hungarian razor wire fence), or border agents. Most importantly (similarly to the German context), for the asylum seekers and refugees themselves, most of whom came to Luxembourg by land from Germany or France, borders emerged as physical barriers during their trajectories before arriving at the Luxembourgish border. The majority of informants were able to identify specific crossings, such as in Serbia or Hungary, as the toughest borders, due to the violence of border agents or the presence of the razor wire fence. In contrast, crossing into Luxembourg was uneventful due to the absence of internal borders. As such, the interviewees distinguish between open borders (in the Schengen area), and closed borders (outside of the Schengen zone), the latter aiming at impeding their further mobilities through the use of physical obstacles or the border agents. Moreover, border crossing was inevitably related to a feeling of danger expressed by the participants, in situations such as the rough sea and strong winds when crossing the Aegean sea between Turkey and Greece, or the violence of border agents encountered at different border crossings.

Nevertheless, once in Luxembourg, some participants referred to the complicated nature of administrative processes regarding the asylum process. Not only do bordering practices take place at the point of border-crossing, but also at the institutional level, when migrants enter in contact with organisations in charge with the application process, which in the Luxembourgish case is the Asylum Unit of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, where the filing, registration and lodging of the asylum application takes place. Moreover, the applicants are fingerprinted and their biometric data is checked against the EURODAC database. If the applicants are considered Dublin cases, they are sent to the emergency shelter Structure d’hébergement d’urgence au Kirchberg (SHUK), an open facility where the asylum seekers stay until they are transferred back to the first country of entry.

While physical borders are often lived as a ‘given’, and the migrants do not ponder on them, the interaction with institutions is highly emotional. In their encounters with the Greek Asylum Service, asylum seekers and refugees express frustration due to the difficulty to get an appointment with the
Asylum service in Athens, long processing times (up to two years), and the interactions with the agents, who, in some cases, would not let the migrants take breaks during the interviews and would not offer any water.

It follows that, in many cases, the possibility to enter the receiving countries due to the absence of borders in the Schengen area is followed by a filtering of populations which takes place within the nation-state, rather than outside of it, with many seeing their asylum applications rejected. In the French and German cases, even some of the asylum seekers who have an ongoing application, fear encounters with the police, which they either avoid or try to be nicely dressed in order to not catch any attention and be stopped and searched. As such, borders are not limited to border checks when entering EU countries, rather they carry on as barriers not only to status entitlement, but also to a fear free and self-assured existence in the host countries. Likewise, in Spain, borders are emerge once the territorial frontier has been crossed, and are represented by the fear of having one's application rejected, uncertainty and long waiting times experienced in order to enter the reception and integration system.

For national legislators and border agents, borders differentiate between ‘us’, who need to be protected, and ‘them’, who should be dissuaded from engaging in mobility. In their accounts of the role of borders surrounding the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, the majority of state actors interviewed across the seven case studies commented that borders are not always effective. Furthermore, the prevailing view is that the absence of border checks amongst the countries belonging to the Schengen area should result into tough controls at the external borders. In line with this, a border agent stated that the external border of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, situated at the airport, has the role of guaranteeing a high level of security for the Schengen area. As such, border controls are in place in order to protect the states belonging to the Schengen area, which, due to the freedom of movement in place, cannot perform border checks any longer. In this context, as emphasized by the majority of national institutional actors, sea borders are more difficult to manage than air or land borders, making the control of border crossings difficult to regulate and control. Given this, from an institutional perspective, bordering practices represent mechanisms of control which operate as filters, allowing in those entitled to do so and keeping out of the country people who are not allowed to engage in border crossing. However, in the case of ‘Dubliners’, their legality on Luxembourgish soil (similarly to other EU member states) is decided weeks or months after they entered the country. This indicates that the elimination of border controls at the point of entry into Luxembourg has been replaced by bordering practices taking place within Luxembourg, in order to give a judgement concerning migrants’ presence and thus status.

3.7. Conclusion

Taken together, these findings suggest that while for institutional actors borders represent mechanisms of control aiming at curtailing migrants’ movements, for the migrants themselves, they are an inevitable part of their journeys which may interfere with their trajectories, resulting in the use of alternative routes (such as the land route from Turkey to Greece rather than the sea route). Nonetheless, the shifting of border controls to become more physical (through the presence of walls and fences), is that migrants take new routes which are more dangerous, thus risking their lives.

Furthermore, for most of the informants in the national studies, the legislative and administrative borders experienced within country during the asylum application were by far more emotionally intense than the physical borders encountered prior to arrival in the host country. This indicates that
the lack of internal borders in the EU has resulted in the creation of legislative and administrative borders within the EU Member States. The control of migrants’ identity and their right to stay in the country are therefore no longer determined at the point of entry in a country.

The majority of institutional informants explicitly referred to the securitisation of external borders, particularly the maritime and land borderlines, in order to protect the EU area. At the EU level, the EU itself has also engaged in strengthening its external borders emphasizing the direct link between border checks and security (see Radjenovic 2019).
4. Mobility trajectories

4.1. Introduction

A focus on migrants’ journeys can provide new insights into the bordering process that the participants’ experience, as journeys traverse legal statuses, legal contexts and physical geographies. This allows us to study the experiences of those who have arrived physically, but wander administratively. It provides a lens to see beyond the departure/arrival and success/failure dichotomies. Indeed, the journey “as an experience with indeterminate beginnings and ends, transcends easy conceptual borders, as well as physical ones. (...) the concept encompasses imagined journeys before migration, journeys from countries of origin through countries of transit to destination, as well as deportation journeys” (Mainwaring and Brigden 2016:244). It is not just a linear process between departure and arrival, between two countries, but a fragmented journey (Collyer and King 2016:6), a “social process that shapes migrants and societies alike” (ibid:247).

This chapter summarises the main findings with regards to the mobility of migrants in the seven countries in which fieldwork was conducted. As such, it examines the following issues: the country of transit/country of destination dichotomy, post-arrival mobility patterns and migrants’ mobility within the host societies.

4.2. The country of transit/country of destination dichotomy

The role that countries have during the trajectories of applicants for international protection change as a result of various factors, such as mechanisms of control in place, timing, reception conditions, degree of danger and the perceived reputation of a certain country.

For example, traditionally, the two routes taken by migrants in order to arrive in Hungary have been by land Afghanistan – Iran – Turkey – Bulgaria-Serbia (and less so via Romania and Ukraine), and by sea and land, Turkey – Greece – Macedonia – Serbia. These two routes have been referred to by a border agent interviewed as the ‘Eastern Mediterranean illegal migration route’. Each route has its own challenges, with most migrants taking the land route being fingerprinted in Bulgaria and registered in EURODAC, which makes onward movement legislatively arduous, while the sea route is dangerous because of the deaths happening at sea. As such, if the sea route presents geographical challenges, the land route has its own administrative obstacles, as the migrants are identified as Dublin cases if they leave Bulgaria and risk being sent back. At the same time, the closure of Hungary’s external borders resulted into migrants changing their migratory routes and avoiding Hungary, to pass through Croatia and Slovenia.

Similarly, some participants decided to come to Luxembourg because they could not reach the United Kingdom, showing that the presence of bordering practices deterred people from engaging in a perilous journey in order to arrive in the United Kingdom. However, most participants found out about Luxembourg once they arrived in Europe, from contacts met along the way. This shows that migrants’ mobility trajectories are not solely dependent on migrants’ encounters with borders, but also on the social encounters made. Moreover, among the asylum seekers and refugees interviewed in Luxembourg, France and Germany, it emerged that poor reception conditions in Italy and Greece convinced migrants to venture to Western Europe. Such is the case of a Libyan migrant currently in Greece, who first arrived in Italy and was supposed to wait for ten days in the reception facility before getting registered, but decided to leave after a week.
An implication of this is that countries do not fall under the traditional country of transit/country of destination typology, rather shifting in and out of this, depending on the cohort of migrants and political contexts. For example, Greece is not initially considered a country of destination, with most migrants considering continuing their journeys on to Germany. However, structural obstacles experienced in Greece with regards to the asylum process, as well as precarious or lack of accommodation, cloud their image of the whole of Europe, and acts as a deterrent to engage in further mobility. In contrast, for others, who have somewhat put down roots in Greece through activities such as studying, Greece is seen as ‘home’ at least until the end of the degree. This indicates that while for some immobility is voluntary, for others it is involuntary, due to the feeling of entrapment in Greece. This is due to the insecurity experienced administratively, but also to the difficulty of leaving the country as a result of the strengthening of border controls. For example, a Syrian couple having received asylum in Greece tried to leave Greece twice, but they were apprehended at the Athens airport the first time and in Vienna the second time, and sent back to Greece. This provides evidence of the complexity of migrants’ decisions in engaging in further mobilities. As such, Greece is a) an entry country to the EU, b) a destination country (in cases where people try unsuccessfully to leave the country), and c) a transit country for persons who successfully reach the wider Schengen area.

Similarly, other countries such as Luxembourg and Spain are both countries of transit and destination. The physical location of Luxembourg, on the geographical route to the United Kingdom, makes it transit country for those who want to reach the UK, in addition to being a destination country for others. In the same way, Spain emerges as a transit country, with (mainly African) participants declaring that Spain represents a door to Europe, particularly if there are no job opportunities in the Spanish labour market. In contrast, a large number of Latin American participants are unlikely to consider engaging in onward movement, which might be due to the shared linguistic and cultural heritage, as well as climate and culinary traditions. Likewise, mainly a destination country, for an unprecedented number of asylum seekers, Germany was also considered a transit country in 2015 for around 83,000 migrants who went to Sweden, via the German-Danish border, instead of settling in Germany.

4.3. Post arrival mobility patterns

Based on the fieldwork carried out in the six EU countries and Turkey, one can distinguish between countries which facilitate onward mobility, and countries which restrict it.

In the Spanish case, two main mobility trajectories have been identified by institutional actors from the Spanish borders on to other EU countries, pointing to the ‘country of transit’ that Spain has for some migrants. First, the trajectory sometimes used by Latin Americans consists of coming to Spain by plane, from where they board another plane to another EU country, a practice facilitated by the fact that they do not need a tourist visa to travel to Schengen countries. Secondly, the maritime border from the Basque Country (Bilbao port) often acts as a stepping stone for migrants wishing to go to the United Kingdom via the ports which have ferry lines to UK. The latter border enhances mobility, mainly because the migrants are not registered at the point of arrival in Spain. In contrast, asylum applicants in Melilla find themselves physically trapped on the territory for up to a year, time during which they are not allowed to go to the European continent, and do not enter the reception and integration system. As such, they stay in a Centre for Temporary Residence for Migrants. Although on Spanish territory, they are prevented from engaging in mobility to the mainland.
In the Luxembourgish case, both institutional actors and the migrants themselves refer to the commonplace aspect of cross-border mobility to the neighbouring countries (France, Belgium and Germany) for mundane activities such as grocery shopping or visiting family and friends, sometimes achievable even for asylum seekers, who are not allowed to leave Luxembourg until they receive the refugee status. While cross-border movements to the neighbouring countries are taken for granted due to the inexistence of borders, traveling further afield, such as to Turkey or Canada, is considered difficult, due to the need of a visa. In these situations, the practical use of holding a Luxembourgish passport is mentioned, as enhancing mobility. In the same way, for the participants interviewed in the Grand East region of France, mobility does not end once arrived in France, with many of those having received the refugee status having chosen to settle in Metz due to its proximity to Germany and Belgium, where they have family, or Luxembourg, for professional reasons. Working in Luxembourg emerged during several interviews with both asylum seekers and refugees, despite not being legally authorised to join the Luxembourgish labour market once the refugee status has been acquired in France.

In contrast to the ordinary nature of mobility experienced by asylum seekers and refugees in Luxembourg and Eastern France, Greece manages the mobility of migrants through the presence of border controls at both entry and exit point, which have resulted into the reduction of secondary movements. However, the success of such operations is rather limited at the sea borders, while the air border is the easiest to control due to the presence of information technology, but very few arrivals/departures are registered at the Athens International Airport. Despite the easy management of air borders, and the fact that Greece is part of the Schengen area, it is important to note that passengers on flights from Greece to destinations considered popular for migrants, such as Belgium, Germany and Sweden, have their documents controlled at arrival, showing that internal borders are still present.

In the Turkish context, various legal avenues are in place for migrants, asylum seekers and refugees to leave the country, however, the numbers of those benefiting from them are relatively low. Importantly, non-EU citizens have traditionally been granted conditional refugee or subsidiary protection statuses on a temporary basis, and would lose this status when they received the refugee status which would allow them to stay in Turkey until they are resettled to a third country, such as EU countries, or the US, Canada or Australia. The resettlement process has been the product of a partnership between the Turkish state and the UNHCR. With regards to the Syrians fleeing their country, they have been given Temporary Protection Status, which guarantees them basic rights, such as access to healthcare, education, as well as labour market participation. Secondly, the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement emerged as a response to the high numbers of irregular migrants sent back to Turkey from Greece. Under this statement, all irregular migrants crossing to Greece from Turkey after 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey; and for every Syrian being returned to Turkey, another vulnerable Syrian (as per the UN Vulnerability criteria) would be resettled to the EU, with most of them having been resettled in Germany, the Netherlands and France. Moreover, Turkey is bound to take measures “to prevent new sea and land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU” (European Commission 2016). From April 2016 until November 2016, over 1700 irregular migrants (mainly from Pakistan, Syria, Algeria, Bangladesh and Afghanistan) were returned to Turkey. Thus, Turkey is becoming a country of return. However, at the beginning of the influx of Syrians to Turkey, a high number of Syrians were choosing not to register in Turkey, to prevent being sent back to Turkey through the Readmission Agreement with the EU. By keeping their options open, albeit, living
irregularly in Turkey, they could have engaged in further mobility, without running the risk of being sent back to Turkey, once in the EU.

A third path type of re-migration of migrants from Turkey is via the family reunification route, mainly to Germany. Finally, people with high social and economic capital engage in regular migration via professional or educational routes. However, it is worth mentioning that the above-mentioned legal routes to leave Turkey provide a fairly limited number of migrants with the opportunity to reach the EU. Thus, numerous asylum seekers leave for the EU irregularly, via Greece or Bulgaria, from cities like Canakkale, Izmir and Mugla.

It has emerged that lack of employment prospects in Turkey has been considered as a factor triggering illegal further mobility to the EU. Interestingly, the alternative was also possible, with the French fieldwork illustrating a case of a Yemeni asylum seeker (who, in the meantime has been granted refugee status), who was regretting having come to France, where at the time of interview he was experiencing uncertainty with regards to his status. He detailed, with hindsight, that he would have chosen to stay in Turkey, where he was working, and not embark on a journey to Europe.

In Germany, immobility is present in participants’ daily lives mainly with regards to their inability to travel to see their families, who are in Turkey. As well as the mobility itself, it is their agency which is undermined by not being allowed to travel. As such, most of them do not plan to engage in secondary movements, as that would mean having to start the integration process all over again. However, those who do consider leaving Germany, the reason evoked is related to the mobility restrictions in place for asylum seekers and refugees, but also to the presence of family or friends in other countries (such as Italy or the United Kingdom).

4.4. Internal mobility

As far as internal mobility is considered, it emerged that a common practice was the relocation of applicants for international protection. In Spain, people who do not have access to the reception and integration system in the city they first arrived in due to the lack of places, are relocated to other cities in Spain, thus disturbing the social networks the migrants were part of initially. Likewise, in France, refugees themselves requesting at times to be relocated to other parts of France where they have social and family networks.

In contrast, in the German case, residence restrictions (which will be elaborated later) imposed by authorities during, and in many cases, after the asylum procedure mean that mobility in Germany is frowned upon for both asylum seekers and refugees. As such, even participants who have a permanent employment, but live hours away from the work place are denied the right to move closer to the work place.

Turning to migrants’ mobility within Turkey, similarly to Germany, Syrians with temporary protection status are required to reside in the localities they are allocated to or registered in. As such, in cases where they need to travel, they need to obtain a travel permission, which is a very administratively strenuous process, resulting in their mobility within Turkey being significantly curtailed, which presents significant challenges to their ability to find employment and work in jobs requiring overseas travel. Therefore, individuals with high socioeconomic capital, found in high skilled positions, prefer to apply for a residency permit, which offers them mobility rights, rather than the temporary protection status, which limits their stay to the city level.
4.5. Conclusion

By showing that countries can be both countries of transit and receiving societies for different cohorts of people and at different point in time, depending on the political context, this chapter has disturbed the country of transit/country of destination dichotomy. Moreover, it identified that countries like France and Luxembourg, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other hand, are at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of asylum seekers and refugees mobility. While cross-border mobility for persons with (or without, in some cases) refugee status is experienced as a mundane practice in France and Luxembourg, in Germany, peoples’ mobility is in many cases restricted to the level of the municipality.
5. The interplay between Schengen and Dublin

5.1. Introduction

This section is interested in the views of state actors and the experiences of migrants regarding the interaction between the Schengen and Dublin systems, which are crucial for an eventual reforms of CEAS.

5.2. Schengen and Dublin – institutional views

The interplay between the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation is of significant importance for the countries involved in this project representing the external borders of the EU, such as Greece (and to a lesser extent Spain). Greece, particularly, has come under pressure due to the large influx of asylum seekers, which put a strain on its border control. This resulted into migrants’ identifications and registrations not being consistently processed, triggering secondary movements within the Schengen area, which have been at the heart of discussions related to security. Indeed, in a 2016 press release, the European Commission stated “[s]ecuring the EU’s external borders and ensuring efficient border controls is a prerequisite in an area of free movement” (European Commission 2016b).

In their accounts of the relation between the Schengen area and the Dublin Regulation, the institutional actors interviewed argued that Greece is currently experiencing a paradoxical reality. On the one hand, as a result of the absence of internal border checks, the Schengen system enables irregular migration and secondary movements. On the other hand, the Dublin Regulation is responsible for migrants’ staying in Greece, a country which would otherwise be considered mainly for transit purposes. As such, Dublin is the primary cause for Greece becoming a country of destination, as migrants are often legally trapped, meaning that they incur the risk of being returned to Greece, the first country of entry to the EU, in case they attempt to engage in secondary movements. While in Greece border agents see the Schengen area as a space which needs to be protected, in Spain, most institutional actors see Schengen as an open door towards other EU countries for the migrants having arrived in Spain.

Unsurprisingly, most institutional actors interviewed were particularly critical of the application of the Dublin Regulation within an area characterised by the absence of internal borders. The Luxembourgish informants seem to be of the opinion that the Schengen agreement renders the Dublin regulation ineffective, as the migrants make use of the border free area. This means that the Dublin regulation is disregarded by the migrants themselves, who leave the first country of arrival, such as Greece and Italy, to come to Luxembourg. In other words, had Dublin worked, Luxembourg would have no asylum seekers, except the arrivals in the cases of responsibility sharing and solidarity, in which the Grand Duchy took in asylum seekers from ships such as Lifeline in July 2018.

Amongst the state actors, there were also concerns regarding the securitisation of borders. In Hungary, most institutional actors claimed that the Schengen and Dublin regulations are not effective in the management of border security, as Dublin is considered to be putting pressure on (rather than benefiting) Member States which have an external border, such as Greece, Italy and Hungary. In this context, Schengen is considered to be working well if the external borders are protected effectively. As such, Hungarian officials consider the fence at the Hungarian external border to represent a solidarity and responsibility sharing mechanism, as not only do Hungarian border agents protect the Hungarian border, but also the EU member states internal borders.
5.3. Lived experiences of the interplay between the Schengen and Dublin systems

From the perspective of migrants interviewed in Greece, Dublin is experienced as another obstacle during their migratory journeys, a border which is not insurmountable. It is not viewed as a regulation which is enforced, rather as a symbolical border of which they know, but does not impede their onward movements. Indeed, during fieldwork in Luxembourg, it became apparent amongst some asylum seekers interviewed, that the need to leave Greece because of poor reception conditions overcame the barriers imposed by the Dublin system.

Two situations emerge with regards to the interaction between Schengen and Dublin in the French context, which has suppressed the Schengen agreement since November 2015. During the interviews with actors of the civil society, it became clear that, the Dublin regulation has had a negative impact on the asylum population, as France applies it in a consistent manner. The most striking example is that of the migrants trying to cross the Italian-French border, after having been fingerprinted in Italy. Those who manage to cross the border and reach France and are not detained by the French border police and returned to Italy, find themselves in limbo for up to a year in France, time during which their application is pending treatment. More often than not, male Dublin cases find themselves homeless, due to the precarious reception system which prioritises families and women due to the lack of places in accommodation centres. Another negative aspect of the Dublin regulation in France is that women, many of them who had been victims of sexual assault and violence and/or prostitution in Italy, fear being sent back. The existence of the Schengen area provides them with a fake illusion that their situation might improve, when, in reality, France applies Dublin, which means that they are waiting to be readmitted to the first country of arrival.

Nevertheless, with regards to the Grand East region of France, where the fieldwork was conducted, the high levels of mobility experienced by the local population to and from the neighbouring countries means that, in practice, the suppression of Schengen would not be a viable solution in the long term. Therefore, cross border mobility becomes an inevitable solution for asylum seekers who have seen their applications rejected in France, and, as a result, decide to place their application in the nearby countries, such as Germany or Belgium. This is particularly the case of Roma families from Kosovo or Serbia, for whom mobility becomes ‘a way of living’. As such, with regards to the Grand East region, the non-existence of border controls undermines the implementation of the Dublin regulation. The two geographical examples above expose the inconsistent enforcement of Dublin across France by Prefectures, resulting in a high degree of divergence across the country.

Similarly to France, in Germany, Dublin equals uncertainty, as asylum seekers are placed in a facility for up to six months, time during which they wait to be returned to the first country of arrival. In the German case, most of the times the transfer does not take place as the migrants are considered unfit for travel.

With regards to Turkey, the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation do not impact the Turkish border regime and the asylum management directly, nevertheless, they do so indirectly at least in two ways: 1) the appearance of new mobility trajectories through Turkey, and 2) the creation of legislation to account for this (the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement). One of the implications with regards to the migrants themselves has been that numerous refugees who should have been resettled to Spain or Italy opted to stay in Turkey instead, due to better living conditions. In this context, it is believed that if Schengen was indeed a borderless area, the migrants would have accepted to be resettled and, once in the EU, would have gone to the Nordic countries or Germany. This indicates that there are instances where the refugees themselves perceive borders between countries belonging to the Schengen area.
5.4. The Common European Asylum System

With regards to CEAS, most actors agreed that the main stumbling block at its heart is the lack of solidarity and responsibility-sharing mechanisms between member states in the context of Dublin, as the EU member states show little solidarity towards Greece and Italy, in not taking a share of asylum seekers. The Hungarian actors, however, considered that, for CEAS to be effective, it should take into account the reality of the Schengen area, which is the absence of borders, by processing all asylum applications either in non-EU nation states, or at EU’s external borders. This would prevent secondary movements, as has already been the case due to the presence of transit centres at Hungary’s external border, which have prevented movements to Austria. Therefore, from their perspective, the enforcement of border security at the Hungarian external border protects the EU member states.

Some actors also referred to the procedures in place, which should be enforced. It has been reported that Spain tried to follow the legal framework, however, due to the high numbers of arrivals, the system collapsed, and it has adjusted its practices to apply a version of CEAS with its own national take. One of the question marks of the asylum policy is, for example, the actual registration of the migrants who arrive in Spain, as many remain unfingerprinted. In this context, there have been cases where migrants were bussed to the North of the country (Catalonia and the Basque Country), from where they undertook onward migration, without having been registered in Spain. A similar practice was mentioned in the Luxembourgish case, with institutional actors denouncing that Italian authorities would shuttle asylum seekers to the North of the country, and let them go to the neighbouring countries, many Eritreans choosing to come to Luxembourg.

In a similar vein, the German legislators stress the importance of the harmonisation of European asylum systems, namely the asylum procedure, criteria for determining refugee status, legal protection and a common list of safe countries of origin. Thus, rather than directives, CEAS should be comprised of an Asylum Procedures Regulation and a Reception Conditions Regulation, which should be binding. The harmonisation of reception conditions (with focus on standardisation of accommodation rather than of asylum allowance) might also deter migrants from engaging in secondary movement, however, it is difficult to achieve due to heterogeneous economic and political contexts. An option for preventing secondary movements might be by connecting asylum and labour migration by distributing asylum seekers to countries based on their skills and the national labour market needs.

5.5. Conclusion

From the perspective of state actors, the reality of Schengen and Dublin is that first countries of arrival (such as Greece and Spain) as well as destination countries of secondary migration (such as Germany) are at the receiving end of migrant numbers, while other EU countries do not show any solidarity in the matter. Furthermore, it is considered that while the freedom of movement of EU citizens is important for European integration, the Dublin procedure is necessary in order to reduce the negative effects of open internal borders, such as secondary movements of asylum seekers. Despite being a good tool in theory, in practice the Dublin regulation is considered to have failed, as in many cases, asylum seekers are not registered, which means that since there is no administrative paper trail of them, they cannot be returned to the first country of arrival. A second pitfall of the Dublin regulation consists of the non-execution of readmissions of migrants, as, in many case, the deadline expires.

To conclude, migrants leave the first countries of arrival irrespective of the Dublin agreement, showing that borders cannot always prevent mobility. Dublin represents just another border they need to cross.
6. Housing and Employment

6.1. Introduction

As previously argued, borders are produced and reproduced. In the process, they become materialised in peoples’ daily lives through the actions of different border managers, may they be public, private or non-governmental. In-country, border controls therefore take the form of barriers upon migrants, curtailing their access to services, rights and mobility on the basis of their migrant status.

6.2. Housing

Across the six European countries studied, Greece, Hungary and Spain present a severe shortage of housing. In Greece, where only asylum seekers are eligible for accommodation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is one of the main actors in the housing market, as accommodation programmes are implemented by it through the ESTIA programme, with the support of NGOs. However, provided that the facilities are full, in some cases, it can take more than ten months for asylum seekers to be placed in a camp, with some resorting to finding accommodation alternatives through personal contacts (by staying with friends already in private accommodation) or with the support of NGOs. There is a total of 26 open reception facilities (mainly camps in the outskirts of Athens, but also some hotels) coordinated by the Ministry for Migration Policy. Camps are situated on the outskirts of Athens, which might exacerbate the feeling of exclusion. The housing shortage, as well as the difficulty to access private housing due to high costs, has changed the landscape of Athens, triggering the appearance of squats.

Similarly, in Hungary, there is very limited accommodation for asylum seekers, and there are no housing options dedicated strictly to refugees. Beneficiaries of international protection can stay in refugee centres for a period of 30 days after their status has been granted. Once this period is up, the only options available are either social housing structures or homeless shelters, which are extremely difficult to navigate without the help of contacts and/or linguistic skills. Therefore, private housing remains the only viable alternative, despite barriers such as price and discrimination.

Access to the Spanish reception and integration system (covering education, healthcare, citizen awareness, housing and labour markets) is dependent on the number of places available and it consists of two phases: the temporary phase (which lasts for six months), and the phase of autonomy. The system is open to those having placed an asylum application and it is also available in case they are granted international protection (ECRE n.d). Despite the asylum legislation guaranteeing access to housing to asylum seekers as part of the reception and integration system, shortage of accommodation represents the main negative aspects to which migrants are confronted, meaning that over 80% of asylum seekers do not have access to accommodation. During the temporary phase, asylum applicants are hosted in asylum reception centres. After this phase, they enter the autonomy phase, meaning that they are meant to look for accommodation, with some financial support provided by civil organisations. Nonetheless, the lack of affordable housing in the private sector and of social housing, as well as discrimination, are only a couple of the barriers encountered by migrants when looking for accommodation. As such, those falling through the cracks of the system, left with no accommodation options, end up living in temporary homeless shelters, in shared accommodation, or allowed to sleep for a certain number of nights in churches or NGOs, or are ultimately left homeless.

In Luxembourg asylum seekers are placed in shelters which are under the responsibility of the Luxembourgish Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI), and are managed either by OLAI itself, or by
the Luxembourgish Red Cross or Caritas. Like in the Greek case, many shelters are located in relatively isolated places, with limited access to public transport, which impeded respondents’ mobility within the country. There are no shelters aimed at refugees, who are supposed to leave the accommodation facilities aimed for applicants for international protection after their refugee status has been granted. However, due to obstacles at accessing accommodation in the private market (due to high rental prices and/or discrimination), many extend their stay in the facilities after the refugee status has been granted, or resort to social contacts in order to find private accommodation.

In France, asylum seekers are, in theory, placed in housing structures in shelters, hotels or apartments. However, the acute shortage of accommodation places means that there is often no accommodation available particularly for single male asylum seekers, who are not considered as vulnerable as women and families. Therefore, asylum seekers and refugees (who often live in social housing) are often relocated to areas where accommodation is available. Similarly, in Germany, after the asylum procedure has been finalised in the first reception centres, asylum seekers are distributed to municipalities on the basis of a quota. In municipalities, they are usually placed in shared accommodation until a decision has been made on their case, after which they need to find accommodation by themselves. The collective accommodation also determines their place of residence, as it is difficult to move out of the municipality. Refugees who receive social welfare transfers have access to affordable housing which needs to meet specific financial and size requirements. As such, it took some participants up to a year to find an apartment, which sometimes can be in poor condition. As well as housing shortages for large families and single people, foreigners also often experience discrimination from the side of landlords or estate agents, which has led to many NGOs providing support in finding accommodation. Moreover, most of the social housing is found outside of city centres, while refugees prefer to live in cities.

Restrictions to persons’ internal mobility takes place also in the Turkish case. Both Syrians under temporary protection and asylum seekers are required to live in cities in which they are allocated to or are registered in. In this context, temporary accommodation centres are seen, from the perspective of institutional actors, as obstructing social harmonisation, which should be enhanced by migrants living in permanent accommodation. As such, camps have closed down, and the Syrians removed were given financial support in order to find accommodation in the cities in which they were registered in the first place. However, most accommodation options for both Syrians and asylum seekers rely on self-financed accommodation in the city in which they have been assigned. In cases where they want to move to different cities, they need to obtain an authorization from the PDMM on health or family grounds, otherwise they might fall into irregularity.

6.3. Employment

In all the European countries studied, asylum seekers and refugees have the right to work, although applicants for international protection generally need to be in possession of an authorisation before taking up work. Asylum seekers in Luxembourg, Spain and France can apply for temporary work authorisation if no decision has been made on their asylum application after six months, while refugees have the right to work and full access to the labour market. In the Spanish case, the work authorisation has to be renewed every six months, but, because of long processing delays, sometimes they are left with expired work documents, making it impossible to find work. Moreover, the stigma associated with the work authorisation and thus the asylum system, means that employers are reluctant to hire asylum seekers. Programmes offered by NGOs promote access to the labour market by offering 3,000€ per year to those who take part in the programme for training and job placement courses offered by civil
organisations. Nevertheless, in practice, there is not enough funding to cover all the requests. Other than the lack of funding, other barriers that asylum seekers encounter in the access to the labour market are the recognition of degrees and experience, as well as linguistic barriers for non-Hispanic asylum seekers.

Nevertheless, various obstacles limit asylum seekers’ and refugees’ participation in the labour market, such as: lack of language skills or local professional experience, or invalidity of the qualifications obtained in home countries. Thus, their labour market participation is relatively low, and/or in low skilled positions in the hospitality sector. Several refugees in Luxembourg and France in employment, as well as jobless asylum seekers at the time of the research, declared having done volunteering, which might have improved their hiring prospects through local experience and the creation of a network.

In Hungary and Germany, the access of asylum seekers to work is somewhat facilitated from an administrative point of view. In Hungary, they have the right to work in refugee centres for up to nine months as kitchen aides or cleaners, or to do community work without being in the possession of a work permit, after which they need to apply for one. Due to high emigration rates and economic growth, prospective employers often contact NGOs active in the field of asylum in order to provide a labour force from amongst the refugee population, however, most employment opportunities are in low skilled jobs, such as cooks in kebab, gyros shops and pizzerias. However, there is no support targeting asylum seekers and refugees in order to facilitate their labour market integration.

In Germany, most asylum seekers (except those from safe countries) can receive a work permit three months after they started the asylum procedure. Refugees receive it automatically and are also allowed to work as self-employed. However, since asylum seekers must stay in first reception centres during the asylum procedure, they become immobile and thus often unable to take up employment. Another barrier to the access to the labour market, which seems unique to Germany, consists of the level of education. People who are not in possession of a secondary school degree do not have access to vocational education, which would enhance their labour market participation as a result of the potential to gain professional and linguistic skills.

In Turkey, people holding different international protection statuses can apply and be granted work permits. For example, conditional refugees are able to enter the employment market upon receiving a work permit, while refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection can use their identity cards to access the labour market. Legislation surrounding the access to the labour market for people under temporary protection has been in place as of 2016, allowing people to receive work permits at the request of the employer six months after obtaining this status. Despite the regulation surrounding and enabling access to the formal market, the largest part of the working population is found in the informal sector. This is due to three main reasons: 1) the absence of benefits associated with working legally (as free healthcare is already provided), 2) the fact that employers need to make the application, (in the case of Syrians under temporary protection), 3) earning an income would not make them eligible to receive the monthly allowance provided as part of the UN-backed Emergency Social Safety Net programme for Syrians in Turkey. With regards to experiences in the informal labour market, it has been found that nearly all participants have experienced instances of exploitation, which took the form of unequal pay for the same type of work as Turkish nationals.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter determined that while in all of the national cases access to employment for applicants for international protection was granted upon application for a work authorisation, barriers such as
discrimination and non-recognition of home country qualification represented the main barriers to labour market participation. With regards to the housing market, shortage of accommodation facilities meant that, in many cases, asylum seekers had to live either with friends, or in the outskirts of cities, which might impede their social and economic integration.
7. Final conclusion

The aim of this comparative study was to examine the interplay between borders and mobility from the perspective of migrants and state, as well as non-state actors in six EU countries (Greece, Hungary, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Spain) and Turkey. The first chapter introduced the theoretical and methodological dimensions of the research, while the second chapter contextualised the empirical data by providing some information on the management of EU borders, the CEAS, and the national asylum legislation in place in each of the countries studied. The empirical component of this study was based on fieldwork conducted in the seven national contexts listed above. It consists of four chapters, which explored, from the perspective of institutional actors and migrants, the following themes: borders, mobility trajectories and patterns, the interplay between the Schengen area and the Dublin Regulation, and access to the labour and housing market.

This comparative study has identified that the majority of state actors interviewed by the national partners expressed concerns with regards to the applicability of the Dublin system in an area characterised by the absence of borders, arguing that the lack of internal borders renders the Dublin package ineffective. This emerged particularly in the interviews conducted in Luxembourg, where the national legislators commented that a landlocked country like Luxembourg, with the airport being the only external border, was a destination country for applicants for international protection due to the absence of internal borders. In a similar vein, from the perspective of the migrants interviewed, the existence of the Dublin Regulation does not prevent their mobility trajectories. Nevertheless, it exposes them to a state of legal uncertainty when arriving in a Member State which was not the first EU country of arrival. This suggests that for many of the migrants interviewed, the mobility trajectories undergone in order to arrive in the ‘destination countries’, become legal and administrative journeys within the receiving countries, in order to become regularised.

One possible solution identified by the public actors was the securing of external borders (particularly the maritime borders), considered significant in counteracting the effects of the border free Schengen area, as it would prevent people from entering the EU. Nevertheless, the research conducted in the field suggests that borders cannot always prevent human mobility. While at times they can deter people from travelling to the destination countries initially targeted, this study has found that borders can mostly change mobility trajectories, resulting either in the creation of new migratory routes and the increase in popularity of some routes over others, and/or the transformation of some Member States from countries of transit into countries of destination. For example, in late 2015 and 2016, when Germany lifted the border control and became the country responsible with examining asylum applications, the Greek-North Macedonia border became popular for people heading to Germany. However, when Germany closed its borders and the hotspot approach was introduced, many people decided to stay in Greece. This suggests that while borders might impede people from arriving in the countries of reception originally–contemplated, they cannot prevent people from engaging in migratory/secondary movements.

Related to this, it was found that in some cases, although the ‘migrants’ did not consider going to a certain country of destination when leaving the country of origin, the social encounters made throughout their journeys, convinced them about the choice of one country over the other. For example, several participants interviewed in Luxembourg declared having only found out about the existence of the country after having arrived in Europe. This shows that mobility patterns are not
necessarily a response to border controls, but also to other factors, such as the presence of acquaintances and friends.

One of the main weaknesses of the Dublin Regulation is that despite the first country of arrival criteria, most applicants for international protection do not seek asylum in the first EU Member State they arrived in. Moreover, many of the asylum claims lodged in EU Member States are made by applicants who have already made an application in a different EU country. This indicates that the Dublin criteria for examining asylum claims does not take into account applicants’ preferences. The current study found that the main ‘pull factors’ which (might) determine applicants for international protection, as well as beneficiaries for international protection to engage in secondary movements are represented by the presence of family and social networks, (perceived) work opportunities in a different EU Member State and precarious reception conditions in the first countries of arrival (such as Italy and Greece).

If we now turn to ‘migrants’ experiences in the labour and housing market in the countries studied, with the exception of Germany and Hungary, access to employment is determined by the granting of a temporary work authorisation six months after having lodged an asylum application. In the German context, the time frame is reduced to three months, while in Hungary work authorisations are not necessary for the first nine months. Nevertheless, barriers such as non-recognition of degrees and work experience, as well as absence of language skills and local work experience mean that access to the labour market is often restricted. This is a compelling finding, since access to the labour market is one of the determinants for secondary movements. Furthermore, it was found that precarious conditions experienced in structures of initial reception might both encourage and discourage asylum seekers’ secondary movements, which points to the importance of studying onward movements from a holistic perspective, by looking at migrants’ everyday experience, rather than in specific areas, such as the housing and employment sectors.

To conclude, this study indicates that while territorial borders cannot always impede human mobility, their in-country reproductions can encourage migrants’ secondary movements.
8. References


9. List of Abbreviations

CEAS - Common European Asylum System
CEASEVAL - Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and Recommendations for Further Development
EU - European Union
EURODAC – European fingerprinting database
FRONTEX – European Border and Coast Agency
GDM - General Direction of Migration
OAR - Office of Asylum and Refuge
OFPRA - Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides OFPRA
PDMM - Provincial Directorate of Migration Management
SIS – Schengen Information System
SHUK - Structure d’hébergement d’urgence au Kirchberg
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VIS – Visa Information System
The research project CEASEVAL ("Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and Recommendations for Further Development") is an interdisciplinary research project led by the Institute for European studies at Chemnitz University of Technology (TU Chemnitz), funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 770037.) It brings together 14 partners from European countries aiming to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the CEAS in terms of its framework and practice and to elaborate new policies by constructing different alternatives of implementing a common European asylum system. On this basis, CEASEVAL will determine which kind of harmonisation (legislative, implementation, etc.) and solidarity is possible and necessary.