CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Fostering Resilience in Areas of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders

Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse

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EU-LISTCO investigates the challenges posed to European foreign policy by identifying risks connected to areas of limited statehood and contested orders. Through the analysis of the EU Global Strategy and Europe’s foreign policy instruments, the project assesses how the preparedness of the EU and its member states can be strengthened to better anticipate, prevent and respond to threats of governance breakdown and to foster resilience in Europe’s neighbourhoods.

Continuous knowledge exchange between researchers and foreign policy practitioners is the cornerstone of EU-LISTCO. Since the project’s inception, a consortium of fourteen leading universities and think tanks have been working together to develop policy recommendations for the EU’s external action toolbox, in close coordination with European decision-makers.

**FOR MORE INFORMATION:**

Freie Universität Berlin
EU-LISTCO
(Europe's External Action and the Dual Challenges of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders)
Ihnestr. 22
14195 Berlin
Phone: + 49 30 83858501
eric.stollenwerk@fu-berlin.de

https://www.eu-listco.net/
https://twitter.com/eulistco
https://www.facebook.com/eulistco

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1. INTRODUCTION: EU- LiSTCO’S FRAMEWORK IN A NUTSHELL

EU-LiSTCO starts from the assumption that Europe’s internal and external environment is characterized by two risk factors, which represent challenges for the external action of the EU and its member states:\footnote{We thank our EU-LiSTCO partners for very valuable and detailed input to this paper, particularly during the discussions at the EU-LiSTCO kick-off conference in Berlin, April 25-27, 2018. Special thanks go to Riccardo Alcaro, Pol Bargués-Pedreny, Federica Bicchi, Sarah Bressan, David Cadier, Stephen Krasner, Christian Lesquesne, Pol Morillas, Havard Mokleiv Nygard, Saima Ozcurumez, Philipp Rotmann, Eric Stollenwerk, and Marcin Terlikowski. For research assistance, we thank Anna Schmauder and Amelie Buchwald.}

- **Areas of limited statehood** (ALS), in which central government authorities and institutions are too weak to set and enforce rules and/or do not control the monopoly over the means of violence. Such areas of limited statehood are ubiquitous. They characterise large parts of the regions surrounding the EU in the East and in the South. However, areas of limited statehood are neither ungoverned nor ungovernable. Some ALS are reasonably well governed by a whole variety of actors – state and non-state, domestic/local and international, while others are not. The challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster good governance in areas of limited statehood.

- **Contested orders** (CO), in which state and non-state actors challenge the norms, principles, and rules according to which societies and political systems are or should be organised. At the global and regional level, powers such as Russia and – somewhat less aggressive – China call the liberal and law-based order into question. The Trump administration in the United States adds a new dimension to order contestations by appearing to turn away from the liberal international order which the U.S. itself was instrumental in creating. Finally, and domestically, Western and non-Western societies struggle with the rise of actors that question their current political and legal order from the inside as well as from the outside. The challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster conditions in which order contestations remain peaceful and do not contribute to governance breakdowns in areas of limited statehood.

Neither limited statehood nor contested orders will go away. They create vulnerabilities and pose risks, but they do not in themselves amount to threats to the EU. Only if and when areas of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into governance breakdowns and violent conflict, do the risks turn into threats to the security and stability of the EU, its member states, and citizens. The main research task of EU-LISTCO is to investigate the “tipping points” at which risks of limited
statehood and contested orders turn into threats leading to governance breakdowns and violent conflict.

Two factors are decisive in affecting such tipping points:

- **Global, diffuse, and regional risks**, such as nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism, economic crises, aggressive powers, cyber threats, and climate change, are likely to promote governance breakdowns and violent conflict in areas of limited statehood and contested orders.

- **Resilience** is likely to help societies to sustain good and effective governance at the local/domestic as well as regional levels. We understand resilience as the “capacity of societies, communities and individuals to manage opportunities and risks in a peaceful and stable manner, and to build, maintain or restore livelihoods in the face of major pressures.” (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2017, 3).

In other words, the various risks, on the one hand, and resilience, on the other, affect tipping points in opposite ways. Whether or not risks turn into threats for European security then depends on the extent to which resilient societies can successfully contain these risks through effective and legitimate governance at the local, domestic, and regional levels.

Last but not least, we use three indicators to measure degrees of resilience:

- **Social trust** in societies and local communities;
- **Legitimacy** (or social acceptance) of governance actors and institutions at the various levels;
- **Institutional design** of local, domestic, and regional governance arrangements including what is left of central state institutions.

Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual framework of EU-LISTCO. Research in EU-LISTCO – particularly Work Packages 2, 3, and 4 – will focus on exploring the relationships between the various factors outlined above which affect the tipping points between risks and threats. The remainder of this paper introduces the various concepts used in the framework in more detail, namely areas of limited statehood, governance, contested orders, threats, resilience, as well as the three factors fostering the latter.
2. EUROPE’S RISKS: AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD AND CONTESTED ORDERS

2.1 Statehood: Functional vs. Institutional Understandings

Theories of the state abound (see e.g. Benz, 2001; Hay, Lister, & Marsh, 2006; Hobson, 2000; Schuppert, 2009; vom Hau, 2015). Most scholars would probably agree that the state constitutes a particular type of political order, a political system, or a polity. A tribe forms a political order, but it is not a state. Global governance, with its many international institutions, also constitutes a political order, but there is no world state. So, how do we know a state when we see it? Two conceptualizations of the state in the literature help us clarify the concept of statehood.

Functional conceptualizations of the state focus on the functions it is supposed to perform. Such a performance-based approach defines functioning states as essentially service providers – from security to education and a clean environment. This functional understanding of the state has informed most of the scholarly literature on ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states, the various datasets measuring degrees of statehood, as well as the state-building programs of development agencies and

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The following draws on Börzel & Risse, forthcoming, ch. 2.
international organizations (e.g. Rotberg, 2003, 2004; Schnecker, 2004; Carment, 2003; Carment, Landry, Samy, & Shaw, 2015; Messner et al., 2015; Messner et al., 2016; Fritz, 2004; Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000). Using state performance to define functioning states is prone to tautological reasoning (cf. Soifer, 2008; Cingolani, 2013; Lindvall & Teorell, 2017). For instance, the OECD 2015 Report on State Fragility claims that fragile states lag behind other states in reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG; see The Development Assistance Committee, 2015). At the same time, it uses economic growth, educational years, and health capacities among others as indicators for state fragility.

Functional understandings are not only analytically flawed; tautological reasoning also leads to bad policy advice, since we have no clue about the causal chain if we use poverty as an indicator for state fragility and then argue that state fragility causes poverty (for a thorough critique of the “failed state” concept see also Woodward, 2017). Fighting poverty is not the same as state-building. Nor does the strengthening of state institutions necessarily reduce poverty.

A related issue is the confusion of definitional issues and research questions. If we define a state through the functions it performs, a non-performing state is no longer a state at all, strictly speaking. Moreover, defining rule of law or transparent, accountable and inclusive institutions as state functions tends to conflate regime type (democracy, autocracy etc.) and statehood. Functional, performance-oriented conceptualisations of the state prevent us from posing the questions that are relevant for our project: under which conditions do states or other types of polities perform well by providing rule structures and delivering goods and services? How much statehood is necessary to avoid governance breakdown and violent conflict? To what extent can non-state actors provide collective goods and services, compensating for the governance failure of states?

Last but not least, most functional typologies in the literature and datasets on fragile states, failing states or ‘states at risk,’ reveal a normative orientation toward highly developed and democratic states. The benchmark is usually the democratic and capitalist state governed by the rule of law (Leibfried & Zürn, 2005). This is normatively questionable, because it reflects Eurocentrism and a bias toward Western concepts, as if statehood equals Western liberal statehood and a market economy. We might find the political and economic systems of North Korea, Iran, Angola, Saudi Arabia, or Russia morally questionable, but they certainly constitute states.

The second understanding of state is institutional and conceptualizes a state as a particular type of organizational structure. Following Max Weber (Weber, 1978, 54), a state constitutes an authoritative rule structure, a Herrschaftsverband, which has the capacity to rule hierarchically, based on the control over the use of violence and can expect obedience to its commands. This is an institutional understanding of the state
as a hierarchical rule structure. It does not imply that states rule hierarchically via command and control all the time, only that statehood implies the ability to do so.

Among contemporary authors, Fukuyama, Holsti, Jackson, and Krasner share this institutionalist understanding of statehood (see Fukuyama, 2004, 2012; Holsti, 2004; Jackson, 1990; Krasner, 1999). Equally important, this institutional understanding conforms to international law, in particular the Montevideo Convention of 1933 (see Grant, 1998-1999; also Jellinek, 1900 (1922)). Accordingly, a state must possess a permanent population, occupy a clearly defined territory, operate an effective government over its territory, and must display capacity to fulfil international treaty obligations. Weber's conceptualisation of the state conforms to the third and fourth criteria mentioned here, if we understand ‘effective government’ as entailing some degree of hierarchical enforcement capacity, what we call statehood. States command what Stephen Krasner calls “domestic sovereignty,” i.e., “the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity” (Krasner, 1999, 4). The control of the monopoly over the use of force captures the coercive or military dimension of state capacity (Gurr, 1988; Fortin, 2010). The setting and enforcement of rules requires some tax and spending capacity (Tilly, 1995) as well as some sort of administration or professional bureaucracy (Skocpol, 1985; Rauch & Evans, 2000).

The Weberian understanding of statehood allows us to strictly distinguish between the state as an institutional structure of authority that can set and enforce rules and controls the monopoly over the use of force, on the one hand, and the kind of governance it provides, on the other. The latter is an empirical not a definitional question. Statehood, understood as the capacity to govern hierarchically, is part of the definition. Whether statehood is used to provide collective goods and services, forms part of the research question. Likewise, statehood has nothing to do with regime type (democracy, autocracy, etc.) or what North et al. call “open” versus “closed access orders” (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). Rather, democracy and rule of law are institutions that may affect the effectiveness and legitimacy of collective goods and service provision.

Separating statehood from governance avoids the fallacies of functional conceptualisations. Most importantly, such separation allows for the possibility that actors other than the state engage in governance. What if non-state actors, such as warlords or rebel groups, gain the ability to maintain a monopoly over the means of violence in a territory controlled by them and are also capable of enforcing their decisions? As Tilly has argued, the European states came about precisely because such violent non-state actors acquired what has been defined as statehood above (Tilly, 1975, 1985). In the contemporary international system, however, the difference
between a state in the above sense and a territory controlled by warlords, rebel groups, or multinational companies is (international) recognition.

2.2 Areas of Limited Statehood

The institutional understanding of the state enables us to define more precisely what limited statehood means. While areas of limited statehood located inside internationally recognized states, it is the domestic sovereignty of these states, which is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood then constitute those parts of a country

\[ \textit{in which central authorities (national governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce central rules and decisions and/or in which they do not control the means of violence.}\]

The ability to set and enforce rules or to control the means of violence can be limited along various dimensions: 1) territorial, i.e., parts of a country's territorial spaces; 2) sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy areas; 3) social, i.e., with regard to specific parts of the population; and 4) temporal (see figure 2 below). The opposite of limited statehood is not ‘unlimited’ but ‘consolidated’ statehood, i.e. those areas (functional or geographic) of a country in which the state enjoys the monopoly over the means of violence and/or the ability to make and enforce central decisions most of the time.

**Figure 2: Configurations of Limited Statehood (Examples)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSIONS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD</th>
<th>AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD (EXAMPLES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Amazon region (Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most Sub-Saharan African countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy area</td>
<td>Environment (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Mafia (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Qaeda and Daesh (Middle East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors’ own illustration.*
Consolidated statehood is the exception to the rule in the contemporary international system covering mostly the “global North” of highly industrialized and democratic states. This is not to argue that areas of limited statehood are confined to the “global South” of the developing world. New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina became an area of limited statehood temporarily when the U.S. state lost the monopoly over the means of violence for a short period. The ‘no go’ areas in many American or European inner cities have to be mentioned, too. Nevertheless, consolidated states – the ‘Denmarks’ of the world – approximate the Weberian ideal type of state at one end of the spectrum.

At the other end of the continuum, we find ‘failed states’, i.e., countries where areas of limited statehood cover the entire territory and most of the population in most policy areas most of the time. Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan constitute prominent examples of ‘failed states’ in the current international system. Somalia is an interesting case insofar as it contains at least one province – Somaliland, which has developed into a quasi-state. While not recognised internationally as a state, Somaliland nevertheless exhibits a provincial government with almost complete domestic sovereignty (Bryden, 2004; Debie, Glassner, Schetter, & Terlinden, 2009; Menkhaus, 2006/2007; Renders & Terlinden, 2010). Yet, Somalia is usually portrayed as the quintessential failed state – a reminder of the pitfalls of “methodological nationalism” (Amelina, Nergiz, Faist, & Schiller, 2012; Wimmer & Schiller, 2003; Zürn, 2002).

Focusing on areas of limited statehood rather than entire ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states provides for a more nuanced picture on governance, even though it may be more difficult to obtain data. Measuring areas of limited statehood in a valid and reliable way represents a daunting task (see Stollenwerk, 2018 for the following). First, most datasets suffer from methodological nationalism, which contradicts our configurative understanding of areas of limited statehood and the reality in most countries. Second, as argued above, many datasets on ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states conflate degrees of statehood with measurements of governance and service provision. Third, many datasets (such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index) are based on subjective expert estimates rather than ‘objective’ measurements. Fourth, measuring areas of limited statehood faces endogeneity issues. Our conceptualisation of limited statehood emphasises lack of state capacity to implement and enforce decisions. But what if weak state capacity results from deliberate choices by political, economic, and social elites? On the one hand, there are ‘neoliberal’ states which have voluntarily

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3 Note that our definition of failed states only pertains to the lack of monopoly over the means of violence and the missing capacity to implement and enforce government decisions. Thus, it differs from the way in which failed statehood is conceptualised in most of the literature (see above).

4 See https://www.bti-project.org/de/startseite/ (last accessed April 24, 2017).
withdrawn from regulating particular policy areas (e.g. capital flows) or from providing particular public services (e.g. telecommunications) and, thus, have ceased to maintain the institutional capacity to set and enforce central rules and decisions in these issue areas. On the other hand, there are the so-called “cunning” states (Randeria, 2003; see also Brandel & Randeria, 2018) whereby political and social elites deliberately keep state institutions weak in order to reap economic and political benefits or to increase their rents (see also Reno, 1998; also Bates, 2008).

Irrespective of measurement issues, there can be no doubt that areas of limited statehood are a pervasive feature of Europe’s geostrategic environment and will remain so for the foreseeable future. They have existed in Europe’s surroundings for such a long time that they can no longer be seen as contingencies (examples include the frozen conflicts in the Western Balkans, Moldova, Georgia, Lebanon, Somalia, Morocco/Western Sahara or Israel/Palestine). In addition, the phenomenon of limited statehood has expanded considerably, so much so that nowadays there is hardly a country among Europe's neighbouring states and in the regions adjacent to them that does not have to deal with it. Areas of limited statehood exist within parts of otherwise reasonably functioning states (e.g. Southern Ossetia in Georgia and Sinai in Egypt), cover virtually the territory of an entire state (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Libya), or extend over potentially vast cross-border areas (e.g. the Sahel). Finally, areas of limited statehood in more distant regions – from the Sahel and the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan and Pakistan – pose relevant risks to European security given the increasingly transnational character and interconnections between regions of the world. Physical proximity still matters, but increasingly porous borders, miniaturisation of technology and the interconnectedness of threats (organised crime, terrorism, and other non-state violent actors) make physical distances less relevant to intra-EU security.

2.3 Contested Orders

Like areas of limited statehood, order contestations per se do not threaten the stability of political systems or the ability and action capacity of states to pursue their foreign and security policies protecting their citizens and realising their various goals and interests. A certain degree of contestation and politicisation is constitutive, particularly for liberal polities. For instance, (mostly) right-wing anti-establishment parties across Europe have started contesting the institutional setup of the EU through a process of politicisation (De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016; Zürn, 2012). While this puts EU institutions under stress, it does not threaten the European order per se, let alone pose security threats. European polities have always had to deal with so-called ‘anti-system’ political parties and social movements (Capoccia, 2002). Likewise, non-liberal societies have faced competing conceptions about appropriate
政治、经济、社会和领土秩序。Contested orders 可以被概念化为关于如何建立和/or 维持政治、经济、社会和领土秩序之间的不相容性。

Order contestations might relate to already existing governance systems and polities (e.g. the rise of populist parties and movements in the EU or the challenges to the international liberal order by both the Trump administration and the Chinese leadership). Orders can also be contested in situations where actors compete to establish their own sets of rules, e.g. the EU-Russian competition over region-building in the Eastern neighbourhood. Order contestations always involve competing ideas and discourses about what is considered an appropriate political, economic, or social system. A prominent example concerns the controversy over violence between Sufism and Salafi Jihadism.

Contested orders often involve a configuration of actors, in which some challenge the legitimacy of the “rules of the game” and of political institutions. Of course, such contestations do not only relate to domestic and national polities, but also to regional and international orders. Russia's challenge to the European post-Cold War arrangement through the annexation of the Crimea or the Trump administration's contestation of a global rule-based trade order are cases in point. As contestation is fairly normal in contemporary political systems, political regimes have developed different mechanisms to deal with them. While democratic polities rely on institutionalised deliberation, majority decisions and accountability, non-democratic systems use co-optation and repression (North et al., 2009; Fukuyama, 2012). Regional and global governance systems have also developed various mechanisms to deal with contestations, e.g. through dispute settlement systems.

Things start to change when the legitimacy of an existing order becomes so contested that the competition for political power can no longer be contained by the normal mechanisms of political systems, be they liberal or not, or where the very existence of the state-based international order is attacked, e.g. by radical religious movements such as Jihadist Islamist forces (Mendelsohn, 2012), but also by revisionist powers, such as Russia in its “near abroad”. In such cases, order contestations are conducted in an increasingly hostile or even violent manner resulting in terrorism, violent insurgencies, or outright wars that destabilise a country or an entire region. Violent actors do not only contest domestic orders internally, as in the cases of Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Alternative or competing ideas and ideologies are also aggressively promoted transnationally by external actors, including Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Salafi-Takfiri Islamist organisations (such as IS/Daesh, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). In these cases, domestic order contestations become increasingly entangled with geopolitical rivalries among regional and global players.
in the EU’s surroundings. Russia’s attempts at securing an exclusive sphere of influence in Eastern Europe by contesting the liberal underpinnings of Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture, culminating in the annexation of Crimea, the destabilization of Ukraine, and the de facto annexation of parts of the Georgian territory, are only one example. This behaviour is mirrored in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East by the regional rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, or the presence of Salafi-Takfiri organizations striving to establish caliphates in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the wider Sahel. These developments impact intra-EU security directly, as evidenced by both the European Foreign Fighters phenomenon and IS/Daesh-inspired attacks in, among others, Paris, Brussels, and Berlin.

2.4 The Interplay Between Areas of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders

Limited statehood and contested orders represent the two risks Europe faces in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods. Order contestations interact with areas of limited statehood in various ways. If the state is too weak to enforce rules and regulations, it is often hard to contain order contestations within the institutional framework of the state. Areas of limited statehood with reduced public service provision often invite local, regional, and global actors in to take over such provisions. This increases the risk of fragmenting societies along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines, thereby undermining social cohesion and trust as well as opening an arena for regional actors to support local actors along these lines, further increasing social and political fragmentation. As a result, the interaction between contested orders and limited statehood bears the risk of governance breakdowns and violent conflicts, when the institutional structures are lacking to contain conflicts and manage them in peaceful ways. These risks are exacerbated, the more external actors – state and non-state – intermingle in the internal affairs of countries with areas of limited statehood further adding to the fuel of order contestations. Lebanon and the rival coalitions between Hezbollah, Assad’s regime in Syria and Iran, on the one hand, and Sunni forces supported by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf states, on the other hand, provide prominent examples. Russia’s interferences in Eastern Ukraine, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia are other cases in point. Conversely, order contestations along ethnic, religious or ideological lines can (further) weaken statehood. Sectarian and ethnic politics undermines the capacity of state institutions to provide collective goods and services and their control over the use of force. Overthrowing the dictatorship of Muammar al-Gaddafi turned Libya from a ‘rough’ state into a largely ‘failed’ state with at least two war lords competing for power.

Overall, the interactions between order contestations and areas of limited statehood are still poorly understood, and EU-LISTCO’s research will particularly focus on these inter-linkages.
Finally, there are also direct effects of order contestations on the EU and its member states themselves. Russia’s contestation of the Western-led, rule-based post-Cold War order and the terrorist attacks of Islamist groups do not only threaten peace and security in the EU’s (extended) surroundings. They provide anti-establishment groups within the EU with alternative narratives (Russia) and a pretext (Islamic terrorism) to contest core liberal values around which the societies of its member states are organized and upon which the European integration project is built, such as cosmopolitanism, liberalism, and religious tolerance. Contestations of Europe's liberal order in Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, or the UK have not turned violent. However, they undermine the EU’s preparedness for dealing with the threats of areas of limited statehood and contested orders when they deteriorate into governance breakdown and violent conflict.

3. FROM RISKS TO THREATS

3.1 Governance Breakdown and Violent Conflict

As argued above, EU-LISTCO starts from the assumption that limited statehood and contested orders are universal phenomena, which do not pose security threats to the EU in themselves. Our main research challenge ahead is to identify the conditions under which areas of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into governance breakdown and violent conflict, posing severe threats to the EU that go beyond conventional geopolitical challenges. Such is the case when deficits in the capacity of states to set and enforce rules become extremely severe and are not compensated by the efforts of other (e.g. non-state or international) actors. This might then result in an overall breakdown of governance, which implies a substantial under-provision of basic public goods and services. For example, an Ebola outbreak does not constitute a substantial security threat to the EU in itself. Only if affected states (and regional and international organizations) in Africa are unable to contain and neutralise the disease which then produces a severe governance-breakdown, as it did in West Africa in 2014, does the outbreak threaten the security and stability of the region with serious implications for the EU. Areas of limited statehood also face governance breakdown when the state monopoly over the means of violence is not only compromised, but a multiplicity of violent non-state actors compete with state actors over controlling the territory.

Contested orders turn violent if domestic conflicts over “good public order” undermine the legitimacy of a regime to an extent that it loses support of key parts of society and relies on repression of dissent to set and enforce its rule. This may eventually trigger violent opposition by those political forces that seek to establish a different order, resulting in popular uprisings or civil war.
In sum, indicators for *governance breakdown and violent conflict* are instances in which

- state, non-state and external/international actors do not provide public goods and services (anymore), and/or
- multiple violent non-state actors fight with state actors or among themselves over the control over territory, and/or
- conflicts about domestic/international order turn violent, and/or
- global, diffuse, and regional threats act as multipliers for governance breakdowns and violence.

Before we discuss the tipping points in the following, however, we need to introduce the concept of governance in order to be able to identify both effective governance and governance breakdown.

### 3.1.1 Governance

The concept of *governance* has made quite a career in the social sciences during the 1990s and the 2000s. There is a growing number of handbooks, edited volumes, special issues, and research centres that are dedicated to global, transnational, multi-level, new, or experimental governance (Bevir, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2012b; Hale & Held, 2011; Schuppert & Zürn, 2008; Enderlein, Wälti, & Zürn, 2010; Mayntz, 2009; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Zürn, 2013).

In its most general definition, governance refers to all modes of coordinating social action in human society. However, such a broad understanding that identifies governance with any kind of social ordering does not appear useful for our purposes here. After all, we are not interested in how markets allocate values and resources. Nor are we concerned with how families deal with conflicts. Rather, we want to know how collective goods and services can be provided in the absence of a well-functioning state. In other words, we are interested in politics as the regulation of public affairs for a society. This involves finding out “who gets what, when, how?,” to quote Harold Laswell (Laswell, 1936) in what David Easton defined as the “(authoritative) allocation of values for a society” (Easton, 1953, 131).\(^5\) As a result, we employ a somewhat narrower concept which situates governance in the context of politics. By *governance*, we mean

> institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods.

This conceptualization follows closely the understanding of governance that is widespread within political science, law, and international relations (see e.g. Mayntz, 2004, 2008; Kohler-Koch, 1998; Benz, 2004; Schuppert, 2005; Schuppert & Zürn, 2008). Simply curbing negative externalities of private goods’ production does not qualify

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\(^5\) We put “authoritative” in parenthesis here, since it should not be conflated with hierarchical. For a discussion see Czempiel, 1981.
as governance in our understanding (while setting up rules to avoid negative externalities does). We distinguish three types of governance contributions:

- The direct delivery of collective goods and services (first-order governance), such as security, public health, education, and clean environment. We follow the usual definition of collective goods as characterised by non-exclusive access and/or non-rivalry in consumption (see Héritier, 2002). At least one of these conditions must be present for a good to qualify as collective or common.

- The formulation and implementation of collectively binding rules for regulating social life (e.g. human rights) as well as the delivery of collective goods and services (second-order governance);

- The establishment of institutions regulating the rule-making itself and coordinating the governance contributions of others (meta-governance).

Research on governance usually distinguishes three different types of institutionalised rule structures: hierarchy (states), market (competition systems), and networks (negotiation systems, such as associations or public-private partnerships; see overviews in Levi-Faur, 2012a). Hierarchy constitute the essence of the (Western) nation-state. It provides a structure of rule and authority that enables and legitimates state actors to hierarchically set and enforce central decisions.

Conditions in areas of limited statehood are profoundly different. While states still exist as hierarchical rule structures, governance cannot rely on states’ capacity to set and enforce central rules or provide collective goods and services directly. We have to look for functional equivalents to modern statehood (see Draude, 2007 on this point). Governance with/out the state in areas of limited statehood relies on combinations of state and non-state actors governing areas of limited statehood. State actors include national governments (the ‘central state’), foreign governments and their agencies (e.g. development agencies), as well as international (inter-state) organizations (IOs) such as the UN, its agencies, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF; see Lederer, 2018 for details). Non-state actors comprise a whole variety of actors, such as companies and other for-profit organizations (Börzel & Deitelhoff, 2018), (international) non-governmental organizations ((I)NGOs), multi-stakeholder partnerships (e.g. the Forest Stewardship Council, overview in Beisheim, Ellersiek, & Lorch, 2018), local “traditional” authorities, such as tribal and religious leaders (Förster & Koechlin, 2018), and even violent or criminal non-state actors such as warlords or rebel groups (Berti, 2018).

The multitude of governors in areas of limited statehood blurs the distinction between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ realms which is constitutive for modern statehood in its Western and Eurocentric understandings (Kumar, 1997). What does this mean in countries in which state institutions are so weak that government actors can easily
exploit state resources for private purposes, while so-called ‘private’ actors, such as companies, provide much-needed collective goods with regard to education, public health, or infrastructure (Börzel & Thauer, 2013a; Thauer, 2014)? In many cases, rent-seeking governments distribute state revenues, including development aid, to maintain their rule via clientelistic networks (the so-called “neo-patrimonial state” in sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern Caucasus, and elsewhere, see Erdmann & Engel, 2007; Erdmann, 2013).

We now turn to a discussion of the factors determining the tipping points, which determine whether or not areas of limited statehood and contested orders turn into governance breakdowns and contested orders.

3.2 Tipping Points: Risks and Resilience

EU-LISTCO examines the conditions under which Europe’s risks turn into threats and tries to identify the tipping points through risk scanning and foresight activities combined with comparative case studies. In other words, we need to clearly distinguish between various risks that have the potential to negatively affect European security, on the one hand, and the tipping points turning these latent risks into manifest threats. Only then can we determine in cooperation with the EEAS and Ministries of Foreign Affairs of selected member states what the EU and its member states can do to both prevent areas of limited statehood and contested orders from lapsing into governance breakdown and violent conflict and to foster resilience and better governance in areas of limited statehood and contested orders.

A thorough assessment of the security risks which the EU faces in its surroundings and on a global scale requires us to examine the sub-national and transnational levels and to identify the causal mechanisms through which the ubiquitous conditions of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into governance breakdown and violent conflict. Such an approach also allows us to identify remedies and make policy recommendations as to how the EU and its member states can foster resilience in areas of limited statehood and contested orders.

We hypothesise that tipping points are affected by two factors, which work in opposite directions, namely global, diffuse as well as regional risks, on the one hand, as well as resilience leading to effective and legitimate governance, on the other (see figure 4 below). In other words, effective and legitimate governance fostered by resilient societies can mitigate the effects of various global or regional risks thereby preventing governance breakdowns and violent conflict. It will be subject of EU-LISTCO’s empirical research to determine the precise interactions between threats, resilience, and governance and their effects on tipping points.
3.2.1 Risks

EU-LISTCO distinguishes between various global, diffuse, and regional risks (see: D3.1: Contribution to the EU-LISTCO conceptual framework). Global, diffuse, and regional risks can originate from particular actors and countries inside and outside of Europe’s immediate proximity. Such risks can then affect tipping points leading to governance breakdown and/or violent conflict in Europe’s immediate neighbouring regions, in North Africa, the Middle East, or Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, as the ongoing crises in Eastern Ukraine or Libya illustrate. Such governance breakdowns and/or violent conflict in Europe’s neighbouring regions constitute what we identify as threats to European security. In contrast, governance breakdown and/or violent conflict in regions further away, such as Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Sahel or other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also East Asia, would be what we call “global” risks for European security. Such cases might turn into threats either through spill-over effects in Europe’s direct Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods (governance breakdown/violent conflict) or through direct repercussions for European security, for example by fuelling radicalization. However, it is important to strictly distinguish between risks and threats under these circumstances. Not every governance breakdown anywhere in the world poses a threat to European security. EU-LISTCO’s research needs to identify the tipping points when these risks turn into threats rather than assuming that a ubiquity of threats to European security.

The same holds true for other global risks. For example, North Korea’s nuclear build-up or the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea certainly affect Europe directly. But they only turn into threats to European security if they result in violent conflict in East Asia which then massively disrupts Europe’s main maritime trading routes.
Diffuse risks are not geographically contingent and often hard to ascribe to particular actors. Examples are climate change and particular types of cyber threats. Climate change, for example, is not a direct threat to most parts of Europe as such, but its current effects already spark governance breakdown and violent conflict in areas that are important to Europe, and, thus, become regional or global threats. Some kinds of cyber risks, such as runaway malware originally intended for very specific, targeted espionage or criminal operations (Wannacry, Petya/NotPetya), can equally turn into threats with enormous economic or physical security impact without a clear source.

3.2.2 Resilience

What are the pre-conditions of good and effective governance at the various levels? Here, EU-LISTCO focuses on the concept of resilience which figures prominently in the 2016 EU Global Strategy:

“It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. Together with its partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions. A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy. But the reverse holds true as well. To ensure sustainable security, it is not only state institutions that we will support. Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.” (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016, 23-24; see also European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2017).

Thus, the Global Strategy conceives of resilience as an active and agency-driven process, which is in line with standard definitions, such as David Chandler's who defines the concept as “the capacity to positively or successfully cope with, adapt to, and recover from security crises” (Chandler, 2017, 436). He describes resilience as an active process of coping with complexity, particularly with regard to “unknown unknowns” (Donald Rumsfeld) in various eco- as well as social systems (Chandler, 2014). In this context, the geographers Keck and Sakdapolrak emphasise three features of social resilience (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013, 5), namely

- coping capacities as “the ability of social actors to cope with and overcome all kinds of adversities;”
• adaptive capacities as “their ability to learn from past experiences and adjust themselves to future challenges;” and

• transformative capacities as “their ability to craft sets of institutions that foster individual welfare and sustainable societal robustness towards future crises.”

While coping capacities are re-active in response to crises (see also Chandler above), adaptive and transformative capacities are pro-active and anticipatory strategies to deal with situations of medium and high challenges or risks. In our understanding of social resilience, we focus on the two latter capacities as agency-centred abilities to prevent risks from turning into threats. Note that resilience needs to be strictly distinguished from stability and stabilization as the preservation of political and social order in situations of crises and rapid change. Rather, resilience is itself transformative as well as adaptive and, thus, incorporates political and social changes (see Chandler, 2014; Zebrowski, 2013). A focus on resilience as adaptive and transformative capacities also overcomes the well-known “stability-democratization” (Jünemann, 2003) dilemma the EU faces and which is often used as an excuse to bolster repressive and autocratic regimes in the European Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods (Börzel, 2015; Babayan & Risse, 2016).

Moreover, while the EU Global Strategy distinguishes between individual, societal, and state resilience, our focus is on resilience as a pre-condition for effective governance. The emphasis on governance rather than the state avoids the state-centrism of other conceptualizations of resilience. We do not focus on state resilience, which can be easily misunderstood as the stabilization of authoritarian regimes. Three factors serve as indicators for resilience, namely social trust relationships, legitimacy of governors and governance institutions, as well as the design of governance institutions. Here, EU-LISTCO can draw on previous research showing under which conditions actors other than the state provide effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood (Krasner & Risse, 2014b; Börzel & Risse, forthcoming).

3.2.2.1 Social Trust

“Trust is largely understood as a cooperative attitude towards other people based on the optimistic expectation that others are likely to respect one’s own interests” (Draude, Höhlck, & Stolle, 2018, 354; see also Börzel & Risse, 2016). Luhmann has conceptualised trust as “upfront risk-taking” (riskante Vorleistung, Luhmann, 1989), that is, deliberately abstaining from checking whether my interaction partner tells the truth about not defecting or keeping her commitments. Relationships of trust induce a sense of appropriate behaviour among actors which is no longer based on cost-benefit calculations.
Three types of social trust can be distinguished (Börzel & Risse, 2016; Draude et al., 2018): First, *personalised trust* among people living in the same neighbourhood or community who trust each other because they know each other; personalised trust develops out of face-to-face interactions. Personalized trust has been found to be a functional equivalent for weak or dysfunctional state institutions in areas of limited statehood and, thus, helps to explain the governance puzzle. It is endogenous to neighbourhoods and local communities where people know and trust each other. Personalised trust contributes to the effective provision of governance in the absence of functioning state institutions in at least two ways. To begin with and as mentioned above, personalized trust enables actors to solve local collective action problems (Gambetta, 1988). Elinor Ostrom demonstrated through experimental designs that local communities where members trust each other are likely to produce common pool resources without having to refer to strong institutions with their monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990, 2002; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). Personalised trust, thus, enhances the action capacity of local communities.

The presence or absence of local trust helps account for the variation in effective governance in areas of limited statehood. At the same time, its governance potential remains limited to neighbourhoods and local communities (Sampson, 2012; Sutherland, Brunton-Smith, & Jackson, 2013). Public goods and service provision more often than not requires governance beyond the neighbourhood. Not only are local resources too limited to provide complex collective goods and services, such as health, education, and infrastructure. Many collective goods problems, such as environmental pollution or pandemics, have to be addressed on a larger scale to be effectively solved.

Second, scaling-up governance in the absence of functional and effective state institutions requires the extension of trust to people not personally known. A first step is trusting strangers because they are members of the same social group based on kinship, a shared ethnic background, faith, values, common history or language, geographical proximity, or behavioural similarities (Brewer, 1981; Tanis & Postmes, 2005). This *group-based or particularistic trust* may generate what Putnam calls “bonding social capital” (Putnam, 2000: 22). It enables groups to cooperate more effectively and to provide collective goods and services, at least for group members and greatly beyond personalised networks.

However, group-based or particularistic trust can also hinder the upscaling of governance. Social groups do not have to use their trust to engage in governance. Criminal networks such as the mafia are built on relationships of trust, too (Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Portes, 1998: 15-18). Moreover, if a group only encompasses parts of a society, group-based trust produces at best club goods whose consumption is confined to the members of the group. At worst, it undermines rather than advances
governance altogether (Putnam, 1995: 665). Group-based trust might foster in-group favouritism (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006) and reinforce in-group/outgroup divisions. This is particularly relevant for areas of limited statehood which are often socially heterogeneous post-conflict societies with deep cultural- or identity-based cleavages.

Third, upscaling governance in areas of limited statehood beyond “islands of excellence” (Krasner, 2018) in local communities ultimately requires some degree of generalised trust in “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991). People who trust each other irrespective of personal relationships, shared kinship, or common religious beliefs are prepared to pay a price for their loyalty (e.g., paying taxes), to cooperate with the governance institutions, and to comply with costly rules (Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2000; Rothstein & Stolle, 2003; Draude et al., 2018).

But how is generalised trust possible in areas of limited statehood that are characterised by social and cultural heterogeneity and strong cleavages? We suggest two causal mechanisms, one for the generalization of group-based trust through the inclusiveness of social identities and the other for the building of generalised trust through the impartiality of institutions. To begin with, whether or not group-based trust leads to generalized trust furthering better governance and the provision of public goods and services in areas of limited statehood and beyond depends crucially on the social construction of the group identity itself. According to Social Identity Theory, people that share a strong sense of group identity cooperate more within their group than with outsiders (Tajfel, 1974). Group identities can be more or less inclusive and accommodating to strangers. The more inclusive a group identity is, the more easily it can be extended to encompass other groups. Once in-group trust is built, it makes the generalisation of trust more likely when combined with inclusive identities, which allow for the emergence of multiple, overlapping communities.

The second mechanism relies on formal political, administrative and legal institutions (Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Hartmann, 2011; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Herreros, 2012). More precisely, it is the local practices of administrative or executive agents that matter. The practices of local police, judges, teachers, or doctors signal to people the moral standards of society. If they perform their governance functions effectively and impartially, people will infer from their experience to the behaviour of others. These arguments resonate with studies on procedural fairness, which show that actors comply even with costly rules and regulations because they believe that those have been adopted “in accordance with right process” (Franck, 1990: 706) and procedures that are fair and just (Tyler, 2006). The more their governance services are provided in an impartial and procedurally fair way, the more they help in generating and maintaining generalized trust as an enabling condition for the up-scaling of governance – even in the absence of functioning state institutions. In other words, there seems to be a causal pathway
from the perception of inclusive, transparent and fair institutions to the emergence of generalised trust as a major factor for enhancing effective governance.

EU-LISTCO will research in particular how the EU can foster generalised trust in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood through its various policies and instruments. We will also look at regional as well as international attempts to overcome challenges to generalised trust and collective action.

3.2.2.2 Empirical Legitimacy or Social Acceptance

The second indicator for resilience is legitimacy. In most general terms, legitimacy refers to the “right to rule” (Weber, 1978) or the “license to govern” (cf. Gehman, Lefsrud, & Fast, 2017). The literature distinguishes between normative, legal, and empirical legitimacy. While a normative perspective assesses whether an actor or institution should have the right to govern according to various normative principles (Schmelzle, 2015), a legal perspective considers whether the actor or institution is legitimate from a formal legal point of view (see Tyler, 1997; Hollis, 2002).

In contrast, we focus on empirical legitimacy as social acceptance. We define the empirical legitimacy of governance actors and institutions as a given social group's or population's sense of obligation or willingness to accept their authority. This conceptualisation not only allows for considering the legitimacy of the state but also of external and non-state actors. Note that social acceptance or empirical legitimacy tells us very little about the normative or legal status of governors or institutions. The so-called Islamic State (IS) is certainly not a legitimate actor according to international law, and its normative legitimacy is surely extremely questionable. Nevertheless, it has enjoyed at least empirical legitimacy amongst its members and some supporters (Fromson & Simon, 2015).

There is a huge literature on the legitimacy of transnational governance (see e.g. Hurd, 1999; Benz & Papadopoulos, 2006; Clark, 2005; Dingwerth, 2007; Risse, 2006; March & Olsen, 1998; Zürn, 2000; Schmelzle, 2011). Social acceptance of the governors and of the governance institutions by those being governed constitutes a crucial condition for the effectiveness of governance itself. It is rather unlikely that effective governance can be achieved if the governors do not enjoy a ‘license to govern’ and if the governance institutions are not considered legitimate by the population or the local elites. As argued above, diffuse support for the governors and the governance institutions leads to voluntary compliance with costly rules and to cooperative attitudes with regard to service delivery. Both are crucial in areas of limited statehood where the state lacks enforcement capacities.

This brings us to the various sources of legitimacy. First, output legitimacy derives from the level of performance of actors and is, thus, directly related to effectiveness. In this context, a virtuous circle might evolve over time in which the initial
performance meets the expectations of local communities which then increases the governance legitimacy and, hence, its effectiveness (see Schmelzle & Stollenwerk, forthcoming for a discussion). Here, governance effectiveness feeds back into legitimacy.

Second, input as well as throughput legitimacy can be generated by designing inclusive governance institutions as discussed above. The development community uses the terms “ownership” or “stakeholder” principles (Fukuda-Parr & Lopes, 2013; Theisohn & Lopes, 2013; Fransen & Kolk, 2007). As argued above, external actors are more likely to enjoy input legitimacy and, hence, to be effective, if they are operating through inclusive institutional arrangements that were created through contracting rather than imposition.

Third, “traditional,” moral, knowledge-based, or charismatic authority are rather common as sources of legitimacy in areas of limited statehood. For instance, (I)NGOs as governors in areas of limited statehood usually claim moral as well as knowledge-based (epistemic) authority and, if they are perceived as such, they are likely to be effective in providing goods and services (Murdie, 2014; Murdie & Hicks, 2013; Lake, forthcoming). Similar claims with regard to “traditional” as well as moral authority can be made by local chiefs and tribal leaders as governors.

In sum, empirical legitimacy appears to be a powerful indicator for resilience in areas of limited statehood, precisely because it should lead to rule-following and cooperation with the governors on the various local, national, regional, or global levels based on the logic of appropriateness rather than some cost-benefit calculations. As a result, the more the governors as well as the governance arrangements are considered legitimate by domestic as well as local elites and populations, the less statehood by state institutions is required to enforce governance and make it effective.

3.2.2.3 Institutional Design
According to a standard definition, institutions are “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain (as well as enable/B&R) activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane, 1989, 161). Here, we concentrate on political or governance institutions, that is, institutions designed for rule-making and/or the provision of public goods and service. First, governance institutions – from (non-state) judicial systems to educational institutions, public health governance etc. – must be “fit for purpose” in order to be effective. This is a straightforward functional argument which – in international relations – has been made by rationalist institutionalists (see e.g. the situation structure approach by Zürn,

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6 We put “traditional” in parentheses because what counts as tradition is often a social construction, see Förster & Koechlin, 2018.
1992 and Martin, 1992, as well as the argument about “rational design,” Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001). A pure coordination problem requires a different institutional design as compared to coordination games with distributive consequences and a collaboration problem of the prisoners’ dilemma variety (see Stein, 1990 on these distinctions).

For areas of limited statehood, enforcement appears to be the main problem. In the absence of a central authority, non-state actors should have a common interest in cooperating to provide collective goods and services. Yet, even though it may be in their best interest, they are likely to forgo cooperation because of the risks of being cheated. Peace-keeping missions face such a collective action dilemma. For instance, the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine,7 which consisted of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE, brokered a peace plan in 2014. The conflict parties pledged to stop the use of violence. In January 2015, the cease-fire had completely collapsed because both sides were still better off without agreement than if one unilaterally defected to extend its control over territory. Institutions can help avoid this collective action dilemma by providing effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms.

Not all governance problems in areas of limited statehood resemble a prisoners’ dilemma which can be solved by institutions with enforcement capacity. Institutionnalised monitoring and sanctioning is not required for coordination games, nor do they help to tackle distribution problems. Pure coordination games are self-enforcing once actors have reached an agreement that helps them avoid their least preferred outcome. The proliferation of governance actors often results in organisational overlap and competition over resources and influence. To avoid problems of ineffectiveness caused by complexity and fragmentation, the various agencies have an incentive to coordinate their activities by establishing joint institutions, coordinating activities, and agreeing on some division of labour among them (Gehring & Faude, 2014; Faude, 2014). Coordination becomes more challenging, however, when the costs are not equally distributed. Accessibility and security may vary across the area, or international organisations may not be prepared to have private donors interfere with their public mandate and claim coordination authority (Beisheim & Liese, 2014a, 205-208). Once a solution is found, no actor has an incentive to defect. The problem is to come to an agreement in the first place. Institutions can facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages which compensate agencies for the concessions they make.

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7 The Trilateral Contact Group does not have an official website. For more information see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trilateral_Contact_Group_on_Ukraine.
Task complexity matters for coordination, too (Krasner & Risse, 2014a): Distributing anti-malaria bed nets or child immunisation are relatively simple tasks that require little coordination among actors and few repeated interventions. In contrast, combating and preventing HIV/AIDS is a hugely complex task that necessitates the coordination of at least the health and education sectors and requires repeated interventions over many years (Schäferhoff, 2014). Institutions governing these tasks must also have sufficient material and ideational (e.g. knowledge) resources to be able to perform their functions.

Institutional designs must also be flexible as to be able to adapt to local circumstances. One problem with the EU’s democracy promotion efforts has been the “one size fits all” strategies and instruments which then lacked effectiveness because they failed to take into account that drivers and obstacles of democratisation processes differ significantly across countries (Börzel & Risse, 2009). Effective governance institutions require flexible process management (Beisheim, Liese, Jannetschek, & Sarre, 2014) and built-in capacities enabling organizational learning and change management.

Irrespective of the type of problem and the degree of complexity they face, governance institutions have to be open, inclusive, fair, and transparent in order to be effective (Börzel and Risse forthcoming). In fact, inclusiveness, which fosters voluntary compliance, is probably even more important if the governance arrangements lack enforcement capacities, as is common in areas of limited statehood. The effectiveness of multi-stakeholder partnerships crucially depends on the ownership they build of their legally non-binding standards among those that shall adhere to them (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2010; cf. Beisheim & Liese, 2014b; for a more critical view see Booth, 2012; Sjöstedt, 2013). Inclusiveness generates input legitimacy insofar as those being governed have a say in the decision-making processes.

But what about the state as a governance institution? While the state is weak by definition in areas of limited statehood, it is not completely absent. To some extent, the design of governance institutions outside the state can compensate for its weak capacity. Yet, it goes without saying that any remaining capacity by the state comes in handy in areas of limited statehood, particularly when state actors are embedded in the governance institutions. First, the control of violence is often a basic precondition for non-state actors, such as multi-stakeholder partnerships or companies, to engage in governance in the first place (Beisheim, Liese, Jannetschek, & Sarre, 2014; Börzel & Thauer, 2013b; Liese, Jannetschek, & Sarre, 2014, 139-142). Second, even where other governors seek to fill the void left by the state, successful implementation often relies on some regulatory capacity of the state. Third, basic infrastructure and administrative organisation are necessary for governance actors to deliver services and broaden access. They require roads, ports, and airports for their
operations (Beisheim, Börzel, Genschel, & Zangl, 2011b; Beisheim, Liese, Janetschek, et al., 2014). Fourth, external and non-state actors are more likely to engage in governance in ALS if they can ‘partner’ with state actors instead of entirely taking over (Deitelhoff & Wolf, 2010; Börzel, Hönke, & Thauer, 2012; Beisheim, Börzel, Genschel, & Zangl, 2011a). This requires states to have a minimum capacity to engage with other actors (Börzel, 2009). Finally, state capacity is important to coordinate governance interventions by other actors. Rather than regulating, it is about orchestrating the multiplicity of governance contributions to make sure that they complement each other (Beisheim et al., 2011a).

4. CONCLUSIONS

The analytical concepts discussed in this paper allow us to systematically approach a broad range of challenges for the EU’s external action and the foreign policies of its member states. First, the notion of limited statehood makes it possible to conceptualise challenges – ranging from conflict management to humanitarian intervention, from fighting illicit trafficking to terrorism, from providing development assistance to border controls – under a single framework, in line with the provisions of the EU Global Strategy (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016). Likewise, the concept of contested orders enables us to analyse how and under what conditions ideological struggles over “good” political, economic and social organization turn violent and thus become security threats to the EU and its citizens. We are also able to examine in detail how global and diffuse threats, order contestations, and geopolitical interests as well as rivalries interact to drive the former into violent conflicts.

Second, our framework helps in identifying areas which are threatened by governance breakdown and violent conflict, which can be situated at different levels (sub-national, national, transnational), and which are based on a complex understanding of space that can relate to territories, policy areas, or social groups. We thereby overcome limitations of state-centric conceptualisations of fragility and deal systematically with drivers of governance breakdown and violent conflict emanating from the lack of governance capacity of both state and non-state actors and/or the lack of legitimacy as well as their interaction effects.

By identifying tipping points, we shall be able to support the EU and its member states in preventing areas of limited statehood from deteriorating into governance breakdown and violent conflict. In this context, we have introduced the concept of resilience as providing the capacity of communities and societies for good and effective governance even in the absence of consolidated statehood and the flexibility to adapt to challenges. We have argued that relationships of trust, social acceptance, and specific institutional conditions are good indicators for measuring resilience.
These concepts and their operationalisation allows EU-LISTCO not only to research resilience, but also to devise strategies and policies for the EU and its member states to contribute to governance in areas of limited statehood and of contested orders thereby preventing risks from turning into threats for European security.
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