Documentos CIDOB
Migraciones; 16

Europe's migration policy. A comprehensive international strategy or a pressing domestic concern?
Stefano Bertozzi
Serie: Migraciones
Número 16. Europe's migration policy: A comprehensive international strategy or a pressing domestic concern?

© Stefano Bertozzi
© Fundació CIDOB, de esta edición

Edita: CIDOB edicions
   Elisabets, 12
   08001 Barcelona
   Tel. 93 302 64 95
   Fax. 93 302 21 18
   E-mail: publicaciones@cidob.org
   URL: http://www.cidob.org

Depósito legal: B-13.038-2004
ISSN: 1697-7734
Imprime: Color Marfil, S.L.

Distribuye: Edicions Bellaterra, S.L.
Navas de Tolosa, 289 bis, 08026 Barcelona
www.ed-bellaterra.com

Barcelona, mayo de 2008
EUROPE’S MIGRATION POLICY:
A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
OR A PRESSING DOMESTIC CONCERN?

Stefano Bertozzi*

May 2008

*Member of the private office of Franco Frattini,
Vice-President of the European Commission.

The ideas contained in this article are entirely those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.
Introduction

Since the Tampere European Council, cooperation with third countries has been one of Europe’s guiding principles in the area of migration. EU Member States realised that their domestic policy goals could be best served by forging a closer partnership with third countries that hinges on shared responsibility and solidarity. Since then, efforts have been geared towards developing closer links with countries of origin and transit in a bid to manage migration flows more effectively.

It can be argued that Europe’s growing domestic concerns initially shaped the way it started to cultivate practical cooperation with third countries. Europe soon realised, however, that migration management needs to encompass a coherent and comprehensive set of measures covering both the internal and the external dimension. In other words, Europe’s political initiatives make it clear that domestic management of migration flows and cooperation with third countries are two sides of the same coin. Member States cannot handle a growing, multi-faceted phenomenon such as migration alone: they need to take other factors into due account, such as practical cooperation on migration issues between themselves and third countries, and on external affairs, including development policy.

The content of this article draws on a presentation that I delivered at the CIDOB Foundation in Barcelona in December 2007 and on other research findings. The main argument is that in today’s world the distinction between internal and external management of migration flows has lost much of its relevance. In the area of migration management, Europe’s domestic and external policy objectives are so intertwined that it is unrealistic to consider these two dimensions as separate policy areas. Effective migration management calls for a truly European policy and a more coordinated European approach to development and external policies. This needs to be accompanied by policy instruments and resources commensurate with Europe’s political ambitions. Once the Lisbon
Treaty\(^1\) comes into force, the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will be “responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action”, can add consistency to Europe’s common foreign policy goals\(^2\). Migration management, which is set to remain at the top Europe’s political agenda in the years to come, will continue to be a test case for Europe. This policy area has already brought to the surface the extent of practical cooperation between Member States and with third countries, the degree of consistency between the area of justice, freedom and security and the foreign affairs sphere and the adequacy of policy instruments and resources made available to attain a given set of political goals. In this context, it has to be underlined that the future establishment of a European External Action Service, as provided for by Article 13a of the Treaty of Lisbon, could significantly help the European Union to further its interests in this highly competitive international arena, including in migration management.

1. The Treaty was signed by the Heads of State and Government of the 27 Member States in Lisbon on 13 December 2007. It was drafted to provide Europe with modern and more efficient institutions and working methods to respond more swiftly to future challenges. OJ C 306, 17.12.2007.

2. It is important to underline that the new President of the European Council will also “ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. In practical terms, the success of this institutional arrangement will very much depend on how the appointed person intends to carry out his/her duties.
Tampere Presidency Conclusions

Paragraph 11 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council on 15 and 16 October 1999 states the following: “The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development”. This paragraph focuses mainly on the so-called “push factors” or “root causes” of migration, and Europe has indeed shifted gears in its attempts to address this broad set of challenging issues more convincingly. It comes as no surprise that, to make a success of managing migration, Europe must also tackle the main root causes of migration, such as economic disparity, lack of career opportunities, instability and poor governance. Good cooperation with partner countries and detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground are essential to this effort. Although Europe’s record on development policy has significantly improved, Europe’s “development dividends” are not yet widely and evenly distributed among the most needy and vulnerable people, in particular in Africa.

On 12 October 2007, the World Bank published a forward-looking report entitled “Meeting the Challenges of Global Development”, which makes impressive reading. This report contains a comprehensive set of statistical data on poverty in developing countries, which can be taken as a yardstick to gauge whether there will be more “migration pressure” from the less developed world. Sub-Saharan Africa is a good example to examine. The World Bank
study shows that, although the absolute number of poor people has declined by 200 million over the last 10 years, the number of people living on 1 US dollar a day is still very high. In 2004, the number of people in extreme poverty (living on 1 dollar a day) was 985 million, 298 million of them living in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2015, the World Bank forecasts a total of 720 million people living in extreme poverty, 326 million of them in Sub-Saharan Africa. This means that, although the total number of people living on 1 US dollar a day will decline in absolute terms, the number of people in extreme poverty will rise in Sub-Saharan Africa. Growing poverty, compounded by the inability of poor countries to reap the benefits of globalisation, could well translate into a growing number of desperate people leaving their countries of origin in the hope of finding the “promised land” in one of the most industrialised countries. Poverty and the lack of opportunities in the less developed world is therefore set to become one of the main economic determinants of migration flows in the years ahead. Moreover, by the end of 2030, World Bank estimates forecast a surge in demographic pressure, as 1.8 billion new people will arrive in this world, 97 per cent of them in the developing world\(^3\). The main lesson that we can draw from the World Bank report is the need for a renewed political commitment to increase the effectiveness of aid development. Europe needs to help third countries to improve their governance and to make their political and democratic institutions more robust. This can then lead more people living in less developed countries to play an active role in the modernisation processes of their countries, thereby building a better future for their families and countries alike. Europe should also provide these people with more information, via specific campaigns, about the projects financed by development aid in their countries. By way of example, these campaigns should be conducted in close cooperation with local govern-

---

3. The population in Sub-Saharan Africa will increase by 540 million people, while South Asia will welcome 600 million.
ments in third countries and aired on local radios, which are one of the most powerful communication tools in less developed countries. Europe should also create more occasions to bring the private sector on board in development programmes, as the business community showed a genuine interest in becoming more involved at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon on 7 to 9 December 2007.

Particular consideration should also be paid to implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness\(^4\), where all the major political and institutional stakeholders gathered to “resolve to take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to the UN five-year review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) later this year”.

If this were the main purpose of my paper, I would continue to chalk up what I consider to be meaningful components and ideas to help Europe reform its development agenda. The point I am trying to make is that, without delivering tangible results to a needy population living in the less developed world, Europe runs the risk of seeing its international reputation as the world’s largest donor tarnished. There is an urgent need to streamline procedures, to raise the importance of mutual accountability between the donor community and recipient countries and to set credible time frames within which policy goals are to be attained\(^5\). Europe’s political leaders need to realise that the time has come to coordinate their valiant development efforts more effectively in a bid to reduce poverty, to narrow strident economic disparities, to enhance education systems

---


and to create more job opportunities for young people. Duplication of efforts, conflicting development agendas between Member States and ponderous disbursement procedures should become remnants of the past if Europe intends to deliver on its political commitments more compellingly and rapidly. In a nutshell, action must follow words. In 1999, the Tampere European Council confirmed its determination to develop a common and comprehensive policy on migration. Although pressing domestic issues initially pushed the European Council to devise a new strategy on migration management, it should be acknowledged that this strategy had a forward-looking vision, which weaved together the internal and external dimension of this highly complex phenomenon.

**Migration and Development**

In December 2002, the Commission tabled a Communication on integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with third countries, which was the Commission’s response to the request made by the European Council in Seville. At that meeting, the European Coun-

6. Paragraph 40 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Laeken European Council explicitly stated that “a true common asylum and immigration policy implies the establishment of the following instruments: the integration of the policy on migratory flows into the European Union’s foreign policy”.


8. Paragraph 33 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council on 21 and 22 June 2002 states the following: “The European Council considers that combating illegal immigration requires a greater effort by the European Union and a targeted approach to the problem, with the use of all appropriate instruments in the context of
cil made it clear that combating illegal immigration called not only for the “use of all appropriate instruments in the context of the European Union’s external relations”, but also for the gradual eradication of the main determinants of illegal immigration. Europe’s leaders were so convinced of the crucial importance of the latter that they turned it into “the European Union’s constant long-term objective”. In other words, since domestic measures had failed to deliver the desired results in terms of the management of migration flows, Europe’s political leadership thought there was a pressing need to add another prong to its strategy and to tackle the issue of illegal immigration with resolve. Against this background, in December 2002 the Commission put forward a first coherent and audacious approach to migration management, which not only proposed mainstreaming migration into Europe’s external activities, but also making fuller use of the financial instruments that were made available to promote and, where possible, raise Europe’s international profile. This Communication, which was consistent with Europe’s overarching external strategy, placed more emphasis on the link between migration and the long-term impact of Europe’s aid development the European Union’s external relations. To that end, in accordance with the Tampere European Council conclusions, an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackle the root causes of illegal immigration must remain the European Union’s constant long-term objective. With this in mind, the European Council points out that closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration flows. The European Council urges that any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Union or the European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration".
programmes, and on the need to foster closer cooperation with third countries. The latter were asked to lend their full support to the fight against illegal immigration, as any lack of cooperation on their part might persuade Europe to take appropriate measures and thus change its favourable political stance. In other words, this was a first attempt to celebrate a “marriage” between Europe’s migration and development policies, which, until then, had been regarded as highly contentious. History has taught us that good ideas are long-lived and the Hague Programme, which was adopted in November 2004, was no exception to this rule. Adopting the same approach, the Programme stated that, as international migration was set to continue in the future, “a comprehensive approach, involving all stages of migration, with respect to the root causes of migration, entry and admission policies and integration and return policies is needed”.

9. In this context, it is also important to underline that paragraphs 35 and 36 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council propose the same course of action: “(35). The European Council considers it necessary to carry out a systematic assessment of relations with third countries which do not cooperate in combating illegal immigration. That assessment will be taken into account in relations between the European Union and its Member States and the countries concerned, in all relevant areas. Inadequate cooperation by a country could hamper the establishment of closer relations between that country and the Union. (36). After full use has been made of existing Community mechanisms without success, the Council may unanimously find that a third country has shown an unjustified lack of cooperation in joint management of migration flows. In that event the Council may, in accordance with the rules laid down in the treaties, adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other European Union policies, while honouring the Union’s contractual commitments and not jeopardising development cooperation objectives”.

On 1 September 2005, the Commission tabled a Communication on migration and development\(^{11}\), which was more results-orientated than the one adopted in 2002. This text contains not only well-defined policy objectives and the way they could be attained, but also ideas to harness the synergies between migration and development policies. The idea behind it was to use these policy concepts in future dialogue and cooperation with interested developing countries in order to gear Europe’s more assistance towards shared goals. This Commission Communication focused mainly on the importance of remittances, on the role that diasporas can play in fostering the socio-economic development of countries of origin, on circular migration and on the steps to be taken to minimise the adverse effect of the brain drain.

As regards remittances, the Heads of State and Government had already met in March 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development and agreed that, while respecting their private nature, remittances can become powerful drivers of economic development\(^ {12}\) and that there was an urgent need to reduce transfer costs. The 2005 Communication reiterated this point by suggesting competition between alternative formal remittance channels, by underlining the potential use of remittances for development-friendly projects and by drawing attention to the punitive exchange rates applied to remittances by banks and intermediaries in recipient countries. In the area of remittances, the Commission has also taken a major initiative, with the adoption on 1 December 2005 of a proposal for a directive on payment services, which will crea-


te a harmonised framework in particular for remittance services. This proposal will increase competition and thus contribute to a decrease in costs. At the same time, the new framework will increase transparency by forcing service providers to disclose information on costs, including the exchange rates used, and the time needed to complete the transfer.

Why are remittances so crucial for the lives of so many families living in the less developed world? According to statistical data produced by World Bank experts, in 2006 recorded international remittances flows totalled USD 199 billion, a higher total than that registered in 2005 (USD 188). To gain a better grasp of the importance of remittances, suffice it to say that the recorded level of remittances exceeded by far the volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the same years:


14. The 2006 level was double the level registered in 2001 (USD 96 billion). This is mainly due to lower remittance costs and expanding networks of remittance intermediaries and to a growing number of migrants and their increased levels of income. World Bank preliminary estimates show that in 2007 the recorded volume of worldwide remittances reached USD 318 billion, of which USD 240 billion to developing countries.

15. To be more precise, official development assistance covers the “flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and
in 2005, ODA totalled USD 107 billion and in 2006 USD 104 billion. It also needs to be underscored that the recorded flows of remittances significantly underestimated the real volumes of money transfers. In fact, the 2006 household surveys conducted in Africa show that remittances account for USD 100 billion more than the recorded flow of USD 199 billion. According to a study by Muzaffar A. Chishti, in 2006 India was the largest recipient of remittances in the world (USD 24 billion), with China and Mexico in second and third place. To give a clearer idea of how remittances can have an impact on the socio-economic structure of a given country by providing additional funds, it is worth recalling the words of Mr Chishti: “In 2005-2006, remittances were higher than the welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions”, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

16. As the World Bank points out, although in terms of volume of remittances Latin America and the Caribbean remain the largest recipients of recorded remittances, remittances in the Middle East and North Africa account for a bigger share of GDP. Flows of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be assessed due to a persistent lack of reliable data. For more detailed information on remittances, see http://econ.worldbank.org/WSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTINTERNATIONAL/0,,contentMDK:21352016~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:1572893,00.html, which is the website of the international migration and development department of the World Bank.

$23.6 billion in revenues from India’s software exports, which is particularly impressive since software exports increased 33 percent that year”. Moreover, remittances significantly contribute to poverty alleviation, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. By way of example, in 2006, Mali received USD 177 million in remittances, which corresponds to 3 per cent of its GDP, Pakistan USD 5 billion or 4 per cent of its GDP, Senegal USS 633 million or 7.1 per cent of its GPD and Sudan USD 1.1 billion or 3.1 per cent of its GDP.

Remittances also represent an opportunity for both European and international banks. On 8 March 2008, for example, the New York Times published an article announcing the opening of the first Hispanic bank in North Carolina. This new bank will offer specific services, including cheap money transfers, credit cards, savings accounts and brochures in Spanish, thereby promoting the “financial inclusion” of that group of migrant workers. In Europe, savings banks are particularly active in providing tailor-made services to migrants, as some financial institutions have finally realised that migrants are a growing segment of Europe’s population. La Caixa in Barcelona, for instance, has been among the first European savings banks to lower remittances costs and to offer a “financial package” to migrants in the hope of turning this group of people, usually suspicious of the banking sector, into loyal customers.

Unfortunately, money transfers can also entail the financing of terrorism and other kinds of illicit activities, including money laundering. In June 2005, the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT), composed of representatives of governments throughout the world to devise and promote policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

18. The United States is the world’s largest recipient of migrants (38 million), followed by the Russian Federation (12 million) and Germany (10 million).

19. This is an inter-governmental body that was established in 1989 to devise and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
tatives from the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe and other international institutions, carried out a study on money laundering and terrorist financing typologies, which included alternative remittance channels (ARC). In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, there is a greater need to track all possible sources of the financing of terrorism that operate alongside conventional banking channels. The hawala system, based on mutual trust and strong family ties, is one example of a well-established and widespread alternative remittance system that does not fall within the remit of Europe’s current legislation. This is due to the fact that “hawala money transfer” does not imply the movement of money and thus it bypasses the ordinary financial regulatory system.

The 2005 Communication also emphasised the role that diasporas can play in the development process of their countries of origin. A skills database can be used to identify people who are ready and willing to share their skills and know-how in a given development project in their home countries, which creates the possibility of twinning development programmes whereby diasporas and home countries – local authorities - co-fund


21. In this context, it needs to be underscored that, on 1 January 2008, the European Commission and the European Central Bank supported a new undertaking of Europe’s banking sector, which hinges on the legal framework provided for by the Directive on Payment Services. This initiative, called the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), aims to make all electronic payments across the euro area as simple as domestic payments within one country, regardless of the means of payment used, be they by credit card, debit card or bank transfer. Barring unforeseen circumstances, SEPA should come on stream by the end of 2010.
a project deemed essential, for example, for providing water sanitation or a new elementary school in a given area of their home country. Diasporas and associations of migrants can also help newcomers to settle in the host country by providing information, for example, on access to introductory training and language courses and on housing. The 2005 Communication also considered circular migration and its potentially positive effect on development. Circular migration is widely believed to work to the benefit of both countries of origin and destination countries. Destination countries receive a steady supply of badly needed workers, both skilled and unskilled (without the requirements of long-term integration). Countries of origin benefit from the influx of remittances while migrants are abroad and from their investments and skills when they return. Migrants themselves also have much to gain, as the expansion of circular migration programmes will increase the opportunities for safe, legal migration to Europe. Brain circulation and temporary migration should therefore be encouraged, along with the possibility of facilitating the return of migrants to their countries of origin, for example, to start up a business activity, or making it easier for migrants to engage in development-friendly activities without returning for good. Since 1997, the number of temporary migrants entering the 30 countries that belong to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has increased annually by 9 per cent. Temporary migration to East and West Asia, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has also shown a steady increase of 2.5 per cent per year since 1985. By way of example, France admitted around 10,000 temporary workers in 2004, as compared with 4,300 in 1998. A recent World Bank survey, for instance, found that 60 to 75 per cent of migrants from Bosnia/Herzegovina, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan

would prefer to work in Western Europe on a temporary basis. In this context, the importance needs to be underscored of the proposed directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, which the Commission tabled on 23 October 2007. Article 17 of the proposed directive provides for specific conditions that will not penalise mobile highly skilled workers in an attempt to foster circular migration and minimise the adverse effects of the brain drain. This proposal, which will become legally binding once the directive enters into force, marked a turning point in Europe’s approach towards circular migration. Moreover, circular migration will also be facilitated by the future proposal for a directive on remunerated trainees, who are one of the categories targeted by the Policy Plan on Legal Migration.

Between October 1999 and September 2005, despite the headway made in combining migration and advancing external affairs policies, Europe


25. In particular, Article 17 (5) states the following: “The derogations to Directive 2003/109/EC set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 shall apply only in cases where the third-country national concerned can present evidence that he/she has been absent from the territory of the Community to exercise an economic activity in an employed or self-employed capacity, or to perform a voluntary service, or to study in his/her own country of origin”.

was unable to solve the conundrum of how to repress the threat posed by growing illegal immigration. Cooperation with third countries was essentially based on a two-pronged approach, which signalled a lack of consistency and political courage. The first prong tackled the issues of border controls and effective management of migration flows. Europe simply tried to foist its tactics and tools on third countries: tightening controls, combating illegal immigration and human trafficking, and returning all migrants residing illegally in Europe. The second prong was geared towards solving the root causes of migration, which called for new tools to be deployed. Although the two components of this joint approach were complementary, Europe had not yet felt compelled to devise and implement a comprehensive, consistent strategy capable of setting the course of its future dialogue and cooperation with third countries. This consideration helped a new pattern of cooperation to emerge, which was then sanctioned by the European Council in December 2005 as Europe’s Global Approach to Migration.

**The Global Approach to Migration**

In the aftermath of the tragic events that occurred in Ceuta and Melilla in October 2005\(^\text{27}\), the European Commission, while deeply regretting

\(^{27}\) The Spanish authorities have kindly provided me with the final figures on illegal immigration. In 2005 alone, 5 566 illegal immigrants attempted to enter Ceuta and Melilla. At the beginning of October 2005, some 700 illegal migrants tried to scale the barbed wire fences of Ceuta and around 200 managed to enter the Spanish enclaves. An indeterminate number of migrants lost their lives while seeking to cross this border. In 2006 and 2007, the number of illegal migrants dropped to 2 000 and 1 553 respectively.
the untimely deaths of several people, decided to send a technical mission to these two Spanish enclaves from 7 to 11 October 2005. The main objectives of this task force were to make a first-hand assessment of the situation in situ and of the number of migrants involved in illegally crossing the EU’s external borders and to explore ways of gearing up practical cooperation between the Spanish and Moroccan authorities in the fight against illegal immigration. The large-scale efforts to break into two gateways to Europe added momentum to the urgency to find practical solutions to the mounting pressure of migration from Africa. Although nobody has a crystal ball to look into the future, it can be argued that the growing mismatch between demographic growth and the increasingly uneven distribution of Africa’s limited resources could have triggered some kind of signal to Europe’s political leadership. While Africa had 221 million inhabitants in 1950 or 8.7% of the world population, today the figure is over 800 million, which accounts for almost 14% of the world population. To this can be added other reasons, such as large-scale environmental degradation, ethnic conflicts, human rights abuses and political persecution, which can force people to take the painful decision to leave their countries of origin. In a nutshell, poverty and fear are among the main determinants of migration. It takes no great leap of the imagination to understand why migration management and the thorny issue of illegal immigration topped the political agenda of the Informal European Council that was held at Hampton Court in October 2005. Europe’s leaders acknowledged the fact that it was necessary to offer migrants a credible alternative to illegal immigration, to put an end to the unacceptable humanitarian di-

28. Among other possible reasons, it can be recalled that in 2003 and 2004 an unprecedented number of desert locusts destroyed crops in the Sahel region, thereby prompting thousands of people to seek refuge outside their countries of origin.
sasters brought on by poorly managed migration flows and to cultivate practical cooperation with third countries. Failing this, migrants were bound to fall prey to merciless traffickers and to continue to chance their luck at crossing the Atlantic and the Mediterranean in rickety boats and trying to climb barbed wire fences. On the back of the Hampton Court Conclusions, the Commission lost no time in putting forward its own proposal of how to enhance the EU’s management of migration flows, and identified a vast array of practical measures to be undertaken in the short and medium term. These measures, geared towards North and Sub-Saharan African countries, can be divided into three main policy areas: “strengthening cooperation and action between Member States on migration issues; working with key countries of origin in Africa; and working with neighbouring countries”. The prime short-term measures included extending Frontex’s activities, including a feasibility study on a “Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network”, beefing up the structure and networks of immigration liaison officers (ILOs) and setting up rapid reaction teams, which were to become one of the success stories of 2006. The medium- and long-term objectives covered “building capa-

31. The creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams provides requesting Member States with “support for a limited period of time” and “in exceptional and urgent situations”. Deployment of a Rapid Border Intervention Team embodies Europe’s “effective response” to help any Member State confronted with a mass influx of illegal immigrants. For the first time Europe will be able to deploy, under the command of the requesting Member State, some 600 experienced border guards to cope with
Europe's migration policy: A comprehensive international strategy or a pressing domestic concern?

city for better management of migration, including providing technical and financial assistance (to be agreed in the context of new Country Strategy Papers); addressing the root causes of migration, such as poverty and insecurity; fostering the linkages between migration and development, e.g. by promoting safer, easier and cheaper remittance transfers; facilitating the role of diasporas as agents for development; exploring options for temporary or circular migration; mitigating the impact of skill losses in vulnerable sectors; combating smuggling and trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration, including implementing readmission obligations, as provided for, inter alia, in Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement; and strengthening protection for displaced persons and refugees and their access to durable solutions, in accordance with the relevant international instruments”. The European Council on 15 and 16 December 2005 welcomed the Commission’s Communication, set its seal on these proposed measures and called on the Commission to “report back on progress made by the end of 2006”.

In 2005, the EU set itself a very ambitious agenda for furthering cooperation and partnership with developing countries, with strong emphasis placed on the development dimension. The Global Approach proved to be an innovative way of dealing with migration management, as it aimed to formulate a coherent and broad set of policies that not only addressed a vast array of migration-related issues, but also amalgamated justice and home affairs, development and external relations in an effort to enhance dialogue and cooperation on migration in close partnership

with third countries. During 2006 and 2007, the increasing role played by the Commission and the Member States turned Europe into a prominent and reliable mouthpiece in the global debate on the links between migration and development.

In December 2006, following a Communication from the Commission\textsuperscript{32}, the European Council decided to extend the Global Approach to eastern and south-eastern regions\textsuperscript{33}. Priority actions focused on operational cooperation between Member States, including better coordination on border management with Frontex\textsuperscript{34}, and greater cooperation with countries such as the Western Balkans, Turkey, European Neighbourhood Policy countries, Russia, Central Asia and Asian countries of origin. These priority actions were taken forward in similar vein to the way in which work with Africa has been developed, in particular via regular expert meetings. Dialogue was promoted at bilateral and regional levels, and practical cooperation received the support of EC financial instruments. The European Council also reaffirmed its commitment to increase “coherence between the Union’s various policies, including their financial


33. “The Global Approach will be applied to the eastern and south eastern regions neighbouring the European Union. The Commission is invited to make proposals on enhanced dialogue and concrete measures by June 2007”.

instruments, with a view to addressing the root causes of migration … and integrate migration and development issues into aid policies and programming, encourage the countries of origin and transit to incorporate migration issues in their national development plans, including poverty reduction strategies, and support capacity building for effective migration management, including through establishment of country-specific migration profiles. The new generation of regional and country strategy papers will fully incorporate, where relevant, the connection between migration and development. In this regard, the Commission’s initiative for an EU Programme on Migration and Development in Africa provides a way to address this issue in the short and medium-term. Member States are also encouraged to enhance coordination and to develop joint programming”. The European Council’s endorsement made it more compelling for all stakeholders involved to join forces and to steer their efforts towards the agreed priority list of activities in the area of migration and management. This political support, however, did not remove the initial problems, in particular with regard to coordination.

2006 and 2007: the first fruits

The expectations placed on the Commission, the Member States, Frontex and other international organisations were very high and these stakeholders immediately felt the responsibility and the political pressure from Europe’s leaders and citizens. At technical level, the first step taken by the Commission was to establish an ad hoc group of experts to help coordinate efforts and activities more efficiently. At political level, some of the EU Member States set up national task forces, composed of officials from different Ministries involved in implementing the Global Approach. At the initiative of Vice-President Frattini and Commissioner Michel, Presi-
President Barroso decided to create a temporary Group of Commissioners on Migration. This Group, which was formally established in August 2006, brought together all the Commissioners engaged in migration management, namely Commissioners Almunia, Borg, Ferrero-Waldner, Figel, Hübner, Kiprianou, Michel and Spidla, with an eye to discussing and defining policy lines in this area. Since then, under the Chairmanship of Vice-President Frattini, the Group of Commissioners has been convened on a regular basis to refine preliminary policy proposals and to take decisions on given issues. As I said earlier, the initial focus of the Global Approach to Migration was Africa. Apart from the political reasons mentioned above, Africa has not only been disproportionately affected by some of the more negative aspects of migration, namely brain drain, illegal migration, and human trafficking; the potentially positive impacts of migration have also not yet been felt in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example because of the cost and the difficulties involved in transferring remittances to these countries, or because of the practical problems many African migrants have in contributing to the development of their countries of origin. Implementation therefore called for new tools capable of both delivering on the political commitments made first at Hampton Court and subsequently in Brussels by EU Heads of State and Government and raising Europe’s international profile.

Let me give you some examples of the tools that have been developed to this end. Cooperation platforms, bringing together all of the stakeholders involved to coordinate projects in the area of migration and development, were established to discuss the merits of a given activity and to assess progress. In a nutshell, these platforms were intended to promote

35. Representatives of the country concerned, EU Member States, the European Commission, donor countries and interested international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Organisation for Migration and other UN agencies.
coherence in policy implementation by bringing together migration and development stakeholders in a given country or region. Migration profiles, as included in the country strategic papers for all African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, were designed as a tool to help pool all the information required to formulate policy in the field of migration and development and to monitor the impact of the policies implemented. In the future, migration profiles will need to be developed in much more detail, because they will provide stakeholders with a basis for more precise programming and evaluation in the area of migration. Mobility partnerships are an arrangement between the European Union, the Member States and third countries designed to shape and manage human mobility more efficiently. The basic idea is that progress can be made by putting together specific “packages” that include items of relevance for both the EU and interested third countries. EU offers could include short-stay visa facilitation, facilitated access to the labour markets of certain Member States and circular migration schemes. In return, partner countries could pledge active cooperation on fighting illegal migration and on ensuring return and readmission. Following approval by the European Council\textsuperscript{36}, pilot mobility partnerships are currently being negotiated between some Member States and Cape Verde and Moldova, which have confirmed their readiness to work towards managing migration flows and, in particular, towards fighting illegal migration. A further idea, which has not yet been put into practice, was the creation of Migration Support Teams (MISTs), which could provide assistance on migration management to a requesting third country, including in the event of a crisis. Teams of this kind can be used to provide specific technical and financial assistance to African countries to solve the root causes of migration flows and any other migration-related issue. Finally, Europe could provide financial as-

\textsuperscript{36}. See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council on 14 December 2007, paragraph 17.
sistance to establish and, where possible, build up research institutes on migration and specific centres whose main purpose would be to facilitate legal movements of people from third countries to Europe. It is also worth underlining that all these new tools tied in well with existing EU initiatives and policies in the area of external relations. The Commission also has a new financial instrument, totalling €384 million for the period 2007-2013, to promote external action in the area of migration and asylum: a thematic programme for cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum.

To cultivate dialogue and cooperation with African countries, two major conferences were organised in 2006, the results of which were fed into the global debate on migration and management. At the initiative of France and Spain, the first was held in Rabat in July 2006 and brought together 60 countries to identify and implement measures to combat illegal migratory flows along West African routes. On that occasion, an Action Plan was adopted and included measures such as developing partnerships between European and African scientific institutions, facilitating the mobility of students, creating a Euro-African business forum to share knowledge and know-how and granting technical assistance to migrants ready and willing to invest in projects in their countries.

37. A new centre of this kind is to be opened in Bamako (Mali) by the end of 2008. If it proves to be a success, ECOWAS countries would welcome the opening of other centres.

38. This programme, which has replaced AENEAS, provides financial support in five policy areas: (1) fostering the links between migration and development; (2) promoting well-managed labour migration; (3) fighting illegal immigration and facilitating readmission of irregular migrants; (4) protecting migrants against exploitation and exclusion; and (5) promoting asylum and international protection.

39. Countries of destination, transit and origin.
of origin\textsuperscript{40}. The second Conference was convened on 22-23 November 2006 in Tripoli. It was the first ever EU-African Ministerial Conference on migration and development and marked a historic event. Europe and Africa joined hands to forge a political commitment to working in close partnership on migration and its links with development. To put it in the words of Vice-President Franco Frattini: “We, Africans and Europeans alike, need to work together to develop an “Afro-European Approach to migration”. The Declaration that we adopt at the end of this Conference must reflect our common understanding of how we can make migration work for the benefit of development and what concrete steps we can take to make this a reality”. The Tripoli Declaration contained a number of “concrete steps”, including making migration a part of poverty reduction strategies, promoting foreign direct investment to create more employment opportunities, supporting diasporas, building capacity in Africa to manage South-South migration\textsuperscript{41}, tackling the root causes of migration, ensuring that migration policies would not lead to brain drain and examining “the feasibility of setting up a fund to implement measures set out in this Declaration”. Finally, to show his preference for concrete initiatives, Vice-President Frattini launched the idea of setting up a Euro-African Institute on Remittances. Commissioner Michel, who also took part in the Tripoli Conference, immediately endorsed the proposal and took the work forward with the assistance of the World Bank\textsuperscript{42}.

\textsuperscript{40} According to preliminary available information, in October 2008 the French Presidency, which attaches great importance to gearing up practical cooperation between the two banks of the Mediterranean, intends to organise the second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference as a follow-up on to the Rabat Conference.

\textsuperscript{41} It needs to be underlined that South-South migration accounts for over 40 per cent of worldwide migration flows.

\textsuperscript{42} At the time of writing, this new body has not yet come into being.
In the slipstream of the two conferences held in 2006, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)\(^43\) started to show greater interest in migration management. This has led to the establishment of an EU-ECOWAS joint working group on migration and in April 2007 the EU-ECOWAS Troika met for the first time. On 28 February 2007, the Group of Commissioners met to take stock of the practical follow-up to the Rabat and Tripoli Conferences and to push for rapid disbursement of EC financial support for action to carry through the political agendas set at these two conferences. At the time of writing, Europe has not yet made any significant progress in delivering on the political milestones that Europe and Africa agreed in 2006. Europe’s international standing could be seriously blighted if adequate funding is not soon made available to meet the legitimate expectations of African governments. Almost two years ago, Africa and Europe decided to work in close partnership on migration and development, raising the hopes of many African leaders and citizens that enhanced practical cooperation will yield the desired results in terms of effective management of migration flows. Time has passed by and the results on the scoreboard are meagre. Time is a perpetual enemy and Europe, together with the Member States, cannot afford the luxury of missing this opportunity. As Nicolas Sarkozy stated at the Rabat Conference: “Africa’s failure today would spell disaster for Europe tomorrow”\(^44\). This phrase needs to become Europe’s refrain on migration management.

\(^{43}\) Set up in 1975, ECOWAS is composed of fifteen Member States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

\(^{44}\) The then Minister of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, delivered a powerful speech at the Rabat Conference: “Car nos destins sont liés: l’échec de l’Afrique aujourd’hui, ce serait le désastre de l’Europe demain”.
Three other major international events marked the second half of 2007: the first Global Forum on migration and development, held in July in Brussels, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Migration, convened in November in Albufeira (Algarve), and the EU-Africa Summit, which took place in December in Lisbon. Building on the work of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)\(^45\) and on the results of the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development\(^46\), the first Global Forum on migration and development was organised by the United Nations in close cooperation with other stakeholders\(^47\) to hold an in-depth discussion of the multi-faceted phenomenon of international migration. Its aim was to find solutions to alleviating the adverse effects of migration on less developed countries and to capitalise on its potential benefits for both the countries of destination, origin and transit and migrants alike. From 9 to 11 July 2007, this event brought together government officials from one hundred and twenty-three countries, the EU representative, Vice-President Franco Frattini, the United Nations Special Representative for Migration, Mr Peter Sutherland, international experts and civil society. The distinct advantage of this Global Forum

\(^{45}\) Report of the Global Commission on International Migration, “*Migration in an interconnected world: new directions for action*”, October 2005. In this report, the Global Commission stated that the number of migrants was set to rise in the years to come and that strident inequalities in social, economic and demographic areas were the main driving forces behind increased migration flows.

\(^{46}\) For further details, see United Nations General Assembly, sixty-first session, Agenda item 55(b), A/61/515, 13 October 2006.

\(^{47}\) The Belgian government, in particular Ambassador Régine de Clercq, the United Nations Special Representative for Migration, Mr Peter Sutherland, and the European Commission were particularly helpful in preparing and organising this high-profile international gathering.
has been to establish “a venue for discussing issues related to international migration and development in a systematic and comprehensive way and … a platform for discussing experiences, innovative and good practices, and for identifying concrete ways of assuring the positive contribution of legal migration to development”\(^4^8\). The second Global Forum will take place in Manila (Philippines) in the course of 2008.

On the strength of the remarkable work already undertaken within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Euro-Mediterranean region also decided to give priority to migration. The Portuguese Presidency gave the political impetus to the organisation of the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meeting on migration. Apart from the commonly shared goals, including, among others, creating opportunities for legal migration, facilitating transfer of skills and know-how, tackling the root causes of migration and the thorny issue of illegal immigration and minimising the adverse impact of the brain drain\(^4^9\), the Euro-Mediterranean meeting sought to give more momentum to practical cooperation by proposing the creation of \textit{ad hoc} working groups, composed of senior officials, to prepare specific projects and ensure proper follow-up. As with the Rabat and Tripoli Conferences, the language adopted on funding referred to “available institutional resources to support the Euro Mediterranean partnership, other financial instruments of the European Union and national contributions of Euro-Mediterranean States participating in projects.”

Although it may be considered unrefined to discuss money during a Ministerial conference addressing migration-related issues, the blatant truth is that,

\(^{48}\) For further details, see Global Forum Summary Report of 20 August 2007, which is also available on the internet: http://www.gfmd-fmmd.org/en/system/files/Rapport+GFMD_EN+_3_.pdf

\(^{49}\) These are political declarations and objectives that can also be found in the conclusions of the Rabat and Tripoli Conferences.
without adequate financial and human resources, no political agenda can make headway. Moreover, given the Soviet-style planning of EU activities imposing clear agenda-setting one year in advance, it is easy to guess that Europe’s existing financial and human resources are already committed to achieving an agreed set of policy objectives. Before the mid-term review of the EU budget scheduled for 2010, therefore, it could be particularly difficult to get hold of the substantial financial resources Europe needs to take the political goals agreed at the Rabat, Tripoli and Euro-Mediterranean Conferences forward. This does not mean that EU governments are obliged to set aside specific resources every time they organise a conference on a given subject. It simply means that it would be advisable and politically forward-looking to consider the financial implications of a given political agenda in greater detail before sitting around a negotiating table. Furthermore, careful consideration needs to be paid to coordination efforts. Within the Commission, for example, coordination is beset by a host of obstacles, including time-consuming “turf wars” that often impede the swift achievement of policy goals. Failing this, Europe’s credibility and standing will be gradually eroded in the eyes of its international partners. This loss of credibility can also have adverse ripple effects in many areas where Europe seeks to establish and, where possible, raise its profile as global player. In the highly competitive international arena, Europe should be seen as a “rising star” not as a “falling star”. The EU-Africa Summit of December 2007 is a case in point. This Summit, which took many long working hours and unremitting political support to prepare, managed to create the political momentum to help African countries overcome their long-standing political and socio-economic problems. As a result, the Summit set a very ambitious political plan, which, if implemented in full and within a reasonable period of time, will make a great difference in the lives of Africa’s most needy and vulnerable groups. The EU-Africa renewed partnership will cover, among other things, peace and security, democracy and human rights, energy, climate change, trade and regional integration, as well as migration, mobility and employment. At the time of writing, it is still unclear how and who will take the vast range of measures forward and how much money will
be made available for this purpose. A preliminary estimate of the funding needed to turn the political goals set out in the EU-Africa partnership into reality calls for a sharp rise in resources to the tune of €5 billion per year, along with an increased number of staff responsible for coordinating work and implementing this far-reaching political plan. Once again, there seem to be black clouds looming over Europe’s side of the deal. Europe and the Member States may find themselves in an uncomfortable situation in which timely delivery can be jeopardised by a number of obstacles, including complex and lengthy coordination efforts and the lack of the additional funds Europe needs to honour its high-stakes political promises.

Despite genuine political commitment and valiant efforts, implementation in the first two years of the Global Approach to Migration proved to be a highly complex exercise. Lack of fresh funds, ill-defined coordination efforts and, sometimes, infantile rivalry between Commission departments have prevented Europe and the Member States from fully accomplishing all the short-term objectives set by our political leaders. The forthcoming European Migration Pact, along with the institutional reforms ushered in by the Lisbon Treaty, may be the best antidote to the most serious of “implementation diseases”. Recent history has taught us that poor management of migration flows can lead to the humanitarian tragedies that Europe’s citizens vividly remember and find almost impossible to tolerate. These humanitarian tragedies put tremendous pressure on countries such as Italy, Greece, Malta and Spain, which have had to cope with wave after wave of human misery. Europe cannot simply look on, without taking political action, at the shocking images of migrants drowning in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. On the back of the common principles and values it upholds, Europe has to make more of an effort to find a lasting solution to this heart-rending humanitarian issue, while continuing to implement its Global Approach with resolve and conviction.
Is there a case for a European Migration Pact?

Once the Lisbon Treaty has come into force, guiding principles such as enhanced solidarity, shared responsibility and close partnership will not only continue to be implemented because they represent the intrinsic and founding values of Europe’s activities, but also because they will become legally binding in the areas of asylum, border management and immigration. Along with mutual trust, these principles have already become the most salient and emblematic components of Europe’s practical cooperation in the area of migration management. Further to the several political declarations made by President Nicolas Sarkozy highlighting the fact that migration will be one of France’s top political priorities, it comes as no surprise that a new proposal on migration management is in the offing.

The fundamental question is how to fit the imminent European Migration Pact into Europe’s existing migration strategy, based on the Global Approach to Migration, and thus to generate added value. There is now a broad consensus that migration, being a complex transcontinental phenomenon, needs to be accompanied and carefully managed with the assistance of all stakeholders involved. In other words, the “migration framework” that the European Migration Pact will devise should therefore build on the achievements accomplished by the first two years of implementation of the Global Approach, correct its shortcomings and put forward new ideas. The European Migration Pact, however, will not only cover the implementation of Europe’s Global Approach. It is a domestic Pact between EU

50. Article 63b of the Lisbon Treaty states the following: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.”
Member States that will have beneficial externalities on cooperation with third countries and on how Europe continues to address migration management, which is both a formidable challenge and a unique opportunity. Let me give you some examples of how the new European Migration Pact could help Europe and the Member States to make significant headway in migration management. The experience gained in 2006 and 2007 brought to the surface the pressing need to have a new financial instrument to gear up practical cooperation with third countries. Although this new financial instrument can only be adopted during the EU budget mid-term review in 2010, it is now that Europe should start to advance this sort of proposal and work on it. The new, complementary financial instrument, to be managed by the Directorate-General of Justice, Freedom and Security, will finance a number of specific programmes that are only partially covered by existing financial tools. Although migration has now been mainstreamed into Europe’s country strategy papers, there are only a few programmes specifically designed to train young people, who are the ones most likely to leave their countries of origin in the legitimate quest for a better life. Apart from being the largest chunk of Africa’s population, young people are the ones who are bearing the brunt of the structural reforms introduced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the last decade. These reforms, which have increased Africa’s overall competitiveness in the international markets by redressing inefficient state-run factories, did not pay enough attention to diminishing job opportunities for uneducated and poorly trained young people. As a consequence of this “jobless competitiveness” and of rapid popula-

51. Although it is true that Africa’s bloated public sector was poorly run –to put it mildly– and could not compete in the international markets, it managed to create a sort of “sticky web” where African people could cling on, in particular during times of economic crisis.
tion growth\textsuperscript{52}, Africa’s youth, including women, are left with small patches of land to cultivate crops, fewer job opportunities and sombre life prospects. Europe’s migration management should therefore tackle the problems of Africa’s youth by providing, for example, vocational training, language courses and opportunities for legal migration and remunerated traineeships that reflect Member States’ labour needs. Europe’s vocational training and language courses should involve a large and diversified number of young people to increase their chances of finding jobs in their own countries or in the region. Young people in the less developed world should become the target group of Europe’s strategy to address their specific employment problems, which are the main driving forces behind their decision to leave their countries of origin. This financial tool will not only enable Europe to provide specifically designed training courses for young people in third countries, which is also in line with the Policy Plan on legal migration, it will also defray part of the costs of travelling to Europe\textsuperscript{53}. Once migrants are in

\textsuperscript{52} In its report entitled “World Population Prospects – the 2006 revision”, the department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UNDESA) states that: “The world population will likely increase by 2.5 billion over the next 43 years, passing from the current 6.7 billion to 9.2 billion in 2050. This increase is equivalent to the size that the world population had in 1950 and it will be absorbed mostly by the less developed regions, whose population is projected to rise from 5.4 billion in 2007 to 7.9 billion in 2050. In contrast, the population of the more developed regions is expected to remain largely unchanged at 1.2 billion and would have declined were it not for the projected net migration from developing to developed countries, which is expected to average 2.3 million persons a year after 2010.”

\textsuperscript{53} Since migration management is one of Europe’s top political priorities, it can be argued that Europe’s coffers cover up to 80\% of total training and travelling costs of would-be migrants.
Europe, the integration fund will kick in with tailor-made activities for newly arrived legal immigrants, which include more language courses for legal migrants and their families, and information on their rights and duties and on the national values and legislative norms of the host countries. In addition to setting a new pattern of practical cooperation with third countries, this strategy will give more credence to Europe’s commitment to effective management and accompaniment of migration flows, in particular with regard to gender issues.\(^{54}\) Moreover, this new financial instrument could boost the role of diasporas in the socio-economic development of their countries of origin by co-funding, up to 80 per cent, migration-related projects devised and agreed upon by the Commission, associations of migrants and interested Member States, and encouraging migrants who, after residing for a period in Europe, decide to go and lend a helping hand on a given project or to give a training course to would-be migrants. Voluntary return can also be facilitated. Under this new instrument, resources can also be made available to make voluntary return easier for those who intend to start up a business in their countries of origin, thereby creating more job opportunities, and to co-finance potential business projects to be run by migrants in their countries of origin.

Although this proposal seems to be plausible and simple to take on board, for it to be a success, it will need closer coordination between Europe’s activities and those carried out by each Member State in third countries, careful monitoring of the results achieved and more direct involvement of EU delegations in undertaking projects. This last point brings me to a further proposal. Article 13a of the Lisbon Treaty states

\(^{54}\) According to United Nations estimates, over 50% of worldwide migrants are women. Some of them are trafficked, but there is also a growing group of female migrants who see migration to the developed world as a new form of emancipation.
that the European External Action Service “… shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council.” Migration Support Teams (MISTs) should also become part and parcel of the future European External Action Service if Europe wants to raise its credibility in migration management. These teams, composed of national and international experts, should be called upon to monitor implementation of EU migration-related projects, provide technical assistance to requesting third countries to help solve specific issues, and to coordinate efforts more effectively in the event of a crisis. The first two ideas should tie in well with the policy goals of Europe’s overarching external action, as they are intended to make migration-related programmes more coherent and results-orientated.

Three additional proposals could also be included in the final draft of the new European Migration Pact. First, at national level, there is an urgent need for inter-ministries and permanent task forces that are capable of coordinating efforts and using the related funds to implement all the different parts of the Global Approach to Migration. Each task force needs to liaise with European and national partners, and to take part in all meetings covering implementation of the Global Approach. Second, the work of the recently announced European Migration Policy Centre, which is set to start its activities on the premises of the European University Institute in the autumn of 2008, should also regularly feed into Europe’s strategy and thereby underpin policy choices addressing such complex issues as demographic changes, Europe’s labour market

55. The new Centre should be managed by a Director in close cooperation with a scientific committee, which should be composed of a limited number of experts.
needs and the fight against illegal immigration and human trafficking, to name but a few. To put it in the words of Vice-President Franco Frattini: “The main goal of the new European Migration Policy Centre will be to translate research findings into realistic policy recommendations and thus help guide Europe’s policy options in the future. Europe needs to have research on its side.” One proposal could be to develop migration profiles for each Member State. If Europe intends to lend a helping hand to its Member States, it needs to understand the international mobility of third-country nationals living and working on its soil much better. If the objective is to formulate tailor-made policy recommendations and to monitor the results of a given policy, Europe needs to have a more detailed picture of migration in each and every Member State. At present, there is no better tool at Europe’s disposal than migration profiles. This can also have a positive effect on third countries that continue to see the development of migration profiles as a by-product of practical cooperation. If Europe sets a good example, many other countries will follow. Finally, proposals on unskilled and low skilled migration could also be included. The Commission has already launched a thorough study of these categories of workers and, on the basis of the evidence gathered, the Pact could propose adding other instruments on labour migration in a bid to meet the ever-evolving needs of the EU labour market\(^5\) and of an ageing

---

56. **Today Europe’s job market is mainly led by technology and information. This means that the future structure of this job market will depend to a large extent on technology changes, which are swift, extensive and hard to predict. Member States and the European Union therefore have a duty to closely monitor the evolution of Europe’s job market and thus to examine its absorption capacity in terms of new jobs available for EU citizens and migrants.**
population. This would extend the sectoral approach the Commission adopted in 2005.
The European Migration Pact is a golden opportunity that simply must not be missed. It can help Europe to polish and, where necessary, to enhance some of the aspects of its comprehensive migration strategy, which integrates the internal and external policies of the EU and covers both legislation and practical cooperation. Migration policy is an area where Europe’s citizens have high expectations. As such,

57. In its report entitled “World Population Ageing”, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UNDESA) states that: “In 2000, the population aged 60 years or over numbered 600 million, triple the number present in 1950. In 2006, the number of older persons had surpassed 700 million. By 2050, 2 billion older persons are projected to be alive, implying that their number will once again triple over a span of 50 years. Globally the population of older persons is growing at a rate of 2.6 per cent per year, considerably faster than the population as a whole which is increasing at 1.1 per cent annually… –Population ageing is unprecedented, a process without parallel in the history of humanity. A population ages when increases in the proportion of older persons (that is, those aged 60 years or over) are accompanied by reductions in the proportion of children (persons under age 15) and then by declines in the proportions of persons in the working ages (15 to 59). At the world level, the number of older persons is expected to exceed the number of children for the first time in 2047… –Population ageing is profound, having major consequences and implications for all facets of human life. In the economic area, population ageing will have an impact on economic growth, savings, investment, consumption, labour markets, pensions, taxation and intergenerational transfers. In the social sphere, population ageing influences family composition and living arrangements, housing demand, migration trends, epidemiology and the need for health-care services. In the political arena, population ageing may shape voting patterns and political representation.”
migration policy is one of the key areas where Europe can and must demonstrate its ability to respond to citizens’ justified concerns. This Pact can embody “the need for a renewed political commitment” and “harness the opportunities which migration represents in a new era of globalisation”\textsuperscript{58}. Since migration issues will continue to top Europe’s political agenda in the years to come\textsuperscript{59}, Europe should spare no effort in pursuit of its policy objectives, including a deeper understanding of this increasingly important phenomenon and implementation of its broad set of activities in close cooperation with all the stakeholders involved. The development of a comprehensive dialogue on migration should give rise to concrete platforms of cooperation between the EU, the countries concerned and other bodies, based on timely delivery of the political commitments that have been made. Action must follow words. This will be essential if mutual trust and respect are to be built, and mutual understanding and dialogue are to be deepened on such an important and politically relevant policy area as migration and development\textsuperscript{60}.

\textsuperscript{58} See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council on 14 December 2007, paragraph 16.

\textsuperscript{59} The United Nations estimates that international migrants represent almost three percent of the world’s population.

\textsuperscript{60} The consequences of migration flows on the development prospects of the countries of origin can no longer be neglected. Whereas migration can sometimes be detrimental in development terms, for example when it leads to severe skills shortages – a situation that has occurred for example in the healthcare sector of some African countries – its potential positive contribution must not be underestimated. Bearing in mind that the world population is set to reach 9 billion by 2050, it needs to be underlined that virtually all population growth will occur in the group of the 50 least developed countries, which have a large proportion of young people.
To boost Europe’s credibility where legal migration is concerned, Member States must tackle illegal employment, which is the main pull factor of illegal immigration, more vigorously and more effectively. Attracting illegal workers to Europe undermines the credibility of Europe’s legal migration policy, distorts normal competition in whole sectors of the economy, depresses wages and allows exploitation of third-country workers to continue (e.g. no protection when operating on building sites or when spraying the fields with harmful pesticides, illegal immigrants forced to work 12 to 16 hours a day in textile, shoe and leather factories). Illegal employment also means lost revenue for state treasuries and social security systems. Is Europe’s leadership willing to turn a blind eye to this insidious threat? The first step towards getting a firmer grip on illegal employment is to intensify national enforcement efforts significantly. EU Member States should not wait for Europe’s proposed directive against illegal employment to be adopted before enforcing existing national measures. Some Member States (Greece, Italy and Spain) have already started, setting a good example for the others to follow. The success of this strategy depends entirely on the political will of the Member States, which are the parties ultimately responsible for ensuring respect for the rule of law and legality within their national borders. Without inspections, unscrupulous employers will continue to calculate that the advantages of employing illegally staying third-country workers far outweigh the risks of being caught by law-enforcement authorities. This fight also needs to be accompanied by information campaigns, which need to be promoted in the countries of origin to make would-be migrants aware of the risks

61. Proposal for a directive providing for sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, COM(2007) 249 final, Brussels, 16.05.2007. The aim of the proposal is to ensure that all Member States introduce similar preventive measures and penalties, and enforce them effectively.
involved in their “voyages of hope”. In this context, I would like to draw
attention to a recent initiative taken by a Senegalese mother, Mrs Yayi
Bayam Diouf, who, after the untimely death of her only son, has decided
to create a network of mothers who have lost their sons and daughters
during the “voyages of hope”. This project, called “the caravan against
illegal immigration”, can already count on the support of eight hundred
mothers in Senegal and on financial contributions from the Organisation
for Migration and the Swiss authorities. The idea is to fight illegal im-
migration among young people, who are the most numerous group, by
creating more job opportunities for them via the funding of the projects
that have been devised by the Senegalese youth itself. Projects can cover
poultry housing, carpenter shops and new crop cultivation. In December,
twenty mothers from this caravan went to Mali to raise awareness about
the risks of illegal immigration and to inform people of this project. In
the coming months, this caravan is also set to go to other Sub-Saharan
countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger. With the new financial instru-
ment, it should also be possible to fund projects of this kind, provided
that they have a tangible and quantifiable impact on the employment of
young people in the country concerned. Training could also be financed
if it allows unskilled and low-skilled young people to join the teams invol-
ved in these projects. These campaigns also need to provide information
on the availability of jobs in Europe, give practical advice on how to
contact employers and explain the labour market rules in force in each
Member State and in Europe in general. A further issue where Europe’s
reputation is at stake is on effective return policy, to be carried through in
full respect of human rights. The proposed directive on common stan-
dards on return, which the Commission tabled on 1 September 2005\textsuperscript{62}, is

\textsuperscript{62} Proposal for a directive on common standards and procedures in Member States for
returning illegally staying third-country nationals, COM(2005), 391 final, Brussels,
01.09.2005.
still before the Council and the European Parliament. This delay has also created a further problem: the Return Fund, totalling €676 million, has been frozen until a final agreement is reached.

The Pact, which needs to support Member States and third countries in their efforts to ensure effective management of migratory flows, can sow the seeds for the success of Europe’s Global Approach to Migration and, at the same time, strengthen the Commission’s hand in migration management. Great strides have been made towards putting the political commitments made in Tampere and in the Hague Programme into action. The same holds true for the Global Approach to Migration. Despite these great achievements, much still remains to be done to implement Europe’s Global Approach successfully. Europe needs to continue to count on the invaluable input of experts and EU and government officials, and on the unremitting engagement of its political leadership if the Pact is to become a success story. In political terms, this means that Europe’s role in managing future migration flows has to grow hand in hand with the challenges ahead. In 1963, during an official visit to Dublin, John F. Kennedy said: “We need men who can dream of things that never were”. Europe does too.