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Task-Sharing for European Security.
Dennis Sandole

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With the title I've been assigned to talk about, task-sharing, I'm looking at the issue in the context of the title of this section. Also, I'm looking at the issue in the context of the title of the conference, which is broader in scope. Further on, I'm looking at task-sharing in the context of overall European security, and not just in the sense of what the Americans, Spanish, French and others can contribute. In essence, I'll be looking at task-sharing in the context of designing a peace and security system for post-Cold War Europe that is meant to be achievable: a peace and security "architecture" (to make use of a fashionable word) that is actually coming into place as we speak because of its making use of existing international governmental and non-governmental actors to provide for security on the continent.

The task-sharing that I'm about to share with you involves a model I've been looking at called the "New European Peace and Security System" – "NEPSS", for short. And NEPSS has both descriptive and prescriptive elements. Descriptively, as I just indicated, NEPSS is developing as we speak; but, it also has prescriptive elements, elements that I think ought to be there for the post-Cold War peace and security system in the new Europe to prevent what I call "future Yugoslavias".

First of all, the descriptive aspects of NEPSS: Here, I'm looking at the post-Cold War peace and security architecture for Europe in the context of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is the main organizing device for my model, for the simple reason that it includes all the former Cold War enemies, and the neutral and unaligned, numbering some 54/55 participating states in all. And, as you all know, the OSCE (coming from the old CSCE – the Helsinki Process) has three pillars, three distinguishing dimensions.

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The first one used to be called "security" back in the old Cold War days; the second: environmental and economic; and the third, humanitarian and human rights. Now we view all three "baskets" as aspects of post-Cold War security in the comprehensive sense. So, basket one in the OSCE is now political-military aspects of overall security; basket two, economic and environmental aspects, and, basket three, humanitarian and human rights aspects of overall security.

What's important about these three pillars of the OSCE? I think most of us would agree that we see paradigm shifts taking place in terms of other existing international governmental organizations in the region, whereby they are moving beyond national security toward *common* security. Let's look at basket one, at the political and military aspects of overall security. Here we have NATO as the principle actor qualifying for political-military aspects of overarching security. And as we know, NATO is talking about increasing its membership to include former members of the former Warsaw Pact: In July, in Madrid, the Czechs, the Poles, and the Hungarians (these three, at least) will be asked to become members of the new NATO. And in addition to NATO as such reaching out to former enemies of the Cold War era, there are two creations of NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the latter having among its members most, if not all, of the former Cold War enemies, plus some of the neutral and unaligned. In terms of analysis, then, at the level of basket one we have, on the one hand, NATO as such; and, on the other, we have NATO as NACC and the Partnership for Peace reaching out to former Cold War enemies to include them in common security organizations. These moves towards common security are, I think, some example of NEPSS which are presently happening in basket one of the three-part OSCE structure .

At the level of basket two, we have the European Union clearly also doing the same thing – reaching out to former Cold War adversaries. In fact, the former Cold War enemies are quite active in looking to get some kind of status within the context of the EU. Some of them already have associate membership, while some are looking for full-fledged membership before the 21st century comes upon us. In any case, the point is that within the context of basket two of the OSCE, the EU is reaching out to former members of the Warsaw Pact as well.

And under basket three, we have the Council of Europe, which has been leading the way in many ways to embrace former Cold War enemies. So, very briefly in terms of the OSCE structure, we have existing institutions taking on board as new members, or contemplating taking on board as new members, former members of the Warsaw Pact, which thereby suggests to me that descriptively we have a paradigm shift taking place in those three dimensions of the OSCE – away from national security in the narrowly defined *realpolitik* sense, towards common security in a true post-Cold War European sense.

Now, having said all that, there's still a problem with the greater scenario, even though empirically these processes are happening. The problem is this: Everything I've talked about thus far is basically inter-state in nature. The OSCE is an inter-state structure. NATO is basically inter-state, as are its two creations, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace. The EU, although it has trans-national, supra-state ambitions, is still basically inter-state. And the Council of Europe is inter-state. So, although these are exciting movements that I've talked about (the getting away from traditional *realpolitik*-based national security and movement toward common security), these developments are not by themselves sufficient to prevent "future Yugoslavias".

And by "future Yugoslavias" I mean conflicts, brutal conflicts, involving members of different ethnic communities, *within* state structures. All those organizations that I've just mentioned, NATO, NACC, OSCE and so on, are really not geared, nor are they designed to deal with these kinds of situations. They may talk about it – the OSCE certainly has; the High Commissioner on National Minorities does have the human dimension mechanism. Basically, however, the OSCE is still inter-state bound.

So, the NEPSS model has to go beyond its descriptive components to include some other dimensions, which brings us to the prescriptive element of NEPSS. And here, I'm also coming to you as a conflict resolution person and not just as an international relations or strategic studies person.

Under the prescriptive part of NEPSS, I have coined an expression called "integrated systems of conflict resolution networks". Integrated systems of conflict resolution networks have two dimensions: the vertical and the horizontal. Under the vertical dimension of integrated systems, I begin by assuming that all politics is local, that all conflicts have a local point of origin. Further, I imagine a vertical mapping of Europe in terms of many villages and cities embedded in societal, national, sub-regional, regional, and finally, international settings. For instance, in the context of former Yugoslavia we have Bosnia, wherein we have Srebrenica and Tuzla; next, we have the national level; further on, there's the sub-regional level in the Balkans; and, then we have the regional (European-wide); and, finally, the international level. I imagine that at each of these levels there's a combination of governmental actors, which are known as "track one" agents in the discipline and, corresponding to each of these governmental actors, there are non-governmental ("track two") actors which specialize in humanitarian and conflict resolution kinds of roles. So, for each of these vertically located levels (local, societal, national, sub-regional, regional, and international), we have governmental actors, and corresponding to each one of these, we have non-governmental actors which can complement what state actors and international governmental actors do, but don't do enough of. And here let me give some examples of what I'm talking about:

Traditionally, governmental actors deal with negative peace. Negative peace is not, by itself, bad. It's not called negative because it's bad. Negative means the absence of war; and that's not bad. I would have loved to have had negative peace in former Yugoslavia long before Richard Holbrooke and NATO came on the scene to help bring about negative peace, which is still holding. But negative peace, as the absence of war (although good in and of itself), does not lead automatically to dealing with the underlining causes and conditions of the conflict that has become waged through violent means. At some point in time negative peace has to be followed by positive peace. And positive peace deals with those underlining causes and conditions, which is not just about putting out the fire (the metaphor we often hear in track one governmental domains). Diplomats often say, "*We have to put the fire out. I'm so busy putting fires out that I don't have time to do anything else. What, deal with the underlining causes*?". Well, if all we do is deal with negative peace –which, again, in and of itself, can save lives– we may end up having a Cyprus-type situation.

But, as we've seen in the last couple of days in Cyprus, if all we have is a green line, manned and womaned by United Nations' troops, and thousands of Turkish forces in the northern part, we stop the fighting, we freeze in place the forces, but we do not deal with the underlining causes and conditions –which means that the violence, the fire in the house can flare up again at any point in time.

In the vertical part of integrated systems of NEPSS, track two non-governmental actors are meant to bring in a positive peace complement to the track one negative peace expertise of state actors and international governmental actors. They are meant to work together with governmental actors at each level: local, societal, national, sub-regional, regional, and international.

Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. At the level of Sarajevo, or Tuzla, or Srebrenica, we have governmental actors fulfilling welfare and law and order functions. Well, welfare and law and order functions may only go so far with regards to what the city or the village can provide. There may be, in this case, a need for a non-governmental actor which can help the state actors at the local level do a bit more of what they would like to do but lack resources to do. It is in such a case as this that track two non-governmental actors might, in fact, provide conflict-resolution expertise which track one governmental actors may not have.

To give you a personal example, I'm a former police officer and a former American marine: I've been trained to do lots of *realpolitik*, negative peacemaking, and negative peace maintenance. Never during my time as a police officer or as a marine was I trained to deal with the underlining causes and conditions of conflict. Now, you might say "that was not your job"; I accept that. That was not my job. However, a lot of the conflicts that the police get called upon to deal with, and that the Marines, Navy, Air Force and diplomats get called upon to deal with might have been dealt with years before the

house (if you will) had ever caught on fire to begin with. So that's why (as envisaged under the vertical dimension of the integrated systems) track two non-governmental actors ought to be in a position to help track one actors at each of those vertical levels.

Now, very briefly, the horizontal dimension. For positive peace conflict resolution to work, it has to have the involvement of all parties. After all, it is quite conceivable that one of the actors may wish to continue prosecuting (even!) a genocidal, ethnic-cleansing policy against another actor, in which case the vertical design may not work.

Also keep in mind that the vertical design is meant to be very practical: It's meant to implement Boutros-Boutros Ghali's idea of preventative diplomacy. If, at the local level something potentially dangerous is happening, it would be very important to get to that situation at that point in time using track two non-governmental as well as track one governmental actors for a variety of reasons: one, to stop the fire before it gets worse; and two, not only to stop the fire before it spreads to include others in other neighborhoods, but also to keep the costs for all concerned as low as possible. That intent may not work. The fire may spread, in which case the horizontal dimension must kick in.

Here, I think, I disappoint some of my conflict resolution colleagues by saying if, in fact, one of the major actors in a conflict situation wishes to continue to prosecute genocidal, ethnic-cleansing policies against other actors, then it becomes imperative for the international community to use a little bit of *realpolitik*-based force, but as part of a larger *idealpolitik*-based positive peace conflict resolution strategy to bring about negative peace, to forcibly stop the fire, to forcibly separate the parties, and then to let the dust settle in order for more positive peace mechanisms, actors and processes to come in to the situation and encourage the parties to deal non-violently with the underlining causes and conditions of the conflicts which have turned violent.

So, to conclude, this has been an outline of NEPSS and of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of its integrated systems of conflict resolution networks. It is a lot of information in a short period of time, but I'll be more than happy to take any questions about it.