Cities in World Politics
Local responses to global challenges

Hannah Abdullah (Ed.)
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Urbanisation is one of the most powerful trends of the modern era. Since 2007, for the first time in history over half the world's population lives in cities, a proportion the United Nations (UN) estimates will rise to two-thirds by 2050 (UN, 2019). Much of this urban growth will take place in Africa and Asia, but other regions will also be deeply affected. New concepts such as the "urban age" (Burdett et al., 2018) and "planetary urbanisation" (Brenner, 2014) have been coined to capture the radical demographic shifts we are witnessing and to express a new reality in which the scale and generality of urbanisation processes leave few places free from their impact and render traditional urban-rural distinctions redundant.

The realisation that our future will be predominantly urban has also bestowed unprecedented relevance on cities and urban regions in world politics. The past two decades have seen a progressive urban turn in global governance. In 2001, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan opened the annual meeting of the UN Human Settlements Programme (Habitat) by stating that the world had entered an "urban millennium". In the same year, his foreword to the first edition of UN-HABITAT's flagship report, The State of the World's Cities, elaborated on this statement:

As more and more people make cities their home, cities will be the arenas in which some of the world's biggest social, economic, environmental and political challenges will be addressed, and where the solutions will be found. As globalization proceeds, more cities will find themselves managing problems and opportunities that used to be the exclusive domain of national governments. (UN-Habitat, 2001: 2).

This extract makes two claims that summarise the rationale that has underpinned the urban turn of global development policy debates and agendas, especially since the negotiation of the post-2015 agenda. The first is that today's major challenges – from inequality to climate change and sustainable economic growth – are concentrated in cities and urban governance is essential to remedying them. The second is that cities are emerging as global political actors engaged in taking on responsibi-
ties that were previously the preserve of nation-states. Together, these observations signal a profound reconfiguration of earlier conceptions of cities in international development: from being viewed as local problem hotspots in the 1980s and strategic sites for intervention in the 1990s, they are now seen as active drivers of positive transformation (Parnell, 2016). Notably, this change in conception is part of a more general revitalisation of debates about cities and the emergence of a new urban optimism in the social sciences at the beginning of the 21st century (Barnett and Parnell, 2016). In this environment, a consensus has arisen across policy, research and practice communities about the central importance of urban processes for our transition to a more sustainable future. The understanding is that, given their current rapid growth, the decisions cities and their local governments make about urban planning, energy, transport, housing and related issues today will impact generations to come.

The pro-urban consensus was consolidated into global policy in 2015 with the adoption of a universal urban sustainable development agenda as part of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The relevance attributed to urban process in the 2030 Agenda is twofold. Firstly, following a two-year multi-stakeholder campaign headed by transnational networks of local governments, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) included a dedicated urban goal, SDG 11: “Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe and resilient”. SDG 11 is the UN’s strongest expression to date of the wider social, economic and environmental significance of cities for the world’s future (Swope, 2014). Further, the 2030 Agenda acknowledges the role of sub-national governments in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the SDGs. Nearly all the SDGs have targets that depend on the actions of local and regional governments. The potential and responsibilities inherent in urban development were also acknowledged by the other major agendas adopted in 2015, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (Rudd et al., 2018). Finally, the New Urban Agenda, the outcome document of UN-Habitat’s 2016 summit Habitat III, further fleshed out the mutually reinforcing relationship between urbanisation and sustainable development established by SDG 11.

Some commentators have spoken of the heightened visibility of urban issues in global policy processes as representing a “global localist ideology” (Ljungkvist, 2014). In this ideology, international bodies are becoming heavily involved in redefining state-local relations, empowering local authorities as well as other urban stakeholders. However, the empowerment of cities has not only been top-down but also bottom-up. Urban representatives and stakeholders have themselves played a major role in the reframing of global challenges as urban ones and in positioning cities’ interests in the global arena. The exponential rise in transnational city networks since the early 2000s (Acuto et al., 2017) clearly shows how cities are collectively stepping up their efforts to seize the opportunity to expand their political influence. As mentioned above, city networks were among the main advocates for an urban SDG. For this purpose, they created the Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments (GTF) in 2013, a coordination and consultation mechanism that brings a local perspective to global policy processes.2

Yet, while SDG 11 has no doubt raised the profile of cities in global dialogue, most of the time their influence is largely symbolic (Fernández de Losada, 2019). The GTF, although a great achievement, is a voluntary mechanism with no formal UN status. The UN and other intergovernmental organisations are clearly struggling to revise existing mechanisms and legal frameworks to accommodate the new role of local government and provide adequate representation in multilateral negotiations. Thus far, the new importance ascribed to cities in the post-2015 agenda has not been matched by any real devolution of power. The fear many member states have of losing political leverage and visibility does not help in this process. While states have come to accept cities’ “soft power” and ability to advocate for their interests (Foster and Swiney, 2019), they are not willing to grant them a permanent and equal “seat at the global table”. This unwillingness to treat local governments as equal partners has also characterised the SDG reporting process. In theory, the SDG reporting framework allows for the nesting of local, national and global indicators. But in practice, sub-national involvement has only been partial and has varied from country to country. Only 45% of the Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) submitted to the UN in the years 2016–2018 engaged local and regional governments (GOLD, 2018). To strengthen the local dimension of the review process, some cities, including New York, Los Angeles, Kitakyushu, Oaxaca, Buenos Aires, Santana de Parnaiba and Bristol, have submitted their own Voluntary Local Reviews to the UN in 2018 and 2019.

Contribution of this volume

The issues and questions that have arisen around the city-centric shift in global policy are numerous and demand deeper analysis. Over the past decade a body of literature has emerged that critically examines and theorises the new global political agency of cities (see e.g. Acuto, 2013; Curtis, 2014; Ljungkvist, 2016; Oosterlynck et al., 2019). The present volume seeks to contribute to this debate by taking a policy-centred perspective. It analyses concrete examples of how cities and their governments are engaging in global governance, through both evolution and devolution dynamics. On the one hand, the subsequent chapters examine what may be called the “global politics” of cities; that is, how cities are actively seeking to extend their political influence beyond their jurisdiction and into the wider arena of world politics. On the other hand, they examine how the 2030 Agenda and its various related initiatives recognise the need for some form of devolution and how these agendas are localised in cities. The focus of the volume is on three global policy areas in which cities have become particularly engaged: climate change, migration and sustainable urban development. It closes with an exploration of how metropolitan areas – i.e. fusions of centre cities and suburbs which account for a major part of today’s urban growth – are emerging as a new level of governance at which innovative approaches to sustainable urbanisation are being formulated.

This volume emerged from a seminar entitled “The Place and Role of Cities in Global Governance” held at CIDOB in November 2018 with the support of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area (AMB). The seminar brought together think tanks from around the world that study the new role of cities in world politics. The participating think tanks were CIDOB (Spain), the Ecologic Institute (Germany, Belgium, USA), the Italian Institute for...
International Political Studies (Italy), the Centre for Cities (UK), the China Centre for Urban Development (China), the Centre for Urban Equity (India), the African Centre for Cities (South Africa), the CIPPEC - The Centre for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (Argentina), The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Brookings Institution (both USA).

The urban governance of climate change

It has become widely recognised that the implementation of effective global and national climate policies depends on the involvement of cities and their governments. Cities are responsible for much of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption. If left unchecked, rapid urbanisation will have detrimental effects on the rising demand for both non-renewable and renewable resources and create new vulnerabilities. Further, as home to significant numbers of people, cities are highly prone to climatic hazards, such as floods, storms and heat waves. But cities also concentrate the knowledge, technical resources and often the political will to drive practical, on-the-ground climate mitigation actions and policies. Some of the most powerful transnational city networks, such as ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, have formed around climate governance. This networked city action is partially filling the “governance gap” (Hale et al., 2013) that has emerged between our need for global climate solutions and the inability of the multilateral order to deliver them (Bouteligier, 2013). Top-down governance responses to climate change are increasingly complemented by concerted city-level action that can address the highly polycentric causes and impacts of climate change.

In their chapter, Linda Mederake, Ewa Iwaszuk and Doris Knoblauch examine the evolving role of cities in the international climate regime, as demarcated by the principles, rules, norms and procedures of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and other related documents. The authors argue that while cities have not been attributed a formal role in intergovernmental negotiations on climate governance, their recognition goes beyond that of other non-state actors in similar processes. Since the creation of the Local Government and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) Constituency in the UNFCCC process in 1995, cities have progressively gained influence and visibility in global climate summits. The 2010 Cancun Agreements were a turning point in this regard. Today, official forums for exchanges between state and city representatives have become common practice at the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCC. In tracing the milestones that lead to these achievements, the authors highlight the important role of transnational city networks that specialise in climate issues. City networks function as platforms for advocacy and peer-learning and they empower cities to act independently from national climate politics. However, the authors also point to the geographical, financial and legal limitations of city-driven global climate action. In particular, they underscore how the international legal order is preventing the much-needed reform of the state-centric framework of global climate governance and the devolution of powers to local authorities.
Providing a view on international climate governance from the Global South, Darshini Mahadevia examines potential synergies and conflicts between climate mitigation efforts and the implementation of the SDGs in urban India. As the world’s second-most populous country, and with a high economic and urbanisation growth trajectory, the pressures on India to reach the objectives of the Paris Agreement are high. However, in India, as in other emerging economies, mitigation efforts are likely to undermine many SDGs unless synergistic pathways are formulated. While the need to approach the two agendas jointly is universal, trade-offs are aggravated in conditions of such high development deficit as is prevalent in urban India. Focusing on transport and land-use policies in Indian cities, the chapter discusses how in conditions of high inequality that facilitate elite capture of policymaking, mitigation efforts can lead to a further increase in poverty and inequality rates, thereby undermining advances on the SDGs. To reduce such adverse effects on disadvantaged sections of societies, more sensitive and ethical public policy planning is required. For Mahadevia, the effective interlinkage of mitigation efforts and the SDGs needs to work from the bottom up through city-level action that can respond to local specificities. With a view to better understanding the link between local, national and global policies, the chapter maps potential synergies and trade-offs between the global climate and sustainable development agendas in urban India, providing valuable insights for future policy planning and empirical research.

Cities at the centre of global mobility

The growing recognition of cities in international climate governance often serves as a model for global urban political agency in other issue areas. An emerging area that is ever more linked with concerns about climate change and the transfer of responsibilities to cities and local governments is migration. With global temperatures rising, urban areas will play host not only to economic migrants and refugees fleeing conflict, but also to growing numbers of people displaced by climate change. Global mobility is reaching record numbers and it is becoming evident that while migration law and governance are primarily national concerns, local governments are essential interlocutors as the first receivers and hosts of migrants. They carry out the greater part of service provisions and subsequent integration efforts and they possess important technical capacities and relevant policy knowledge (Brandt, 2018). Nevertheless, until recently, their needs and experiences were not considered in regional and international deliberations and policies concerning migrants and refugees. This situation is currently changing, with cities actively engaging in migration diplomacy and policymaking. Prominent examples include the alliances between US cities with “sanctuary” policies and the European “Solidarity Cities” network. At UN level, the most notable initiatives have been the Mechelen Declaration, which – under the leadership of the world association of municipalities United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) – advocated for the Global Migration Compact (GMC) to take a human-rights approach, and the Mayors Migration Council (MMC), which was created in parallel to the adoption of the GMC in December 2018, with the objective of shaping and informing its implementation.
Cities in the United States (US) have been at the forefront of this development. Juliana Kerr analyses how US cities are emerging as new actors on migration policy at both national and international level, and proposes some ideas on how cities could be more systematically involved in policy decision-making. A majority of mayors and local leaders across the US have traditionally been committed to the migration agenda and have introduced numerous initiatives to minimise its challenges and maximise its benefits. Yet, as Kerr shows, the effectiveness of these initiatives is severely compromised by outdated national laws created without input from cities that have proven unable to answer today's global dynamics and cities' socioeconomic needs. To counter these limitations, cities are collaborating to try and shape migration policy. Kerr throws into relief the most successful strategies they have developed to this end, including the collective enactment of local policies, city diplomacy and other forms of transnational collaboration. As these strategies are not specific to migration policy or US cities, Kerr's chapter has strong reverberations with other policy areas and regions. However, like Mederake and colleagues, she also takes stock of the limitations of local influence on migration policy and the potential risks involved in giving cities too much autonomy. While the American "new localism" has much potential (Katz and Nowak, 2017), it should not be romanticised. In the US especially, local control over settlement policies has a violent history related to racial segregation and the suppression of minority rights.

Both chapters in this section address the important issue of how cities are rewriting populist anti-immigration narratives. Kerr discusses how the American "sanctuary cities" movement has effectively countered President Trump's racist rhetoric and deportation agenda by advocating for diversity and inclusion. Turning to Italian cities and the European Union (EU) context, Tobia Zevi critically unpacks the anti-immigrant discourse that has come to dominate the public debate in Italy since the Five Star-League government took office in 2018. He provides a rational counterweight to the populist misrepresentation of an overwhelming rise in immigration by reviewing concrete immigration numbers in the 2013–2018 period and the policies devised in response. In particular, he analyses how since the 2015 "refugee crisis" the Italian reception system – the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR), which was adopted in 2002 – has progressively engaged cities and local authorities in order to divide up responsibilities and distribute the recipients of international protection across territories. According to Zevi, the management of migrants in Italian cities is intimately linked with questions of urban planning. By not supporting municipalities with planning policies at both local and national level, the central government severely compromised the success of SPRAR. Further, the strain on municipalities was increased when the Five Star-League government cut back on SPRAR funds. It is this over-burdening of cities that is leading to the deterioration of the reception system and providing fuel to the populist anti-immigration discourse. The analysis of the Italian case shows that cities have a high degree of resilience when it comes to responding to migration flows. However, without a clear vision, efficient management and sufficient funding they are at risk. There is an urgent need for international migration policies to engage with and respond to these on-the-ground realities.
National Urban Policies: linking the global urban agenda with local specificities

National Urban Policies (NUPs) have been widely recognised as an effective tool for the implementation and monitoring of the urban dimension of the post-2015 global agenda, above all the SDGs and the NUA. The NUA identifies NUPs that establish a link between urbanisation dynamics and the overall process of national development as one of its five main pillars of implementation to support clear and accountable governance, coordination and follow-up across the different levels of national, regional and local government. In the wake of the integrative logic of the post-2015 agenda, a new generation of NUPs has emerged that seeks to replace the top-down approach of traditional policies with multi-level mechanisms that harmonise national priorities with local and regional needs and expectations. Underpinning these reconfigured multi-level governance arrangements is the belief that sustainable development pathways can only be achieved if they are effectively localised; that is, if their implementation actively involves local governments and stakeholders, including civil society, the private and knowledge sectors. However, while this ideal is being widely propagated in international policy forums its implementation is still evolving. The two chapters in this section critically examine the adoption of new NUPs in Africa and Latin America with a view to their effective localisation.

In Africa, the world's most rapidly urbanising continent, 38 countries are currently developing or implementing NUPs. The large-scale adoption of NUPs is a recent phenomenon. Due to a historic anti-urban bias that is particularly strong in Sub-Saharan cultures, national urbanisation processes and strategies barely received any policy attention until the turn of the century. Edgar Pieterse traces the political shifts, external pressures and policy instruments that paved the way for the positive reframing of Africa's urban transition as an opportunity to embark on a sustainable development pathway. A critical turning point in this process was the passing of the African Union's Agenda 2063 in 2015, which served as a direct input into the SDG negotiations. Since then, NUPs have emerged as an important governance mechanism to embed the urban turn in multi-level policy processes across Africa. However, as Pieterse shows, there is no enabling political environment for impactful NUPs. At this time, most African NUPs operate as performative documents that mimic global agendas, but barely advance on their localisation. A major impairment has been the colonial legacy of highly centralised government systems and top-down administrative control, which prevents democratic decentralisation reforms. Further, inefficient bureaucracies limit adequate responses to poorly managed urbanisation. Unlike in some Latin American countries, the humanitarian and development costs of these dynamics have not been met with coordinated civil society demands for more transparency and accountability. Pieterse closes with recommendations on how to foster the developmental potential of African NUPs through alliances between international actors and African organisations at all levels.

Turning to Latin America, Gabriel Lanfranchi examines how localisation is approached by Argentina's first comprehensive NUP, which was launched in 2018 as a response to the country's adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the NUA. Within Argentina’s federal structure urban
policy is the responsibility of the provinces and no national regulation mechanism previously existed. However, although the NUP is a policy advance, it contains much room for improvement. For Lanfranchi, one of its major problems is its non-binding nature, which makes it prone to political preferences and changes at both national and local level. But a more serious deficit that makes effective localisation difficult is the lack of mechanisms for participation and engagement. While the initial design of the policy provided some opportunities for the involvement of subnational governments and non-governmental stakeholders, this has not been the case with the implementation phase. To demonstrate how these shortcomings may be overcome, the chapter introduces the PlanificACCIÓN method developed by the Cities Program at CIPPEC, which is currently being applied in five Argentinian cities and metropolitan regions. Launched one year before the NUP, the aim of PlanificACCIÓN has also been to support the localisation of the NUA. But as its name (which translates as “planning in action”) suggests, the programme takes a more bottom-up and participatory approach that promotes the capacity of local administrations to align policies with the international agendas and empowers all sectors of civil society to play an active part in this process.

Governing from the metropolitan scale

With cities having moved to the top of the international agenda in the past two decades, it is important to go beyond generic understandings of urbanisation and ask how exactly the world is urbanising. A distinctive feature of the accelerating urbanisation trend has been the expansion of urban populations beyond what were previously considered the limits of the city. More and more cities are growing into larger metropolitan agglomerations. In 2017 these metropolitan areas were home to 41% of the global urban population and by 2050 it is estimated this population will grow by 600 million (GOLD, 2017). This spatial reality poses a new challenge to municipal governance structures: namely, how to bridge the mismatch between the political boundary of the city and its over-spilling functional area – its physical extension, labour and service flows, and financial markets (Gómez-Álvarez et al., 2017). There is no one-size-fits-all solution to this problem. Different arrangements are emerging in both the Global North and South to move towards more coordinated metropolitan governance (Tomás, 2017). They include complex forms of multi-level governance, with regional or state government managing some services, the creation of inter-municipal forums, and the establishment of a separate metropolitan-level government.

Given the growing importance of large metropolitan areas as global economic and cultural hubs, but also as sites of intense inequalities and pollution, the question of how to provide sustainable urban solutions at the metropolitan scale has attained increasing importance in global governance. Addressing this issue, Agustí Fernández de Losada examines how six of the main global sustainable development agendas respond to the economic, social and environmental challenges metropolitan areas face, and what opportunities and difficulties their adaptation to the metropolitan scale brings. The agendas reviewed are the 2030 Agenda, the NUA, the 2015 UN
Climate Change Conference (COP 21), and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. By discussing local-national-global relations in the definition, implementation and evaluation of this broad range of agendas, the chapter fleshes out the main challenges of moving towards integrated multi-level governance and ties together some of the issues addressed in previous chapters. Particular attention is given to the capacity of large cities and their surrounding areas to shape the definition of both national and global strategies and policies, and why it is important that they ensure their needs and interests are taken into account. While the engagement in national and international dialogues is a challenge for cities, it is also putting healthy pressure on them to better define their competencies and improve their capacities and governance structures, particularly at the metropolitan scale. The underlying principles of the post-2015 agendas – their holistic universalism and ambition for engagement, participation, transparency and accountability – are a helpful guide in this process.

In the United Kingdom (UK) intensive efforts have recently been made to improve metropolitan governance structures. Between 2017–2019 eight city regions in England, including Greater Manchester and Liverpool City Region, elected a “metro mayor” for the first time to represent combined authorities. Andrew Carter analyses the metro mayor system as part of the UK government’s devolution agenda and as an opportunity for English cities to become more active partners in global governance initiatives post-Brexit. The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act was passed in May 2016, one month before the Brexit referendum. Carter argues that if giving cities more autonomy to take control of their specific challenges was already emerging as a political priority before the referendum, the Leave vote only emphasised the urgency of reform. That vote revealed stark political divides within the country that directly map onto its economic ones, especially between the most and least prosperous cities. Today, we know that the Leave vote in economically underperforming areas was less about the UK’s relations with the EU than the desire for decisive change at home. These “left-behind” places have been the victims of a highly centralised government that is increasingly struggling to adapt national policies to the needs of ever more diverse urban conglomerations with different levels of resilience to global pressures. For Carter, the metro mayors hold the promise of a potentially bigger shift towards more federal governance arrangements that would not only enhance urban performance but also enable UK cities to take a more active role internationally.

References


THE URBAN GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

• THE EVOLVING ROLE OF CITIES AS NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE REGIME
  Linda Mederake, Ewa Iwaszuk and Doris Knoblauch

• CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND THE SDGS IN URBAN INDIA: SYNERGIES AND CONFLICTS
  Darshini Mahadevia
While nations talk, cities act.” This quote from Mike Bloomberg, the former New York mayor, reflects the frequent portrayal of the role of cities and local governments in global climate governance: in light of concerns about the inability of national governments to agree on and achieve sufficient emissions reductions, cities and transnational city networks are often seen as actors that could fill that gap (Johnson, 2018). The readiness of cities to take ambitious climate action in the face of inaction at national level was perhaps never more visible than when President Trump decided to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement. In response, mayors, governors and business leaders formed “We Are Still In”, a coalition of non-state actors reaffirming their commitment to the global climate pact, joined to date by 247 cities across the US.¹

While hardly anyone would argue against the importance of cities and local governments in the implementation of climate policies, what remains contested is their role in the international climate regime. The analysis conducted in this article uncovers how the activities of cities and transnational city networks, which have been evolving over the years, have gradually broadened the “international climate regime”, even though cities are not subjects of international law. The international climate regime referenced is formed of the principles, rules, norms and procedures included in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and other related documents (see: Okereke et al., 2009: 58). It increasingly offers visibility, legitimacy and motivation to the climate protection efforts of cities (and other non-state actors).

The chapter is organised as follows: First, we briefly discuss the relevance of cities in the context of climate change. The second section presents the evolution of city-level responses to climate change. The third outlines milestones that helped cities gain visibility within the international climate regime, starting with the establishment of the Local Government and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) Constituency in the UNFCCC process, ¹. https://www.wearestillin.com/signatories
and continuing with the recognition of cities as governmental actors in this process in 2010. Then a closer look is given to the role played by transnational city networks. And finally, the role of cities in the international climate regime on the road to COP21 in Paris is analysed, along with the developments that followed the adoption of the Paris Agreement.\footnote{COP21 was the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.} We conclude with a summary of the main argument.

I. Cities as key sites of climate mitigation and adaptation

Today, 55\% of the world’s people live in urban areas. The city-dwelling population only passed the 50\% mark in 2007, and ever since the share has kept increasing. It is projected that the population living in urban areas worldwide will rise to 68\% by 2050.\footnote{https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html} The urban population today accounts for over 70\% of the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Cities are not only relevant as the source of greenhouse gas emissions, but also as places where many solutions can be devised. As homes to most of the world’s universities, public and private research bodies, businesses, think tanks and policy institutes, cities serve as hubs of innovation and knowledge exchange. Thanks to their density, concentrated populations and control over decisions on existing and new infrastructure, cities can significantly contribute to climate mitigation and greenhouse gas reductions. This can be achieved, for example, by designing transport infrastructure that promotes the use of public transport and cycling over cars, by retrofitting existing building stock and, ultimately, by steering the way a city is designed, for instance, by using green and blue infrastructure, planning for dense, compact settlements and introducing policies to curb urban sprawl.

Furthermore, when it comes to adaptation, the impacts of urbanisation and climate change are converging in dangerous ways. Urban areas are particularly exposed to extreme heat stress and precipitation-related weather events: 70\% of cities are already dealing with the effects of climate change, and nearly all are at risk. Moreover, more than 90\% of all urban areas are coastal, putting the majority of cities on Earth at risk of flooding from rising sea levels and powerful storms. More than 136 megacities (port cities with populations of over one million) are at risk of flooding due to sea level rise if no further adaptation is undertaken (Hoegh-Guldberg, 2018). Since local governments are frequently in charge of energy supply, transport, mobility, land use planning, building regulations, and storm water and waste management, they can make a significant contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation on behalf of the majority of the world’s population.

II. The Evolution of local responses to climate change

Cities have been at the forefront of climate action for nearly three decades. Prior to the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, the first municipal governments in North America and Europe had already started establishing renewable energy targets, energy efficiency incentive programmes, green procurement standards and public transport policies that aimed to reduce local GHG emissions (Bulkeley, 2010). In the years since, cities’ responses
to climate change have evolved in scope and nature and spread to thousands of cities across all continents, demonstrating the potential of cities to advance climate mitigation and adaptation (Smeds and Acuto, 2018). Activities undertaken by municipalities themselves in response to climate change have evolved from the above-listed self-regulation activities, which initially primarily concerned assets and activities directly operated by local governments, to citywide climate protection strategies. A survey of 350 members of the transnational city network ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability has shown that cities worldwide are increasingly integrating climate mitigation activities into sectoral plans, long-range plans, sustainable development plans and energy plans, with 78% of cities reporting that they have established a specific mitigation target. Of those, 93% propose specific actions for reaching this target (Aylett, 2014).

Beyond strategies and policies, cities are the sites of multiple interventions aimed at either reducing GHG emissions or adapting urban areas to the impacts of climate change. In a study from 2013 Castán Broto and Bulkeley investigated over 600 examples of what they term urban climate change experiments – innovative, purposive and strategic interventions aimed at reducing GHG emissions or vulnerabilities to climate change impacts. The study sheds light on the diversity of the climate change actions tried and tested in urban areas, which are being implemented not only by local governments, but also by other public or private actors working alone or in partnerships, and which are found in cities around the world irrespective of their size and income.

Taken together, the reduction targets and pledged mitigation actions of individual cities amount to a considerable total emissions potential: to date the carbonn Climate Registry, a global reporting platform for cities and regions recorded pledges from 1065 local government entities representing 9% of the world's population, amounting to reductions of 5.6 GtCO$_{2e}$ by 2020 and 26.8 GtCO$_{2e}$ by 2050. For comparison, the UNEP Global Emissions Gap Report indicates that NDCs (national emissions reductions pledges with a time horizon of 2030) fall short of emissions reductions that would keep temperatures within the 1.5°C limit. The emissions gap will amount to 29–32 GtCO$_{2e}$ by 2030 (UNEP, 2018).

III. The emerging engagement of Cities in the international climate regime

Over the years, the importance of cities in terms of climate action has also been increasingly recognised in the international climate regime (see: ICLEI, 2015; Rambelli et al., 2017). The involvement of cities in the international process started as early as 1995, when 150 local authorities and municipal organisations from more than 50 countries presented a communiqué to the Conference of the Parties (COP) that included the recommendation to create a local authority subsidiary body to support local authorities’ climate mitigation efforts. As a result, the LGMA Constituency was established, alongside constituencies for businesses and environmental NGOs. The LGMA Constituency gathers together networks of local and subnational governments that are accredited to the UNFCCC as observers. All constituencies have a Focal Point that has a coordinating function and communicates with parties and the UNFCCC Secretariat. ICLEI has been the LGMA's Focal Point since its establishment.

4. Many cities have adopted emissions calculations standards using their own principles as no emissions standard regulations are available to cities at national level. Comparing emissions reductions and climate actions remains difficult: reasons include boundary setting, emissions factors calculations, and data collection. See: https://carbonn.org/

5. It should be noted that NDCs may include cities’ commitments. Currently, no standards exist that avoid double counting.
After the creation of the constituency, the visibility of cities within the international climate regime did not significantly increase until 2007, when the Bali Road Map, a two-year process to reach a binding agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen, was adopted by COP13. Since the road map did not include the local perspective, ICLEI decided to develop a “Local Government Climate Roadmap” (LGCR) as a parallel and accompanying process. The aim of this roadmap was threefold: 1) to have local and subnational governments recognised as “governmental stakeholders” of the global climate regime; 2) to engage them in setting the agenda and implementing the global climate regime through partnerships at all levels; and 3) to mobilise financial resources to increase municipal capacities for climate mitigation and adaptation.

Despite the unsuccessful COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the LGCR's objectives have mostly been accomplished in the 2010s. In the Cancun Agreements in 2010, local and subnational governments were officially recognised as governmental stakeholders and local and subnational leaders met with the COP16 Presidency for a first dialogue. Three years later, in 2013, local and subnational governments were highly visible in the official agenda thanks to a workshop on urbanisation organised within the new negotiation group for Paris, and the first ever “Cities Day”, announced and endorsed by the UNFCCC Secretariat and the COP Presidency. What is more, the COP19 presidency hosted a Cities and Sub-nationals Dialogue, which brought together mayors and ministers from across the globe. Last but not least, Friends of Cities, a partnership between the LGMA and the parties that pushes for the recognition, engagement and empowerment of local and subnational governments within the international climate regime, conducts thematic technical studies, and organises regular ministerial-mayoral dialogues, was also created in 2013. The pioneering members of Friends of Cities are Mexico, France, Poland, Indonesia, South Africa, Peru, Germany, the Netherlands and Senegal.

**IV. The role of networks for cities’ climate action**

When international negotiations stalled after the unsuccessful attempt to reach a binding agreement in Copenhagen in 2009, attention shifted to the climate action of non-state and subnational actors, including actions taken by the transnational city networks. These networks play an important role not only by representing the local perspective in the international climate regime, but also by facilitating cooperation and knowledge exchange between cities to promote the spreading out of city-level climate actions. The study by Castán Broto and Bulkeley (2013) demonstrates that urban climate change actions are more likely to occur in cities that are members of a transnational city network, and that membership is a stronger determinant for such intervention than other factors such as GDP per capita or population size. Transnational city networks dedicated to addressing climate change such as ICLEI, C40, Climate Alliance and the Global Covenant of Mayors bring cities together on a voluntary basis to foster increased mobility of effective policy interventions and are said to be “the primary vehicle through which cities participate in the global response to climate change” (Gordon and Johnson, 2018). The networks’ main efforts include the aforementioned political
advocacy and lobbying on behalf of member cities in the international climate regime but also facilitating the spreading out of urban climate actions e.g. through city-to-city collaboration and knowledge exchange. The networks facilitate such cooperation by providing points of access to finance, technology and expertise (Smeds and Acuto, 2018; Johnson, 2018; Gordon and Johnson, 2018). Last but not least, networks develop methodologies and establish platforms for estimating and reporting emissions reductions, establishing baselines, calculating carbon budgets and modelling reduction scenarios and trajectories (Gordon and Johnson, 2018). Through this kind of networked response, cities can act directly on climate change, irrespective of the action taken at the national level, to collectively achieve a visible, global response to climate change. In turn, the importance of cities’ collective efforts is being increasingly recognised at the intergovernmental level, as evidenced by the developments in the international climate regime in the run up to COP21 and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015.

V. Towards the Paris Agreement and beyond: the increasing visibility of cities in the international climate regime

2014 was a crucial year in terms of dialogues, as two mechanisms were created to explore the role and impact of local and subnational governments in the framework of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. The Forum on Cities and Sub-national Authorities and the Technical Expert Meeting on Urban Environment presented ground breaking examples of local action in diverse areas, including, among others, low-carbon transport, renewable energy, and climate change adaptation. What is more, the Lima–Paris Action Agenda as well as the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) were created, allowing companies, cities, regions and investors to register their commitments to climate action (Gordon and Johnson, 2018; ICLEI, 2015; Rambelli et al., 2017). The successful advocacy of the LGMA is also reflected in the COP decision 1/CP.21 to adopt the Paris Agreement. This decision “welcomes the efforts of non-Party stakeholders to address and respond to climate change, including those of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities” (UNFCCC, 2016: Section V, paragraph 134) and calls for stronger and more ambitious climate action by parties and non-party stakeholders, including cities. In fact, the COP decision explicitly calls on non-state actors to step up their efforts and make them public on the NAZCA platform. The mentioning of the platform in the COP decision provides legitimacy and links it loosely to the official negotiation process (Donat, 2017).

Although the Paris Agreement does not give non-state actors a seat at the table in the official negotiation process – no surprise in an intergovernmental forum, as cities are not subjects of international law – the agreement nevertheless establishes a number of new forums and further develops existing mechanisms to improve cooperation between states and non-state actors. These include: a) the Technical Examination Processes, an expert exchange that allows non-state actors to exchange ideas about their approaches and to feed their experience into the negotiations; b) High-Level Events which allow for exchange between...
non-state actors and ministers or heads of state; and c) the High-Level Climate Champions who organise the High-Level Events and provide a point of contact for non-state actors to indirectly influence the agenda of the Technical Examination Processes and High-Level Events. Through these forums and processes, cities can convey their knowledge and demands into the official processes such as the Global Stocktake, and expand their dialogue with the parties (Donat, 2017).

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are another important element introduced with the Paris Agreement. If countries address urban issues in their NDCs, this provides support for cities to take ambitious climate action. A comparative review of NDCs by UN Habitat shows that over two-thirds of the analysed NDCs (113 out of 164) contain relevant urban keywords in the context of national priorities and ambitions for reducing emissions and adapting to climate change. Moreover, 79 NDCs mentioned specific mitigation and/or adaptation measures within the urban context. Asian and African countries address urban issues most often, followed by those in Latin America and the Caribbean. In contrast, European and other developed countries hardly ever include urban climate challenges or measures in their NDCs. An important explanatory factor for the uptake of urban content seems to be the pace of urbanisation in a country (UN Habitat, 2017).

Since COP21, and as part of the Talanoa Dialogue, a process launched at COP23 in 2017 to help countries implement and enhance their NDCs, the LGMA has facilitated a series of Cities and Regions Talanoa Dialogues. These in-country climate consultations convene national, regional and local governments to take stock of, shape and strengthen NDCs. To date, they have taken place in 37 countries. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the key source of science and evidence informing the UNFCCC process, recommended stronger integration of impacts of climate change on cities and their unique adaptation and mitigation opportunities in its main report. The panel also announced that it will produce a special report on climate change and cities (IPCC, 2016). In 2018, the body organised a scientific conference on climate change in cities, partly to stimulate scientific reports and peer reviewed publications on the subject. On the other hand, local governments are hardly mentioned in the text of the “Katowice Rulebook”, the 2018 document which establishes the detailed guidelines for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

VI. Limits to city-driven climate action

Without ambitious national policies and progress in the international climate regime, there are limits to the extent to which city- and city network-driven climate action can address the global problem of climate change. First of all, this is simply because there are limits to the type of climate actions cities can govern. Many matters, like trade policies, fuel subsidies and even suburban transport services are beyond cities’ jurisdictions. Moreover, most of the emissions reductions pledged and delivered by cities focus on emissions that occur within city boundaries with limited consideration of emissions associated with consumption of goods produced beyond those boundaries (Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). There are also limited opportunities for cities to implement larger scale negative emissions schemes in the form of bio-sequestration or carbon capture and

6. https://citiesipcc.org/
storage. Moreover, the ability of cities to undertake climate mitigation and adaptation activities and engage in transnational city networks is limited to cities with the capacity and resources to do so – many poor and marginal cities are excluded (Gordon and Johnson, 2018).

More importantly, while cities and city networks focus on delivering mitigation and adaptation on the ground and strive for greater visibility in the international climate regime, the extent to which they question or attempt to redefine the overarching governance framework is limited. As argued by Johnson (2018), in their response to climate change cities operate within the frameworks and respond to the norms and practices set out by national governments and intergovernmental institutions. The city networks that aim to be the voice of cities in the international climate regime receive funding and intellectual contributions from international donors, multinational corporations and national governments, which are likely to shape their objectives and priorities. Survey data gathered among side-event participants in 2011 and 2012 regarding the roles performed by local government and municipal authorities in climate governance shows that the LGMAs’ strongest side has always been taking adaptation and mitigation actions, while their influence on policymakers and the agenda is limited, according to other stakeholders (Nasiritousi et al., 2014). Even at the local level, most climate actions are technical interventions. A 2018 study by Castán Broto et al. analysed 400 urban sustainability initiatives (over 20% of which addressed either energy or climate change and air pollution) looking for evidence of initiatives possessing qualities that increase the capacity of urban systems to attain deep transformation. The study found that actions designed to rethink modes of governance and promote urban transformative capacity are rare.

Conclusion

The governing of climate change is not only confined to arenas of international negotiation or national policymaking; it is also a critical urban issue. As major CO₂ emitters, but also due to their vulnerability, many cities aspire to raise the ambition of national and international climate governance through leading by example and delivering significant and visible action on the ground. The number of city-focused measuring and reporting initiatives (such as carbonn Cities Climate Registry, the Carbon Disclosure Project and the Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventories) increasingly show the sheer volume and impact of actions taken at city level.

Over the years, formal, top-down governance at intergovernmental and national level has proven insufficient to address a problem as complex as climate change. The reality of climate change governance today is instead polycentric. Despite this, formal recognition of the important role of cities (and other non-state actors) in international climate agreements is only possible to a limited extent, as cities are not subjects of international law and therefore do not have a direct say in the official negotiations. This is far from a unique characteristic of the international climate regime, and is a general issue at international level. Hence, city networks such as United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) advocate for a substantial reform of the UN system to give cities a more prominent, formal role in the international governance system.
Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that the participation of cities in the international climate regime goes beyond the usual role of stakeholders in similar intergovernmental processes with ministerial-mayoral dialogues, visibility on the official agenda, discussions with the COP Presidency and recognition as governmental stakeholders in the Cancun Agreements in 2010. In fact, several forums were created or strengthened in the run up to Paris as well as at COP21 to allow for better exchange between state and city representatives. While these platforms and forums are not a formal part of the negotiation process, they are closely linked to the negotiations, thus offering increasing visibility, legitimacy and motivation for the climate protection efforts of city actors. More recently, the IPCC has also emphasised actions undertaken by cities in its work.

In conclusion, global climate institutions and organisations can learn from and are being influenced by the experiences and insights gained at city level. The increased efforts of cities over the years are slowly being accommodated by the international climate regime. Hence, the activities of cities and city networks have broadened what constitutes the international climate regime.

References


UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC). “Adoption of the Paris Agreement” Decision 1/CP.21, 2016 (online) [Accessed on 15 February 2019] https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2
In 2014 a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned that the impacts of climate change, such as heat waves, floods, storm surge, and health epidemics adversely impact the poor and disadvantaged, particularly in urban areas (Revi et al., 2014). Four years later, in its report highlighting the importance of limiting temperature rises by 2100 to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (rather than the previous target of 2°C), the IPCC stated that “Climate change impacts and responses are closely linked to sustainable development which balances social well-being, economic prosperity and environmental protection. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals [SDGs] provide an established framework for assessing the links between global warming of 1.5°C or 2°C and development goals that include poverty eradication, reducing inequalities, and climate action” (IPCC, 2018: 20). It warned that any adaptation and mitigation efforts must work in tandem with the SDGs (IPCC, 2018: 21). Questions of ethics and equity need to be considered when addressing both impacts and mitigation efforts in order to highlight uneven distribution of possible adverse effects on disadvantaged sections of societies.

The observations of the IPCC’s Global Warming of 1.5°C report are particularly important for developing countries with significant SDG backlogs. In these countries, given the current neoliberal setting, the elite capture of policymaking and politics means mitigation efforts have the potential to cause further impoverishment, massive exclusions through both state interventions and market operations, and wide, persistent and growing inequalities. Joseph Stiglitz (2012) argues that inequality paves the way for the economically and politically powerful groups in society to capture or monopolise natural and financial resources. In the Indian context, for example, the car-owning lobby is powerful and makes a lot of noise when the right of the way for its private vehicles is reduced because of provisions for public transport or pedestrians. The link between inequality and elite capture of politics in the context of urban India will be further explored below.
India's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Agreement include: reducing the national greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity of its GDP by 33% to 35% below 2005 levels by 2030; 40% of the power capacity to be based on non-fossil fuel sources (in particular solar power); and creating additional carbon sinks of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide ($\text{CO}_2$) equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030. The localisation of these commitments in cities requires a new urban policy and programme perspective, which, for example, would include the following efforts: a shift to electric mobility; increasing public and non-motorised transport and making land available for it; energy-efficient buildings; releasing land in cities and their immediate surroundings for open and green spaces and plantations for carbon sequestration; preservation of water bodies; land allocations for public transport; managing urban waste; and paying a carbon tax for energy conservation, among others.

The question is how the SDGs link with urban development agendas in Indian cities in the context of the policies and actions related to climate change and whether these are synergistic or conflicting. Indian cities, like those of other emerging economies, are undergoing multiple transitions in demography, income, governance, physical expansion and infrastructure while continuing to maintain and sometimes even expand existing social, income and gender inequalities. Amidst these inequities, development deficits in housing, potable water, sanitation, infrastructure for economic growth, employment and a clean environment have to be solved. Meeting the SDGs is therefore important. However, mitigation efforts related to climate change are likely to conflict with many SDGs unless synergistic pathways are deliberately chosen.

This chapter conceptualises these links in the context of current SDG achievements in urban India. The links between the SDGs and the climate change mitigation efforts required will be explored by looking at the synergies or trade-offs between the two sets of agendas. The next section presents the status of the SDGs in urban India. The second section discusses the links between the SDGs and climate change mitigation efforts in urban areas in India. Due to the scarce empirical evidence available, this discussion is conceptual. The last section examines the links between the urban agendas of large countries such as India and the global climate and sustainable development agendas, suggesting these relationships should work from the bottom up. The context of implementation is different in each city. For the Indian case, a "one-size-fits-all" approach to the implementation of global agendas would not work. In the recent past, urban development agendas for each city have been left to the state governments – the middle tier of administration in India – in consultation with municipal governments. Together, they apply for financial assistance from the national government, rather than the national government determining local actions. The importance of creating city-level actions for mitigation and resilience in moving forward was recently stressed by the Global Research and Action Agenda on Cities and Climate Change Science that was the result of the IPCC Cities and Climate Change Science Conference held in Edmonton, Canada in March 2018. By examining ongoing climate change mitigation efforts in urban India, this chapter illustrates the need to further investigate

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1. Accessed on January 22nd 2019 at: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/India%20First/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNFCCC.pdf
the links between city, national and global policies and action. With the country being on the cusp of rapid urbanisation and economic growth, cities are required to progress on inclusive low-carbon pathways to meet both the SDGs and NDCs. With India representing 16% of the global population, it will have to play a key role in meeting global challenges.

I. The SDGs in urban India

At the macro level, India’s economy has registered the fastest economic growth rates in recent years, but it remains 130th out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2018: 25). The country therefore has large development deficits that could be solved by achieving the SDGs’ targets. Meeting the SDGs is also important because India is emerging as a highly unequal country (Oxfam, 2019; Himanshu, 2018). Its Gini Coefficient for income is 0.51 (Table 1), while that for wealth is 0.83, and these values are rising (Himanshu, 2018: 17). In urban areas, Mahadevia and Sarkar (2012) show that consumption inequalities have increased over time. Hence, meeting the SDGs and their targets in India is going to be tough unless there is a drastic shift in government policies and investments in the areas of human well-being and the urban sector.

In this section we assess the achievements with regard to the SDGs in urban India. In the 2011 census, 31.7% (377 million) of the national population lived in urban areas (Census, 2011). This is a low percentage and it is expected that the country will experience a high rate of urbanisation in the coming decades (MGI, 2010). The nation will therefore have to simultaneously address the challenges of urbanisation – providing housing and other services to incoming migrants, many of whom will be in the low income category due to continuing rural distress (Himanshu, 2016) – and having 30.9% of the population living below the poverty line (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2014: 66). Climate change impacts such as declining water availability and increased frequency of droughts in rural areas is likely to further aggravate distress migration to cities as a disaster coping strategy (Mallya et al., 2016). This rural-to-urban migration would further development deficits in urban areas. Urban areas must therefore also focus on the SDG targets.

The current achievements with regards to the SDGs indicate lags on some of the individual goals. Slightly more than a quarter (26.4%) of the urban population was below the official poverty line, defined as deficit in consumption of per capita 2100 kcal per day in 2011–12 (see Table 1 which gives achievements of indicators for select SDGs). The infant mortality rate (IMR) is high at 29 per 1,000 live births in 2015–16; about 17% of children (aged 6–23 months) that were not breastfeeding did not have an adequate diet; 29% of children under 5 were underweight; the sex ratio at birth was adverse (899 females per 1,000 males); half the women did not continue schooling beyond 10 years old; and 30% of the population did not have access to sanitation in urban areas (Table 1). Two-thirds of workers in urban areas were informally employed. Nearly a quarter of urban households (18.8 million) face housing shortages and 16.9% (13.4 million) live in slums (Table 1).
Table 1: Achievements related to specific SDGs in urban India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDG</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Achievement</th>
<th>Numbers in millions*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Poverty reduction</td>
<td>Poverty (% below Poverty Line) (2011–12)*</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>102.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Health</td>
<td>Health: infant mortality rate (IMR) (per 1,000 live births)**</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% children aged 6–23 months (non-breastfeeding) getting adequate diet**</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% children under 5 years underweight**</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – Gender equality</td>
<td>Sex ratio at birth for children born in the last five years (females per 1,000 males)**</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women who are literate (%)</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women with 10 or more years of schooling (%)**</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – Clean water &amp; sanitation</td>
<td>Households with clean drinking water source (%)**</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Households with access to improved sanitation facility (%)**</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 – Affordable &amp; clean energy</td>
<td>Households using clean energy for cooking (%)**</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 – Decent work</td>
<td>% Workers in informal employment ***</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – Reduced inequality</td>
<td>Inequality (Gini Coefficient) (2013) ****</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – Sustainable cities &amp; communities</td>
<td>Households facing housing shortage (%) (2012)</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Households living in slums (%) (2010)*</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data of achievements for each of the goals is not available for urban India
* Calculated by author.
** As per Rangarajan Committee’s methodology (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2014: 66).
**** Calculated by the author based on NSSO (2012).
***** International Monetary Fund report.*
@ MoHUPA (2012).

Of direct relevance to climate change and the SDGs is the urban transport sector. As well as greenhouse gases the urban transport sector emits other air pollutants that have the immediate impact of creating local air pollution. Currently, Indian cities have large public transport deficits, leading to high use of private motorised transport, which causes severe congestion on the roads, thus increasing travel time to almost double that expected in some cities (Juyal et al., 2018). At the same time, high urban inequality means that a section of the urban population is extremely dependent on walking and cycling, apart from in the four Indian cities with a developed metro network: Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai (Dhar et al., 2016). On the one hand, there is a need to increase access to public transport, especially to enable women to access work and other services (for example education and health) (Mahadevia, 2015). This would have a positive impact on a few SDGs such as those concerning decent work, education, health, gender equality and poverty, and inequality reduction. On the other
hand, if public transit is fuelled by fossil fuels this will lead to an increase in greenhouse gases. What is more, with an increase in income levels, the failure to improve public transport will inevitably lead to a transition to private motorised transport and increased energy demand and CO₂ emissions (Shukla et al., 2015). Currently, in the World Health Organization’s air quality database, 6 ten Indian cities figure among the most polluted 25 for PM₁₀ and 13 for PM₂.₅. Pollution levels are very high in Indian cities that have low levels of mobility, in particular that of women (Mahadevia, 2015). Improvement on some of the SDGs could impact climate change as well as local air quality, and as a result other SDGs such as health and climate.

II. Links between climate change mitigation efforts and the SDGs in cities

The SDGs are part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which expands on the previously accepted definition of sustainable development as “meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of the future generation” given by the Brundland Commission (WCED, 1987). The SDGs specifically target the agendas of poverty and hunger alleviation, promoting decent life for people and their overall well-being. They particularly address gender equality issues across all development goals, while meeting the climate change and environmental sustainability goals through global partnerships. The 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, in which UN member states declared their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to meeting the climate change goals, were both agreed upon in 2015. The IPCC’s Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018) emphasised that climate change goals and the SDGs need to be approached jointly, and flagged up the synergies and trade-offs between the two agendas. Given that the INDCs issued after the Paris Agreement would not limit global warming to 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018: 20), stronger actions would be required on the mitigation front, which could in turn have an adverse impact on the SDGs. However, as the report suggests, the introduction of sensitive public policy and planning can potentially assist with managing conflicts and trade-offs between the two agendas and contribute to creating synergies between them.

Potential conflicts between climate mitigation actions and the SDGs are aggravated in conditions of high inequality, which facilitates policy capture by elites. For example, when the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS) was implemented in the Indian city of Ahmedabad, the road space available for private motorised vehicles was not greatly affected. Nevertheless, it was compensated for by evicting vendors operating on the sides of streets and narrowing footpaths, causing great inconvenience to pedestrians. For the vendors, streets are their livelihood spaces and their displacement leads to a decline in their incomes and thus increased poverty and inequality. The idea of a BRTS is to make people shift from private to public transport by making the former more inconvenient (i.e. taking away road space for private vehicles leads to more congestion). However, in Indian cities, current policy on road space allocation tilts heavily in favour of private vehicles, displacing livelihood activities such as vending and reducing the space for pedestrians and cyclists. In most cities in India, in a conflict between private vehicle users’ need for road space and those of vendors, pedestrians and cyclists, the private vehicle owners are given priority. This elite capture of policymak-

Conflicts between climate mitigation actions and the SDGs are aggravated in conditions of high inequality.

ing fundamentally undermines the attainment of the SDGs on climate change, decent employment and reduced inequality, as well as others.

Various conflicts between the two agendas also arise because both require public land. The urban poor being unable to afford housing at market prices, means public land must be allocated to their housing. If not, housing poverty may spill over into overall poverty, hunger and generally falling living standards. SDGs 1, 5 and 11 would not be met. But the solutions to mitigating the effects of climate change on life in Indian cities also require public land to be allocated to them. For example: (i) increased heat episodes due to average temperature rises lead to higher electricity consumption by cooling devices. Locally, temperatures experienced can be reduced by extending open and green spaces, which can then help lower energy consumption in buildings. (ii) Waste management, which requires facilities to be built, reduces the emissions of some greenhouse gases such as methane. (iii) Public and non-motorised transport can reduce emissions from transport. And (iv) water conservation is required for dual purposes – adaptation to water shortages and reducing urban heat island formation, which in turn reduces energy demand in buildings. But, as mentioned, all these activities would require public land, which may lead to fewer being available for purposes such as housing for the urban poor.

Para-transit is another obvious case in point. Auto-rickshaws and their variants contribute to air pollution because of their poor maintenance and poor-quality fuel. This has led them to be banned from cities or forced to use relatively cleaner technologies such as compressed natural gas (CNG) or even batteries. Improved public transport can lead to lower demand for such para-transit. But if they are not supported, the decline in driver incomes could leave them without a livelihood, adversely affecting SDG 8 on decent employment. The 2018 IPCC report recognises this: “Mitigation options deployed in each sector can be associated with potential positive effects (synergies) or negative effects (trade-offs) with the … SDGs” (IPCC, 2018: 22). Meeting the NDCs in developing country contexts needs to be well-managed in terms of sustainable development benefits or else these actions can lead to mal-development.

At the same time, temperature rises beyond 1.5°C are likely to have adverse impacts on the SDGs (IPCC, 2018: 20). In this chapter we therefore argue for strong mitigation efforts, keeping in mind the possibilities for synergistic actions and also the need for trade-offs in situations of possible conflicts (between mitigation and mitigation, mitigation and SDGs, and SDG and SDG). Table 2 maps synergies and trade-offs between mitigation efforts and the SDGs in Indian cities and identifies areas for future empirical research. These links are mediated by enabling conditions such as coordination between different levels of governance, institutional capacity, policy instruments, technological innovation, transfer and mobilisation of finance and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles (IPCC, 2018: 21). Take the example of the transition from para-transit vehicles to clean fuel: it would require a financing policy and finance would need to be made available. Apportioning land for street vendors when public transit is being planned requires land-use policy and street-design guidelines. Popularising electric vehicles requires fiscal policies and motor vehicle legislation at all levels of governance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDG</th>
<th>Synergies with mitigation efforts in cities</th>
<th>Trade-offs with mitigation efforts in cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>Employment through afforestation</td>
<td>Increased energy consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban agriculture</td>
<td>Increase in all consumption with indirect impacts on all resource use</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment through waste management</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pollution reduction measures</td>
<td>Shift of low-income households from informal to formal housing, construction of health infrastructure leading to increase in energy consumption in building sector (embodied and through electricity consumption)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased public transport that uses clean fuel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deployment of clean energy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increased walking and cycling</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mixed land uses leading to higher accessibility to education</td>
<td>Construction of education infrastructure, leading to increase in energy consumption in building sector (embodied and through electricity consumption)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Improvement in public transport increases women’s mobility and hence improves employment and empowerment</td>
<td>Women are under-consuming energy (directly as well as indirectly due to, for example, not making trips) and meeting SDGs for women would lead to increased consumption</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Improved health due to pollution controls would lead to less unpaid time for care activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mixed land use makes multi-tasking easier for women</td>
<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Reduces healthcare expenditure, which can then be devoted to use of cleaner technologies</td>
<td>Infrastructure construction can interfere with informal settlements</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Eases women’s household and care giving work</td>
<td>Increases energy consumption</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enables low-income households to take up household work, their children to study and to help cope with urban heat island impacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Increases households’ ability to invest in clean technologies</td>
<td>Increases consumption</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increases trips to work and for other purposes</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Equitable urban planning efforts that are synergistic with mitigation</td>
<td>Increased consumption of resources</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>All mitigation efforts lead to environmental sustainability</td>
<td>Evictions from informal settlements in order to build public transport, urban green spaces, biodiversity parks, solar parks, water recharging systems, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If these efforts are equitable, they can help reduce conflicts and violence</td>
<td>Evictions can lead to immiseration, conflicts and violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Increased biodiversity can provide opportunities for generating green employment</td>
<td>Land devoted to biodiversity conservation reduces land available for human habitat, mainly housing, which in turn leads to increased land prices and hence the informalisation of housing and workplaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Public participation in decision-making</td>
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Source: author.
An example of how the two agendas can be effectively linked in the Indian context is provided in the Indian Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) report (Shukla et al., 2015). The report develops two scenarios: a “conventional” 1.5°C scenario, and a second “sustainable” scenario which takes an integrated approach to social, economic and environmental goals through interventions in, for example, investments in health, education and technology innovation, improving governance and promoting sustainable consumption behaviour (Shukla et al., 2015). In both scenarios, Indian energy consumption and hence GHG emissions are expected to rise by 2030. In both scenarios the report proposes a more equitable model of urbanisation which advocates for small and medium-sized towns, an even distribution of the urban population, the creation of new low-carbon infrastructures (particularly in the mobility sector), and the improvement of green infrastructure.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have examined climate mitigation activities in cities in the context of sustainable development pathways, identifying upfront the possibilities for conflicts so as to be able to formulate possibilities for policymakers to enhance synergies. With India being on a high economic and urbanisation growth trajectory, the global pressures on the country to meet the climate mitigation agenda and in particular the 1.5°C target are strong. However, urban India has severe deficits with regards to poverty, health, housing, employment and other indicators of the SDGs while remaining at low levels of urbanisation. As India’s urbanisation progresses, the government will be required to address mitigation of greenhouse gases (the government ratified the Paris Agreement in 2015). This chapter sought to remind us that while attempting to meet its Paris Agreement commitments, India should not compromise on the SDGs. The world has now set itself the target of 1.5°C temperature reduction, which requires more ambitious mitigation efforts. In such a situation, the low carbon urbanisation pathway should simultaneously address the SDGs. Addressing the two agendas simultaneously requires an understanding of their links – synergistic or otherwise – and of how the enabling conditions discussed above could mediate to create synergies or address potential conflicts.

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CITIES AT THE CENTER OF GLOBAL MOBILITY

• CITIES SHAPING MIGRATION POLICY
  Juliana Kerr

• ITALIAN CITIES ON THE FRONT LINE: MANAGING MIGRATION BETWEEN 2013 AND 2018
  Andrea Tobia Zevi
Cities have long been on the frontlines of migration. When immigrants settle in cities, a broad range of urban institutions play a role in their integration. Migrants rent or buy homes, join the labour force or open new businesses, enrol in schools and visit cultural sites, engage with places of worship, pay taxes and use services, and take part in other aspects of daily urban life. Cities have often been the gateways of diversity, opportunity and tolerance. In fact, a wave of policies and programmes have been developed in recent years in cities across the United States to further facilitate and promote migrant integration.

Research and public debate on the intersection of migrants and cities are not necessarily new. What is new, however, is how city leaders are emerging as actors in shaping migration policies beyond their jurisdictions. No longer focused solely on local integration initiatives, cities are now trying to effect change at the national and international levels. Through advocacy, collective action, city diplomacy and international platforms, cities are demonstrating they have mechanisms to exert influence on this issue.

To be sure, there are limitations and concerns, but perhaps also untapped possibilities and opportunities. The parallel realities of urbanisation and increased migration flows of the global era will require cities to play a different role from the past. Furthermore, as city leaders step up as actors on other global issues, such as climate action, safety and security, and inclusion, it should be no surprise that they are engaging on migration as well. Whether cities become partners in shaping sensible policies or adversaries of outdated national laws will depend on how other policymakers understand and respond to the context and implications of this trend.

This chapter highlights existing research on the impact of immigration in cities to understand why they are committed to the migration agenda. It also discusses the series of recent events that have catalysed the momentum at this time and explores the many ways in which cities are in fact beginning to influence migration policies. The
Cities across the US have made investments to attract and integrate immigrants.

chapter attempts to recognise the areas where cities are legally limited and the concerns stakeholders may have about giving cities too much autonomy. It concludes by identifying a few areas where cities may play a bigger role in the future to ensure that migration policies respond to their realities and serve their needs.

In different cities around the world these trends are playing out in distinct ways. Each country has its own laws and governance structures that permit or limit the autonomy of cities. And what happens in one context cannot necessarily be translated into another. Yet, geographical diversity and variation in the root causes of migration notwithstanding, there are mayors from all regions of the world who want not only to be held accountable for the implementation of migration policies, but also seek to contribute their expertise to shaping them. This chapter focuses on examples drawn from the United States.

I. Cities recognise the realities and impact of migration

It is first important to understand why many cities across the United States are generally supportive of immigration. A 2017 report on migration and cities by the World Economic Forum stated that over 90% of the immigrants in the United States live in urban areas (World Economic Forum, 2017: 26). While urban areas are generally defined by density rather than population size, cities large and small across the country have made investments in their communities to attract and integrate immigrants. They not only acknowledge that migration is an unavoidable 21st century reality of globalisation, they also recognise the benefits immigrants bring with them.

In many communities across the United States, immigration is the demographic lifeline for keeping their cities on the map. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs looked at US Census data on population shifts in over 40 metropolitan areas of the 12-state Midwest region, and found that the populations had risen only 7% from 2000 to 2015 compared to 14% for the nation as a whole (Paral, 2017: 1). Immigrants helped offset the declines of the native-born population, and in some metro areas, including Chicago, immigration was responsible for most of the population growth.

Cities bear witness to the entrepreneurial spirit and economic contributions of immigrant communities. The Kauffman Foundation found that immigrants in the US were twice as likely to start businesses as the native-born population and that over 25% of new entrepreneurs in 2014 were foreign-born (Kauffman Foundation, 2015: 2). New York City’s “State of Our Immigrant City” report says that immigrants own 52% of the city’s businesses, comprise 45% of its workforce, and contribute about 22% of the city’s total gross domestic product (NYC Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs, 2018: 6, 9). The main street that runs through the heart of Little Village, Chicago’s Mexican community, is said to be the second-highest-grossing commercial corridor in the city after the Magnificent Mile (Sweeney, 2015). These
trends are of particular importance in smaller cities where main street storefronts close and businesses leave, taking the jobs with them. Immigrants have helped inject energy and dynamism back into numerous cities and communities across the country.

Mayors also recognise the intangible assets immigrants bring to their cities and neighbourhoods. It is difficult to quantify the impact of being surrounded by dozens of spoken languages, by people from all corners of the world, and by the cultural influences and sensibilities they bring with them. Religions, foods, traditions and customs can slowly break down deep-rooted stereotypes, promote tolerance, and help create a globally minded citizenry.

Indeed, not all individuals and communities across the country openly embrace immigration. Many argue that the short-term social costs, the language barriers, the cultural differences, and the fear of job displacements are not worth the trade-offs. Others are so concerned with maintaining the rule of law that they fail to recognise that today's laws are not meeting today's realities. They insist that immigrants wait in lines that do not exist, apply for visas that have not been created, and legalise their statuses when no path is available to do so.

This is where mayors and city leaders have been so instrumental. They have spearheaded a number of policies and initiatives at the local level to minimise the challenges associated with immigration and to maximise the benefits.

New York City has had an office for immigrant affairs since 1984, but since 2008, over 20 other cities—from Atlanta to Seattle—have opened similar ones (Pastor and Rhonda, 2015: 42). These agencies can support a variety of activities. They are champions of city engagement with the diaspora, representing the city at cultural festivals and events. They help immigrants navigate legitimate legal and financial institutions, direct them to language courses, and promote civic engagement and information about naturalisation. They can also assist in coordinating other city departments, building capacity and working with the police to understand the changing demographics in the city.

The momentum to develop local policies for attracting and integrating immigrants has swept across the nation. Welcoming America, for example, was founded in 2009 to help develop a framework for what it means to be a “welcoming community”, a city or county committed to fostering inclusion and reducing barriers for newcomers of all backgrounds. As their website states, “In a 21st century world, the strongest communities will be ones where all people can take part in economic, civic, and social life.” With over 90 local government units signed on to the network, Welcoming America recently launched a certification programme for places that meet the rigorous requirements of their Welcoming Standard. In collaboration with the National Partnership for New Americans, a Gateways for Growth fund was also created to help cities develop internal capacity, build offices, and navigate the integration landscape. Cities across the country are helping ensure that the “American dream” remains possible.

1. https://www.welcomingamerica.org/
II. Current laws and narratives are not serving cities’ needs and priorities

While many US cities are seeking to maximise the benefits of immigration through integration policies within their jurisdictions, many national laws – laws created in another era and without input from cities – hinder their abilities to be truly effective.

Cities, for example, rely heavily on migrants of all skill levels to help keep their economy and businesses thriving. Hospitals, hotels, restaurants and construction companies are some of the employers in urban areas that rely on intensive immigrant labour and yet regularly face outdated legal challenges. A low-skilled visa for year-round employment does not exist to support some of these industries. The low-skilled visa in the United States was designed for seasonal agriculture support rather than hospitality or healthcare.

High-skilled visas need to be sponsored by companies and are costly processes, made additionally complicated by quotas from an era before technology, globalisation, and the internet dramatically changed how people live and work. The entrepreneurial system of both start-ups and new small businesses – trends essential to cities and incubator hubs – is not supported by current national laws. A visa exists for investors with significant personal assets who can guarantee at least ten permanent full-time jobs for qualified US workers, but this visa does not help the ambitious restaurateur from Mexico, the tech-savvy entrepreneur from India, or the non-profit founder from France.

Cities are also at the centre of the debate around undocumented immigrants. The United States has about 10.7 million undocumented immigrants, the majority of which, according to the Pew Research Center, live in only 20 metropolitan areas of the country (Passel and Cohn, 2019). Pew estimates that metropolitan areas including New York, Los Angeles and Houston are home to 61% of the nation’s undocumented population, compared to 37% of the total US population. City leaders view them as members of their communities – residents, neighbours, workers, taxpayers – and yet have no authority to help adjust their status. In addition, cities are increasingly being asked to enforce national immigration laws and identify undocumented immigrants for deportation.

What is more, cities must provide all the support systems immigrants do not receive from the national level. Schools need to expand classrooms, hire new teachers and offer classes for English language learners. Local government materials are increasingly being translated into other languages. From legal services to access to healthcare, from housing to citizenship programmes, cities are held accountable for ensuring community cohesion and financial stability, and blamed when it doesn’t work.

Across a number of dimensions, cities have to deal with the implications of immigration but are not in a position to shape immigration policies. In the meantime, the country not only fails to update laws to address the 21st century realities of the global economy, but in recent years, it has enacted policies that further complicate and counter urban prior-
cities. The travel ban targeting Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen separated families in Chicago, Minneapolis and Seattle, as well as other cities. The termination of Temporary Protected Status for over 300,000 people from El Salvador, Honduras and Haiti will require long-term residents of cities to leave their homes, families and jobs. The demand on cities to enforce national immigration laws and detain undocumented immigrants not only breaks down important levels of trust in communities but burdens municipal officers with duties beyond their actual mandates.

Every day cities are on the frontlines of the realities of immigration and yet have not been given a voice, a mechanism or a vote to influence national-level policies. Cities are beginning to question whether the hierarchy of the past need define the governance framework of the future.

III. Cities are emerging as actors shaping migration policies

Mayors are increasingly frustrated with the lack of action at the national level and the paralysis it creates for them in cities. In the United States in particular, the current narrative has created a culture of fear and distrust that is tearing communities apart. As the World Economic Forum pointed out, “Although the key role of cities as first responders to migration is uncontested, they are in general far from adequately involved in national and international migration decisions” (World Economic Forum, 2017: 10).

In turn, cities are stepping up and emerging as new actors on migration policy. Where they used to focus on economic development and integration, they now find themselves engaging on national and international platforms to defend their interests and needs. They are using their voices and positions of influence to change the narrative. Through collective action, they are simultaneously enacting policies at the local level that are resulting in nationwide momentum. They are actively forging links across borders and engaging in city diplomacy. And they are demanding a seat at the international table in discussions about global migration and refugee policy.

The ability of mayors and cities to change the narrative around immigrants cannot be underestimated. When at the national level, immigrants are being portrayed as criminals, rapists, drug dealers and job takers, cities have been vital in countering the negative rhetoric. As Misha Glenny writes, “Plural cities will play a critical role in determining whether humanity survives this century or not” (Glenny, 2017). Mayors have been advocates not just for diversity, but for inclusion. Through networks such as Cities for Action, a coalition of over 175 US mayors and county executives, they have issued press statements of concern about family separations at the border, the termination of Temporary Protected Status, travel bans, and asylum seekers being turned away. They cite research and data that show that immigration does not in fact increase crime (Flagg, 2018). Cities are using their platforms and megaphones to change hearts and minds across the country.

Cities are also influencing policy through collective action. While limited to implementing policies within their jurisdictions, when mayors do so
collectively and simultaneously across the country, the impact is quite significant. Most notable perhaps, is the number of cities in the United States that have adopted some version of a sanctuary city ordinance that reaffirms a city’s responsibility to enforce laws within its jurisdiction and not those of the national government. The US Department of Justice sided with the City of Chicago in a 2018 lawsuit against the federal government, which had threatened to withhold grants from Chicago because of its sanctuary policies. The results of this legal dispute made clear that the separation of powers in the United States is essential to democracy and that cities cannot be commandeered by the national government to enforce national laws (Byrne, 2018).

Other actions taken by cities include closing detention centres, issuing municipal identification cards, and giving scholarships to qualifying undocumented immigrants to access community colleges. Some cities, such as Washington, DC, are providing free legal services or financial support for immigrants to offset the cost of citizenship (Delgadillo, 2019). When the nation’s largest cities pursue similar policies at the same time, reaching and representing large populations, one begins to wonder to what extent the national policies matter.

Cross-border collaboration and city diplomacy is another important example of cities influencing policies beyond their jurisdictions. In 2017, shortly after President Trump was elected on an anti-immigrant platform, the mayors of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Juarez conducted a diplomatic tour of major cities in the United States with large Mexican immigrant populations. Meeting with mayors, they wanted to ensure respect and protection for their diaspora despite the national narrative. Healthcare and human rights were at the top of the agenda during these discussions (Channick, 2017). Parallel conversations are taking place regularly across borders, such as between Tijuana and San Diego, two cities working together on a blueprint for their shared metropolitan area (Selee, 2018).

Lastly, just as some mayors have been driving the global agenda on climate action, mayors are beginning to organise globally around migration. In December 2017, a dozen cities from the United States joined over 130 cities worldwide in signing a historic petition requesting a seat at the table as the United Nations met to negotiate the Global Compact for Migration (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2017). When President Donald Trump announced he was withdrawing the United States from the compact, the cities quickly mobilised. Many of the goals listed in the compact rely on cities to successfully implement the strategies, such as collecting and reporting data, and ensuring inclusion and safety. If they are to be held accountable, cities feel they should have a formal role in developing these agendas and setting expectations in the first place.

The global momentum continued throughout 2018. Mayors voted on migration policies at the Global Parliament of Mayors summit in Bristol where the Bristol Declaration was passed (Global Parliament of Mayors, 2018). They launched a new Mayors Migration Council in Marrakesh in December (Biron, 2018), and participated in the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ 11th Dialogue on Protection Challenges around the theme of “Cities of Light” (Gaynor, 2018). These initiatives pave the way for what will happen in the years to come.
IV. Certain limitations and concerns must be recognised

The emergence of cities as actors shaping migration policies beyond their traditional jurisdictions certainly raises many questions and concerns. Immigration is determined at the national level: cities cannot change visa laws, grant citizenship to undocumented immigrants, decide to whom they want to grant asylum, or prevent Immigration and Customs Enforcement from operating in their cities. And with good reason. Once within the country’s borders, people can move freely from city to city. It is therefore logical that ensuring overall national security, conducting background checks against intelligence databases, and overseeing the nationwide labour force cannot all be devolved to hundreds of municipalities.

It is also important to note that the authority cities possess not only differs from country to country, but even within the United States, from state to state. Some cities have more autonomy, or in some cases, their priorities are aligned with leaders at state level. The nature of immigration also differs. Long-term migrants, undocumented immigrants, asylum seekers and resettled refugees all come with a different set of demands. Understanding what works, when it works, and why it works is crucial when offering new policy recommendations.

Many cities have expressed concern that immigrants and refugees may be misled about how safe and protected they are within the city’s limits. Vocal welcoming proclamations and informal competitions to be “the most immigrant friendly city in the country” could leave immigrants who are unfamiliar with the intricacies of US immigration policy with a false sense of optimism about their future.

There are many other concerns too. Some wonder about the extent to which a city’s experience with migrant integration legitimises their ability to influence policies at the national or international levels. Others have asked whether the situation in the United States is politically motivated, with Democratic mayors trying to counterbalance a Republican president. Questions arise about a reverse scenario: what if mayors tried to reduce immigration while a country was opening its doors? Would the support for cities to shape migration policies receive the same response? These concerns and more will need to be addressed as cities continue to emerge as migration policy actors.

V. Systems could evolve to include cities in decision-making

Governments and systems have evolved over time to meet the realities of the day. When it comes to migration policy, it is not impossible to conceive of a new era in which cities are helping shape the policies that affect them. The following are a few examples of areas where cities could potentially garner more influence:

• Employment visas: Cities are among the most vocal supporters of immigrant entrepreneurs and small business owners, which are vital
to local economic vitality. Could cities help accelerate a new form of entrepreneurial visa that is sponsored by the local government to help improve economic development?

- **Legal status protections:** For those who have been long-term members of the community, who call the city their home, who have raised families and worked tirelessly, can the city help make the case for their status to be legalised? This could also apply to immigrants whose Temporary Protection Status will expire. If a local government can vouch for them, can the national government create a pathway that recognises a city’s interests?

- **Sponsoring refugees:** In cases where the country is decreasing the number of refugees it will accept, but where cities want to open their doors, could a new system be created where cities can help influence outcomes? A new programme in Ireland, similar to one in Canada, is encouraging a community-led programme of refugee sponsorship that continues to pass national-level guidelines and requirements (Pollak, 2019). Could this serve as a model?

- **Shared-border visas:** For cities with such deep ties to another city that they ultimately form a large metropolitan region across national borders, could a new visa help streamline border life?

- **Voting power:** Many immigrants have been living in their cities for over twenty years. Mayors care that they pay local taxes, use local services, and are a part of the local community. If a newly relocated US citizen resident can vote on the future of the city, why can a long-term immigrant resident not use their vote too?

- **A seat at international tables:** Cities are implicated through these processes and negotiations. They are responsible for reporting on data, integrating immigrants, and creating ecosystems of inclusion. Can international organisations evolve their procedures to ensure that cities are at the table when decisions that affect them are made?

**Conclusion**

Cities have a stake in the future of migration policies. Immigration manifests itself most acutely at the local level and cities are on the frontlines every day of adapting to a changing, global and diverse world. Across the United States, city leaders are grappling with their responsibilities to the residents within their localities against the often-oudated laws enforced at national level. But, globally, a range of push and pull factors will continue to drive migration trends, with cities as the first responders in times of crisis or as gateways for opportunity. World leaders are beginning to construct a framework and guidelines for migration governance with significant implications for cities. Rather than simply being held accountable for implementation and integration locally, cities want and should be able to contribute their needs and concerns to policy decisions more broadly. When it comes to migration policy, it will not be enough to simply let cities have a voice. Their voice will need to be heard as well.
References


The Italian case clearly demonstrates that any solution to the global governance challenge posed by migration requires strong cooperation with local authorities and communities. As in many other European countries, the huge rise in immigration described by prevailing discourses does not correspond to actual numbers and statistics. As a counterweight to this, a rational account of the situation in Italy is urgently needed in the Italian public debate.

In this chapter, I will describe the role of Italian cities in managing migration between 2013 and 2018. In the first part, I will briefly review the development of migration to Italy in the past decades and how the “Arab Spring” led to the first refugee “crisis” in 2013. Subsequently, I will explain how the reception system for asylum seekers and refugees was shaped in the first years of this century and from 2014 onwards directly involved cities and local communities according to the principle of “loyal co-operation” between different levels of government (article 120 of the Italian Constitution). The third part of the chapter will explore the consequences and risks of the immigration and security legislation approved at the end of 2018 under the League-Five Star coalition. The chapter closes with an analysis of the main challenges Italian cities have been facing, and will face, in terms of the urban management of migration.

In the following pages, I will use various terms to describe the different conditions of foreigners in Italy: by “foreigners” I mean all foreign residents who are not citizens, regardless of their formal status; by “migrants” I mean economic migrants who come to Italy to improve their lives but are not fleeing war or persecution; by “asylum seekers” I mean those people who have requested protection but have not yet completed the immigration procedure; and by “refugees” I mean those people whose right to receive international protection in Italy has been recognised.

I. From the “Arab Spring” to “Mare Nostrum”

More than 5 million foreigners reside officially in Italy today, while the number of irregular migrants is estimated to be between 700,000 and
800,000. Eastern Europeans and Maghrebis make up the majority of the legal foreign community and, contrary to common beliefs, the most widely practiced religion among these groups is Romanian Orthodox Christianity, not Islam.

Large-scale immigration to Italy is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is only since 1975 that the number of immigrants has exceeded that of emigrants, which had until then been a significant transformational element of the post-war Italian Republic. Politics began to address this novelty in the late 1990s through legislation such as the Turco-Napoli-tano (1998) and Bossi-Fini (2002) laws, which bear the names of their first signatories. The latter remains the fundamental reference framework in Italian national legislation, although subsequent restrictive or permissive amendments by the parliament or courts have transformed parts of the law. While the “conservative” foundations of the law, which was developed by two right-wing leaders, were criticised from the start, the law itself was not abolished by the governments – including those of the centre-left – that led the country from 2006 to 2008 and then from 2011 to 2018.

Beyond political evaluations, this is also because the influx of migrants to Italy has stabilised in recent years. There are three essential reasons for this. Firstly, the economic crisis that began in 2008 made Italy less attractive as a destination for those seeking a better life. Secondly, Italy was until 2015–2016 a “transit country” for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa heading towards the economically more affluent countries of northern Europe (Germany, France, the UK, Sweden, etc.). Thirdly, the eastward enlargement of the European Union between 2004 and 2008 changed the status of Romanian, Bulgarian, Polish, Czech and Slovak citizens, promoting intra-continental and periodic or occasional mobility mechanisms more than systematic permanent transfers of large numbers of migrants.

However, the migratory wave that followed the so-called “Arab Spring” and the deposing of Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 dramatically changed the situation. Gaddafi was an unpredictable interlocutor, but he was also highly attentive to the interests of his European neighbours, and Libya descended into chaos soon after he was overthrown. The country became a huge refugee camp, a haven for human traffickers and exploiters organised in various tribal militias. The number of migrants arriving from Niger and other countries grew exponentially, while in Italy the public debate started to focus more on refugees than on economic migrants. The number of people drowning in the Mediterranean increased dramatically, with six people dying every day in this silent massacre over the past 20 years (UNHCR, 2019) – to quote merely the official statistics.

It is in this terrible context that on October 3rd 2013, not far from the island of Lampedusa – first landfall in Europe for many boats – 369 children, women and men became victims of the sea and of indifference. The emotional reaction in Italy was strong. In part, this was because Pope Francis, elected a few months before, had made his maiden mission to Lampedusa, where he threw a wreath of flowers into sea as a symbol of mourning. In response to the crisis, the Italian government under Prime Minister Enrico Letta, who lead a coalition of centre-left
and centre-right parties in 2013–2014, approved the “Mare Nostrum” mission, which is the starting point of the period analysed in this chapter.

Mare Nostrum, developed by the minister for foreign affairs, Emma Bonino, in collaboration with military and civilian authorities, committed the Italian Navy to rescuing as many people as possible in areas close to the Libyan coast, in accordance with maritime law. It is no exaggeration to state – as Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, would do some years later (European Commission, 2015) – that this initiative restored some of the honour and dignity Europe lost during years of prevailing selfishness and indifference. However, in Italy criticism mounted against what many felt to be indiscriminate reception. Italian leaders realised that the southern regions of Italy, where the ports of disembarkation were located but which are economically the country’s poorest, could not shoulder the responsibility alone. In 2013, 42,295 people landed on the Italian coast, and in 2014 the figure was 170,100 (Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2017: 12). According to the Dublin Regulation, they are to be received and taken care of by the first European Union member state they enter. Figure 1, which shows the number of people accommodated by the national reception system, indicates that the gap between landing and reception numbers is around 50%. The missing individuals are asylum seekers and refugees who benefited from community networks for primary needs and later went into hiding or managed to cross national borders.

**Figure 1. Migrants in the reception system (2013–2017)**

![Graph showing the number of migrants in the reception system (2013–2017)](source: Ministry of the Interior)

**II. Cities on the frontline**

After the initial reception and the identification process, asylum seekers and refugees enter the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR), which was enshrined in law in 2002. SPRAR is funded by the Ministry of the Interior’s “National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services” and by the European Refugee Fund (EFR), and involves the National Association of Italian Cities (ANCI). The general goal is to assist
asylum seekers and refugees in an integrated way, distributing them across the whole country in order to avoid high concentrations, and fostering small groups of newcomers. The local authorities and NGOs that implement the projects are supposed to provide both basic services and more advanced ones, such as language learning and job training. Cities apply on a voluntary basis (each time for a specific number of SPRAR beneficiaries), and they apply for two complementary reasons: because the ministry pays for each individual hosted, and because the national government pressures local authorities to take on shared responsibility.

On July 10th 2014, with the pressure on Italian cities having increased, the central government negotiated a meaningful agreement with the regional body, the Conference of the Regions, which officially recognised the importance of local communities throughout the process: “The management of widespread (“diffusa” in Italian) reception (…) without the involvement of the territories, risks creating discomforts and tensions” (Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2017: 13-14). The National Coordination Table was established, consisting of two representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, one from the Ministry of Labour, one from the association of cities, one from the association of provinces (UPI) and one from the Conference of the Regions. The different stakeholders in the National Coordination Table agreed that the influx of non-EU citizens, families and minors had become a structural problem that needed to be tackled. The agreement confirmed the principle of widespread acceptance and loyal collaboration (“accoglienza diffusa e leale collaborazione tra istituzioni” in Italian) and the involvement of territories, namely the mayors, the closest authorities to citizens. Collaboration with and between local authorities was meant to ease the reception process by streamlining the identification of migrants, the assessment of requests for international protection, and the reception of unaccompanied minors. The agreement continued: “In the same way we will proceed to the timely placement of refugees according to a shared allocation plan on the national territory that refers, as a priority, to the expansion of the SPRAR network. The SPRAR is the pivot of the second-level reception system for both adults and unaccompanied minors: any urgent solutions will have to play a residual role and tend to the SPRAR model requirements”.

The 2014 agreement was reinforced a year later by Decree 142 of August 18th 2015, which better defined the entire national reception architecture and contemplated special procedures in cases of particular emergency. More important than that, the decree also created the Regional Coordination Tables: these reproduced at the local level the structure of the National Coordination Table, and wisely involved trade unions, entrepreneurial and foreigners’ organisations. The legislation thereby recognised the role of local civil society and communities in the integration of asylum seekers and refugees, and we can consider this kind of engagement a best practise to be reproduced outside Italian cities.

If we look at Figures 2 and 3 we note how the subdivision of asylum seekers and refugees in 2015 and 2016 among the Italian regions reflected the abovementioned idea of shared responsibility between different territories and that of small concentrations of asylum seekers and refugees instead of big settlements of newcomers.
Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of asylum seekers and refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lombardia</td>
<td>13,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicilia</td>
<td>12,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio</td>
<td>8,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>8,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piemonte</td>
<td>7,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>7,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toscana</td>
<td>7,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia Romagna</td>
<td>6,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>5,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>4,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friuli Venezia Giulia</td>
<td>3,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>3,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>2,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardegna</td>
<td>2,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzo</td>
<td>2,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trentino Alto Adige</td>
<td>1,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>1,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>1,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>1,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle d’Aosta</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>103,792</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Interior
Update: 31/12/2015

Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of asylum seekers and refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lombardia</td>
<td>23,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio</td>
<td>14,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piemonte</td>
<td>14,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>14,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>14,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicilia</td>
<td>14,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toscana</td>
<td>12,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia Romagna</td>
<td>12,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>12,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>7,414</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>5,756</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sardegna</td>
<td>5,662</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friuli Venezia Giulia</td>
<td>4,849</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>4,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzo</td>
<td>3,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>3,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>3,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>2,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolzano</td>
<td>1,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trento</td>
<td>1,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle d’Aosta</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>176,554</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Interior
Update: 31/12/2016
At this point, two observations must be made. Firstly, we should remember that the summer of 2015 represented a turning point. In June, the meeting of the European Council took place at which then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi obtained a commitment from continental partners to relocate the first 40,000 refugees according to a principle of demographic shares and national origin, a commitment that was subsequently largely disregarded. In July, the pressure on Italian cities became decidedly stronger: the cities of Rome, Milan, Bologna and Turin set up temporary reception centres, which often lacked the necessary technical and professional resources. There was also a strong human response among citizens, who provided food parcels, blankets and basic necessities. Yet, with the deterioration of many urban public spaces, citizens’ worries understandably grew. Due to the Dublin Regulation, migrants tended to stay in Italian cities only for a short time and, seeking to avoid identification while waiting to move north, they became “urban ghosts”. This was when Angela Merkel pronounced the famous phrase “Wir schaffen das”, roughly, “We can make it”, which had notable consequences on her political parable, and when Europe was still characterised by permeability – although this permeability was not officially declared and was not applied homogeneously (France, for example, was far less generous).

Secondly, it seems useful to make a general consideration. The SPRAR system, which in a forward-looking manner seeks to distribute the recipients of international protection throughout villages, towns and cities, encouraging small concentrations of people that are as integrated as possible, is not just an experiment in management and administrative engineering. It also builds on some of the fundamental characteristics of the history of Italian population settlement. Since ancient times, Italy has been structured into a complex urban network, which includes a small group of large cities (Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Genoa, Padua-Venice, Palermo), a large group of medium-sized cities and an infinity of small villages, rich in tradition and culture. In the post-war era, this structure underwent transformation: intra-national mobility and impetuous economic development caused the growth of suburbs. Conurbations of numerous medium-sized cities along coastlines and across plains led to a high degree of urban sprawl. At the same time, small towns and villages in the mountains and the interior increasingly depopulated. Nevertheless, in spite of these profound changes, Italy continues to have a strongly polycentric structure, whether demographic, economic, or cultural. This also applies to the settlement patterns of immigrants that began in the 1980s. The immigrant population tended not to concentrate in the large suburbs, but instead filled empty historical centres, whether in villages, towns or cities, settled in abandoned rural areas, or dispersed in the many rivulets of urban sprawl, where a social, ethnic and professional mix can be observed today.

Returning to the main argument, the administrative framework outlined above was further enriched in December 2016, when the ANCI signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of the Interior (Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2017: 20 ff.). From our perspective, it is interesting to underline that the MoU moved from the subdivision among regions we saw above to establish additional criteria within the individual regions in order to share the responsibility between the different cities. Moreover, the MoU classified the projects to integrate asylum seekers and refugees in six fundamental areas: (1) reception methods and organisation; (2) language learning and citizenship edu-

1. The relocation mechanism should have affected about 160,000 refugees arriving in Greece and Italy from 2015 (see, Lianni, 2017). As of September 27th 2017, about two years after the agreement, only 20,066 people from Greece and 9,078 from Italy had actually been redistributed. Among the subscribing states, only Malta had respected its commitment, while Finland had reached 95% of its quota, Portugal 50%, Holland 40%, Belgium 26% and Spain 14%. Germany, which was supposed to receive 27,536 refugees and which in those months reversed its migration policy, only received 8,300 refugees.
cation; (3) training and job placement; (4) information on available services; (5) organisation of recreational or sporting events; and (6) protection of vulnerable categories. The MoU had a coherent logic and demonstrated a good understanding of the main issues. However, such a complex multilevel governance system neither automatically means a proportional distribution of tasks between the various institutions, nor a homogeneous quality of the services offered. As Figure 4 shows, municipalities, cities and mayors bore the heaviest burden.

Figure 4. Category of local institution leading SPRAR projects

![Pie chart showing the distribution of SPRAR projects by category: Municipalities 88.40%, Provinces 7.30%, Partnerships 4.30%]

Source: Central Service – SPRAR.

Finally, Decree 13 of February 17th 2017 established a legal path to allow asylum seekers and refugees involved in the SPRAR system to participate in public utility projects (for example, the restoration of public areas, sanitation and social activities) on a voluntary basis and in compliance with current laws. This intelligent initiative aimed to foster the integration of asylum seekers and refugees – who had effectively been transformed into urban residents – and change the Italian population’s often negative perception of them.

Yet, while the SPRAR system and the various agreements and decrees passed in association with it produced overwhelmingly positive results, there were also problematic episodes in the implementation process, demonstrating that the system is not easy to maintain. We will focus on two such episodes here. In October 2016, riots broke out in the village of Goro, in the province of Ferrara, Emilia Romagna, where citizens set up improvised roadblocks and lit fires. This anger in a place so habitually quiet and even economically depressed was unleashed by the arrival of 12 Nigerian women, some of them pregnant. Their arrival was not preceded by adequate communication and was independently managed by the prefect, without the participation of the mayor and citizens, producing a highly disproportionate reaction to the situation. Another episode took place in Riace, a town in Calabria, where the mayor Domenico Lucano developed a strategy to repopulate his town and give it an economic boost by welcoming asylum seekers. Thanks to creative and courageous management of funds for migrants, the mayor developed a system of internal payments between cooperatives, migrants and shops to favour domestic demand and consumption, employing asylum seekers in socially useful activities. The socioeconomic experiment attracted much national and international interest.

Municipalities, cities and mayors bore the heaviest burden of the reception process.
attention, including an award from the American magazine *Fortune*. But his initiative was targeted by the Italian judiciary (as well as those who opposed it for ideological reasons) who found irregularities and administrative mistakes, and arrested the mayor in October 2018, removing the symbol of migrant integration from the town.

Generally speaking, while the Italian reception system seems well-conceived and designed, the overall perception of immigration continues to deteriorate. People in Italy appear scared and shocked by the influx of foreigners, and tend to follow political leaders who play to this fear in order to gain more votes.

### III. The new government and the securitarian management of migration

In this context, the new government voted into power in 2018 started a new chapter in Italian migration policy. On October 4th 2018 Decree 113 was passed (later converted into law 32/2018), which the media coined the “Security Decree”, and which was introduced by the interior minister and leader of the League, Matteo Salvini. It includes, among others, a series of restrictive measures concerning the reception of asylum seekers and refugees that ultimately aim to reduce their numbers. Specifically, the humanitarian residence permit was abolished, and access to employment, public housing, the national healthcare system and social assistance was denied to many asylum seekers. Instead, short-term special protection permits have been introduced in specific situations, such as dangerous health conditions, labour exploitation, victims of violence, climate migrants in the case of natural disasters and instances of particular civil value. Further, a very broad list of “safe countries”, whose citizens have no right to international protection and can thus not be admitted into the national asylum reception system, will be drawn up. Such a list was already required by an EU directive but the Italian government had chosen not to implement it until now.

Of the above restrictive measures, the cutting of funds is probably the most alarming. The daily amount available to refugee and asylum seeker centres for each “guest” has been reduced from €35 to €21, effectively eliminating all the services from the budget that go beyond food and accommodation, such as job training and language learning. Moreover, within the SPRAR system the number of potential beneficiaries decreases: according to the decree, only unaccompanied minors and holders of international protection can be received. For other categories previously admitted there are no services or activities to promote integration.

Matteo Villa from the Italian Institute of International Political Studies (ISPI) estimates that the decree risks producing 60,000 new irregular foreigners by 2020, in addition to the 70,000 irregulars that are the consequence of the slow bureaucracy (see Figure 5). These estimated 130,000 new “invisible” migrants in Italian cities will be an easy catch for the illegal economy and organised crime.

Many Italian mayors recognised the negative effects the so-called Security Decree would have on crime levels, safety and social cohesion
in their cities. They declared their disobedience of the new legislation between the end of 2018 and the first days of 2019, led by the mayor of Palermo Leoluca Orlando, together with those of Naples, Florence, Milan, Bergamo, Padua, Parma, Bologna, Bari, Cagliari, and others. In this way, they triggered a bitter political-institutional-media conflict, whose administrative and legal consequences cannot yet be fully grasped, but which recalls the fight taking place in the US between the federal administration and the “sanctuary cities”.

**Figure 5. The New Irregulars to Italy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denied Protection</td>
<td>26,094</td>
<td>39,651</td>
<td>137,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>30,100</td>
<td>14,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denied Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>-14,890</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline protection denied</td>
<td>59,125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afer policy changed: not renewed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated effect of the policy change</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISPI estimates based on the Ministry of the Interior.

**IV. The ordinary management of urban immigration**

The foreign population in Italy is currently just over 5 million, a figure that is tending towards stabilisation (see Figure 6). Italian cities have welcomed these immigrants largely without creating urban ghettos or segregated neighbourhoods, which we can consider a sign of resilience. Individual cases of deep segregation between the resident population and foreigners have attracted media attention over the years because of their uniqueness. One example is a wall built on the outskirts of Padua to prevent groups of foreigners from “bothering” and “degrading” the nearby middle-class district. It is worth pointing out that a centre-left mayor took this initiative. However, despite the rarity of cases of segregation, Italian cities did not develop their own forward-looking model of integration that could provide a positive contrast to the French “banlieues” or the English ethnic neighbourhoods. In part, this is due to much of the integration happening spontaneously: neighbourhoods such as Porta Palazzo and San Salvatio in Turin, the area of Piazza Garibaldi (in front of the railway station) in Naples and the Esquilino in Rome, may be seen as bottom-up attempts at integration, sometimes successful and sometimes less.

These endeavours may be seen to be specific to Italian cities. In fact, these informal responses have led to many transformations and innovations in urban areas, promoting new forms of housing, community structures, trading and appropriating public space. These urban solutions require further analysis. Particular attention should be given to how they can be accompanied by complementary public planning policies at the local and national level that foster integration. Approached from
this perspective, a comparative analysis with Turkish cities – especially Istanbul – which are hosting around 3 million Syrian refugees, might be helpful (leaving aside any political-moral evaluations of the EU-Turkey agreement on migration flows from Syria).

However, in the Italian case, it is also necessary to point out that positive instances of bottom-up responses have been accompanied by conflicts with the local population (recently, in a couple of working class neighbourhoods in Rome), and by the proliferation of alarming racist local legislative micro-initiatives, especially in the north. Over the years, foreigners have been forbidden to take the bus in Calizzano (Liguria), to eat kebabs in Padua, to walk without wearing reflective vests (if they are black!) in Flumeri (Campania), to wear the veil in Novara, and to run without a certificate of a “healthy and robust” condition in Alassio (Liguria). One of the most recent examples of this list of discriminatory initiatives was a measure taken by the mayor of Lodi in Lombardy that denied access to school cafeterias and school buses to foreign children from families that could not demonstrate their disadvantaged economic condition. This caused a scandal and was then sanctioned by the judiciary.

To conclude, the question of how to manage migrants within Italian cities is intimately linked with questions of general urban planning. The Italian Urban Agenda for Sustainable Development, promoted by the Alliance for Sustainable Development and Urban@It has put forward a range of possible approaches to this complex problem (Vitali et al., 2018). They include the establishment of a parliamentary commission on urban peripheries; the reactivation of the Governmental Committee for Urban Policies (CIPU); the preparation of a Strategic Plan for Italian Cities; the identification of a head of urban development in the central administration; and, finally, the recovery of the "Outskirts Plan", which was implemented in the recent past and has effectively advanced a large number of urban regeneration projects. Although these are reasonable proposals, it is unlikely that Italian cities will advance on issues related to migration without forward-looking urban planning and a strong strategic plan for integration. If this is achieved, it may well be possible that the Italian cities will serve as a virtuous model for migrant integration, in spite of the current major European trends towards fear and exclusion.

Figure 6. Foreign resident population of Italy. January 1st 2002–2016 (millions of people)

Source: Ministry of the Interior.

3. https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaArticolo?art.progressivo=0&art.idArticolo=12&art.versione=1&art.codiceFiscalearticolo=12A08941&art.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2012-08-11&art.idGruppo=3&art.idSottoArticolo1=10&art.idSottoArticolo=2&art.flagTipoArticolo=0

References


NATIONAL URBAN POLICIES: LINKING GLOBAL AGENDAS WITH LOCAL SPECIFICITIES

• EMBEDDING NATIONAL URBAN POLICIES IN AFRICA
   Edgar Pieterse

• NATIONAL AND LOCAL APPROACHES TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW URBAN AGENDA IN ARGENTINA
   Gabriel Lanfranchi
Until recently most African governments were in denial about urbanisation. This stemmed from at least two factors. One, most political parties who come from a tradition of fighting an anti-colonial struggle for political independence hold a deep-seated attachment to the belief that “liberation” means a return to the land dispossessed from them by colonial powers. Two, the second green revolution and connective infrastructure (ports, roads, airports) were at the heart of the African renaissance discourse of the 1990s popularised by former presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo. This dovetailed with the nostalgic ideological currents about land and placed all focus on Africa achieving its rightful place on the global (economic) stage through agricultural productivity and mineral beneficiation. And there was a critical political consideration as well: most opposition political forces were gaining support and influence in urban areas where democratic elections were being held, often displacing the ruling party from running municipalities in cities and towns. The most visceral expression of this deep-seated anti-urban bias was the commitment to stem rural-to-urban migration (Smit and Pieterse, 2014).

However, two decades later there has been a sea change in African public policy. Africa’s urban transition is seen as an opportunity to achieve the lofty goals the African Union (AU) set out in its long-term strategic vision, Agenda 2063 (African Union, 2015), which can be read as Africa’s contribution to and lens on various global policy processes. Specifically, the African region and individual countries have had to formulate responses to the various international UN summits convened in 2015 and 2016, for example, on disaster risk reduction (Sendai), on finance for development (Addis Ababa), on the sustainable development goals for 2030 (New York), the climate summit (Paris), and Habitat III (Quito). The discursive shift in Agenda 2063 can be seen as a result of multiple pressures stemming from social movements in civil society, academic critique, policy prescription from development agencies, policy advocacy from organised local government and, importantly, the growing influence of international management consultancy firms in shaping national and regional policy agendas (Swilling and Hajer, 2017). Strategic policy officers working in key pan-African institutions such as the African
I. An abbreviated history of policy milestones

It is useful to go back in history to 1998 when the African Renaissance conference was convened. This event marked a decisive moment in African political affairs when a number of key leaders sought to establish a fresh political discourse to galvanise democratic and economic reforms across the African continent in an attempt to navigate the pressures of globalisation more effectively (Malagapuru, 1999). The event was marked by three policy priorities: agricultural development, science and technology, and a reaffirmation of so-called African values such as Ubuntu (social interdependence and solidarity) that stem from indigenous knowledge systems and practices. The focus on indigenous knowledge signalled a commitment to building cultural confidence and pride in order to assert Africa’s unique contribution to the world and capacity to take control of her destiny (Malagapuru, 1999).

Practically, the African renaissance discourse found expression in a pan-African agenda to coordinate desperately needed economic infrastructure such as energy plants, roads, airports, harbours, ICT connectivity and so forth. These infrastructures were seen as crucial to support the agricultural production focus alongside greater beneficiation around the mineral economy. Science and technology was seen as key to generating the local expertise to drive greater beneficiation in African countries before commodities were exported to international markets. The African renaissance discourse and Nepad seemed to be vindicated from 2000 onwards when GDP growth rates surged upwards across most of Sub-Saharan Africa, instilling greater political and policy confidence to push harder along the same policy lines.

However, for our purposes it is noteworthy that an Africa Union summit held in Maputo in 2003 generated a resolution to seek formal collaboration with UN-Habitat to prepare an African perspective and policy response to urbanisation. This collaboration resulted in the establishment of the African Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development (AMCHUD), which had its first convening in February 2005. Given the close working relationship with UN-Habitat, their staple urban development discourse featured prominently in the declarations of the various AMCHUD meetings over the years. This forum was an important start to addressing urbanisation but had very little influence over the central policy formulation aspects of the African Union. However, in 2008, at an AU finance ministers’ meeting in Abidjan, it was agreed that an urbanisation strategy was called for. This work was completed by 2010 and tabled at a members’ meeting but

NUPs are an important tool to fully embed the urban turn in multi-level policy processes across Africa.
it was effectively stillborn. There was no discernible institutionalisation or implementation of the strategy by the operational arm of the AU. Furthermore, it had equally limited influence over the policy thinking and priorities of the African Development Bank (AfDB), which takes policy direction from the AU.

Despite these formal limitations, the discourse of sustainable urbanisation did pop up in various AU documents and processes. The most significant was Agenda 2063, which was first published in draft form in 2013 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Organisation for African Unity (the forerunner to the AU) and finalised after consultations in 2015 as a direct input into the SDG Summit. Tellingly, Agenda 2063 marks an important policy turning point in how urbanisation is perceived as a critical dimension of a prosperous and sustainable future for the African continent. It asserts that:

We aspire that by 2063, Africa shall be a prosperous continent, with the means and resources to drive its own development, and where: African people have a high standard of living, and quality of life, sound health and well-being; Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation for a knowledge society; Cities and other settlements are hubs of cultural and economic activities, with modernized infrastructure, and people have access to all the basic necessities of life including shelter, water, sanitation, energy, public transport and ICT; Economies are structurally transformed to create shared growth, decent jobs and economic opportunities for all (African Union, 2015, emphasis added).

This shift in policy understanding of the role of urbanisation in sustainable development can be attributed to the efforts at the margins of the African Union to move this issue up the policy ladder, which found little apparent success in the early years. However, the combination of a formal AU strategy and the efforts of other pan-African actors such as UN-Habitat Africa, United Cities and Local Governments of Africa, Cities Alliance, and academic networks and institutions such as the Association of African Planning Schools and the African Centre for Cities, all created momentum around the importance of sustainable urbanisation in Africa. In fact, a uniquely African perspective was developed by the Africa desk of UN-Habitat in its efforts to generate discussion and preparation for Habitat III. They published *Towards an African Urban Agenda* in 2015 and this fed into another critical policy statement published by the African Union and OECD: *African Economic Outlook 2016, Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation* (OECD et al., 2016). This weighty policy intervention made the economic case for sustainable cities, destabilising the conventional neo-classical prescripts that are typically rehashed in the macro-economic analysis of the AfDB and the AU.

The really decisive development was the championing of the urban cause by Africa’s foremost development economists at the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Under the leadership of Carlos Lopes, UNECA sought to foreground the imperative of the structural transformation of African economies. This concerned the need to interrupt the trend whereby most African economies were failing to create a large enough industrial component to their economies, which in turn was...
detrimental to achieving job-generating growth. Moreover, UNECA was developing an argument that connected the imperatives of sustainable growth (the green economy) with labour-intensive economic policies and identifying the territorial dimensions of achieving green and inclusive industrialisation. It also allowed them to argue rather boldly about the risks of ignoring urbanisation. In their 2017 flagship report they put it as follows:

African cities thus face low productivity, tepid job creation, high informality, huge infrastructure and service gaps, weak linkages with rural areas, high levels of informality, increasing inequalities, growing environmental damage and vulnerability to climate change and weak institutional systems and capacities. Unless resolved, these impediments will undermine Africa’s urban potential for structural transformation. [...] The challenge confronting Africa is thus to accelerate structural transformation by harnessing the rapid urban transition to promote economic diversification, with a special focus on industrialization that will create jobs, enhance access to basic services and reduce inequality and poverty (UNECA et al., 2017: 20)

II. Global policy approach to mainstream urban policy

In parallel to global efforts to prepare for the SDG Summit and the Paris Conference of the Parties (COP21) in 2015, preparations were also afoot for Habitat III – convened by the UN every 20 years to reflect on human settlements and territorial development. In concert with UN-Habitat, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), as the international political voice of organised local government, established a multi-agency global taskforce to push for a practical institutional mechanism to address urban development issues in national policy processes. They were also keen for such a mechanism to reconfigure multi-level governance arrangements premised on the belief that the sustainable development goals (SDGs) can only be achieved if they are effectively localised, that is, if implementation is driven by local government in concert with citizens and civil society. The preferred mechanism was National Urban Policies (NUPs). Through an international policy design process, UN-Habitat and UCLG defined a NUP as: “[a] coherent set of decisions derived through a deliberate, government-led process of coordinating and rallying various actors for a common vision and goal that will promote more transformative, productive, inclusive and resilient urban development for the long term” (UN-Habitat, 2014). This policy advocacy agenda must be understood against a backdrop of limited and inadequate democratic decentralisation in most parts of the Global South despite the formal policy commitments established at the Rio Summit in 1991 (Local Agenda 21) and the Habitat II declaration in 1996.

In their flagship GOLD IV report, UCLG presented a strong perspective on what the ideal-type macro policy frameworks should be and where national and rural policies fit in. Figure 1 is adapted from this report and summarises the importance of a national development strategy as an apex framework which is informed by and guides a number of

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1. UN-Habitat established a number of Policy Units on a range of topics to feed into the Habitat III process. One of these, comprised of diverse stakeholders, developed a perspective and guidelines on NUPs. For more information, see: United Nations (2016).
evidence-based pieces of planning to enable effective coordination and alignment, so that the SDGs can progressively be realised.

**Figure 1: Enabling national institutional mechanisms**

In this approach, the National Sustainable Development Strategy will provide an account of how the SDGs and Agenda 2063 are localised in given African countries. The macroeconomic policy flows from that perspective and must be subservient to it. It is also important to explicitly address the spatial aspects of these overarching macro policy frameworks. An understanding of the differential nature of the national, regional and local space economy informs economic development thinking, and most importantly, a coordinated approach to infrastructure investment. This is why it sits between the territorial policies, the macro-economic strategy and the infrastructure investment framework. Despite the importance of a national spatial perspective, it is remarkably absent from most planning systems in Africa. However, what is especially novel in the UCLG approach is the insistence on identifying a select number of catalytic investments to demonstrate an alternative approach is possible, and keep the change management agenda manageable (Scoones et al., 2015). Thus, it is important that each country and major city has a limited number of catalytic projects that can set the direction for long-term transformation.

**III. NUPs in Africa**

According to a recent report sponsored by UN-Habitat and the OECD (2018), since Habitat III, up to 180 countries have been pursuing NUPs. Figure 2 provides a regional breakdown of this statistic and reflects the stages of policy development. Significantly, 38 African countries can be identified as being engaged with developing or implementing NUPs.

1. This policy approach is echoed in the recent report published by various UN agencies on how best to implement the urban SDG. See: United Nations (2019).
21 African countries have explicit NUPs and 17 countries are in pre-implementation stages.

This figure demonstrates that 21 African countries have explicit NUPs, in other words, they are at the point of implementation or monitoring and evaluation, whereas 17 countries are still in pre-implementation stages. The same study reports that the majority of African countries prioritise a thematic focus centred on the relationship between spatial structure and economic development, which suggests that there is indeed a recognition that a national spatial perspective is critical. However, very few focus on environmental sustainability and climate change resilience, which is striking since most African urban systems are dominated by coastal cities that manifest a high degree of vulnerability to climate change impacts. Nonetheless, in light of the earlier analysis demonstrating the anti-urban policy sentiment that dominated pan-African policy until recently, it is impressive that there has been such a significant uptake of NUPs. The final section of this chapter will turn to the political dynamics that surround NUPs and conclude with a number of pointed recommendations to ensure that the developmental potential of NUPs are truly realised in Africa.

**IV. Political context of NUPs in Africa**

Most African countries are in the midst of experimenting with and trying to fully embed multi-party democratic political systems. However, these relatively new democratic institutions often struggle to cope with the enormous ethnic, linguistic, cultural and political differences that flourish in societies with deep histories of colonial occupation and regulation which bled into postcolonial episodes of civil conflict and authoritarian rule. Moreover, modern bureaucratic institutions were first established during colonial rule and though there is great pliability to accommodate the sectarian interests of political leaders their founding administrative and professional logics often remain intact. Practically, this means that many African countries suffer from the worst impacts of classic Weberian top-down administrative control and intransigence...
which raises the transaction costs of daily life for citizens and businesses. Consequently, many African bureaucracies are notoriously inefficient, which in turn creates a market for parallel systems of access, permission and turning a blind eye. As a result, there is often limited administrative capacity to deal effectively with the scale and scope of development challenges that are typically found in developing societies with limited infrastructural networks and highly unequal patterns of access to services. Poorly managed urbanisation is one of the most complex challenges.

This postcolonial institutional legacy usually goes hand in hand with highly centralised governance systems to ensure that political control and power is kept in relatively few hands at the executive core of central government. It is therefore unsurprising that democratic decentralisation reforms have long been a mantra of many African governments but very seldom met with consistent policy and legislative follow-through (Smit and Pieterse, 2014). This reality became even more entrenched during the last two decades as new opposition political parties started to win municipal and regional elections representing a threat to entrenched national political leaders. In this context there is little incentive to devolve powers and fiscal resources to local government or create the legal framework to enable that. However, complex urban challenges such as slum upgrading, public transport management, local economic development, and so forth cannot be done effectively through long-distance rule and governance. This institutional dynamic is a recipe for poor urban management and ineffectual governance. It creates fertile ground for numerous informal, illicit and traditional forms of authority and power to fill the vacuum in the regulation of everyday life, frustrating the potential for effective, holistic and integrated urban development.

It is noteworthy that despite the obvious humanitarian and development costs of these dynamics, there is little evidence of effective civil society coordination and response. In fact, in most African countries civil society organisations tend to be very active but in a highly fragmented fashion, often focussed on hyperlocal issues, and inappropriately allied to political parties. Deep and meaningful political and policy reforms are few and far between in most African countries because of the absence of strategic, effective and sustained activism that can inject transparency and accountability. Difficult and risky policy reforms do not happen without democratic pressure and as long as urban movements are unable to connect sectoral and localised issues into a broader “right to the city” platform, it is hard to imagine an enabling political context for impactful NUPs to emerge.

It is against this backdrop that the Coalition for Urban Transitions is working on the promotion and embedding of substantial NUPs that can advance a clear national understanding about how to pursue sustainable and inclusive growth through a climate-aware urbanisation strategy. This work is underway in Ghana and Tanzania with support from the African Centre for Cities in concert with a spectrum of local actors from the government, civil society, academia and the private sector. By working iteratively through carefully curated deliberative processes, a series of policy recommendations on NUPs in Africa have been developed.

Democratic decentralisation reforms have long been a mantra of many African governments but very seldom met with consistent policy and legislative follow-through.

3. “The Coalition for Urban Transitions is a global initiative to support national governments to address pressing economic, inequality and climate challenges by making their cities livable and sustainable. It is a major collaboration between over 40 research institutes, intergovernmental organizations, investors, infrastructure providers, strategic advisory companies, NGOs and city networks.” For more, see: https://newclimateeconomy.net/urban-transitions/about. [Accessed on 11 April 2019].
V. Recommendations for embedding transformational NUPs

This is a unique time to build a broad-based alliance between international actors championing the implementation of the SDGs (especially goal 11 on sustainable human settlements) and African organisations at all levels. They should focus their energies on deepening the quality of NUPs that are currently in development or in their first iteration of implementation. Despite the profound political and economic differences across the African continent, it is possible to identify a number of broad policy priorities around which such a coalition could cohere.

1. *Increase the capacities of and resources allocated to urban governments, and codify those commitments in law.* This recommendation allows new urban policy coalitions to tap into established work to give effect to democratic decentralisation, which has effectively stalled.

2. *Create a culture of rights and social justice that manages inevitable competition for space, markets and services.* This recommendation is critical because there is a real danger that once urbanisation is on the policy map, completely inappropriate and exclusionary urban investments are promoted. This usually happens when elitist real estate ambitions drive urban policies. The proliferation of unsuitable new town developments across the African continent is one example of this danger.

3. *Collect data and evidence that demystify all aspects of African cities, including the informal sector.* One of the greatest risks associated with NUPs is that they respond to an idealised reality instead of the real urban system and condition in a given country. Often, policy frameworks only draw on formal statistics and as a result miss out on the actual economic practices, processes and flows that anchor the majority of urban livelihoods. Perpetuating this is obviously a recipe for policy failure.

4. *Adopt a spatial strategy that curtails sprawl and creates sufficient population density to make public transport and other services financially viable, as well as a tenure system that improves both revenue collection and household security.* Equitable access is at the core of fostering sustainable and inclusive cities. Public policies that promote the common good for the largest number of urban dwellers whilst creating a more sustainable spatial form are likely to have the greatest developmental impacts. This is why a spatial strategy must be at the core of the NUPs.

5. *Adopt an infrastructure strategy that reinforces the spatial strategy and draws on community-led innovations to ensure universal access to basic services and economic opportunities.* It is essential that an NUP directly influences the national and regional infrastructure investment priorities and approaches of the country. This is not just about installing network infrastructure systems but figuring out how large state-driven investments can be done in ways that recognise the makeshift systems poor citizens devise to compensate for the absence of infrastructure. Beyond recognition, new

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4. This section is a summary of a more developed argument set out in: Cartwright, et al., 2018.
hybrid systems need to be devised that are affordable and culturally appropriate in a given context, as well as being as sustainable as possible. The "how" of this agenda is a critical issue that the NUP should provide guidance on.

6. **Adopt a fiscal and financing strategy that increases public budgets across all levels of government and mobilises the resources needed to fill the chronic shortfall in investment in urban infrastructure.** This recommendation is self-evident since no reforms are possible without adequate budgets. However, it is worth stressing because of the propensity to proliferate policy frameworks that regurgitate all the right discourses and keywords but actually have no impact because they are too abstract and divorced from budgetary processes. Since it is a precondition for urban reform, it is crucial that a sound NUP drives intergovernmental fiscal reform and budgeting processes.

These recommendations are clearly still at a high level of abstraction and generality. NUPs will only be effective and impactful if they are premised on sound comprehensive data that can offer a realist account of various urban systems and dynamics. However, sound data is just a starting point. For NUPs to fulfil their potential, they need to be anchored by various urban development research and development nodes across a given country that are linked up into a national system of deliberation and strategy formulation and review. It is best to think of these R&D nodes as local innovation hubs that conduct the detailed work of figuring out how key cities and regions can be transformed as part of developing a bottom-up strategy to transform national urban systems. It is too soon to assess what the prospects are of embedding NUPs in this manner but a number of experiments across the African continent may prove promising for the future.

**References**


Urbanisation is transforming societies around the globe. Every day, millions of people move to urban centres, drawn by job opportunities, a better quality of life, greater security or other reasons. According to UN-Habitat's World Cities Report (2016), in the next ten years two-thirds of the world's population will live in cities, and by 2050 this figure will have reached 72%. In this context, the role of cities as engines of social and economic change is increasingly important and evident.

However, rapid and unplanned urbanisation has also led to pressing challenges. Beyond the economic and social benefits of urbanisation, the expansion of cities has led to increased inequality in access to land and public services and exacerbated pollution and risks linked to global warming. Additionally, the governance of large metropolitan areas, where institutional fragmentation obstructs decision-making, has become more complex as urban challenges and problems have extended beyond the traditional boundaries of the city. Access to an equitable urban habitat remains an outstanding debt in many parts of the world. Argentina, where 92% of people live in cities and 40% of the country's urban population is concentrated in the city of Buenos Aires and its metropolitan area, is no exception (INDEC, 2012). An estimated 30% of the country's population still resides in inadequate housing, 15% have no access to potable water, and 45% lack access to the sewage system (Lanfranchi et al., 2018c). To respond to these conditions, and in line with the urban focus of the post-2015 UN development agendas, the central Argentinian government embarked on formulating a comprehensive urban strategy, a process that culminated in the passing of the country's first National Urban Policy (NUP) at the end of 2018.

This chapter provides an overview of the different dimensions of Argentina's NUP, its strengths and its weaknesses. An introduction is then given to “Planificación”, a complementary initiative run by the Cities Program at CIPPEC – The Centre for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth. Planificación was launched one year earlier than the NUP with the aim of supporting the
localisation of the New Urban Agenda (NUA) in Argentinian cities and metropolitan regions, but from a more local perspective. As its name suggests, the programme prioritises “planning in action”, that is, it promotes active citizen participation in the policy planning process so as to generate specific solutions based on peer learning for particular communities.

I. The role of cities in global urban development agendas

Urban development is a challenge for local administrations. They know the most about the territorial realities of their domains and, to varying degrees, they hold competences and responsibilities in the domains of housing, urban services, transport and environment. However, whether due to budgetary or technical constraints, or situations in which isolated decision-making is inadequate, the challenges of urban development cannot be faced by local governments alone (Lanfranchi et al., 2018c). Instead, integrated national strategies are needed for “good” urbanisation that fosters social inclusion, economic development and environmental sustainability (UN-Habitat, 2017).

Over the last decade, the international community has worked to address the challenges of urbanisation by defining general guidelines for a common agenda that promotes national policies. In 2015, the UN’s 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted, which include a stand-alone goal on “Making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” (SDG 11). Further, within the framework of the UN conference on climate change, The Paris Agreement, which seeks to engage nations in mitigating climate change through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, highlights the important role of cities, in particular for the promotion of actions toward carbon neutrality by 2050. Finally, the UN’s New Urban Agenda, which was adopted at the Habitat III Summit in 2016, marks an important milestone. The resulting declaration established norms for the planning, construction, development, management and improvement of urban areas according to six guiding principles: equity, security, health, affordability, resilience and sustainability. The goal of the NUA is to define a shared vision towards a sustainable future, where all people have the same rights and can take advantage of the benefits cities offer. The agenda also urges governments to agree on long-term national strategies to tackle urban challenges through cooperation and coordination, not only among different levels of government, but also with other non-state stakeholders from the private sector, civil society and knowledge-based organisations.

The inclusive and participatory approach of the NUA is crucial: urban planning needs to be a collectively negotiated and agreed upon development process. If national policies aim to develop solutions to local problems without actively involving the local community, their effectiveness tends to be radically diminished. A new model of urban governance is required where cities and local governments are granted a role that corresponds to their development contributions and vulnerabilities, and where urban leadership has a legitimate and valuable place (Lanfranchi et al., 2018c).
II. Argentina’s National Urban Policy

When Argentina adopted the UN 2030 Agenda and the NUA, it had no national urban regulation in place. Moreover, only four of the 24 national jurisdictions have some kind of legislation that regulates urban development within their boundaries, and only a handful of municipalities have up-to-date urban laws or plans (Lanfranchi et al., 2018c).

The National Urban Policy (NUP), the country’s first comprehensive urban policy, was launched at the end of 2018. Emerging from the commitments made by the Argentinian government during the Habitat III Summit in 2016, the purpose of the NUP is to establish guidelines for inclusive, productive, innovative, resilient and sustainable urban development based on solid normative, institutional and financial frameworks generated through participative decision-making and multilevel coordination. The policy expands on three existing national programmes: the National Housing Plan (“miCASA”), the National Habitat Plan (“miBARRIO”), and the National Water Plan. It is important to underscore that doubts have been cast on both the effectiveness and longevity of these three plans because of their markedly sectorial approach, which lacked coordination, and their implementation by decree, which meant that they lacked a more active participatory process. By contrast, the design and formulation of the NUP, which was led by the National Ministry of the Interior, Public Works and Housing, together with secretariats, decentralised offices, and other national ministries responsible for urban and housing policies, actively involved subnational and non-governmental actors from the private sector, civil society organisations, academia and international organisations.

The NUP is built around nine axes:

1. Comprehensive management, urban planning and land management focusses on coordination and agreed policies for tackling the challenges of rapid urbanisation;
2. Integrated mobility and transport that targets deficient urban transport systems, accessibility and service delivery;
3. Integrated equipment and urban infrastructure which targets the lack of proper infrastructure and services to promote healthy urban growth;
4. Socio-habitational equity which targets problems stemming from unequal and fragmented access to urban land;
5. Competitive and inclusive economic development which targets challenges arising from disparate socioeconomic development and the inequitable distribution of resources;
6. Environmental management, resilience and climate change adaptation which targets the consequences of global warming, such as the degradation of soil, air and water;
7. Effective local governance which targets the challenges local governments face when they implement public policies related to urban issues;
8. Sustainable local finances to address the financial fragility of local governments;

9. Community empowerment, targeting the lack of public participation and the exclusion of certain groups from planning and policy decision-making processes.

Each of these axes contains different public policy guidelines, possible instruments for their implementation and an overview of the key actors involved. Further, each guideline proposes a set of strategies for how the different levels of government should be involved in the short, medium and long term.

The NUP also includes a four-pillar Action Plan for its implementation. First, the plan recommends a multi-channel and multi-dimensional communication and dissemination strategy which aims to foster NUP adoption by key actors. Second, it recommends building on and aligning with previous policies, plans, programmes, projects and normative frameworks, and mapping the actors involved in these processes. Third, it proposes strategies for good governance that target all levels of government with a focus on access to housing; integral urban planning and land management; risk and environmental management; and training programmes for sustainable urban management. Finally, it supports the monitoring, evaluation and updating of policy tools to ensure accountability and the continuous improvement of policies.

The NUP certainly marks an ambitious first step in government efforts to link national policies to the goals laid out in the NUA. Taking advantage of the window of opportunity created by Habitat III, the national government achieved something unprecedented, which was to engage several public departments and agencies at the national level to develop an instrument for urban development. At the same time, the 2015 change of government brought several officials from the Secretariat for Habitat and Inclusion of the City of Buenos Aires into the national government administration, where they gained access to national platforms and applied their previous experiences involving the implementation of public policies in informal settlements in the city.

These policy advancements notwithstanding, the NUP falls short when it comes to consistency and participation. The main weakness of the policy lies in its limited scope within a federalist context: in Argentina, although many investments in infrastructure require the participation of the national government, urban policy is largely left up to the provinces. Besides which, the NUP has not been enshrined in law. This arrangement leaves the NUP susceptible to political shifts and changes in government administrations. Moreover, despite early attempts to include diverse actors in its design, particularly from within the national government, an overall lack of citizen participation threatens to undermine the sustainability of the NUP.

At the same time, the NUP lacks a clear set of quantifiable goals able to help local governments in evaluating and implementing policies. Well-defined mechanisms for financing the programmes that are essential to meeting NUA objectives and overcoming institutional barriers to effective governance are also needed. Yet, the implementation of the NUP is
already under way. Time will tell if the guidelines provided will be implemented or ignored by future national and local administrations.

III. PlanificACCION: a method for implementing the NUA in Argentinian cities

In November 2017, about a year before the NUP was passed, CIPPEC’s Cities Program launched a new initiative called PlanificACCION that seeks to promote the comprehensive development of Argentinian cities in line with the NUA. Led by CIPPEC and supported by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Lab and the National Ministry of Production and Labour, PlanificACCION is a method for participatory planning that occurs over a period of 24 months.

Like the NUP, the “PlanificACCION” method is deeply inspired by the principles and goals of the NUA. As a result, they share several characteristics. For instance, both are based on a horizontally integrated approach to urban planning that aims to overcome the sectorial structures and silo thinking that are typical of 20th century urban planning. Both address similar issues, including housing and the urban environment, urban resilience, modernisation and multilevel governance. Finally, the overarching goal of both is local community empowerment.

What distinguishes the PlanificACCION method from top-down traditional urban planning and the NUP is that it focuses on the generation of social capital among the city’s main stakeholders to ensure a collective and participatory planning process that meets the demands of the community as a whole. Social capital is generated through collaboration with different leaders from the public, private, social and academic sectors who are involved in multiple phases of the public policy design process, including implementation. In this sense, PlanificACCION is based on a deeper process of collaborative peer learning, rather than a top-down directive from the central government to the cities. Given that state institutions and the implementation of public policies in Argentina often suffer from changes of government, one of PlanificACCION’s central aims is that by empowering local actors across the civil, business and governmental sectors policies can be promoted that outlive single-term administrations.

PlanificACCION is currently being applied in five Argentinian urban agglomerations. Puerto Madryn (Patagonia region), Greater Mendoza (Cuyo region), Greater Cordoba (Center region), Greater Resistencia (North East region) and Greater Catamarca (North West region) were selected via a contest in which 22 urban agglomerations and their municipalities participated. They represent each region of the country (except Greater Buenos Aires) and encompass 38 municipalities governed by mayors from a wide range of political backgrounds.

The PlanificACCION method consists of five stages:

Stage 1: Diagnosis (duration: 3 months)

The first objective of this stage is to identify leaders in the ecosystem of local actors and carry out interviews and perception surveys to reveal local attitudes about the challenges and opportunities facing the city.
The second objective is to compile and analyse existing information that can inform the planning and implementation process. CIPPEC analyses existing plans, studies and projects for each urban area. To uncover patterns of urban expansion and growth, the Digital Urban Laboratory (LUD) at CIPPEC studies spatial and social changes in each urban agglomeration over recent years. This analysis has two parts. First, urban expansion is considered through the prism of land use to understand how this factor explains urban sprawl and population growth. Second, existing census and survey data on access to water and sanitation infrastructure, population density, and poverty, is analysed using the Urban DNA methodology. This methodology combines these data to generate eight categories for measuring the quality of urban growth and predicting scenarios of future urban growth.

Finally, CIPPEC’s Social Vulnerability Index (IVSD) is used to assess risks faced by the population of each agglomeration. Territorial information is crossed with population, housing and household information and the vulnerability is established.

Stage 1 culminates in the presentation of the findings from CIPPEC’s initial diagnosis in a forum that brings together local leaders with the aim of generating public dialogue and consensus on issues that will be developed in the next stage of PlanificACIÓN.

Stage 2: Defining strategic projects (duration: 3 months)

The objective of this stage is to devise, select and develop strategic projects that address the key challenges identified in the diagnostic stage. Unlike traditional planning, where the development of a strategy precedes the design of programmes and projects, in the PlanificACIÓN methodology the strategy grows out of a dialogue between local leaders and decision-makers, their interests and commitment.

Local leaders begin by choosing projects that will be developed through a participatory process. This process is guided by the Scrum project management methodology which provides a framework for creating face-to-face learning spaces that promote the exchange of knowledge and peer learning. Through participation and collaboration, leaders share their knowledge and expertise and define projects to tackle the challenges of the selected metropolitan area.

At the end of the process the agreed projects are presented to the local community. Notably, Stage 2 strengthens the ability of local actors to influence the production of urban space. Through exchange and collaborative debate, Stage 2 promotes consensus and strengthens local relationships that extend beyond local government terms and, in turn, allows leaders to prioritise public policies.

Stage 3: Implementing a strategic project (duration: 3 to 6 months)

Following the Scrum process and the definition of strategic projects comes implementation. This phase involves local leaders working with experts at CIPPEC.
CIPPEC helps local leaders target financing options and coordinate meetings with key actors. Local leaders also receive technical assistance to carry out project objectives. At this point, PlanificACCIÓN diverges from the NUA: citizens are not only given the power to participate in the diagnostic stage or formulate solutions that meet their necessities, they are also given the necessary tools for the implementation and management of the agreed-upon strategies.

**Stage 4: Creating the development strategy for the city and its metropolitan region (duration: 9–12 months)**

The formulation of a comprehensive development strategy for a city and its metropolitan region is informed by the diagnosis conducted in Stage 1 and the definition of strategic projects in Stage 2.

To assure that each development strategy is consistent with the objectives of the three UN agendas introduced above, CIPPEC employs a framework called the “Comprehensive Development Cities Approach” (CDCA) (Lanfranchi and Yañez, 2018), which is based on four axes: equitable habitat, climate change, digitalisation, and metropolitan governance.

**Equitable habitat** focuses on implementing the NUA based on the orderly growth of the city, the eradication of poverty, the “right to the city”, security, and the “healthy” city.

**Climate change** links urban planning to climate change response. It focuses on mitigation of and adaptation to climate change as well as the implementation of the Paris Agreement by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, on the one hand, and increasing resilience, on the other.

**Digitalisation** aims to modernise and improve local management processes and accountability through open data. It also promotes local digital entrepreneurship.

**Metropolitan governance** targets effective management of urban development. It also aims to improve urban finance and create instruments for metropolitan coordination, such as the Corporaciones de Desarrollo Metropolitano.

Following the application of the CDCA, Stage 4 provides a forum for local leaders that targets each thematic axis, during which information is gathered that assists CIPPEC’s technical team in defining strategies. This process is repeated four times so that the four thematic axes can be addressed. Stage 4 ends with the preparation of a final document that synthesises the outcomes of the work done on each of the four axes and the development strategy.

**Stage 5: Acceleration of platform economy projects (duration: 12 months)**

Stage 5 empowers the digitally based entrepreneurial ecosystem and promotes local models of collaborative economy while targeting local training
and mentoring programmes as well as the problems and opportunities identified in the diagnostic process. To achieve these goals, CIPPEC works with digital business specialists and the Small and Medium Enterprise Secretariat of the National Ministry of Production and Labour to assign models. This process culminates in the selection and promotion of platform economy projects. Engagement with other sectors of society is crucial throughout Stage 5 in order to promote the inclusion of additional actors in the opportunities offered by collaborative and platform economy models.

Conclusion

The role of national governments in making urbanisation processes more dynamic is increasingly important. To make a real change the Argentinian government must take a more proactive approach towards urban development. We believe that a national urban law that gives the issue the necessary relevance and puts in place general guidelines and tools for policy planning and decision-making should be the next step. Until legislation exists at the national level that guarantees the implementation of comprehensive urban habitat policies, any initiatives carried out are likely to remain susceptible to the whims of the Argentinian political system.

While the NUP marks an ambitious step toward urban habitat policy advancements at the national level – an issue usually left off the national policy agenda –, its power and scope are limited. Far from being a national law with binding norms, the NUP serves as a guide to policymakers. Its ideas and policy recommendations are promoted by the national government without legal recourse being available to guarantee compliance. On the other hand, a national habitat law such as the one we have proposed in this article includes political instruments necessary for guaranteeing implementation at the local level as well as the mechanisms essential for funding such policy interventions.

CIPPEC’s PlanificACIÓN method aims to address some of these shortcomings, and it can be replicated by national and subnational governments. Using a comprehensive approach the method improves the capacity of local administrations and citizens to intervene in urban planning and provides them with a framework and concrete strategies for action to align local policies with the objectives of international development agendas, such as the NUA. The objective is that in the territories where PlanificACIÓN is applied at least one of the planned projects will be implemented, that a collectively formulated agenda for development policies will be put in place, and that a group of local leaders committed to their implementation is formed. We also hope that a series of collaborative economy projects will be launched and that an innovation network of local entrepreneurs which responds to the needs of the community is created. We believe that if the PlanificACIÓN method had the support of local and regional governments in terms of financing, diffusion and technical assistance it would have deeply transformative consequences. With this support, the method could facilitate both the activation of strategic projects for communities and the reissuing of urban planning plans, a part of urban policymaking that is largely neglected in Argentina.
References


GOVERNING FROM THE METROPOLITAN SCALE

• METROPOLISES FACING THE GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS
  Agustí Fernández de Losada

• AFTER THE VOTE TO LEAVE: HOW DEVOLUTION COULD MAKE BRITAIN’S CITIES PLAYERS ON THE GLOBAL STAGE
  Andrew Carter
Our planet is moving towards a metropolitan era characterised by large urban agglomerations of unprecedented complexity and diversity. The challenges posed by urbanisation processes become highly visible in metropolitan areas of over one million inhabitants, where up to 1.6 billion people already live and which should be home to 40% of the world’s population by 2050.

As well as the demographic concentration, the great metropolises also host much of the planet’s well-being, economic activity and innovation. Some have higher GDPs than many nation-states: Tokyo, New York, Los Angeles, Seoul, London and Paris would all figure among the top 30 economies in the world. They host the headquarters of government agencies, major companies, universities, research and cultural centres, and leading civil society organisations; they unite a very substantial proportion of talent and creativity, technological innovation and artistic production. The large metropolises are globally connected and have the ability to articulate and energise the surrounding territories at local, national and regional levels.

But metropolitan areas also have to face major threats. Inequality, both between metropolitan areas and within them, is growing. Increasing pressure to promote economic development and competitiveness generates significant negative externalities that have adverse effects on sustainable urban development. In the metropolitan areas of the most developed countries, growing social segmentation has been observed for some time, which translates into varied forms of gentrification and ghettoisation of the most vulnerable communities. In emerging and developing countries, the main challenges relate to unemployment and informal employment, poor integration of migrant populations and increased segregation in both the housing and labour markets.

On the other hand, current consumption models are unsustainable. Metropolitan areas account for a highly significant proportion of

1. This chapter in part reproduces revised and updated sections of Issue Paper 2 “Metropolises addressing the global agendas” written by the author for the city network Metropolis in 2016.
greenhouse gas emissions and are extremely vulnerable to climate change-related risks and natural disasters. Environmental sustainability demands new patterns of production and consumption which should help produce new approaches in metropolitan areas to key policies in fields such as housing, energy, transport, water and waste management.

The confluence of global and metropolitan challenges has meant that many of the new generation of global agendas linked to sustainable development focus on cities and metropolitan agglomerations and have a decisive influence on their policies. In this sense, consensus seems to exist that metropolitan areas are the setting in which some of the planet’s most urgent problems can be solved.

This chapter analyses the link between six of the main global sustainable development agendas and the key challenges facing metropolises. It takes as a starting point the 2030 Agenda and the New Urban Agenda, the latter of which emerged from Habitat III as a guiding framework for metropolitan sustainable development. It also reviews the climate commitments made by the international community under the Paris Agreement, as well as the measures adopted to prevent and reduce natural disasters in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Finally, it examines how the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing sustainable development and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation are fundamental tools for implementing both the Sustainable Development Goals and the NUA in metropolitan areas.

I. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly approved the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 2015. This multidimensional, comprehensive and universal agenda draws the roadmap for the development policies of all the countries of the world for the next 15 years. It is an agenda that addresses many of the main challenges facing the planet and which, depending on how it is deployed, may have major transformative potential.

From the moment the 2030 Agenda was formulated, widespread agreement has existed that it will require the active participation of cities and metropolitan areas, not only in its implementation phase but also during the process of defining national strategies and the monitoring, evaluation and reporting stages. In fact, the inclusion of a goal specifically focussed on sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11) is an outstanding achievement made possible by the efforts of a powerful alliance of actors: the main networks of local and regional authorities, agencies in the UN system, and a number of national governments, civil society organisations and academic institutions. But, as well as SDG 11, most of the goals and targets defined are directly linked to the competences and the main challenges city administrations face all over the world.

As Figure 1 shows, the connection between the SDGs, the targets resulting from them and the main metropolitan challenges have a notably integrated nature.
But beyond this clear connection, the critical opportunities and challenges the 2030 Agenda represents for metropolises around the globe must be analysed.

Firstly, we must consider how metropolises are contributing to shaping national strategies for implementing the 2030 Agenda. These strategies will influence many of the national policies that affect metropolises from multiple perspectives (climate change, urban development, transport and infrastructure, housing, economic growth, etc.). It is also essential to determine the extent to which the Agenda is contributing to promoting a legal-institutional environment that is better suited to metropolitan governments assuming their responsibilities. But what is certain is that, on a global scale and in general terms, the governments of metropolises and big cities have little capacity to influence national agendas.

There is still a long way to go. The Local and Regional Governments’ Report to the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) prepared by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) in 2019 details the limited participation of metropolitan governments in the governance structures set up...
by national governments to design, implement and monitor the 2030 Agenda (Gold, 2019). This may be seen as symptomatic of the problem, given that large urban conurbations are where many of the challenges that need to be addressed are being played out. All the more so, given the dynamism and commitment to the SDGs shown by large metropolises around the world.

Secondly, the 2030 Agenda is an excellent opportunity for metropolitan governments to improve the processes of designing and implementing their public policies. It aims to approach sustainable development from a holistic and integrated perspective, appealing to shared challenges at global level; to operate inclusively, incorporating key stakeholders, especially the most vulnerable, and thereby mobilise the resources available in the territory; and to measure the results obtained with a focus on accountability and learning from experience. All of this makes the 2030 Agenda a road map with major transformative potential and more and more metropolitan governments are referring to it when defining their plans and strategies on sustainable development.

Despite lacking the resources and, particularly, the competences necessary, metropolises are responding to the great challenges they face with innovative and effective solutions that are serving, more or less explicitly, to contribute to the implementation of the SDGs. UCLG set out some of these practices in its report to the HLPF in New York (GOLD, 2019). The document shows how big cities are trying to deal, among many other things, with problems as complex as the fragmentation and the segregation of the most vulnerable groups; inequality, social exclusion and precarious access to basic rights and services; unemployment and informal work; and pollution and the impact of natural disasters. They do this through ambitious policies in diverse areas such as decent housing, sustainable transport, education, gender equality and the solidarity economy.

In this context, it is important that metropolises report their contributions to the 2030 Agenda and to sustainable development, and that they do so with a dual purpose. On the one hand, they should provide accountability of their public policies, subjecting them to the monitoring and scrutiny of citizens; and on the other, they should share their experiences and capitalise on solutions with other cities and operators. However, only a small number of cities are able to follow New York in producing a Local Voluntary Review (NYC Mayors Office for International Affairs, 2018 and 2019). The information and monitoring systems available to them (when they are available at all) are often precarious and poorly adapted to the system of indicators designed by the UN for monitoring the SDGs. This is an issue of great relevance. If disaggregated information is not available on the agenda’s implementation in large cities, only a blurred perspective of its impacts can be obtained. Hence, increasing numbers of initiatives are being launched at international, national and local levels to support cities in their effort to measure their contribution to different goals and objectives.

The 2030 Agenda represents a good opportunity for metropolises to consolidate their recognition as key actors in sustainable development processes: key in their territories, where they can mobilise and organise the main development actors and link them to a shared development
process; and key worldwide, through active participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of an agenda that should set the course of the planet’s development until 2030. In this sense, it also gives them the chance to access new opportunities in the form of financial resources for development (national, international and private), knowledge and experience, new modalities of shared management (especially public-private collaboration), and innovative solutions, among others.

II. The New Urban Agenda

The New Urban Agenda (NUA), which emerged from the Habitat III Conference held in Quito in 2016, proposes a new development model for conurbations that encompasses every aspect of sustainable development, with the goal of advancing towards new standards of equity, well-being and prosperity for all. In this framework, the specific references in the NUA to metropolitan challenges focus on four main themes:

Governance

- Effective metropolitan multilevel governance across administrative borders, and based on functional territories.
- Metropolitan authorities with the necessary powers – clear competencies – and financial resources.
- Metropolitan governance that is inclusive and encompasses various legal frameworks and reliable financing mechanisms, including sustainable debt management, as applicable.

Planning

- Metropolitan plans that encourage synergies and interactions between urban areas of all sizes and their peri-urban and rural surroundings.
- Support for sustainable regional infrastructure projects that stimulate sustainable economic activity, and for the equitable growth of regions across the urban-rural continuum.
- Promotion of inter-municipal co-operation mechanisms as effective instruments for performing municipal and metropolitan administrative tasks, delivering public services and promoting local and regional development.

The use of digital platforms and tools, including geospatial information systems, will be encouraged in order to improve long-term integrated urban and territorial planning and design, land administration and management, and access to urban and metropolitan services.

Sustainable transport

- The formulation of measures to develop common mechanisms and frameworks to evaluate the wider benefits of urban and metropolitan transport schemes, including impacts on the environment, the economy, social cohesion, quality of life, accessibility, road safety, public health and action on climate change, among other things.
• The development of mechanisms and frameworks for sustainable, open and transparent procurement and regulation of transport and mobility services in urban and metropolitan areas, including new technologies that enable shared mobility services.

• The development of clear, transparent and accountable contractual relationships between metropolitan authorities and transport and mobility service providers, in particular on data management, thereby protecting the public interest and individual privacy and defining mutual obligations.

• The development of sustainable urban and metropolitan mobility and transport plans.

Climate change and resilience

• The development of feasible solutions to climate and disaster risks in cities and human settlements.

• The establishment of mechanisms to collaborate with stakeholders who can facilitate investments in urban and metropolitan infrastructure, buildings and other urban assets, and mechanisms to enable local populations to meet their financial and housing needs.

In addition to these explicit references, which we might regard as limited to the metropolitan environment, the NUA is a guide for directing the efforts of all the actors operating in a city (and a metropolis). To this end, using a universal, integrated and inclusive approach it seeks to promote cities that provide: 1) the right to adequate housing as a basic component of the right to an adequate standard of living without discrimination; 2) universal access to safe and affordable drinking water and sanitation; 3) equal access for all to public goods and quality services in areas such as food security and nutrition, health, education, infrastructure, mobility and transportation, energy, air quality and livelihoods; 4) civic participation and engagement, cohesion and social inclusion; 5) women's effective participation and equal rights in all fields and in leadership at all decision-making levels; 6) natural disaster risk reduction; 7) lasting, inclusive and sustainable economic growth; and 8) the restoration and promotion of the city's ecosystems, water, natural habitats and biodiversity.

For the first time in a worldwide pact, the NUA includes the concept of the "right to the city". With the entire system supported by three "facilitators" of sustainable urban development: local fiscal systems, urban planning, and the provision of basic services and infrastructure. In this context, the NUA presents three challenges for metropolises and other actors operating in cities.

Firstly, there is a need to define and specify the scope of some of the most innovative concepts in the NUA, particularly the right to the city. While this is not a new concept, its inclusion in the NUA was strongly resisted, and it was limited to the formulation of a vision of an ideal city: one that fosters prosperity and quality of life for all; that facilitates equal use and enjoyment; and that is "just, safe, healthy, accessible, affordable, resilient and sustainable". This is, in any event, a concept with enormous potential and one that offers a frame of reference for devising more sustainable and inclusive urbanisation processes.

9. The "right to the city" was first coined in 1968 by Henri Lefebvre in his book Le Droit à la ville.
Secondly, the actors operating in cities and metropolises need to advance the roll-out of the NUA. National governments must review their legislation and urban development policies in the light of what is agreed in the NUA, and cities and metropolises must work to ensure that national governments revise their policies effectively and align their own development plans (strategic and sectorial) with its guidelines.

All of this will require an integrated approach to sustainable urban development. Development plans – key elements in the implementation of the NUA – must ensure coherence between the various sectors and public policies involved in the development of cities and metropolises (regional planning, economic growth, social inclusion, the environment, resilience, housing, transport, waste management, etc.). In addition, there is a need to continue advocating for forums that bring together the various tiers of government operating in a city (national government and regional, metropolitan and local authorities), as well as mechanisms for forging links with the other stakeholders active in the city (civil society, academia, the private sector, etc.), thereby ensuring their involvement in every stage of the formulation and implementation of public policies (design, execution, monitoring and evaluation).

For the roll-out of the NUA in cities and metropolises to be viable, there is a need to continue demanding that national governments guarantee a favourable environment to ensure that local authorities are able to operate (decentralisation, clarity in the assigning of powers and responsibilities, sufficient financial, human and technological resources, etc.). This is even more important in the metropolitan context given that in most countries, metropolitan governance is not equipped with adequate competences or legislative frameworks and the financing and resource provision systems are far from satisfactory.

Lastly, the third challenge relates to the need to ensure that there is a coherent connection between the 2030 Agenda and the NUA: national sustainable urban development policies and the processes to align cities and metropolises’ sustainable development plans must conform to both the 2030 Agenda (which provides the frame of reference for sustainable development) and the NUA (the frame of reference for sustainable urban development).

III. The Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

Metropolises play a key role in two of the main agendas linked to climate change: the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Sendai Framework for Risk Reduction. On the one hand, they play a decisive role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions; on the other, they are the tier most impacted by climate change-related natural disasters.

The Paris Agreement adopted in the framework of COP 21, which promotes a transition towards a low-emissions economy that is resistant to climate change, recognises the importance of cities and other subnational...
administrations, as well as civil society, the private sector and others as non-party stakeholders. At the Climate Summit for Local Leaders, held as part of COP 21, 700 representatives of local authorities from all over the world, including metropolises, signed the Paris City Hall Declaration. In it, the leaders of the participating cities and regions pledged to achieve ambitious targets to protect the planet and ensure a sustainable future.

It is highly significant that the signatories set more ambitious targets on reducing urban greenhouse gas emissions than those adopted by national governments, committing to up to 3.7 gigatonnes of annual greenhouse gas reductions by 2030 – equivalent to 30% of the predicted difference between current national commitments and the emission levels recommended by the scientific community to limit warming to two degrees.

Local authorities also pledged to work towards the full transition to renewable forms of energy at the local level and an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Aware of the inextricable link between these climate-related measures, the SDGs and the NUA, the signatory local leaders promised to “join global organisations, national governments, the private sector and civil society to provide a joint response to climate change that protects our planet” (Climate Summit for Local Leaders, 2015), taking advantage of existing platforms like the Compact of Mayors, the Covenant of Mayors, the Compact of States and Regions, the NAZCA platform and the Local Government Climate Roadmap.

It is vital that local authorities, including metropolitan authorities, remain linked to global political processes in the fight against climate change, especially at a time when the United States government has abandoned the Paris Agreement. In this context, large US cities have made clear that they will continue to fight against climate change and other metropolises around the world are also reaffirming their role and determination to meet the commitments made. Likewise, metropolises must do all they can to involve and engage people and local stakeholders in this shared effort. Finally, the commitments made must be reflected in metropolitan sustainable development plans and in actions defined in their frameworks, whilst necessary measures are established to assess the results and provide accountability.

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 is a voluntary and non-binding agreement that recognises the responsibility of all stakeholders in society to reduce disaster risks. Four priority areas are identified in relation to which specific measures should be taken in all sectors, as well as at local, national, regional and global levels: to understand disaster risks; to strengthen disaster risk governance to manage those risks; to invest in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and to enhance disaster risk preparedness in order to respond effectively and to “build back better” in terms of recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The document recognises the role of local authorities several times, as they are the first to have to react to crises and emergencies and to provide resilient basic services (education, water and sanitation, and transport). Cities and regions have shown commitment to the framework (e.g., through the Declaration of Local and Regional Governments at the 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction held in Cancún in May 2017) and have urged national governments to provide the necessary financial,
in institutional and legislative support to develop risk prevention strategies and take other steps as set out in the framework. At the individual level, metropolises must develop risk prevention and reduction plans that involve all citizens and local stakeholders and coordinate efforts with the different tiers of government with competence in the matter (national, regional and local governments).

IV. Financing sustainable development

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, which provides the basis for funding the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, is another milestone in international agreements reached in recent years. The mobilisation of domestic financial resources, more effective international co-operation, access to new forms of funding and public-private partnerships, are just a few of the challenges it addresses.

Paragraph 34 makes special mention of the role of subnational governments in sustainable development-related spending and investment. Metropolises face this fundamental challenge as well, since most countries in the world lack the right resources to guarantee the infrastructure and basic services necessary for sustainable development.

In this regard, according to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, progress must be made to empower local authorities to generate their own resources (fiscal decentralisation), ensure predictable systems and laws are available for participation in state revenues (transfers) and commit to making the most of locally available domestic resources. Indeed, in a context of scarce resources, local budgets must be aligned efficiently with the priorities identified and established by local governments themselves in development plans.

Similarly, city governments must be able to access both official and decentralised international co-operation funds and alternative sources of financing, including public debt and other forms of funding (private debt, philanthropic funds, crowdfunding, etc.). They can also establish alliances with other stakeholders, especially through public-private partnership mechanisms that provide access to funding, knowledge, new solutions and technology.

For city governments to be able to successfully access these funds, it is essential to support them in improving their institutional and operational capacities through more efficient planning and management systems. These systems must also be more transparent, in order to help prevent corruption and fraud, and more responsible, in order to promote accountability.

V. The effectiveness of cooperation for development

Launched in 2011 in the framework of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan (Korea), the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) provides a platform for the
main actors in the international cooperation for development system to work on new, more effective forms of cooperation aimed at achieving the SDGs. The Nairobi Outcome Document that resulted from the Global Partnership’s Second High Level Meeting in 2016 establishes the roadmap the different actors must follow to advance on achieving the 2030 Agenda, and commits to complementarity as a fundamental part of that (GPEDC 2016).

In this regard, subnational administrations, including the metropolitan (which sit on the Global Partnership Steering Committee), are recognised as fully fledged stakeholders in the international development co-operation system with a key role to play and various challenges to face.

The first is the lack of direct access to the official development co-operation programmes of traditional (and new South-South) donors, which thus far work mainly with national governments. Changing this would help direct these programmes towards the priorities municipal authorities set in their development plans. The co-operation programmes promoted by private stakeholders and especially philanthropic organisations should also focus on metropolises, in order to ensure that they meet cities’ real needs and the development priorities they establish. Interesting examples in this regard, include the city platforms C40 (supported by Bloomberg Philanthropies), 100 Resilient Cities (supported by the Rockefeller Foundation) and the Mayors Migration Council (supported by the Open Society Foundation).

Finally, decentralised co-operation has been established as a type of development co-operation that is naturally oriented towards effectiveness and that can make a major contribution to strengthening the institutional and operational capacities of city governments. Decentralised co-operation provides metropolises with an exceptional tool for defining platforms for sharing experiences, transferring knowledge and learning from each other; for innovating and sharing new solutions; for building bridges between territories involving local stakeholders, providing them with a framework for exchanging and defining shared opportunities; and, in short, for sharing the challenges and opportunities resulting from urban development. By strengthening the capacities of city governments, decentralised cooperation contributes towards improving the processes of localising the 2030 Agenda.

**Conclusion**

The major challenges metropolises face, are clearly reflected in the major global agendas related to sustainable development. As noted in this chapter, large urban agglomerations are the stage on which some of the most complex problems linked to globalisation play out. Although the governments of metropolises (if they exist) and of big cities try to respond to these problems, they generally do so with a significant lack of resources, poorly defined competences and in contexts of institutional fragmentation.

The new generation of global agendas articulated around the 2030 Agenda represents a good opportunity for metropolises to change this.
Although the capacity of city governments to influence the global agendas remains more symbolic than real, their recognition as key actors in development processes has given them unprecedented centrality. The growing visibility of urban and metropolitan challenges is making city governments increasingly aware of the need to clarify their competencies, improve their financing, strengthen their capacities and address their weak governance structures.

Further, the core principles of this new generation of agendas constitute a roadmap for improving metropolitan policymaking processes that administrations should not overlook. The universal nature of the challenges, the comprehensive approach to sustainable development, the appeal to inclusive and multilevel governance formulas, the inclusion of concepts such as resilience and the assertion of transparency and accountability, are basic parameters for creating more efficient and better quality public policies.

An in-depth analysis of the metropolitan reality allows us to state that many metropolises and large cities are offering highly innovative, creative and effective solutions to the challenges arising from globalisation. These solutions are greatly contributing to the progress towards the objectives set out in the global agendas analysed above and they should be capitalised on. Nevertheless, they are responses that are largely palliative in nature, as the capacity of cities to produce structural changes remains limited.

Fundamentally, today’s major global challenges are conditioned by current development models, which are based on the aspiration for sustained economic growth. This growth is incompatible with the limits of the planet and its natural resources. Making advances on structural changes requires the promotion of processes that aim to redefine these economic models and generate the local and global consensus necessary for this. The 2030 Agenda and the other global sustainable development agendas offer a good framework for progress and have transformative potential. But there is still a long way to go. Along the way, metropolises can play a decisive role.

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Urban Britain today is divided, with its political divides mapping onto its economic ones. On no issue is this divide so pronounced as on the country’s European Union membership. The vote to leave the EU is often characterised as a protest by people in “left-behind” places, where voters felt ignored by national politicians (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018).

Increasing economic divides – for example in relation to wages, welfare spend per capita and employment rates – at least partially explain the recent political divides that have opened up across the country. Mansfield, a small city in the east Midlands where resident wages in 2017 were 19% below the national average, saw a 70% vote to leave – the highest share of any UK city. At the other end of the spectrum, Reading, a larger city in England’s south-east – where resident wages in 2017 were 18% above the national average and welfare payments in 2016/17 were £1,100 lower per person than in Mansfield – voted to remain (Centre for Cities, 2018).

But in practice, whether a city is on the “leave” or “remain” side of the debate, the fact is that Britain’s cities have precious little scope to influence their future relationship with the EU now the referendum is over.

The UK’s centralised political and economic system means that Britain’s cities, unlike cities in most of Europe and North America, are unable to chart their own path. They cannot choose to pursue regulatory alignments with the EU, they cannot offer bridging finance to businesses struggling with Brexit uncertainty, and they have limited capacity, beyond the rhetorical, to establish independent partnerships and alliances with international organisations and businesses.

This article outlines why this centralisation is a problem, and why the UK government, as part of its post-Brexit strategy, needs to devolve more power to its cities. To a large extent, this case is couched in the terms of economic growth but it also has a related political rationale.

Britain’s cities cannot and will not become more active partners in international initiatives without having meaningful powers to implement economic policy within their own jurisdictions. If this power is forthcoming then Britain’s cities could become real partners in driving forward a global urban agenda.
I. City economies in the UK today

The case for further devolution to Britain’s cities, allowing them to engage effectively with global initiatives, must be grounded in the present-day economies of those cities. It is their power – or lack thereof – to influence the local economy that ultimately determines how effective a partner any UK city can be in global policy, regulatory and governance initiatives.

Brexit and city economies today

The EU is the biggest export market for all of Britain’s large urban areas, with many sending more than half of their exports to the EU. Even Aberdeen, the city least reliant on EU exports, sends 30% of its exports to EU countries (Whearty, 2019).

Several studies have explored the potential economic impacts different forms of Brexit might have on different parts of the country. Some suggest that a “soft Brexit” customs union style deal might provide some short to medium-term shelter to the manufacturing-intensive parts of the country—mainly in the north and the Midlands—whilst having more immediate negative economic impacts for those places—mainly in the south-east—that rely on service exports to the EU and have a greater share of EU migrants in their workforce. Others suggest that under any Leave scenario, because of the intricate “just-in-time” supply chains that many manufacturing companies rely on it is manufacturing-intensive regions that will be hit the hardest (Clayton and Overman, 2017; Chen et al., 2018; HM Government, 2016).

What all of these studies agree on is that whichever Brexit deal is struck will have a negative impact on future economic growth for all places across the UK in the short to medium term.

What is also not in doubt is that British cities have limited powers and resources to mitigate the negative economic impacts associated with Brexit. For example, British cities are unable to support local businesses with bridging finance when they believe a business is suffering due to Brexit uncertainty. While this type of support should be used sparingly and only where there is a compelling business case, it is still a capability that cities should have in order to support their local economies.

Productivity in city economies today

The economic challenges arising from Brexit are merely the most recent story in a longer-term narrative of economic divergence between Britain’s most and least prosperous cities.

One of the main reasons for these differences in economic outcomes across Britain is the differing productivity – the average output of each worker – across the country. Even though the UK has record employment levels across the country, the quality of those jobs has been uneven, affecting productivity and wages. While the UK’s productivity woes have been subject to a great deal of comment and analysis in
recent years, there has been much less consideration of how these play out across the country, and the implications of this geography for the national picture.

Economic activity in the UK is not evenly or randomly distributed across the country — it is clustered in cities, where jobs and businesses are concentrated. Great Britain’s 62 largest urban areas account for 9% of land, but 63% of national economic output.

As centres of employment, innovation and trade, cities should be leading the way on productivity. But research shows that the UK economy is being held back by the underperformance of many of its cities outside the greater south-east. For example, in Britain:

48 out of 62 cities were below the national average for productivity (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Productivity of British Cities (2017)**

Of the 14 cities that were above the national average, ten were in the greater south-east. Cities located in England’s greater south-east are 44% more productive than cities elsewhere in the country.¹

In contrast to London’s strong performance, most of the UK’s next largest cities underperform the nation as a whole. As Figure 2 shows, only
Bristol consistently performs better than the national average on a range of indicators. This underperformance is even starker when they are compared to their European counterparts (Bessis, 2015).

**Figure 2: Economic performance of Britain’s biggest cities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Gross value added (GVA) per worker 2017 (£)</th>
<th>Employment Rate 2017 (%)</th>
<th>Business start-ups 2017 (per 10,000 population)</th>
<th>Working age population with qualification at NVQ4 or above 2017 (%)</th>
<th>Average weekly workplace earnings 2018 (£)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>50,437</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>526</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>47,922</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>43,933</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>45,888</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Average</td>
<td>57,632</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: red indicates below national average performance, green indicates above national average performance.

This means that a big part of improving the productivity of the UK as a whole will be focusing on addressing the below-average productivity performance of most British cities.

**II. The future of UK city economies**

For many UK cities, their current challenging economic conditions will only be compounded in the future. Even the most advantageous Brexit deal will have a negative impact on future economic growth for all places across the UK in the short to medium term. And over the longer term, places that are already struggling are likely to be worst hit in terms of lost productivity and jobs and lower wages, further exacerbating the country’s already unbalanced economic and political geography.

This is because places that are more productive and have highly skilled workforces will find it easier to adapt to economic changes. Cities such as London, Reading and Edinburgh are home to large highly skilled workforces, significant numbers of innovative firms and strong business networks, all of which will greatly assist them in reinventing their economies to reflect changed circumstances.

Furthermore, other research that maps which cities are most at risk of losing jobs to automation in coming years finds that it is cities with relatively weak economies in the north and the Midlands that are most vulnerable to job losses, while more prosperous cities in the south of England will be less affected.

Significantly, the cities that are most at risk from automation-related job losses also tended to vote to leave the EU. The implication
is that, if patterns of job creation in the future reflect those of the past, the political divides revealed by the Brexit referendum result will likely grow wider. For example, British cities lack the powers to align themselves with future EU regulatory standards that could constrain technology companies and push for a better deal on automation.

III. Why devolution?

The problem

The UK’s economic performance problems are both profound and long-standing. British cities have long been restricted by the centralised nature of the UK’s political system. For example, in 2009 cities raised just 17% of their income from local taxation, compared to the OECD average of 55%. The level of taxes controlled locally or regionally is about ten times greater in Canada, seven times more in Sweden and nearly six times higher in Germany (Blöchliger and Petzold, 2009). And while British cities are able to raise some funds, strict government rules and regulations mean that this is autonomy more in name than in reality.

The constrained fiscal and policy context of UK cities also means that they tend to be less involved in international initiatives and networks. A case in point is the limited implementation of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at urban level in the UK, compared to cities in other European countries. While in many European countries, progress towards the achievement of the SDGs has been undertaken on the regional/state and municipal level (GOLD, 2018), this is not the case in the UK, where the implementation of these goals has been led by national, rather than local, policymakers.

Responsibility for the delivery of the goals in the UK appears to rest solely with central government (Department for International Development 2019). As the widespread localisation of responsibility for SDG implementation in other countries suggests, there is nothing intrinsic to SDG implementation that requires such a centralised approach. It is a product of the UK’s failure to give autonomy to cities that prevent them from tailoring policy to their own needs.

The solution

It would be a missed opportunity if leaving the EU led to further centralisation of power at a national level in the UK. Instead, there should be a renewed impetus and refreshed approach to the process of devolution, particularly in England.

Giving cities more control over the issues that affect the daily lives of the people that live and work in them would make sound economic and political sense even if Britain had voted to remain in the EU. That it voted to leave, revealing stark political and economic divides within the country, makes the case for the wholesale devolution of policies to cities even more compelling.
Against this backdrop, England’s new metro mayors are a radical innovation with the potential to change England’s government substantially. Although the formal powers available to them and the combined authorities which they convene are currently limited, they represent a building block in a potentially bigger edifice.

Places with metro mayors now have the ability to tailor policy to do just this, with some powers over skills, planning and transport, in particular. When the Mayor of London is included, they have a mandate which covers one-third of England’s population. Whilst their powers are currently limited, they are already expanding.

**What is a metro mayor?**

A metro mayor is the directly elected chair of a combined authority that has agreed a Devolution Deal and is voted in by the electorate in the combined authority area. These combined authorities are made up of several local authorities.

A directly elected metro mayor has the powers and responsibilities to make strategic decisions across whole city regions which encompass several local authorities (in the case of Greater Manchester it is ten local authorities) in contrast to existing local authority mayors (which are also directly elected) or local council leaders that only make decisions for, and on behalf of, their local authority.

Eight city regions have either agreed or nearly agreed devolution deals with national government so far, and elected metro mayors. Six were elected in 2017, one in 2018, and another in 2019 (see Figure 3). The geographies covered by metro mayors are varied. Some are focused on the old industrial big cities, including Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham and Newcastle. They tend to include the city proper as covered by the existing local authority, along with the suburban local authorities on their outskirts. While there are exceptions – North of Tyne excludes the southern side of the Tyneside conurbation – in general, these mayoralties capture the effective reach of their core city’s labour markets, ensuring a focus on the needs of the urban economy.

Meanwhile, Bristol’s metro mayoralty covers both Bristol proper and a significant amount of the surrounding countryside, tying a significant number of commuters with more rural needs, and Tees Valley is a polycentric geography covering multiple smaller conurbations in Middlesbrough, Darlington and Hartlepool. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough’s metro mayoralty is both polycentric and responsible for a significant amount of rural land. The eight also account for different population sizes: Greater Manchester covers 2.79m people, while Tees Valley only covers 0.67m.

The new metro mayors are a key plank in the government’s devolution agenda, which allows combined authorities to take on more functions, over and above those permitted under previous legislation. The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act, which became law in early 2016, states that in order for a combined authority to be given these powers, a metro mayor must be elected for the area.
The directly-elected metro mayors are responsible for setting out the strategy for growing the city region’s economy, and have been given powers over issues including planning, housing, transport and skills. Previously, the majority of these powers lay either with individual local authorities, such as most planning or local transport decisions, or with national government, such as the adult skills budget administered through the Skills Funding Agency.

The exact powers and funding of each metro mayor is determined by the individual deals each of them has agreed with government. Due to different capacities, appetites and abilities to deliver, the deals vary in size and scope across different city regions. The majority of city regions have powers over skills, housing and transport. In addition, Greater Manchester has agreed a devolution deal that also includes control over criminal justice, and health and social care.

### Combined authority powers in the different city regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cambridge-shire and Peterborough</th>
<th>Greater Manchester</th>
<th>North of Tyne</th>
<th>Liverpool City Region</th>
<th>Tees Valley</th>
<th>Sheffield City Region*</th>
<th>West Midlands</th>
<th>West of England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30-year investment fund</td>
<td>£600m</td>
<td>£900m</td>
<td>£600m</td>
<td>£900m</td>
<td>£450m</td>
<td>£900m</td>
<td>£1.1 bn</td>
<td>£900m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The new metro mayors are a key plank in the government’s devolution agenda.
Metro mayors have been putting their powers and platform to use. The metro mayor of Liverpool has introduced a lower-rate £1 Fast Tag toll for the Mersey tunnels under the city's river, while the metro mayor of Manchester has been responsible for raising the profile of homelessness in his city, helping to draw in funding to ease the issue, and has also introduced a policy of half-priced bus fares for 16–18 year olds. All have pursued packages of extra funding to allow them to deliver on plans in areas such as green growth and digital connectivity.

Metro mayors are also increasingly representing their cities on the global stage. Birmingham's metro mayor has been the public face of the city's successful bid for the 2022 Commonwealth Games, and metro mayors and their combined authorities are increasingly providing representation in international city networks; with Manchester's metro mayor forming part of the METROPOLIS network and Liverpool's metro mayor speaking of the need to create new international city networks. Examples also exist of metro mayors fronting trade missions: Sheffield's metro mayor recently led a pan-northern delegation to China. But they are hamstrung by their present reliance on soft power for international influence.

Over time, it is anticipated that the powers and responsibilities of the metro mayors will increase, as has happened in London. The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act is an enabling piece of legislation that
allows for the devolution of any domestic central government responsibility. The shape and pace of future devolution under this model will ultimately be determined by the willingness and capacity of local and national politicians to reach agreement on what additional functions should be devolved.

What can metro mayors do to soften the impact of Brexit?

Metro mayors presently have limited scope to cushion the likely negative economic impacts Brexit is expected to bring. However, metro mayors are taking steps to safeguard their cities and their inhabitants from the perceived negative consequences of Brexit.

In London, for example, Mayor Sadiq Khan’s “London is Open” campaign clearly expresses the city authority’s support for migrants and businesses that may be disheartened by the vote to leave the EU. However, this campaign is reliant on the mayor using his “soft” powers – his ability to set the agenda through publicity and lobbying – rather than on any concrete policies the mayor or the London Assembly can enact. Much more of this sort of activity could be done if Metro Mayors were empowered to do so.

On the international level, cities with guaranteed budget settlements from central government tend to be better placed to produce credible public investment plans that provide international investors and companies with confidence when they are looking to locate and invest in that city. Those cities are also better placed to meet the demands of the increasingly globalised economy for highly skilled workers.

The next step in this pursuit of high skilled workers was laid out in Sadiq Khan’s planning for a special visa scheme for London, which would have allowed skilled workers from around the globe to work in the capital and contribute to growing its economy. There are some parallels to this sort of geographically targeted scheme in other countries: in New Zealand, visa applicants can gain additional points for working outside of Auckland, and in Australia, some visa extensions are conditional on working outside of major cities. But this scheme for London failed to gain traction with government.

IV. What should happen next?

To build on the progress made on city-region devolution in recent years, metro mayors should be given significantly more control of the total public sector funding spent in their areas, including education, skills, transport, health, aspects of welfare, planning, business support and innovation (in Greater Manchester’s case, would amount to roughly £22 billion of funding) to create an area-based “block grant”. This would enable metro mayors to set out longer-term investment plans and give them greater influence over how public service reform is integrated with economic growth.

But given the scale of economic changes resulting from Brexit, as well as automation and demography, even these enhancements are unlikely to be sufficient in the long run. Metro mayors are also increasingly representing their cities on the global stage.
to be sufficient to deal with the existing and coming challenges many places face. So devolution will need to go much further. Cities should increasingly look internationally for inspiration and investment, learning from the experiences of international comparison cities and sharing expertise.

For their part, central government should seriously consider introducing a more "federal system" for the UK, particularly in England. In the short term, this would give London and the other big English city regions powers equivalent to those currently available to Scotland and Wales, including tax and borrowing powers. The model for this should be the "reserved powers" approach used for the original Scotland Act which enshrined in legislation only those areas where the Scottish government does not have competence – such as foreign affairs and defence.

Over the medium term, we should aspire to a more federal system and learn from the constitutional and fiscal settlements of countries such as Germany, Spain and Canada. Indeed, in Germany the federal states have some limited capacity to strike international agreements with the consent of the federal government. A fully federal UK could see the country’s cities strike legal agreements with other cities, allowing them to take a leading role in global urban governance initiatives.

V. Final reflections

The geography of the Leave vote in the EU referendum symbolises the varied outcomes of many decades of economic and political change in the UK.

In or out of the EU, the fundamental reasons some places have struggled to adapt to economic and social changes will remain. To ensure that the coming decades do not bring a re-run of what we have seen in decades past, there will need to be a concerted push to help places adapt to ongoing change, rather than attempting to fight against it.

If Brexit leads to central government further centralising power in Whitehall, the already difficult issue of adapting national policies to meet the economic and political needs of increasingly diverse places will only get worse.

But if the upheaval associated with Brexit – whatever the final deal – results in more devolution to Britain’s cities, then bridging the economic and political divides in the country looks more possible. Cities will also become valuable partners to international businesses and organisations, being able to plan for the long term and shape local economic policy to match.

Whitehall doesn’t have all the answers. Giving UK cities the opportunity to learn from best practices abroad in urban economic policy, and the powers to match, could help those cities’ economies to grow while at the same time placing them in a position to lead on new international urban policy initiatives.
References


Urbanisation is one of the most powerful trends of the modern era. Since 2007, for the first time in history over half the world’s population lives in cities, a proportion the United Nations estimates will rise to two-thirds by 2050. Much of this urban growth will take place in Africa and Asia, but other regions will also be deeply affected.

The realisation that our future will be predominantly urban has bestowed unprecedented relevance on cities and urban regions in world politics. Over the past two decades there has been a progressive urban turn in global development policy, which acknowledges that today’s major challenges – from climate change to inequality – are concentrated in cities and that urban governance is essential to remedying them. The culmination of this policy trend is the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes a dedicated goal on inclusive, resilient and sustainable cities and 169 targets that nearly all depend on the actions of local governments.

We are witnessing profound transformations in global governance, in which cities are transitioning from being seen as local problem hotspots or strategic sites for intervention, towards being active drivers of positive change. This book seeks to contribute to an emerging debate on how cities are evolving into global political actors engaged in taking on responsibilities that were previously the preserve of nation-states, especially in the areas of climate change, migration and sustainable urban development.