

Policy Report

European youth cooperation schemes in the southern Mediterranean context: One for all, all for one?

Asuman Göksel

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Public
Administration, Middle East Technical University

Özgehan Şenyuva

Associate Professor, Department of International Relations,
Middle East Technical University



This project has received funding from the European Union's
Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological
development and demonstration under grant agreement no 613174

CONTENTS

1. Introduction

2. European youth cooperation schemes in the southern Mediterranean countries: A comprehensive analysis

2.1 The Euro-Med Youth Programme

2.1.1 Main characteristics

2.1.2 Analysis of the Euro-Med Youth Programme as a European policy instrument

2.2. Council of Europe initiatives

2.2.1 Two main cooperation schemes

2.2.1.a The South Programme I and II

2.2.1.b The EU-CoE Youth Partnership

2.2.2 Analysis of the Council of Europe initiatives as a framework

2.3 The Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures

2.3.1 Main characteristics

2.3.2 Analysis of the Anna Lindh Foundation as an intergovernmental cooperation scheme

3. Discussion: A comparative analysis

4. Conclusions and recommendations

5. References

ANNEX

Abstract

This report analyses three European youth cooperation schemes for the southern Mediterranean region, namely the Euro-Med Youth Programme, the Youth Partnership between the European Union and the Council of Europe, and the youth-related initiatives of the Anna Lindh Foundation. All three cooperation schemes directly and exclusively target young people; they are developed for the southern Mediterranean countries including all five SAHWA countries, namely Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia; and they are all fully or partially funded by the European Union. In this context, this policy report outlines the major characteristics of these youth cooperation schemes (historical background, priorities and objectives, target groups, activities, implementation mechanisms and institutional actors, budgets and activities carried out, and participants), provides in-depth analysis of the major features of their actual implementation, discusses the major common issues deriving from their implementation in a comparative manner, and develops policy recommendations to contribute to increasing the relevance of the schemes to their beneficiaries in the southern Mediterranean region.

1. Introduction

Mediterranean countries, and especially those in the southern Mediterranean region, are often characterised by the high proportion of young people in their societies. And it is the region's young people demanding change in their own countries that has been the major driving force behind recent political and social changes, especially in some Arab Mediterranean countries. They protested for improvement in their lives and for more dignity, social justice and for better economic conditions in their societies. The outcomes of the demand for change have varied in different countries: in some, sociopolitical transformations were initiated, while in others the youth faced increased oppression.¹

Within the European context, policies targeting young people have been developing dramatically over the last couple of decades. Young people in Europe have become much more organised, connected and recognised in their societies due to the democracy and freedoms enjoyed in most European countries and the existence of different programmes

that support and encourage learning mobility, although they continue to face an array of challenges.

European policymakers have also been quite aware of the developments in the Europe's neighbourhood, with particular concern for stability and peace. Different attempts at cooperation and communication have been made with those regions, among which the southern Mediterranean has always been a major one. Considering the important role of the youth in social, cultural, economic and political development, a special focus on young people in the Mediterranean region was institutionalised within the framework of the Barcelona Process in the mid-1990s. Since then, a variety of European youth initiatives targeting young people in the southern Mediterranean have been providing important opportunities for empowerment and mobility to region's young people, laying the necessary foundations for young people from Europe and the southern Mediterranean countries to come together, exchange opinions and work together on issues that matter to them. Such initiatives have also provided opportunities for the development of youth work and civil society in the southern Mediterranean region, in terms of both quantity and quality. Numerous young people, specialised youth workers and other people working with the youth population were given the opportunity to participate in seminars, training courses, exchanges and workshops aimed at improving the quality of life and welfare of young people in the whole region.

By the mid-2000s, the European Union (EU) had started to engage with and financially support more cooperation schemes on youth in the southern Mediterranean. While the increase in the number and diversity of European initiatives has contributed directly to the diversification of opportunities for young people, it has also necessitated thorough analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of those initiatives as policy instruments. In addition, it requires an analysis of the degree of their relevance to the realities of the young people in the southern Mediterranean region. Such a need has become even more urgent, especially considering the increased political and social attention given to the region during and in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, where young people in the region acted as one of the driving forces of change.²

In this context, as also elaborated in the Background Study on "International Cooperation and Public Policy" prepared within the context of SAHWA Project's WP1 as D1.2 and as

also refined and adjusted in the context of the WP8 “Public Policy and International Cooperation”, this policy report (D8.1) intends to elaborate on and contribute to answering following questions:

- With particular focus on the EU, how can the role of the European institutions supporting the youth in the southern Mediterranean region be conceptualised?
- How are young people integrated into the EU’s policies towards the southern Mediterranean countries and why does the EU develop those cooperation schemes?
- What kind of cooperation schemes and policy instruments focussed on young people does the EU develop, financially support and implement in the southern Mediterranean countries?
- What are the implications of the ongoing changes in the southern Mediterranean region for the EU in defining and implementing youth cooperation schemes in the region?
- How relevant are the European cooperation schemes to the young people in the region and how could they be improved?

Purpose of the policy report

This report aims at analysing the European youth cooperation schemes for the southern Mediterranean region as *policy instruments* within the wider context of youth policy. More specifically, the document analyses the Euro-Med Youth Programme as a *programme*, the Youth Partnership between EU and the Council of Europe as a *framework*, and the youth-related initiatives of the Anna Lindh Foundation as an *intergovernmental institution*. All three policy instruments share three common characteristics: they directly and exclusively target young people; they are developed for the southern Mediterranean countries, including all five SAHWA countries, namely Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia; and, they are all fully or partially funded by the EU. This policy report outlines the major characteristics of these youth cooperation schemes, provides in-depth analysis of the major features of their actual implementation, discusses the major common issues deriving from their implementation in a comparative manner so as to identify their weaknesses and

strengths, and develops policy recommendations in order to contribute to increasing the relevance of the schemes to their beneficiaries in the southern Mediterranean region.

This policy report targets the main stakeholders and policymakers in the European youth cooperation schemes, namely, the European Commission, the Anna Lindh Foundation, the Council of Europe and the national authorities of the southern Mediterranean countries, as well as any audience interested in such a policy instrument analysis.

Methodology and limits of the policy report

The information provided in this policy report utilises, primarily, the official publications and reports of the three European youth cooperation schemes. In order to enrich the analysis nine in-depth interviews were also conducted with the representatives of the major European institutions in charge of implementing the European youth cooperation schemes.³

This policy report has also a number of limitations. Although there have also been numerous other EU policy instruments and programmes that target southern Mediterranean countries, such as MedCulture, Governance for Employability in the Mediterranean (GEMM), the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility (CSF), Euro-Mediterranean Young Entrepreneurs (EMYE) and Euromed Transport, they have not been included in this policy report for a particular reason. These initiatives treat young people as one target group among others, which limits their explanatory power for the aims of this policy report. In this regard, as a product of the cooperation between UNESCO and the EU, the Net-Med programme could be considered an exception. Although it particularly focuses on youth it has been left out of the scope of this analysis. As Net-Med is a very recent initiative it is too early to analyse its implementation and impact, and its sustainability in the coming years is also still uncertain.

2. European youth cooperation schemes in the southern Mediterranean countries: A comprehensive analysis

In this section, analysis is made of the three European youth cooperation schemes in the southern Mediterranean region, namely, the Euro-Med Youth Programme, the Youth Partnership between the European Union and the Council of Europe, and the youth-related initiatives of the Anna Lindh Foundation. All three cooperation schemes are different in the

ways they are organised, in their forms of policymaking and implementation mechanisms, but they also share the three main common characteristics, as underlined before. In this section, the major characteristics of these youth cooperation schemes in terms of their historical background, priorities and objectives, target groups, activities, implementation mechanisms and institutional actors, budgets, activities carried out and participants are outlined.

2.1 The Euro-Med Youth Programme

The establishment and development of the Euro-Med Youth Programme (EMYP) dates back to the mid-1990s, when the Barcelona Declaration was concluded between the EU and 12 Mediterranean partner countries as part of a wider process known as the Barcelona Process,⁴ a particular stage of the EU's foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region. The third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration (Social, Cultural and Human Affairs) envisaged that dialogue between young people from all the Euro-Mediterranean partners would help by “fostering mutual understanding among the people of the region, integrating young people into social and professional life, and contributing to the process of democratisation of the civil society”.⁵ The Barcelona Declaration's work programme, under the title “Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs: Developing Human Resources, Promoting Understanding between Cultures and Exchanges between Civil Societies” pays particular attention to youth, especially to youth exchanges, vocational training for young people without qualifications and the training of youth workers.⁶

Accordingly, the EMYP was adopted in 1998. Although the geographical composition has changed several times (due to the EU enlargements on the one hand and the changing involvement of the Mediterranean countries on the other),⁷ and although the implementation of the stages of the programme has been delayed a few times due to political and financial reasons, the EMYP has been one of the most sustainable international cooperation schemes in the Mediterranean youth field.

Chronology of youth involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership⁸

1992	EU support for dialogue between young people and for youth exchanges included the Mediterranean, through the EU programme Youth for Europe.
1996	Launch of the EU's European Voluntary Service programme for its Mediterranean partners.
1996	A conference in Amman on "Youth Exchanges between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners" brought officials and NGO representatives together for discussion on the objectives of a new cooperation scheme under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
1997	The second Euro-Mediterranean Conference, held in Malta in April 1997, reiterated that a programme of activities for young people should be put forward soon.
1998	The first EMYP (1999-2001) was adopted by the European Commission and the Euro-Mediterranean Committee.
2001	The second phase of the EMYP (2001-2004).
2005	Before launching Phase III of the EMYP, the centralised mode of the programme was reviewed and preparations were made to decentralise its management.
2007	The decentralised EMYP III (2005-2008) started.
2009	EMYP IV (2010-2013) was approved.

The fourth and, to date, latest stage of the EMYP (2010-2013) was adopted by the European Commission (EC) in 2009 within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and the Regional Indicative Programme (2007-2013) for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.⁹ 35 countries participate in Euro-Med Youth IV: the 27 EU member states¹⁰ and eight Mediterranean partner countries that are signatories of the Barcelona Declaration, namely Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Israel.

2.1.1 Main characteristics***Priorities and objectives***

In the initial phase, the EMYP was based on the priorities of the EU Youth Programme(s) implemented since the 1990s,¹¹ but it was adjusted to the "perceived" needs of the southern Mediterranean youth: the fight against racism, discrimination and xenophobia; greater and easier access to life for young people with fewer opportunities; and dialogue with other cultures.¹² Gender equality, minority rights and protection of the environment and cultural heritage were among the thematic priorities of the first phase of the programme. This is to say that the EU integrated the Mediterranean youth into its already existing youth programmes through the signature of the Barcelona Declaration and since then it has provided cooperation schemes and funding for the youth sector.

Over time, the priorities have evolved in later phases and "active participation of civil society, strengthening of citizenship, the place of women in society, the fight against racism

and xenophobia, minority rights, heritage and environmental protection” were included.¹³ Euro-Med Youth IV addresses five thematic priorities: fighting xenophobia and racism, support for gender equality, heritage and environmental protection, human rights and the participation of young people in the development of civil society and democracy. Also, in this phase of the programme, it is possible to see that the participating Mediterranean countries have identified their additional national thematic priorities, such as “economic empowerment and youth employability, enhanced participation in the nascent democratic processes and elections in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’, and strengthening freedom and rights (minorities, special needs, migrants, etc.)” in line with the “evolving geo-political context in the Euro-Med region” (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013). The table below indicates those of three SAHWA countries – Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia – as summarised from the guidelines of the calls issued by the national Euro-Med Youth Units (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013).

National Thematic Priorities in Euro-Med Youth Programme IV	
Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political participation. • Economic empowerment. • Community support and services. • Addressing the migration issue.
Lebanon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancing youth motivation and commitment to the social and political reform process. • Strengthening freedom of expression and dissemination of the culture of inter-community dialogue among the youth. • Supporting youth employability.
Tunisia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supporting the national electoral process. • Development of local-level democracy. • Supporting youth employability.

When all four phases of the EMYP are considered, it is possible to see that the focus on youth within the Mediterranean context is reiterated through support given to civil society, active citizenship, democracy, intercultural interaction and, finally, as a rather more recent emphasis, through the development of youth policy. As is the case for the EU youth programmes, non-formal education and intercultural learning have always been horizontal characteristics of the Euro-Med Youth Programme.

Target groups

The EMYP’s major target group is “young people”, as the final beneficiaries of the programme. The age group was originally 15-25 and was later extended to 13-30. Then there

are the non-governmental youth organisations at local and national level and their partners, as the beneficiaries of the grants, followed by youth leaders, youth workers and volunteers as the actors and stakeholders in the youth field.¹⁴ Here the major focus is on youth work and its actors. In addition to those general categories of target group, the EMYP has also specified priority target groups as “young people who have had few, if any chances to benefit from national or international mobility activities, in particular young women, regardless of their socio-economic profile, or their educational, cultural, religious, physical or geographic backgrounds” (Mid-Term Evaluation, 2004).

Programme actions and activities

The EMYP works to promote young people’s mobility and understanding between peoples through three types of actions, namely, youth exchanges, voluntary service and training and networking activities. Those three types of activity are operationalised in the form of “projects” prepared and implemented by (youth) organisations.

Throughout the history of the programme, beneficiaries in both the EU and Mediterranean countries have prepared hundreds of projects, funded by the EC. In this sense, thousands of young people have had the chance to benefit from mobility and intercultural exchange opportunities as shown in the following table.

Table: Number of projects and participants in the Euro-Med Youth Programme

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
Youth Exchange	66	216	115
European Voluntary Service	29	111	123
Support/Training/Network	39	122	69
Total number of projects	134	449	307
Total number of participants	3,157	~10,000	7,154

Implementation mechanism and institutional actors

Since its inception, the EMYP has changed according to the needs of the countries involved. In this regard the programme has been carried out following two methods of implementation: centralisation and decentralisation

Euro-Med Youth I (1999-2001) and Euro-Med Youth II (2001-2004) were the *centralised* phases of the programme, in which the activities of youth civil society organisations (youth

exchanges, voluntary service and support measures) from the Mediterranean partner countries were financed directly by the EC,¹⁵ co-managed centrally under the control of two Directorates General, namely DG Education and Culture (DG EAC) and DG EuropeAid. All the projects prepared both by the European and Mediterranean organisations were submitted to the EC in Brussels. The operational management was carried out by DG EAC in close contact and cooperation with DG EuropeAid and with the support of the Technical Assistance Office (TAO) for the Socrates, Leonardo and Youth Programmes. Financial management of the programme in Phases I and II was based on two distinctive budget lines depending on the cooperation between these two Directorates General. For the Euro-Med Youth Programme, DG EuropeAid has sub-delegated the use of the MEDA funds to DG EAC to be used in funding the projects submitted by the Mediterranean beneficiaries; and DG EAC funds were used in the projects for the European beneficiaries of the Euro-Med Programme (Mid-Term Evaluation, 2004). At the national level, the programme was promoted and disseminated by the National Agencies (NAs) of the youth programme in the EU member states and by the National Coordinators (NCs) appointed by the respective political authorities in the Mediterranean partner countries.

The programme's management was replaced by the method of decentralisation for Euro-Med Youth III (2005-2008) and Euro-Med Youth IV (2010-2013).¹⁶ Decentralisation refers to the delegation of programme management to the respective EU Delegations and newly created Euro-Med Youth Units (EMYUs) in the programme countries, appointed by the respective national authorities. It is argued that this decentralisation process allows “the appropriation of the programme by the Mediterranean partner countries and a closer relation with the beneficiaries through the creation of EMYUs.”¹⁷ Decentralisation efforts aimed at “strengthening the complementarities with the Youth in Action programme and increasing cooperation between EMYUs and National Agencies, to bring the action as close as possible to the beneficiaries and to adapt it to the diversity of national systems and situations in the field of youth.”¹⁸ EMYUs have been responsible for the traditional tasks of the NCs (programme dissemination and visibility, supporting the beneficiaries, etc.) and in addition they have been assigned new managerial tasks for different stages of the programme, such as application, selection, contracting, monitoring, and financial management of all the projects presented by youth organisations in the Mediterranean partner countries.¹⁹

In practice, decentralisation of programme management means that starting from Euro-Med Youth III, the beneficiaries and applicants from the Mediterranean partner countries could have the opportunity to directly apply for the programme grants in their own countries through their national EMYUs, and the decisions to grant the projects were taken at the national level. In this management model, EMYUs have operated in collaboration with three key actors: the EU Delegations in the respective Mediterranean partner countries, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office based in Brussels, and the Regional Capacity Building and Support Unit (RCBS).

Budget

Euro-Med Youth I was provided with a budget of €9.7 million for 1999 and 2000, of which €6 million was financed by MEDA and €3.7 million by the EC's youth programme. For Euro-Med Youth II, with an increase of 40%, the budget allocated was €14 million, where €10 million came from MEDA and €4 million from the EC's youth programme.²⁰ In Euro-Med Youth III, a €5 million budget was allocated to the programme for the projects submitted by the Mediterranean beneficiaries.²¹ For Euro-Med Youth IV, the initial budget was €5 million,²² however, in 2012 it was granted an extra €6 million top-up to remain operational until December 2014.²³ This extra allocation can be considered a response to the new environment emerging from the Arab uprisings.

2.1.2 Analysis of the Euro-Med Youth Programme as a European policy instrument

The most significant characteristic of the EMYP is that it may be the only EU-funded programme that is “directly” targeting young people in the Arab Mediterranean countries. As the nature and context of the programme in all its four phases indicate, the EMYP has been based on a very complex set of procedures and political environments from its very start. On the one hand, the institutionalisation of the programme in the EC has been subject to a set of complexities, mostly due to financial management issues, but also with respect to the ownership of the programme within this institution. On the other hand, and especially relevant for the decentralised Phases III and IV, the national political and administrative characteristics of and dynamics in the Mediterranean partner countries further complicated the smooth implementation of the programme. In this section, some observations on the

implementation of the EMYP will be examined categorically depending on the outcomes of the field study, specifically, the interviews conducted and the external evaluation of three phases of the programme commissioned by the EC.

Changing modes of implementation: Centralisation versus decentralisation

From the very beginning, the EMYP has been implemented in a multi-actor setting, where it has been managed and implemented by the NCs/EMYUs, EU Delegations, national authorities, SALTO Youth EuroMed and RCBS under the rules and financial procedures identified by the EC, and has targeted youth organisations as its major beneficiaries. However, the roles of these actors have changed over time, from the centralised (Phases I and II) to decentralised (Phases III and IV) phases of implementation. For example, after the change in the mode of implementation towards decentralisation, the NCs left their places to EMYUs in the Mediterranean partner countries, and the weight of the EU Delegations has considerably increased.

In addition, the ownership and financial management of the programme at EC level has changed along with the different stages of the programme. At the European level, the management of the programme has been shared by different units (Directorates General) and the financial resources have been allocated under different EU budget lines. This has created a complex and complicated structure, which has not always been easy to grasp and follow for either the policymakers or beneficiaries in the Mediterranean countries. In addition, as the interviews show, the high turnover, for example, of the task managers at EC level has interrupted the sustainability of the implementation. Probably as a result of such complexities, data collection at European level has not worked efficiently, and newly created instruments are often considered to be complicated.

The changing role of the EU Delegations from the centralised to decentralised administration has also brought new dimensions to implementation. For Phase I, the delegations were assigned a role in the promotion and management of the programme as a support mechanism for the NCs. Their involvement and role in terms of implementation varied to a great extent from one country to another, but it eventually remained overall relatively low (Mid-Term Evaluation, 2001). For Phases III and IV, the EU Delegations in the Mediterranean partner countries were defined by a more active role, especially in terms

of guiding, monitoring and managing the EU budget at the national level. They can now be considered to be the actors who have the first-hand information, as a result of being closest to the field of implementation, as well as to the domestic policymaking actors. Their increasing inclusion can actually be considered to be an important “political link” (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013).

The EMYUs, which seem to be the most important actor for the sustainability of the implementation of the programme in the decentralised phase, have actually become one of the most problematic elements of the programme for several reasons. In terms of their composition and functioning, they have not been stable, especially during the transition from Phase III to Phase IV of the programme and they have shown varied performance. For Phase IV, five countries had new EMYUs: Algeria and Morocco totally missed this phase of the programme; in Lebanon, the whole structure should have been renewed; and Egypt could select projects but could not contract them due to the problems regarding the agreement of the national authorities with the EU Delegation (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013). Overall, communication and dissemination of Phase IV at the domestic level remained weak (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013), meaning that the structuring and functioning of the programme at this level has had problems with continuity, sustainability and credibility. In the absence of effective national units to implement the programme, in some cases the support units assumed a role that was not actually defined for them at their inception stage. In order to guarantee that the beneficiaries of the Mediterranean partner countries can benefit from the programme’s support measures even when their national units do/can not function, the support units have had to show flexibility and initiative to overcome problems. This was the case, for example, when it was impossible to organise any activities in Algeria and SALTO Youth EuroMed included Algerian participants in its training event organised in Tunisia.

A number of additional observations can be made in relation to the difficulties encountered as a result of transition into decentralised implementation. Within the time span of the programme, the number of Mediterranean partner countries has decreased from 12 in Phases I and II to eight, whereas the number of EU countries has increased from 15 to 27. This situation leads to two observations. On the one hand, the budget allocated to the programme has changed accordingly, creating an imbalance for the overall programme; and on the other hand, decentralisation has decreased the interest of the European countries for two reasons:

the length of the suspension period between Phases III and IV and the inclusion of the central and eastern EU countries in the programme. The suspension period between Phases III and IV has also had rather negative repercussions for the Mediterranean partners because it damaged the credibility of the programme in the eyes of the beneficiaries and the memory of the first three phases of the programme was lost. Considering the beneficiaries, it is also possible to observe that their responses to the new EU requirements (such as the European Voluntary Service (EVS) accreditation) have been notably slow.

Political character of the Euro-Med Youth Programme

The political character of the programme refers to two interrelated aspects: the politics of the programme at the European level and the impact of domestic politics in the Mediterranean partner countries on the implementation of the programme.

The politics of the programme at the European level refers to the reasons such programmes have been developed and implemented as a result of EU policymaking processes. At the beginning, the EMYP had been a product of the Barcelona Process, which actually refers to a regional cooperation model between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries. When it comes to Phase IV of the programme, it can be observed that, to a great extent, implementation lost its regional cooperation characteristics, and the agreements between the parties in the programme have started to be concluded through bilateral talks and individual agreements. In addition, the ways in which the EU prioritises the region has changed over time, as shown by the categorisation of the region under different labels at European level, such as Mediterranean partner countries, MEDA countries, MENA countries and, eventually, countries in the ENP Southern Neighbourhood.

There is also a gap observed between the political character of the programme and the ways in which the EC implements it. As one interview shows, there is a problem with the image presented by Europe, which is criticised for being unclear towards the Mediterranean partner countries and for missing a vision of having an impact. Another pitfall in this regard is the highly strict and technical implementation of the programme by the EC, which runs the risk of underestimating the “human value” and “human component” of the programme. In this regard, for example, the suspension of the programme between Phases III and IV is also owed to, among other reasons, an interruption due to technical bilateral preparations.

The politics of the programme at the European level is also highly influenced by the domestic political dynamics in the Mediterranean partner countries. The appointment of the NCs in Phases I and II, and the institutionalisation of the EMYUs in Phases III and IV, which are considered to be technical implementation units by the EC, has always been a very political issue at the domestic level, which has to some extent negatively affected the implementation of the programme. For the NCs, the national governments were not considered “to play any role in the management of the programme, but have a key input in terms of paying the salaries of the NCs” where “they were responsible for identifying and proposing an NC to the EC” and where eventually “a tripartite contract was signed together by the NC, the EC and a representative of the national government” (Mid-Term Evaluation, 2001). In that sense, the NCs, compared to the EMYUs, were rather freer from domestic political pressures, mainly because they did not select any projects or manage any EU funding for the projects. When the programme was decentralised and the management of the EU funding for the youth projects were also delegated to the EMYUs, the effects of domestic politics were felt more strongly.

Firstly, the establishment of the EMYUs has been a political issue. In some cases, they were only charged with the duty of implementing the programme, and in some cases they were embedded into already existing governmental units in Mediterranean partner countries. In this regard, the possibility of the political turbulence also affecting the functioning of the EMYUs has increased and any changes of political figures or systems have directly influenced the functioning and, sometimes, the existence of the EMYUs. As the Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV (2013) indicates “political instability and the frequent change in governments and ministers in charge of the youth portfolio” have created challenges to the sustainability of the programme. In some cases, the political ownership of the EMYP has been negatively affected by several factors, such as the perception that the programme budget is limited, and that the programme constitutes an additional burden on top of their already heavy load of duties (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013). Differences in political and administrative systems and domestic procedures have also sometimes negatively affected the implementation of the programme in some cases. For example, the procedures to spend any funding from abroad in Morocco blocked the transfer of money to the EMYU by the EC due to its incompliance with EU rules. Also, as a part of its political character, small issues such as the locations of the meetings – which should be neutral

considering the political sensitivities of different Mediterranean countries – and cancelled official orders for EMYU staff to attend European-level programme meetings turned out to be significant problems that considerably affect implementation. Compared to the technical problems, these more “political” considerations needed “thorough negotiations and decisions that are not under the direct and hierarchical control of the EMYUs” (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013).

Perhaps more importantly, the programme priorities defined at the European level have been an important issue of political confrontation with some Mediterranean partner countries. For example, in the case of Egypt, although the EMYU was in place and the EU Delegation invested in the backstopping of the programme, the EMYU could not propose a programme estimate that was acceptable to the delegation (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013). As a result, although a number of projects were already selected, they could not be funded. Another example is where “political” blockages in Algeria and Morocco led to “an uncommon situation” where the EMYU was appointed and ready to work, but had no means to start the programme’s implementation (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013). Such political problems, which had different natures in different country contexts, resulted in a more “tailor-made” approach for the EC and, starting from Phase III, the programme agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries were starting to be made through bilateral relations.

Lack of synergy with other youth cooperation schemes

Cooperation and communication between the EMYP and other European programmes and actors targeting youth in the Arab Mediterranean countries seem to have some flaws. Although a general level of contact exists, especially in the form of attending and/or being invited to each other’s activities/meetings, there is no visible structural relation or dialogue between different schemes such as the Anna Lindh Foundation or the Youth Partnership, especially in terms of defining complementary objectives and/or activities in order to achieve a more comprehensive approach to youth in Arab Mediterranean countries. In some cases, EMYP actors, especially the support units such as SALTO Youth Euro-Med, are invited to the meetings on other cooperation schemes by the EC, as was the case for the Net-Med meeting held by Directorate-General for International Cooperation and

Development (DG DEVCO), or the Youth Partnership activities on youth policy development in the Arab region; however, in some other cases EMYP actors might not be included as stakeholders, which was the case for the Anna Lindh Forum that took place in Marseilles in 2013.

The perception of programme actors from the other European youth cooperation schemes is also an important aspect of the synergy between different schemes. The interviews show that there is rather a sense of comparing Euro-Med's own sources and working methods with those of the other schemes, which results in feeling of an unbalanced distribution of resources. In some cases, the strategies of the other schemes have been considered to be unclear, the budgets or manpower to be abundant, or the image given by that specific scheme to be confusing (as is in the case of Net-Med, which is actually funded by the EU but is perceived as a UNESCO programme).²⁴

The Arab Spring as a catalyst?

There is no doubt that the turbulent political atmosphere in the Mediterranean partner countries had an impact on the implementation of the programme on the one hand, and increased the role of the programme at the European level to achieve its original objectives. This is recognised in the Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV (2013) as the problems of sustainability of the EMYUs due to “the profound changes that affected the national administrations in ‘Spring’ countries” and “political instability and the frequent change in governments and ministers in charge of the youth portfolio”. On the other hand, the extension of EuroMed Youth IV with an extra €6 million budget in 2012 can be considered a signifier of the importance given to the Arab Spring in relation to its focus on youth. In addition, in this phase, identification of national priorities such as “political participation” (Egypt), “youth motivation in social and political reform process”, “freedom of expression” (Lebanon), “support to national electoral process”, and “development of local-level democracy” (Tunisia) shows that the “evolving geo-political context” has had an impact on the programme's implementation.

From a more general perspective, the Arab Spring also brings the risk of the elimination of a special focus on youth, by streamlining the youth-related issues in many other programmes targeting the southern neighbourhood within the context of the new European

Neighbourhood Policy. As one of the interviewees indicated, there is the perception of the youth as an enormous component of the population in Arab countries, which makes it difficult to target young people's problems through specific exchange programmes. It seems that the approach of the new ENP shifts towards the priorities of ensuring stability and socioeconomic development in the region, in which youth is a vital component but not a direct beneficiary of the support to be provided by the EC.

Translation of programme outcomes into national/domestic policies

In all four phases of the programme thousands of young people, youth workers and youth organisations benefited from it. Through the funding provided, the programme aims at an ultimate contribution to active citizenship, democracy, civil society and youth policy in the Mediterranean partner countries; however, it is a difficult task to identify such impact.

The numbers show that the programme has been instrumental in providing funding for youth and youth organisations, which generally have low budgets and scarce domestic and international financial support especially in the context of youth work activities (Mid-Term Evaluation, 2001). Through such support, it has contributed to “the democratisation of civil society in countries where youth policies and structures are characterised by a top-down approach, by promoting associative life among young people” (Mid-Term Evaluation, 2001). However, especially considering deeply different national youth work realities in those countries, as well as their institutional, political, social and cultural differences, the question of how the experiences gained in the programme activities can/should be transferred into national realities and policy systems remains unattended in the absence of any mechanisms defined at programme level. The EMYUs in Phase III and Phase IV are the actors recommended to link the programme's achievements to a broader debate on youth empowerment at the national level and young people's experiences to the national youth policies (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013); however, the instabilities that they face and domestic political control over them seem to diminish such an impact.

2.2 Council of Europe initiatives

Besides its own youth-focussed activities, the Council of Europe (CoE) also works in close cooperation with the EU. Common action between these two organisations mainly covers fields such as youth worker training, youth research and Euro-Med cooperation. Two major cooperation schemes between the CoE and the EU within the context of Euro-Med cooperation in the youth field are the South Programme (SP) I and II begun in 2012 and the Youth Partnership started in 1998.

2.2.1 Two main cooperation schemes

2.2.1.a The South Programme I and II

The EU and the CoE launched the joint programme “Strengthening democratic reform in the Southern Neighbourhood” (South Programme I) in January 2012, mainly as a response to the Arab Spring, aiming to “accompany democratic and political reforms in the Southern Mediterranean countries, following a demand driven and targeted approach”.²⁵

SP I is significant for being the first ever joint programme by the EU and the CoE in the southern Mediterranean. The programme is structured around the priority themes of the CoE, namely rule of law, human rights and democracy. The primary aim of the programme is stated as accompanying and consolidating the democratic reforms undertaken by the partner countries in the region.²⁶ The SP was initially targeted at Morocco and Tunisia and was underpinned by the EU Neighbourhood Policy and the CoE Policy towards neighbouring regions.

SP I had four specific objectives:²⁷

1. To enhance efficiency and independence of the judiciary by improving the performance of courts and by facilitating judicial reform, using relevant CoE standards as a reference.
2. To promote good governance through increased prevention of corruption and money laundering on the basis of the relevant CoE standards, mechanisms and instruments, and to improve the basic framework for regional cooperation.
3. To strengthen and protect human rights, in particular through the prevention and control of trafficking in human beings in line with the provisions of the CoE Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings and other international standards.
4. To promote democratic values in the region, building on existing CoE networks such as those developed by the North-South Centre, the Youth Department, the Pompidou Group,

the Venice Commission, the Schools of Political Studies and the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE.

Throughout the implementation of SP I, the promotion of the democratic values component became increasingly significant due to the demand from partner countries for the CoE's support towards the reinforcement of democracy.²⁸

The programme was implemented between January 2012 and December 2014, with a budget of €4.8 million. As a follow up to SP I, a new Joint Programme for 2015-2017 "Towards strengthened democratic governance in the Southern Mediterranean" (SP II) was launched.

The youth dimension of the South Programme

SP I covered youth-related issues under its fourth component: to promote democratic values in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean and to ensure the sustainability of democratic reforms. Due to the structure and design of the programme, the CoE's bodies and networks were instrumental and in charge. For youth, it was the Council of Europe's Youth Department that played a leading role.²⁹

Under SP I, the youth dimension was included mainly within the participation of civil society in democratic life and decision-making processes. The programme brochure states that "through activities addressed to young leaders, NGOs and youth organisations, the South Programme contributed to equip civil society representatives with the skills and expertise necessary to play an effective role in public life and to foster a dialogue between civil society and national authorities."³⁰

One major activity within this frame was the establishment of schools of political studies in Morocco and Tunisia. These two schools had participants from civil society organisations, as well as civil servants, local politicians and young members of political parties. The annual seminars and activities of these two schools and their participation in the networks of political studies in Europe are considered important platforms for activists and policymakers to collectively discuss and exchange opinions on relevant issues, as such opportunities are rather rare.

SP I directly targeted youth organisations with the activities that aim at promoting youth participation and a human rights culture in youth programmes and policies. A long-term

training course was organised by the CoE to develop and apply democratic youth participation in projects and programmes of youth organisations and local authorities. 45 youth leaders and trainers from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia participated in this long-term training course.³¹

Overall, young people were included within the components of SP I. Youth was directly addressed within the context of youth participation and human rights, and was indirectly addressed within the citizenship education dimension through the schools of political studies. In the new SP II, youth is not addressed directly and is included as a sub-component of the main themes of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

2.2.1.b The EU-CoE Youth Partnership

The second EU-CoE international cooperation scheme for young people in the Euro-Mediterranean region was established in 1998 with the aim of advancing the synergies between the youth-oriented activities, resources and initiatives of the two institutions. Geographically, the EU-CoE partnership covers the EU and the CoE members as well as the signatory states of the European Cultural Convention and the neighbouring south Mediterranean countries. However, south-east Europe, eastern Europe and the Caucasus and the Euro-Mediterranean regions have had particular importance for cooperation throughout the partnership's 17-year history. There are three major components of the EU-CoE Youth Partnership: human rights education, intercultural dialogue and youth policy cooperation.

Priorities and objectives

Linked to the values and priorities of both institutions, the EU-CoE Youth Partnership adopted the following priorities for 2014-2016: participation/citizenship, including new concepts and tools; social inclusion regarding outreach, access to social rights, fighting new forms of xenophobia and discrimination against vulnerable groups; and recognition and quality of youth work.

The specific objectives of the Youth Partnership for 2014-2016 are identified as:

- “Better knowledge”: a “think tank” function to establish a clear picture of the current and upcoming challenges (including the economic crisis and access to the labour market) and trends in participation for all young people based on research evidence,

sociological and statistical analysis and input from within and beyond the youth sector.

- “Promotion of youth work”: advocacy regarding the contribution of youth work to youth participation, including innovative youth work, partnerships, outreach, learning mobility and recognition of youth work.”³²

In addition, two horizontal objectives were also defined for the same period:

- Cooperation with a regional focus: promotion of young people’s participation through peer learning and capacity-building in specific European and neighbourhood regions: eastern Europe and the Caucasus, south-eastern Europe (the western Balkans), and *the south Mediterranean* within the specific themes.
- ““Communication and information”: dissemination of results of activities among a wider audience.”³³

Activities

The EU-CoE Youth Partnership was established by exploring new areas of cooperation such as youth policy. The core mission of this partnership is defined as “developing youth policy and constructing its links with research and practice”. In line with this, the main activities organised by the partnership include: youth policy and youth work training; European citizenship training; training for trainers; and youth research seminars.

Although the two main stakeholders are the EC and the CoE, the partnership aims to involve various partners including the European Youth Forum, the National Agencies of the EC’s Erasmus+ (Youth in Action) Programme, the SALTO Youth Resource Centres, the European Youth Information and Counselling Agency (ERYICA), Eurodesk, the CoE’s governmental and non-governmental partners, the ministries responsible for youth issues in the member states and research bodies.

Target groups

Decision-makers, governmental experts, youth researchers, youth practitioners and youth organisations all over Europe and the south Mediterranean constitute the target group of the Youth Partnership. In that context, the partnership does not directly identify the young people as the target group but rather considers them final beneficiaries.

Focus on the southern Mediterranean

A closer look at Euro-Mediterranean cooperation within the context of the Youth Partnership between the EU and the CoE shows that the programme has three major components: human rights education, intercultural dialogue and youth policy cooperation.

In this context, human rights education refers to the specific objective of the Youth Partnership, namely the promotion of European citizenship, human rights education and respect for diversity. The activities on human rights education include the publication of the Arabic translation of *Compass*, a series of regional training courses in the Arabic-speaking region, with the purpose of supporting the emergence of networks of trainers and multipliers in the region and developing the capacity of youth organisations to introduce human rights education in their work.

Being a cross-cutting theme for the CoE and the EU, intercultural dialogue is considered a fundamental objective and implicit part of all Euro-Mediterranean youth activities. In this context, the Youth Partnership has organised training courses, seminars on intercultural dialogue, as well as launching the project on the indicators for intercultural dialogue in non-formal learning/education activities as a tool for the organisers, facilitators and trainers involved in these activities.

Following the integration of the whole of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation into the Youth Partnership framework programme with the EC as one component in 2005, there were certain changes in the focus of activities. Youth policy cooperation was initiated in 2005 by the Youth Partnership together with several national and regional partners to foster greater cooperation between youth policy stakeholders. With the increased focus on youth policy cooperation, increased cooperation and partnership between the Youth Partnership and the Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures and the League of Arab States can be observed.

Youth policy cooperation aims, on the one hand, to contribute to the recognition of cooperation between institutions responsible for youth policy (public and private), and to bring about an expansion of partnerships and cooperation with a variety of institutions involved in Euro-Mediterranean and Euro-Arab cooperation on the other.

2.2.2 Analysis of CoE initiatives as a framework

Nature of the activities

Many activities have been organised within this framework of the partnership in order to provide educational tools and support for youth workers and trainers in Euro-Mediterranean youth work. Seminars and training courses, especially on issues of common concern such as citizenship, intercultural learning and dialogue, human rights and participation in the Mediterranean and the production of training and educational materials have been fields of activity for the partnership. All these activities have been realised in cooperation with national partners and with other organisations active in the region, such as the SALTO Youth Euro-Med Resource Centre, the Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures, the Euro-Med Youth Platform, the European Youth Forum and the League of Arab States. In any case, with youth policy cooperation, activities became more diverse and more focus was put on youth research and on new media as a tool for youth participation.

The estimated number of participants in Youth Partnership activities related with the southern Mediterranean was around 1400 across all their activities, including the larger conferences. This number includes both sides of the Mediterranean, not only those from the Southern Mediterranean countries. In its activities, the Youth Partnership tries to establish a north-south balance in order to foster and enhance real dialogue at the events.

Working in the region

The interviews and desk research indicate that while the Youth Partnership was very active in the region and contributed to the youth work through its activities, its relations and cooperation with the local authorities were at a minimum. It appears that the Youth Partnership particularly relied on the League of Arab States and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and that these institutions have acted as the major partners for the Youth Partnership. While from 2012-2013 there was a form of cooperation with the Tunisian Youth Observatory, which is a part of the Ministry of Youth, the League of Arab States still appears to be the main driving force in the background through its co-financing. Relations between the Youth Partnership and the Tunisian Youth Observatory did not last for long and appear to be heavily reliant on personal relations with little institutional sustainability. Therefore, it seems clear that the Youth Partnership, while running its activities and programme, did not have direct cooperation with national authorities and

relied on the international organisations such as the League of Arab States and the UNFPA to act as intermediaries and the main networks to establish such contacts, when needed.

Relations between the Youth Partnership and the local youth workers, young people and national NGOs seem to be strong and active. In this regard, the priorities of the Youth Partnership activities in the region were mainly developed directly through the activities that were organised. Many of the topics that have been developed throughout the years have been identified jointly at these events, from one event to the other. As one of the interviewees indicated:

“For instance Youth Policy Cooperation in general, the participants in the related conference identified co-topics they would like to discuss further and deeper also. From one event to the other it was influenced by the other participants. They defined their needs and their interests. That is much more influenced really by the local NGOs or regional NGOs, country NGOs whatever. But also from the side of the European participants, many of them involved in the exchange programmes, in the cultural programmes.”

Dialogue with other cooperation schemes

Lack of structured cooperation and dialogue with other European and non-European institutions in the region seems to be a major drawback for the Youth Partnership. Despite being an active stakeholder in the southern Mediterranean, the Youth Partnership does not have an established division of labour or priorities with other stakeholders. Most strikingly, with the SALTO Youth Euro-Med, the quantity and strength of dialogue and cooperation appear to be minimal, although at one level they have institutional linkage through the EC. However, there also seems to be a de facto division of labour in the region: while the Youth Partnership focuses on youth policy cooperation and structures, SALTO Youth Euro-Med focuses on training courses and empowering youth structures. This de facto division of labour, however, is not sustainable, as it has been highly dependent on individuals and has not been institutionalised.

One striking example of the lack of dialogue and cooperation in European activities in the southern Mediterranean is, ironically, the very effort to create dialogue and cooperation. Acknowledging the need for structured dialogue and cooperated effort, the Youth Partnership initiated and led the organisation of a stakeholders conference in 2012 with the title “Arab spring: Youth participation for the promotion of peace, human rights and

fundamental freedoms” in Tunisia.³⁴ The symposium was co-organised by the Youth Partnership, the League of Arab States, the Tunisian governmental authorities, the North-South Centre of the CoE, the Euro-Med Platform, the United Nations Population Fund and the European Youth Forum. The objectives of the gathering were to include a large set of stakeholders in an exchange of information and to explore cooperation in the field of youth policy. This event proved to be a successful one, bringing together 120 policymakers, experts, researchers, youth organisations and young people from Europe and the southern Mediterranean region.

A similar (in fact a follow-up to the 2012 event) stakeholders meeting was organised in June 2015 by the Italian National Youth Council with the aim of bringing together the relevant stakeholders involved into the Euro-Arab youth cooperation process.³⁵ However, the success and reach of the event needs to be analysed as, for instance, the Youth Partnership did not participate due to lack of timely communication.

Transferring experiences into national policies

The activities of the Youth Partnership, aiming to provide a space of interaction between young people and youth workers from the Southern Mediterranean and the European countries, have an important characteristic. The Youth Partnership provides change in youth policy and contributes to the development of it in the southern Mediterranean through direct contact and interaction between young people, rather than directly promoting or trying to transfer a certain policy. As one interviewee argued:

“One I think good example was our bigger conference on youth participation in Jordan. I think that was very successful in terms of the exchange between the Europe and Arab countries and participants because usually you always risk to go there as European and to teach them. What Democracy is; how things function etc. So I think it is mutual risk also in the whole relationship. It is not happening on equal footing and mutual respect. There we constructed practices and workshops in this conference around youth participation in different areas, in education, in working life, in civil society, policy and so forth. And show cased for both sides good practices. So that means not only for Europe to Arab participants but the Arab participants also showed their success and their developments in the last years to Europeans. Then it was an exchange also around differences, or I don't know what. That was for me very good example, how you could exchange on an equal footing of positions, practices and so. That influences then also

youth practice. For me it was a very positive event also in terms of the working methodology and the spirit between participants.”

2.3 The Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures

Working as an intergovernmental institution, the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) was established in 2005 by the members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with the aim of bringing people together from across the Mediterranean to improve mutual respect between cultures and to support civil society working for a common future for the region.³⁶ Developing a “region-wide Network”³⁷ of over 4000 civil society organisations from 43 member states of the Union for the Mediterranean³⁸ involved in the promotion of intercultural dialogue across Europe and the Mediterranean and supported by the EC, the ALF is an important initiative in the field, supporting and funding many Euro-Mediterranean youth projects every year.

2.3.1. Main characteristics

Objectives, priorities and target groups

The statutes of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures³⁹ indicate that the foundation was established to “promote the dialogue between cultures and contribute to the visibility of the Barcelona Process through intellectual, cultural and civil society exchanges”. Civil society as a partner is central to the ALF in its activities for a “common Mediterranean future”. In addition, intercultural dialogue, mutual respect, peace, freedom and human rights constitute other values and priorities of the foundation.⁴⁰ Accordingly, the main scope of the ALF is “overcoming the misunderstandings and stereotypes which affect relations between and within the societies of the Region.”⁴¹

Through cooperation with civil society, the ALF targets the whole population with a particular focus on women, migrants and young people. In addition, under the major topics of education, culture and media, the foundation organises activities for educators and youth leaders, cultural leaders, media practitioners and young journalists. The ALF supports the

priorities defined and the activities planned at national level by the foundation's national networks.

In 2016 the work plan of the main trends in the ALF's work is identified as follows:

- “Investment in Youth”: The proposed expansion from 2016 of the flagship debate programme “Young Arab Voices” which will centre on embedding debate skills training in schools, youth associations and universities, and introducing new programme components on youth advocacy and communication.
- “Working through Partnership”: A series of new cooperation agreements have been launched with regional partner institutions, among them UNESCO, the CoE and the Club de Madrid, with a particular focus on scaling-up the impact and visibility of youth programmes”.
- “Opening a new phase of Communication”: With visibility as a strategic priority for the current phase, in 2016 the Foundation will begin implementing its new communication plan, which includes a new large-scale programme of enhanced media skills for youth leaders and civil society managers.”⁴²

Since 2011, the Foundation's focus on youth, especially in the Arab region, has considerably increased. In addition to the main trends in the 2016 work plan, the statement of Elisabeth Guigou, president of the ALF, at the “‘Madrid+10’ Policy Dialogue on Countering Violent Extremism” in October 2015 strengthens such an observation:

“Investment in youth is our top priority, and the Foundation takes the strong view that youth must be empowered as central actors in promoting their own, alternative narrative to extremism...The “Young Arab Voices” flag-ship debate programme is a prime example of how to build a bottom-up approach and create the space for youth voices to shape this alternative narrative. We now want to invest in creating the platforms and tools for this next generation of leaders to play a central role in the face of regional challenges.”⁴³

Actions and activities⁴⁴

The main scope of the ALF's activities is in fields that impact on mutual perceptions, namely, education for intercultural citizenship, culture and arts for social change and media across cultures. In line with its objectives, the ALF organises activities on a variety of themes such as: the empowerment of women; peace; human rights; learning, education and knowledge societies; Euro-Med heritage; popular music; educational and cultural

journalism; culture of religions; and school textbooks and curricula. Development of human resources is given particular importance in order to strengthen intellectual cooperation and ensure capacity building.

The flagship initiatives of the ALF include: the Anna Lindh Mediterranean Forum; the Report on Intercultural Trends and Social Change; the 1001 Actions for Dialogue campaign; Restore Trust, Rebuild Bridges; and Translation for the Mediterranean.

Specifically targeting young people, the ALF has provided some opportunities for Arab young people which were designed as ad hoc programmes for a particular time period, specifically, Dawrak- Citizens for Dialogue and Young Arab Voices. An important characteristic of these initiatives is that they particularly targeted some Arab countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and provided a space for young people to get into dialogue and debate with their counterparts in other Euro-Mediterranean countries. Focus on a south-south dimension has been an identifying feature of such initiatives.

Dawrak - Citizens for Dialogue was launched in 2011, specifically targeting nine Arab Mediterranean countries, namely Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan. Three main components of the programme were “Exchange”, “Spaces”, and “Capacity Building”. The “Exchange” component was in fact a mobility programme, also called a “twinning scheme”, which enabled the exchange of civil society representatives from the Arab and other Euro-Med countries in the field of civic participation and dialogue. An additional type of exchange was also targeting journalists of the region to share their experiences in the newsrooms of other countries. The “Spaces” component aimed at the creation of networking opportunities and dialogue tools at the national level, which also led to the production of digital resources and mapping exercises. The “Capacity Building” component focussed on training on topics of intercultural citizenship, local dialogue and art, all with a particular focus on youth. Dawrak also included a closing event entitled “Moltaqa – Encounter”, a civil society gathering with the aim of disseminating tools, practices and methodologies and providing a platform for debate on the continuation of the programme by adapting it to the emerging regional realities.

Young Arab Voices (YAV) was launched in 2011 as a response to the Arab social uprisings, in order to provide opportunities to develop skills and debating activities for young people across the Mediterranean region, especially in six targeted countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya,

Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The programme was created by the ALF and the British Council. Three main components of the programme were the “regional training for trainers programme in debate methodologies”, “investment in the creation of debating hubs within education institutions and civil society groups” and, “international exchange opportunities for debaters from the Mediterranean region and Europe”. YAV also provided a space for youth advocacy in form of high-level debates, with a digital outreach dimension. The programme outcomes underlined a tendency towards more localised social, economic and development issues such as “freedom of expression, tribal ideology and Arab identity, healthcare reform, the role of civil society, women’s rights, role of media, employment and privatisation, change of cultural spectrum, hooliganism, foreign relations, the role of religion, school curriculum, and environment”. In 2015, the ALF announced that the YAV programme had been expanded at the Euro-Med level and as part of the EU’s renewed Neighbourhood Policy, specifically targeting young women and men as participants and contributors to it.⁴⁵ This expansion has also received strong support from different units of the EU such as the European External Action Service, the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and DG DEVCO.⁴⁶ In addition, in July 2015, the ALF and UNESCO agreed on “closer programme alignment between UNESCO Net-Med Youth and Young Arab Voices in selected countries”.⁴⁷

The ALF provides grants under its Intercultural Programme for the projects of the civil society organisations and networks in the Euro-Mediterranean region. As a part of fulfilling its mission, the ALF makes open calls on its priority fields in order to provide financial support for transnational projects developed by NGOs from south and north Mediterranean countries. In ten years, the ALF launched seven regional calls and supported 218 projects involving more than 600 organisations for their activities such as seminars, roundtables, training, photo exhibitions, video production, books, musical events, theatre productions, festivals and academic research initiatives.

Last but not the least, the ALF produces reports and analysis on public opinion in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Two big survey reports were the Anna Lindh Report 2010 entitled “Euro-Med Intercultural Trends 2010” and the Anna Lindh Report 2014 entitled “Intercultural Trends and Social Change in the Euro-Mediterranean Region.”

Implementation mechanism and institutional actors

The ALF works as an intermediary organisation between governments and civil society, where it aims to bring the needs of civil society to the attention of governments. The foundation also provides recommendations to decision-makers and institutions and advocates for shared values.⁴⁸ It is co-financed by the 42 countries of the Union for the Mediterranean⁴⁹ and the EC.

The decision-making organ of the ALF is the Board of Governors, composed of the representatives of all the countries of the Union for the Mediterranean, and where the EC and the League of Arab States are observers. The board approves the ALF's programme and its budget and appoints the president and the executive director, who manage the foundation from its international headquarters in Alexandria, Egypt.⁵⁰

The main structure of the foundation involves a large network of civil society organisations working on the promotion of intercultural dialogue across Europe and the Mediterranean. In that regard, the foundation can also be considered to be a “Network of National Networks” established in each member state of the Union for the Mediterranean. Around 4000 civil society organisations within the ALF network reflect its diversity, including NGOs, public institutions, foundations, local and regional authorities, individuals and private organisations.⁵¹

For its activities, the ALF also works in partnership with many different international institutions, civil society networks and foundations, with 200 international and regional partners, such as the CoE, UNESCO, the League of Arab States, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation (ALECSO), the Swedish Institute and the UN Alliance for Civilizations. For example, a most recent cooperation scheme is the agreement with UNESCO for a new phase of partnership on cooperation for youth development in the Mediterranean, which included “(a) Closer programme alignment between UNESCO “Net-Med Youth” and Young Arab Voices in selected countries; (b) Building and supporting large scale communication and advocacy campaigns with youth alumni; (c) Creating a permanent line of youth policy engagement via joined up work on International dialogue

events, including the UNESCO youth forum and the third edition of the Anna Lindh Mediterranean Forum.”⁵²

Budget

The ALF is co-financed by the countries of the Union for the Mediterranean and the EC. Throughout 2005-2014, ALF received contributions from the member states and the EU. The distribution of the financial resources in three phases is given in the table below.

	Phase I 4 August 2008 – 3 November 2008	Phase II 4 November 2008 – 31 December 2011	Phase III 1 January 2012 – 31 December 2014
Member state contribution	€ 5,414,460	€ 5,897,115	€ 5,444,000
EU contribution	€ 4,830,766	€ 6,585,659	€ 9,900,000
Total	€ 10,245,226	€ 12,482,774	€ 15,344,000

As indicated in the Anna Lindh Review: in the space of ten years, between 2005 and 2015, €21 million was spent on grass-roots activities, which constitute more than 60% of total ALF expenditure; €3.5 million was allocated to supporting ALF Networks; more than €8 million was invested in grants for civil society projects; and 218 Euro-Med projects were funded by ALF grants.

Activities and participants

In the 10 years of the foundation, an impressive number of activities have been carried out, including thousands of participants. The ALF has also succeeded in getting its activities and messages across with an extensive use of traditional and social media. While full figures and details on ALF activities and number of participants may be found in Anna Lindh Review 2005-2015, some selected figures may be illustrative in giving a general idea:⁵³

- 143,000 civil society leaders and practitioners were involved in activities organised by the ALF and its networks;
- 186,000 people benefited from grant-funded activities;
- Over 500 international partnerships were established through network support.

Within the context of the “opportunities for Arab youth” activities, the Dawrak - Citizens for Dialogue programme reached the following number of beneficiaries:

- More than 2000 people participated in Dawrak with 30,000 indirect beneficiaries and around 1 million reached online;
- 54 beneficiaries have been involved in the “Exchange” and twinning schemes;
- Participants from 26 countries have been involved in the Dawrak programme.

In the context of the Young Arab Voices programme:

- 34,430 young people participated, more than 1000 debates were held;
- More than 1000 debates took place, engaging more than 9,000 debaters with 59% male and 41% female participation.

2.3.2 Analysis of the ALF as an intergovernmental institution

The ALF is actually an institution, rather than a programme, which targets young people especially in the Arab Mediterranean countries. One of the characteristics of the foundation is the way in which it assigns a particular role to civil society, the role of being a partner, in order to be able to reach a wider set of indirect beneficiaries in the societies of the Union for the Mediterranean countries.

There are a number of characteristics of the foundation that require further analysis in light of the interviews conducted within the context of this policy report. Those characteristics can be summarised as the nature and intergovernmental characteristics of the foundation; the role of the Arab Spring in the focus and activities of the foundation; the impact of politics on the functioning and activities of the ALF; the nature of its activities and international cooperation; and the potential for the beneficiaries to transfer their experiences into national realities and policies.

Nature of the organisation and its intergovernmental characteristics

The ALF is an intergovernmental institution. This means that each country has an equal say in the decisions taken. In this context, the interviews show that there has been tension between having such an intergovernmental decision-making mechanism and at the same time having Euro-Med characteristics, defined in the Barcelona Process as a regional and multilateral scheme. Those two methods of decision-making are not always considered

compatible. These characteristics are reflected in the understanding of the objectives of the foundation working with each country in a very good relationship with the stakeholders and policymakers. However, as one of the interviewees indicated it is not always possible for each and every country to be satisfied with the decisions taken, or to ensure that the foundation and its activities are present on the agenda for all the individual countries. In addition, the ownership of the foundation is not equally distributed amongst the member states.

The nature of the ALF is also a part of its intergovernmental characteristics. Although it is not a programme, the interviews reveal that it is often confused with a cultural organisation or political organisation, or even with a large NGO. In addition, as one of the interviewees claimed, there is a contradiction between the foundation's needs, its mandate and its intergovernmental nature. Although it is considered to be an institution, in reality it is not because there is a contradiction between the expectations and the means of implementing them. It is claimed that an institution requires more support than a programme, that there needs to be political will and relative room for manoeuvre.

As the ALF identifies its mission, it is an intermediary institution between the governments (Board of Governors) and civil society. In this regard, the objective of the organisation was defined by one of the interviewees as "bringing to the attention of the governments the needs of the civil society." In this context, the ALF networks at national level assess the needs of the organisations at this level and feed the foundation at different levels. The ALF tries to gather all these inputs to define its strategy and to bring it to the Board of Governors to request funds from the governments in line with these needs. This is actually a bottom-up approach that considers civil society as a partner.

The Arab Spring as a catalyst

The research shows that the Arab Spring has been influential on the ALF principally in two senses. From 2011 onwards, the increasing emphasis on youth in the ALF activities and work plans reveals that the Arab Spring was influential in defining youth as a specific target group for the foundation. The development of new ad hoc programmes, namely Young Arab Voices in 2011 and Dawrak in 2012, the allocation of budgets to those programmes and the extension of the YAV programme to a new phase in 2015 show that the youth has now been

considered a top priority in the context of the “investment in youth” discourse of the foundation. As indicated by one of the interviewees, this has also been reflected by the number of youth beneficiaries in ALF activities increasing to 70% in recent years from 50% in the past, which shows that “ALF is not specialising its actions but providing a lot of importance to the youth dimension much more than the past” since the Arab Spring.

In addition, the Arab Spring has also influenced the strategy of the foundation. As one of the interviewees stated, in the last three years, the ALF has developed activities on citizenship and empowerment of the people, which was not a direct focus in the past and also recompiled such activities for future programmes. Some other ALF actions, such as the Anna Lindh Report 2014 entitled “Intercultural Trends and Social Change in the Euro-Mediterranean Region” have been specifically designed to monitor changes since the Arab Spring.⁵⁴ These activities can be considered an effort made by the foundation for individual people and citizens, especially young people, which, together with gender issues, have been transversal aspects of all the activities of the foundation.

The role of politics

Based on the observations, the role of politics and the political character of the ALF can be identified in relation to the positioning of the foundation and the design and implementation of its activities. The interviews show that the foundation is always at the heart of politics, public debate and civil society. Being in between civil society and governments, it is stated that the foundation has needed to follow the political situation of each country and adapt its speed and steps with the intention of being useful at each part of the process. In cases of political turbulence or the outcomes of it, the ALF does not challenge the governments or political situations at the political level, but tries to accompany them and create spaces of consensus. As one of the interviewees stated, this is considered to be the mandate and philosophy of the foundation, not to confront any political challenge but instead try to offer dialogue between different actors, rather than imposing it. An example of such a role was seen in Egypt. Since the Arab Spring, the foundation has tried to promote the democratic election of the members of its civil society member organisations. But if the government in Egypt indicates that the ALF can only work with established and legal entities in Egypt, the ALF follows this pattern, it cannot force another. Or in other cases, when any of the actors

do not want to get into specific topics such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, the foundation does not challenge the decisions by any means. In that regard, the mission of the ALF was stated to be “not to change or do politics, but provide intercultural dialogue for it”.

Another impact of politics on the ALF can be traced in the design and implementation of the foundation’s activities. The interviews reveal that, in some cases, the themes of the activities of the foundation have also been influenced by the political changes. For example, it is no longer conflict resolution that the ALF focusses on, but rather the themes such as debating for intercultural dialogue that have been introduced in the Mediterranean region. This is also the case for the instruments and methods used by the ALF, which have also been adjusted to the recent realities. It is mentioned in one of the interviews that, depending on its close links with civil society, the foundation has been able to follow the recent trends after the political movements and could incorporate these trends into its methodology in the way it works and in the tools it offers to people with the aim of exploring initiatives from the background and field that can be useful for Euro-Med cooperation.

Trying to keep a balance between the demands of civil society and those of the political authorities, the topics of the activities have been chosen rather cautiously; some sensitive issues such as human rights or democracy have been tackled in an indirect way in the foundation’s activities. In this context, it is possible to observe that the ALF tries to avoid political confrontation by adopting overarching themes and topics such as intercultural dialogue in such a way as to include sensitive topics in an indirect manner. For example, for Dawrak, the first idea was to call it “political spaces”, and then it was changed to “public” spaces because it was considered much better for the ALF to work in this public domain of the intercultural.

Unstable conditions in some southern Mediterranean countries have also had an impact on the implementation of the ALF’s activities. As one of the interviewees pointed out, in some cases the organisers of the activities on behalf of the ALF cannot let people talk openly about what they want in order to protect the young participants in the activities. This sometimes necessitates deliberately setting sensitive political or religious issues aside. In some cases, the political situation in a particular country also creates political scrutiny on the foundation’s related activities. As indicated in an interview, to the extent that the governments are cautious about everything, they can ask for the details of the events and

their content and the political authorities might needed to be given assurances by the foundation in this regard. Difficulties such as mobility or visa issues, which are not only a north-south problem but may also be a problem between the southern countries, affect the efficiency of the foundation's activities. For example, 30% of the exchanges failed due to mobility difficulties. The need for government approval of the transfer to and use of grants by the beneficiaries is another issue of political significance. For example, in Egypt the government refused to give approval to two of the beneficiaries receiving ALF grants within the context of Young Arab Voices.

The nature of ALF activities and international cooperation

Although young people have always been a part of the target group and the beneficiary of ALF activities, it has already been mentioned that they have become an issue of increasing importance for the ALF since the Arab Spring. In this context, it is possible to observe that the recent initiatives targeting young people were considered rather as ad hoc activities designed and implemented for a limited time span, such as Dawrak and Arab Youth Voices. However, it is also interesting to see that to the extent that those initiatives are considered successful, the foundation has decided to continue and expand such initiatives.

Focussing on southern Arab-Mediterranean countries and assuming experience and expertise particular to those countries is an important characteristic of the ALF. This is reflected in the way some of the ALF's activities, such as Dawrak, have been solely designed for the southern members of the foundation. As added value, the particular focus on the south has shown that even between people speaking the same language and with some common culture, there has been a need for dialogue and a lot to learn from each other.

Another characteristic of many ALF initiatives, especially those carried out through calls, is that the foundation only defines the general contours of the proposals within the context of dialogue and leaves it to the beneficiaries and civil society organisations to decide on the topics in line with their own needs and demands. This was also the case for the YAV programme, where the participants chose the topics they wanted to talk about and debate.

In relation to its decision-making mechanisms and the implementation of its activities, the ALF seems to have a wide network of national and international partners with which it cooperates on activities. One of the interviewees mentioned that the ALF cooperated with

the League of Arab states on a specific youth event and with the CoE on training educators. A recent cooperation scheme is the agreement with UNESCO for youth development in the Mediterranean, that brings the Net-Med and Young Arab Voices programmes closer together.

Transfer of experiences to national realities

As mentioned by one of the interviewees, having an impact on national policies is not so straightforward for the foundation. However, there are also some instances where the foundation could have monitored some degree of transfer of the participants' experiences into their own national realities. The foundation considers a close link between intercultural dialogue and youth, and in this context, it aims to provide spaces where young people are empowered through using new intercultural dialogue skills and create networks which can be used in their own lives later on. Such an approach is reflected by one of the interviewees as follows:

“Now we know that young people are drivers of change because our reports tell us that young people and women ...are one of the drivers or they are assets for the change of their societies. Then, we are investing not to change the perceptions but to provide them with all the tools to provoke things happening, benefiting cooperation and dialogue and cooperation. This is the change.”

Through instruments such as the Dawrak and Young Arab Voices programmes, the ALF has intended to build the capacities of the major civil society actors, especially those in the fields of education, culture and youth. In addition, it has provided spaces for civil society within the ALF networks in which public actors from the ministries and local regional actors could come together, and gave some organisations the chance to speak to others. Thus, by creating spaces for youth empowerment, for local authorities and for young people themselves the idea was to create dynamics in which young people could find mechanisms to impact policies at the local level. Some of the activities of the ALF such as Young Arab Voices went beyond ALF funding: the participants started to organise similar events, such as the debates, on their own initiative. As indicated in the interviews, for example, an organisation in Morocco was able to use the methods from Young Arab Voices in a model government in order to discuss the recent issues concerning the country and to give recommendations to the government about their experiences and how young people think. Also in Morocco, young

people debated with the minister of youth about Arab youth identity. In addition, to the extent that the participants could choose the topic they wanted to talk about, the young people in the programme countries identified the themes of the debates in line with the recent developments in their own countries. For example, again in Morocco, young people decided to talk about the constitution because rephrasing the constitution was on the agenda in this country. To measure the impact of the ALF's activities, the Anna Lindh Reports are a useful tool, in which it is argued by one of the interviewees that "the knowledge of the people and commonalities of the values increased in three years from the second report to the third".

3. Discussion: A comparative analysis

The European youth cooperation schemes considered in this report, whose common characteristic is being fully or partially funded by the EU, can be considered distinctive with their particular focus on youth in the southern Mediterranean region. In that context, although there are some other EU initiatives and programmes targeting the region such as MedCulture, Governance for Employability in the Mediterranean (GEMM), the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility (CSF) and Euromed Transport, it is possible to see that they treat youth as one target group among others, making the three youth cooperation schemes in question unique for their exclusive focus on youth and youth organisations. In this section, a comparative analysis of the three schemes will be provided.

What does youth mean in these cooperation schemes? Target groups and stakeholders

The three cooperation schemes under review have particular differences in terms of their target groups and stakeholders. The Euro-Youth Programme delivers to both young people and youth organisations. Its main focus is *learning mobility*, both for young people and youth workers. For youth exchanges and European Voluntary Service projects, the participants are considered to be young in line with an age limit which used to be 15-25, but was revised to 13-30 under the new Erasmus+ Programme of the EU. These two actions are for the participation of young people and, except for the age limits, there are no education, language or social status requirements, making them open to any interested young individual. For the training and networking projects there is no age limit as the action

addresses youth leaders, trainers and NGO representatives. The Euro-Med youth projects can only be applied to through legally registered youth organisations, making it impossible for individual young people to apply directly.

The Youth Partnership projects, on the other hand, are targeted towards youth leaders, trainers and NGO representatives, similar to the Euro-Med youth training and networking projects. However, the Youth Partnership holds open calls for their activities and collects applications for participation, which allows individuals to apply on behalf of their organisations. The Youth Partnership has a rather vague understanding of the age definition of youth, however, and, for instance, the age range of 18-30 is eligible for the Advisory Council of the co-management structure. Besides the age limit in certain projects, the Youth Partnership does not have any minimum educational, ethnic or socioeconomic requirements for their general activities. However, as the partnership's activities are targeted mainly at youth and civil organisations, there is in general the requirement of having some form of affiliation with a youth-related organisation or initiative.

Due to the diversity of their programmes and activity types, the Anna Lindh Foundation has different categories of applications and application procedures, including the direct initiatives of organisations or individual young people. Their projects vary in their definition of young people, but they place no educational or socioeconomic requirements on their activities.

A comparison of the three schemes shows that young people are the final beneficiaries, and are to be reached through civil society and their involvement in the youth work. That is why there is a particular emphasis on mobility in such a way as to increase the quality of youth work. In all schemes, there is no specific focus on the participants' educational backgrounds, which means that young people are considered in a rather broad understanding going beyond being only students. However, to the extent that almost all the projects have an international aspect, some young people have greater potential to benefit from them due to having foreign language and technological skills and international experience. In this context, the extent to which these youth programmes manage to include young people with fewer opportunities is often a concern at the European level.

In addition, the impact on national youth policies or local initiatives is rather indirect, and is expected to be realised through the multiplication of international experience that youth

workers gain in different cooperation scheme activities. In terms of participation in the activities, programmes and projects run by these three schemes, the possibility of beneficiaries overlapping is real. All three schemes work with youth sectors in the region and carry out activities targeted at youth leaders, trainers and NGO representatives. It is very likely that they are all benefiting from the same and rather limited pool of youth organisations in the region. As there are no structural channels of communication and coordination between these three schemes, there is no possibility of tracking down and handling participant overlap. At face value this is not a major issue, and more participation in different projects and activities should lead to more quality. However, in reality, there is always the risk of repetition and creating professional participants who make a career of participating in different activities, with little multiplier effect. Also, if similar groups of people participate in similar activities, though organised by different schemes, an effort to make each of these activities complementary, addressing different needs, should be considered for the sake of efficiency and increased impact at local levels.

Policymaking and implementation mechanisms

Each cooperation scheme has been developed within a different framework and in terms of the mode of operation and implementation each follows its own mechanisms. Although the common denominator in all the cooperation schemes is the EU, it is not possible to argue that even the EU adopts the same policymaking mechanisms for different cooperation schemes. Even within the same programme, the EU's approach to cooperation may differ, as was the case in the Euro-Med Youth Programme. In this case, it is possible to observe that Phase I and II of the programme depended on a more regional cooperation method accompanied by a centralised way of management, whereas for Phases III and IV the EU shifted towards bilateral agreements resulting in decentralised implementation. This seems to be the result of the political environment in which the cooperation schemes operate rather than design. When the European institutions prefer to act bilaterally in order to circumvent any possible obstacles or in order to reach their objectives, it results in major differences in implementation. It also paves the way for increased influence and intervention by the national authorities in the cooperation schemes.

In terms of management, the EMYP has a decentralised implementation structure, which is coordinated by the EMYUs in respective countries and also involves the EC, based in Brussels, the EU Delegations in the respective Mediterranean partner countries, and the Regional Capacity Building and Support Unit. Applications are made directly to EMYUs in the country as well as receiving support from them during the application process. The ALF works as an intermediary organisation between the governments and civil society and operates through a “Network of National Networks”, established in each member state of the Union for the Mediterranean. The Youth Partnership is the most centralised scheme, working mainly through Strasbourg and Brussels while taking into consideration the demands and opinions of the involved partners and stakeholders. However, considering the CoE’s system of co-management, which involves representatives from non-governmental youth organisations and government officials forming joint committees, the centralisation aspect is rather illusive.⁵⁵ From a comparative perspective, the discussion of centralisation or decentralisation of implementation mechanisms is important since there is an understanding that the decentralisation method has the potential to increase the involvement of young people at the domestic level by bringing the programmes closer to them by eliminating, for example, the language barriers and simplifying the application procedures. However, decentralisation also makes the processes more prone to political influence, since there is increased involvement of the national authorities in the management of the programmes.

The impact of politics on the implementation of the cooperation schemes refers to two aspects: agreement on the cooperation schemes and implementation of cooperation activities. Agreement on the terms of cooperation involves high politics from both sides with regards to identification of the priorities and modes of implementation. Partially due to the co-ownership of policies at the EC level and increased reliance on national authorities in the southern Mediterranean region, there are some instances where the cooperation schemes were sometimes delayed or even suspended. This particularly holds true for activities and programmes that do not fit into domestic concerns or politics. Unfortunately, these are also the very topics that form the priorities of the European programmes, such as human rights (which seems to form a contentious issue with the Egyptian authorities) and political blockages (a conflictual issue with the Algerian and Moroccan authorities), as was the case for the Euro-Med Youth Programme. In some cases, when, for example, the Euro-Med Youth Programme was decentralised and the management of the funding of the youth

projects were delegated to the EMYUs, the negative effects of domestic politics were felt strongly. The effects were in play from the very establishment of the EMYUs to the effects of the political instability and high turnover of individuals on the national political scene.

Maybe more critically, the politics and political changes affect the actual implementation of cooperation activities. Many examples can be found where the political problems such as barriers to mobility, namely the visa issue, national political sensitivities, domestic obstacles to, as well as strict European rules on management and transfer of international funds, have severely affected the realisation of the activities of the cooperation schemes. This is actually a common problem for all three cooperation schemes analysed in this policy report.

Priorities and topics

In terms of the priorities, values and topics adopted by the youth cooperation schemes, the comparison shows that they are all built on the further development of universal values such as democracy, human rights, active citizenship, youth participation, youth empowerment, intercultural learning and intercultural dialogue. Those schemes do not only provide opportunities for empowerment, capacity building and personal development for the youth workers and young people in the southern Mediterranean region, but also offer financial support for north-south mobility and cultural exchange opportunities. Especially after the Arab Spring, political developments have resulted in an increased emphasis of European institutions on such values within the context of the youth cooperation schemes.

In this context, any emphasis on the problems of young people, such as unemployment, housing, education, poverty and so on, seems to be indirect and within the context of the cooperation schemes. All the schemes emphasise the development of civil society, especially through supporting youth organisations. The major beneficiaries of the cooperation schemes are defined as the civil society organisations that are considered to be the major agents of change in the societies for the benefit of the young people. Actually, youth work activities developed within the context of the civil society are considered instrumental to reaching out to more young people at national and local levels, and youth empowerment through capacity building, training, exchanges and mobility activities is considered to be part of empowering youth workers and youth leaders working with young people at local level. In this framework, the impact of the cooperation schemes on the lives

of the young beneficiaries is related to the increasing quality of youth work through learning outcomes and competence development, such as increasing intercultural awareness, developing debating skills, eliminating prejudices and increasing tolerance. However, the ways in which youth workers and young participants in the programmes and projects transfer their experiences into their own national realities through the skills and competences that they have developed through their participation remain difficult to identify.

Changes over time: Before and after 2011

The comparative analysis of the European schemes shows that the Arab uprisings were a turning point for European youth initiatives in the southern Mediterranean region. European youth cooperation schemes have been differentially affected by the Arab Spring, and have reflected it through different mechanisms.

An important change appears to be in the fields of governance and cooperation with the national stakeholders in the region. Until the uprisings, the European stakeholders in the cooperation schemes were mainly dealing and communicating with national authorities and relying on them to operate. However, following the uprisings it appears that there was a significant shift, and the role and contribution of civil society actors have increased. The Youth Partnership particularly stands out for its modus operandi as it has allowed the young people and civil organisations to set the agenda for the activities, with minimum dependency on and intervention from national authorities. In the case of the Euro-Med Youth Programme, the sustainability and preserving the memory of the programme was ensured to an extent by the previous beneficiaries in the Mediterranean countries in the aftermath of the political instabilities. Following the Arab Spring, the ALF has started to focus on more young individuals in the region, in addition to civil society organisations.

The Arab Spring also affected the operations of the programme units in the Mediterranean partner countries. In the case of the EMYP the political turmoil affected the establishment and functioning of the EMYUs. For the ALF, the Arab Spring brought closer national political scrutiny on the procedural aspects of implementation of the activities.

Another impact of the Arab Spring at the European level can be observed in the increasing additional financial resources allocated by the EU to the cooperation schemes. Euro-Med Youth IV was allocated an additional €6 million in 2012 to extend the programme for

another two years. The ALF allocated resources for the development of two specific programmes – Young Arab Voices in 2011 and Dawrak in 2012 – designed for the Arab Mediterranean countries. The South Programme was initiated jointly by the EU and the CoE in 2012 with a budget of €4.8 million to “accompany democratic and political reforms in the Southern Mediterranean countries”.

The increasing interest in youth as a result of the Arab Spring was also reflected in the themes and topics of the cooperation schemes’ activities and underlined the importance of general priorities and values in different cooperation schemes, namely, democracy, human rights, intercultural dialogue, participation, active citizenship and youth empowerment.

Relevance of the youth cooperation schemes to youth policy development

The relevance of the three youth cooperation schemes to youth policy development in the southern Mediterranean countries is shown in the way the focus on youth policies is often shaped in line with the critical role defined for civil society, youth organisations and youth work in the national policymaking processes on the welfare of young people. In particular, the youth policy cooperation component of the Youth Partnership and the inclusion of youth policy as an objective within the context of the EMYP should be considered within this framework. This is to say that those cooperation schemes do not get engaged in different elements of youth policy such as employment, education or poverty at national level, but they rather support individual projects developed by the beneficiaries on any topic that may or may not focus on those aspects of youth policy. In addition, the intention to initiate a process of youth policy cooperation does not refer to any concrete policy actions towards the elimination of youth problems in any specific countries, but remains limited to creating spaces for cooperation and exchange of information between the national, regional and international youth policy stakeholders in such a way as to expand “partnerships and cooperation with a variety of institutions concerned by the empowerment of young people in the MENA region”.⁵⁶ Considering the youth policy focus from such a perspective also helps us to understand the bold emphasis on materialising the conditions of democracy in all the cooperation schemes. Thus, empowering civil society actors through human rights, intercultural dialogue and youth participation become the major elements of youth policy development in the southern Mediterranean within the context of the cooperation schemes.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

With the main goal of providing a systematic account and analysis of three European youth cooperation schemes in the southern Mediterranean region, this policy report has provided a detailed review of the existing institutional initiatives, followed by an overview and analysis of the nature and functioning of each initiative. Accordingly, the discussion part aimed to discuss major issues deriving from a comparison of all three schemes. This section concludes the policy report with major issues that makes it possible to develop several policy recommendations for the European level policymakers, depending on the strengths and shortcomings of the youth cooperation schemes in question.

European youth cooperation schemes offer valuable opportunities for the youth in the southern Mediterranean region. However, there is still room for development in order to increase the value, effectiveness and efficiency of the instruments that they have provided. As one of the interviewees indicated, “a complex programme with too many priorities” obscures a clear programme in the eyes of the beneficiaries and not only endangers the message but also limits the further participation of young people in the cooperation schemes. To better achieve the objectives, it is important to ensure the ownership of the initiatives and programmes by the young people, as well as the partner countries involved in the schemes.

→ The cooperation schemes should be designed in line with evidence-based research about the actual needs of the young people in the southern Mediterranean countries, and the instruments to fulfil those needs should be identified accordingly.

The impact of politics, at both European and national levels, on the European youth cooperation schemes can be observed at many different levels of cooperation and in different elements of the schemes. In this regard, some flexibility in procedures and mutual understanding would be helpful at least for the timely implementation of the cooperation schemes. It would also avoid the creation of any mistrust among the beneficiaries of the cooperation schemes in the southern Mediterranean region.

→ The cooperation schemes should be more flexible in a way that ensures inclusion of national priorities, overcomes procedural problems and guarantees increasing participation of youth organisations and young people in the youth cooperation schemes.

There is a clearly observable lack of communication and coordination between the different European cooperation schemes. It is not possible to find a systematic communication mechanism – especially one that is defined by the EU or EC – as the common denominator of all the schemes. Thus, the lack of communication and coordination between different European stakeholders is clear, while a limited degree of cooperation between them can be traced. While each of the schemes organises and supports different and important activities for the young people and organisations in the region, there seems to be almost no structured effort or communication to avoid recurrences. The majority of the interviewees stated that cooperation with other policy sectors in the youth field depends rather on personal contacts, and cooperation is minimal, if it exists at all.

This also refers to the fact that there is no systematic method among the European stakeholders to align their approaches to youth and the instruments created within the cooperation schemes to empower young people in the southern Mediterranean region. This is actually a potential hindrance to reaching the aims and objectives of these schemes. In addition, the lack of communication and coordination actually brings some risks of the inefficient use of European funds or duplication of efforts without a complementary, comprehensive approach to youth.

→ Cooperation schemes targeting young people in the Mediterranean region should be better coordinated at intra-institutional and inter-institutional levels by the EU in the light of a clear and comprehensive approach to youth.

→ Communication should be central to ensure a complementary approach between the European stakeholders in youth cooperation and to avoid double funding and inefficient use of resources at the European level.

The impact of the European youth cooperation schemes on national youth policies in the southern Mediterranean countries has been indirect. Each European youth cooperation scheme has its own priorities, objectives and activities. In some cases those priorities refer more to individual impact on the actors in civil society and youth work in the region, such as capacity building and training in particular skills, while in others they refer to rather broader macro objectives such as contributing to the development of youth policies, without going beyond providing common spaces for partnership and cooperation. In this context, youth becomes an indirect final beneficiary. In this model of supporting youth, there is no impact evaluation mechanism developed by the cooperation schemes in order to identify the ways in which the beneficiary civil society organisations put their experiences into practice as pressure groups at the national level so as to influence the youth policymaking processes towards a better future for young people.

→ Mechanisms to identify and support concrete topics of youth policies in line with the problems and needs of young people in the southern Mediterranean should be developed.

Information and evidence on the impact of the European youth cooperation schemes on the young people in the southern Mediterranean are rather limited. Further research focussing on the experiences of young people and their youth organisations seems to be a must in order to create a (visual or material) platform where the civil society organisations, if not the young people themselves, can share their experiences in their own national realities. Furthermore, compared to the financial investments made in those schemes, the lack of an elaborative evaluation, assessment or impact analysis using systematic qualitative and quantitative indicators for these schemes is a major shortcoming. The general evaluations conducted at the end of different phases or stages fall short of providing evidence of the impact of the activities.

→ A systematic evaluation with quantitative and qualitative indicators that runs parallel to the programmes, with special focus on the impact generated at local, regional and national levels should be developed and implemented.

References

“Political and Institutional Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Youth Work”, in: MOSAIC: T-Kit on Euro-Mediterranean Youth Work, Council of Europe and European Commission publication, 2010.

Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 27-28 November 1995. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/barcelona_declaration.pdf.

Commission Decision C(2009) 5215 of 01/07/2009 approving the second part of the 2009 Annual Action Programme in favour of the Mediterranean region to be financed under Article 19 08 01 01 of the general budget of the European Communities. Available at: http://euromedyouth.net/IMG/pdf/aap_2009_enpi-s_en.pdf.

Euro-Med Youth III Leaflet available at: http://enpi-info.eu/files/publications/EuroMedYouth_Leaflet_EN.pdf.

Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, Identification of a regional programme under ENPI South 2013-2016 for youth and evaluation of on-going programme Euro-Med Youth IV, Final Report of the Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, HTSPE Limited, Project No. 2012/298 514 - Version 1, 2013.

Høigilt, Jacob & Kjetil Bjorvatn “Youth and the Arab Revolutions in Oil States” in: *The New Middle East: Uprisings and Stability*. London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 39–56.

Mid-term Evaluation of the Euromed-Youth programme (2001) A final report to the European Commission - Directorate General AIDCO, ECOTEC Research and Consulting Limited, 24 August 2001, (MEI/B7-4100/1B/0418).

Mid-Term Evaluation, The Euro-Mediterranean Youth Programme 2001-2003 (2004) Final Report, European Consulting Organisation (ECO) and Roldan & Sorensen Consulting, December 2004, (MEI/B7-4100/IB/98/0418).

Strengthening democratic reform in Southern Neighbourhood Brochure. Available online at: <http://south-programme-eu.coe.int/Source/Strengthening%20democratic%20reform%20WEB.pdf>.

Symposium Executive Summary Report. Online at http://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/1017981/3084942/Draft_Executive_summary_report_Tunis_conf.pdf/ca3e95cc-6085-4bb3-8551-62668cab7f70

The Anna Lindh Review: 2005-2015, available at:
http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/sites/annalindh.org/files/documents/page/interno_alf_review.pdf

The Mediterranean University on Youth and Global Citizenship (MedUni) information retrieved from:
<http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/nscentre/Youth/UYD/3rd%20MedUni%20Presentation.pdf>

Online references and websites

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jordan/grants_tenders/files/20110419_01_en.htm

<http://euromedyouth.net/Description-and-legal-bases.html>

<http://euromedyouth.net/Description-and-legal-bases.html>

http://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/1017981/3084942/Draft_Executive_summary_report_Tunis_conf.pdf/ca3e95cc-6085-4bb3-8551-62668cab7f70.

http://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/youth-partnership/youth-policy-co-operation/-/asset_publisher/9NJp35INOPb8/content/symposium-arab-spring-youth-participation-for-the-promotion-of-peace-human-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms-august-2012-tunisia?redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fyouth-partnership%2Fyouth-policy-co-operation%3FinheritRedirect%3Dtrue&inheritRedirect=true

<http://pjp-eu.coe.int/sr/web/youth-partnership/priorities/objectives>

<http://south-programme-eu.coe.int/>

<http://ufmsecretariat.org/history/>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/governance-and-management>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/mandate-and-founders>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/networks>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/anna-lindh-foundation-board-governors-backs-investment-youth>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/anna-lindh-foundation-board-governors-backs-investment-youth>, <http://www.pressreleasepoint.com/youth-and-women-are-central-facing-extremism-says-eu-dg-international-cooperation-and-development>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/unesco-forum-announces-enhanced-communication-support-young-arab-voices-and-net-med-youth>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/youth-and-women-are-central-facing-extremism-says-eu-dg-international-cooperation-and>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/youth-and-women-are-central-facing-extremism-says-eu-dg-international-cooperation-and#sthash.bWrOATwz.dpuf>

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/report/inside-anna-lindhgallup-poll>

http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/sites/annalindh.org/files/documents/page/04-09-alf_statutes_0_0_0.pdf

<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/working-network>

<http://www.coe.int/en/web/programmes/south-programme>

<http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/nscentre/Youth/UYD/3rd%20MedUni%20Presentation.pdf>

<http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth>

http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Coe_youth/co_management_en.asp

http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=53&id_type=10

<http://www.euromedyouth.net/About-EuroMed-Youth-Program,51.html>

<http://www.euromedyouth.net/TARGETS.html>

<https://www.salto-youth.net/rc/euromed/saltoeuromed/euromedyouthprogramme/abouteuromedyouth/>

ANNEX

List of interviews

Name, surname	Position	Date	Place
Gemma Auberell	Anna Lindh Foundation, Head of Programme and Operations Unit	18 June 2015	Alexandria
Eleonora Insalaco	Anna Lindh Foundation, Programme Manager	18 June 2015	Alexandria
	Anna Lindh Foundation, Programme Officer Young Arab Voices	18 June 2015	Alexandria
Bernard Abrignani	SALTO Youth Euro-Med Resource Centre Coordinator, Acting Head of the French National Agency	9 July 2015	Paris
Hans Joachim Schild	Council of Europe, Youth Partnership, External Relations Co-ordinator	10 July 2015	Strasbourg
Rui Gomes	Council of Europe, Head of Education and Training Division	10 July 2015	Strasbourg
Chrystelle Lucas	European Commission, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Programme Manager	6 August 2015	Telephone interview
Philipp Boetzelen	Council of Europe, Youth Partnership, Research and Youth Policy Officer	8 October 2015	İstanbul
Michael Köhler	Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations – Director Neighbourhood South	9 October 2015	Milano

Endnotes

¹ Høigilt, Jacob & Kjetil Bjorvatn “Youth and the Arab Revolutions in Oil States” In: *The New Middle East: Uprisings and Stability*. London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 39–56.

² Ibid.

³ A list of the interviewees can be found in the Annex.

⁴ Parties to the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 were 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean states, namely Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Libya had observer status.

⁵ <https://www.salto-youth.net/rc/euromed/saltoeuromed/euromedyouthprogramme/abouteuromedyouth/>

⁶ Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 27-28 November 1995. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/barcelona_declaration.pdf.

⁷ Malta and Cyprus became full EU member states in 2004. Turkey has been fully integrated into the EU Youth Programmes as a result of its pre-accession status. The involvement of some Mediterranean partner countries in the programme has been subject to bilateral agreements between the country in question and the EU.

⁸ Adopted and updated from “Political and Institutional Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Youth Work” in MOSAIC: T-Kit on Euro-Mediterranean Youth Work, Council of Europe and European Commission publication, 2010.

⁹ Commission Decision C(2009) 5215 of 01/07/2009 approving the second part of the 2009 Annual Action Programme in favour of the Mediterranean region to be financed under Article 19 08 01 01 of the general budget of the European Communities. Available at: http://euromedyouth.net/IMG/pdf/aap_2009_enpi-s_en.pdf.

¹⁰ The 27 member states of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

¹¹ European youth programmes also develop and change over time: Youth for Europe I (1989-1991), Youth for Europe II (1992-1994), Youth for Europe III (1995-1999), European Voluntary Service (1998-1999), Youth Programme (2000-2006), Youth in Action (2007-2013), and eventually Erasmus+ (2014-2020).

¹² Some of these perceived needs may have been / could still be in line with the real needs of the young people, but making a valid comparison is not possible due to the lack of a systematic study of the real needs identified by the young people themselves in the region. The SAHWA Project aims to contribute to the knowledge on this issue, which is a major gap in the literature.

¹³ Euro-Med Youth III Leaflet.

¹⁴ <http://www.euromedyouth.net/TARGETS.html>

¹⁵ <http://euromedyouth.net/Description-and-legal-bases.html>

¹⁶ The Directorate General Education and Culture has continued only to manage the part of Euro-Med youth projects taking place in Europe, which are submitted by European youth organisations to their respective National Agencies or by Europe-wide youth NGOs to the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency. It also continues to manage the programme’s support structures (SALTO YOUTH Euro-Med Resource Centre, Euro-Med Youth Platform). (Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013).

¹⁷ <http://euromedyouth.net/Description-and-legal-bases.html>

¹⁸ <http://www.euromedyouth.net/About-EuroMed-Youth-Program,51.html>

¹⁹ Euro-Med Youth III Leaflet.

²⁰ <https://www.salto-youth.net/rc/euromed/saltoeuromed/euromedyouthprogramme/abouteuromedyouth/>

²¹ http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=53&id_type=10

²² http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jordan/grants_tenders/files/20110419_01_en.htm

²³ Evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, 2013.

²⁴ From the young people’s perspectives, the extent to which the participants in those different cooperation schemes overlap and the extent to which the beneficiaries’ experiences of those different schemes complement (or contradict with) each other require thorough examination. In fact, this is the subject of complementary research to be conducted as part of SAHWA Deliverable 8.2 on the impact of the policy instruments on young people.

²⁵ <http://south-programme-eu.coe.int/>

²⁶ South Programme, available online at <http://www.coe.int/en/web/programmes/south-programme..>

²⁷ <http://south-programme-eu.coe.int/>

²⁸ Strengthening democratic reform in the Southern Neighbourhood brochure, p1. Available online at: <http://south-programme-eu.coe.int/Source/Strengthening%20democratic%20reform%20WEB.pdf>.

²⁹ www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth

³⁰ Strengthening democratic reform in the Southern Neighbourhood brochure, p1. Available online at: <http://south-programme-eu.coe.int/Source/Strengthening%20democratic%20reform%20WEB.pdf>.

³¹ For a discussion of projects developed and examples of projects see *Strengthening Democracy*, pp. 29-30.

³² <http://pjp-eu.coe.int/sr/web/youth-partnership/priorities/objectives>

³³ <http://pjp-eu.coe.int/sr/web/youth-partnership/priorities/objectives>

³⁴ Symposium Executive Summary Report. Online at http://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/1017981/3084942/Draft_Executive_summary_report_Tunis_conf.pdf/ca3e95cc-6085-4bb3-8551-62668cab7f70.

³⁵ The Mediterranean University on Youth and Global Citizenship (MedUni) information retrieved from <http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/nscentre/Youth/UYD/3rd%20MedUni%20Presentation.pdf>.

³⁶ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/mandate-and-founders>

³⁷ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/networks>

³⁸ ALF develops its activities in 43 countries: Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, Palestine, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Syria (2005-2011), Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom.

³⁹ Statutes of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures is available at http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/sites/annalindh.org/files/documents/page/04-09-alf_statutes_0_0.pdf

⁴⁰ The Anna Lindh Review: 2005-2015.

⁴¹ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/mandate-and-founders>.

⁴² <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/anna-lindh-foundation-board-governors-backs-investment-youth>

⁴³ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/youth-and-women-are-central-facing-extremism-says-eu-dg-international-cooperation-and>

⁴⁴ This section is based on the description of the activities of the ALF as explained in the Anna Lindh Review: 2005-2015.

⁴⁵ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/youth-and-women-are-central-facing-extremism-says-eu-dg-international-cooperation-and#sthash.bWrOATwz.dpuf>

⁴⁶ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/anna-lindh-foundation-board-governors-backs-investment-youth>, <http://www.pressreleasepoint.com/youth-and-women-are-central-facing-extremism-says-eu-dg-international-cooperation-and-development>.

⁴⁷ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/unesco-forum-announces-enhanced-communication-support-young-arab-voices-and-net-med-youth>.

⁴⁸ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/mandate-and-founders>.

⁴⁹ The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was established on 13 July 2008 to give vigour to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) dating back to 1995. The UfM is considered to be “a framework for political, economic and social relations between the European Union and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and is inspired by the goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration, namely working towards the creation of an area of peace, stability, security and shared economic prosperity, as well as full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations in the Euro-Mediterranean region.” <http://ufmsecretariat.org/history/>

⁴⁹ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/governance-and-management>

⁵⁰ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/governance-and-management>

⁵¹ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/working-network>

⁵² <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/unesco-forum-announces-enhanced-communication-support-young-arab-voices-and-net-med-youth>

⁵³ The Anna Lindh Review: 2005-2015.

⁵⁴ <http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/report/inside-anna-lindhgallup-poll>

⁵⁵ For a detailed description of the co-management structure of CoE, see http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Coe_youth/co_management_en.asp

⁵⁶ http://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/youth-partnership/youth-policy-co-operation/-/asset_publisher/9NJp35INOPb8/content/symposium-arab-spring-youth-participation-for-the-promotion-of-peace-human-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms-august-2012-tunisia?redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fyouth-partnership%2Fyouth-policy-co-operation%3FinheritRedirect%3Dtrue&inheritRedirect=true



Researching
Arab Mediterranean Youth:
Towards a New Social Contract



This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 613174.

The SAHWA Project ("Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract") is a FP-7 interdisciplinary cooperative research project led by the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) and funded by the European Commission. It brings together fifteen partners from Europe and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries to research youth prospects and perspectives in a context of multiple social, economic and political transitions in five Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon). The project expands over 2014-2016 and has a total budget of €3.1 million. The thematic axis around which the project will revolve are education, employment and social inclusion, political mobilisation and participation, culture and values, international migration and mobility, gender, comparative experiences in other transition contexts and public policies and international cooperation.

