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Dan Rodríguez-García, John Biles & Lara Winnemore
Ines Michalowski.
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POLICIES AND MODELS OF INCORPORATION.  
A Transatlantic Perspective:  
Canada  
Germany, France, and The Netherlands

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Immigration and Models of Incorporation: Contexts, Key Points of the Debate, and Future Trends

Dan Rodríguez-García

In recent decades, and as a result of globalization processes and the new international division of labour, migration movements have reached a scale and a complexity that are unprecedented in history (Castles and Miller 2003). This reality is transforming societies in a structural manner: Unquestionably, at present, immigration is the main factor leading to social, political, and economic transformation. For this reason, it is fundamental to reflect upon the different ways of managing current migration processes. While caution must be taken in the comparison and the transfer of experiences from one context to another, a detailed analysis of models and experiences of immigration management in different countries and regions – both in different European countries and in the classic countries of immigration – is crucial for the purpose of devising improved management strategies in our own sphere over the short, medium, and long term.

Many differences exist between continents, countries, and regions, and even between cities in the same country or province, and it is clear that there is not, nor can there be, a single model of integration that is valid for all cases. Each model has to satisfy the particular characteristics (historical, demographic, economic, political, cultural, etc.) of each location, and there would not be much point in transplanting a model from one place to another. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyze different cases, find points in common, and use the different experiences to improve on our reflections and actions. Rather than an exhaustive analysis of cases and models, this introduction is an attempt, on the one hand, to emphasize the importance of contextualization in explaining the differences between models, and on the other, to identify key elements for debate and general desirable trends. Furthermore, this
introduction also establishes comparisons between the North American and European contexts, which serve as a framework for the other contributions in this book. As will be shown, the case of Canada, in particular, provides some extremely interesting elements for reflection.

**Contexts and Models**

Immigrants are incorporated into host societies in very diverse ways, in accordance with the historical, demographic, political, and social particularities of each country or region as well as, to a great extent, how notions of national community and belonging have historically been conceived. Forms of incorporation are, thus, closely linked with colonial history, the emergence of nation-states, and the resulting policies of exclusion (segregation) and inclusion (integration) on the basis of citizenship.

Generally speaking, two basic criteria exist for gaining access, with differing degrees and combinations, to nationality and citizenship\(^1\): first, the principle of *jus soli* (right of the soil or territory, or birthright

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1. It is important to distinguish between nationality (the condition of belonging or the legal status of a person born or naturalized in a nation) and citizenship (the quality that endows an individual with rights and obligations within a political unit, usually a State). Both concepts are superimposed onto each other and are almost interchangeable, as nearly every nation has a State. In fact, “nationality” includes the legal condition of belonging to the State. That is to say, generally, by law, all the people who make up a nation are citizens of their State and have civil, political, and social rights and obligations associated with that membership. However, individuals of different nationalities can enjoy the benefits of citizenship of another nation, and citizenship can go beyond the limits of the State (e.g., European citizenship, universal citizenship).
citizenship), which exists in countries such as the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands; and second, the principle of *jus sanguinis* (right of blood or descendants), which is present in countries such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Germany. Given the tremendous importance of context, it would, therefore, be impossible to understand, for example, the French assimilationist model without considering it as the result of the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 (which had as a precedent the Magna Carta of 1215 and the 1774 Declaration of Rights in the United States); these events in France laid the foundations for the liberal republican model, State centralism, secularism, and citizenship as the key factor that links individuals with the State and with other citizens through a series of legal rights and obligations granted and defended by the State. Similarly, the German segregationist model could not be understood without examining the essentialist, exclusivist conception of nationality – based on ethnic-racial criteria – that, in turn, has served to limit people who traditionally have been viewed as temporary “guest workers” (*gastarbeiter*) from having access to citizenship and from being integrated. Nor could we comprehend the way in which ethnic minorities are treated in the United Kingdom and Holland without understanding these countries’ colonial history and the preferential status that was granted to minorities in Asia and Africa (for example, Muslims in colonial India). Nor could we understand the federal pluralist model of Belgium, which, when formed as a State, had to acknowledge the plurality of religions and cultural and linguistic communities (Flemish, French, and

2. Only recently (in early 2000), Germany modified the *jus sanguinis* as the sole criterion for nationality, which meant that the German-born, German-educated children of Turkish immigrants could now be considered Germans with full rights.
Germanophone) from the outset. And nor, finally, could we make sense of the Canadian multicultural model without referring back to the country’s particular demographic and political history – its settlement by French and English colonists in the 17th century and the agreements that were made between the different communities of colonists in order to create an independent State in the mid-19th century – as well as to Canada’s relative geographical isolation and its continual need for labour throughout its history.

Therefore, the models used by different countries in Europe are very diverse. Similarly, in the case of North America, the models adopted by the United States and Canada – two classic immigration countries – are very different, as, once again, the two approaches are determined by the countries’ distinct geographies; histories; and political, social, and cultural traditions. The USA, a country with a republican tradition, has an assimilationist model (or rather, a “triple melting pot” model, given that differences are maintained between Catholics, Jews, and Protestants)3, while Canada, which has a liberal socialist tradition, possesses an officially multicultural or pluralist model.

If we examine the case of the United States, the caste system lasted for 200 years in the South, until the end of the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery in 1865 under the mandate of Abraham Lincoln. In the 20th century, economic expansion, social and geographical mobility, and technological change caused the old system further to break down. It was then that the model of assimilation or Americanization (Anglo-conformity) appeared, which was inherited from George Washington

(the first president of the United States), and which required immigrants to renounce their distinguishing features (linguistic, religious, etc.) and to conform in every way to the socio-cultural, Anglo-American “WASP” (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) model. This model was accompanied by a restrictive, eugenic immigration policy that included exclusion laws and the setting of quotas according to each ethnic-racial group and their potential for assimilation.

Apart from these restrictive policies, racial segregation lasted for a further century following the era of slavery by other means: the so-called “Jim Crow system.” From 1876 until the mid-1960s, primarily in the South of the United States, a racial segregation system, based on a eugenicist ideology (social Darwinism) that legitimized anti-black racism, was implemented. Explicit laws were enacted to separate the white and black populations and through which black Americans were relegated to the status of second-class citizens. After the Second World War and during the 1950s, the Civil Rights movement began to gain strength, and in 1964, the Civil Rights Act was passed by President Lyndon Johnson. This act definitively abolished the Jim Crow laws and any discrimination based on a person’s race, colour, religion, sex, or origin. The act was passed shortly after Martin Luther King made his famous “I have a dream” speech at the 1963 Civil Rights March.

In a parallel fashion, the 1950s saw the upsurge of the “Melting Pot” or amalgamation policy (even though the theory had been formulated at the beginning of the century). This policy promoted the idea of the fusion or mixing of the different groups, both minority groups and the majority, to produce a new hybrid: “American culture.” But the Melting Pot policy was harshly criticized during the 1960s, as it was considered to be a symbol of a coercive assimilation policy and to discriminate socially against ethnic minorities.

From the 1960s onward, American patriotism suffered a series of setbacks: Apart from the loss of Anglo-American hegemony, there was also the social shock represented by the Vietnam War, the failure of the
second and third generations to assimilate, and racial and class conflicts, as well as other factors. The Civil Rights movement not only did away with the Jim Crow system of segregation, but it also inspired other struggles that affected the core of American society, from the anti-Vietnam War movement to the fight for the rights of women, gays, and lesbians. It was within this context that a revitalization of difference took place and that “ethnic revival,” which had been gestating since the end of the Second World War, gained in popularity. Ethnic identity, in terms of people’s search for and valuing of their own roots, was taken up as a cause by Africans, Asians, Chicanos, and descendants of Europeans. Thus, a model of cultural pluralism emerged, a stance that criticized the assimilation and Melting Pot models and called for the right of all groups to maintain their own identity and their cultural and ethnic characteristics while asking them to uphold common values and rules (i.e., to achieve political and economic integration into society). It was in these circumstances that the idea of “affirmative action” came into being, as well as several pluralistic trends of varying strengths. Even so, the idea of assimilation and the Melting Pot (which was one of Ronald Reagan’s favourite clichés in the 1980s) has dominated – and continues to dominate – American society, both politically and socially.

The United Kingdom underwent a similar process, though theirs tended more strongly toward multiculturalism. It was particularly around the time of the First World War and especially the Second, after many immigrants from the Commonwealth (“non-white” British citizens) had settled permanently in Britain, that discussions began on the issue of integration, especially regarding the “second generation” – a subject referred to as “the Black question” (Solomos 1988). For several decades, it was believed that given the entry restrictions for new immigrants, there would be a massive return of “guest workers” to their respective countries. But it soon became clear that immigration was not a temporary process and that immigrants generally did not return; instead, they settled in the host country, brought over their families, and
formed ethnic-cultural communities, consequently maintaining links and social connections (political, economic, family, cultural, etc.) in several countries at the same time. “The Black question” was initially considered in terms of “Anglo-conformity,” or the assimilation of the dominant cultural values, and this assimilation model was employed from the 1950s until the mid-1960s. Criticism of this model, however, gave rise to a policy based on the notion of pluralistic integration and equal opportunities. Politicians acknowledged that simply learning the English language was not the solution and that the processes of interculturality that they were tackling were something much more complex. Thus, in the 1970s, the multicultural model was adopted, especially with respect to educational policy (e.g., a multicultural curriculum in schools), though it was not actively applied to the field of labour integration, and as a consequence, it produced situations of social exclusion and marginalization. In spite of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government and its restrictions on immigration (which led to some historic urban conflicts), the trend toward a pluralistic model was reinforced during the 1980s and 1990s, and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, during his 1997-2007 mandate, referred in positive terms to the United Kingdom as a multicultural or multiracial society.⁴

Canada – another of the traditional immigration countries, together with the United States and Australia – tended toward a model that was different from the American one and closer to British and Dutch models. In fact, it was the first official multicultural model according to

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⁴ Even though some authors, such as Parekh, claim that the term “multiracial” is less satisfactory than the term “multicultural” or “multi-ethnic,” in fact, all of these terms can be co-opted by different discourses, whether that of universalism, assimilationism, cultural homogeneity, or equality. See Simpson (1995).
which the State would play an active part in defending cultural diversity and minority rights, at the same time as promoting a common frame of reference regarding citizens’ shared values, rights, and obligations; thus, it was more of a pluralist than a multicultural model in the classic sense of cultural juxtaposition.

Significantly, important historical and social elements have helped to shape the different models in the United States and Canada. One distinguishing factor is the historical relations between the English and French colonies in Canada. Canada’s multicultural model, which is based on the pledge to respect and defend ethnic-cultural diversity, in effect, had its earliest roots in the Quebec Act passed by the British in 1774 (Isajiw 1999: 45). Although the governing British were primarily concerned with minimizing conflict in the region and with preventing the French in Quebec from allying with the United States given the threat of American invasion and annexation, the Act, nonetheless, represented a commitment by the British to protect the language and the religious (i.e., Catholic) and civil institutions of the French population. This type of protection for French ethnic identity and for regional differences was also entrenched in the British North America Act of 1867, through which Canadian Confederation was accomplished. The mandate for officially recognizing diverse cultures within Canadian society later led to the introduction of the Canadian Multiculturalism Policy in 1971, reinforced by the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 1988 Multiculturalism Act.

Another basic difference between the United States and Canada is the political traditions of the respective countries and the treatment of minorities, particularly of black populations. In the United States, one-third of the population is African-American, and many black Americans today have ancestors who were slaves. In a society in which they have traditionally been subjected to discrimination, and at an institutionalized level, African-Americans are less likely to have a desire to be treated differently; on the contrary, they want to become assimilated – to be
viewed as fully “American” – in the sense that they do not want to be excluded from dominant society. In contrast, Canada’s black population does not have a history of slavery; in fact, many slaves in the United States escaped to Canada before and during the American Civil War. As a result, black populations in Canada, while certainly not exempt from unofficial forms of discrimination, have had greater options for expressing ethnic or cultural difference, since it was neither the consequence nor the legally sanctioned cause of social exclusion.

However, heterogeneity of models can exist within the same country, or even between cities in the same region.5 To continue with the case of Canada, there are great differences in the models between different provinces, and particularly between Ontario (which has an anglophone, Protestant tradition) and Quebec (with its Catholic, francophone, nationalist tradition). In contrast to Ontario’s actively multicultural policy (which coincides more with a multicultural, rather than a multinational, emphasis on the State), in Quebec, there is not so much an emphasis upon multiculturalism as on multinationality and on the assimilation of immigrants (i.e., identification with the land, essentially through education and learning the French language).

In summary, integration-incorporation models tend to be divided into three types: assimilationist or republican (based on the idea that equality can be achieved through the full adoption of the rules and values of the dominant society and through the avoidance of any considerations of diversity, as in the case of France); multiculturalist or pluralist (based on the respect for and protection of cultural diversity within a framework of shared belonging, as in the cases of Holland,

5. See Vertovec (1998) and the references that he makes to comparative studies between different European cities in France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Belgium.
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada); and a separation or exclusion model (characterized by a restrictive legal framework regarding immigration and access to citizenship, as well as by separation between ethnic-cultural communities, as in the cases of Austria and Germany). Using different terminology, Soysal (1994) differentiates between countries with a corporatist model (which institutionally recognizes that the link between the State and ethnic minorities is similar to the connection between the State and other corporatized groups, as in the cases of Holland and Sweden); an individualist model (which rejects the creation of policies focused on groups and instead places emphasis on individual immigrants and the processes of incorporating them into the job market as the basis for their integration into the host society, as in the case of Great Britain); and a statist model (which also defines immigrants as individuals but takes a much more State-centric point of view than the individualist model with respect to immigrants’ incorporation into the host society, as in the case of France).

To simplify, it could be said that two basic perspectives exist, neither one of which is identified with a single political ideology, and both of which are practised to differing degrees and with different emphases and outcomes according to the particular countries: the assimilationist model, from the French liberal tradition, and the pluralist model, from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. The assimilationist model – whose main supporter is France – is based on the need to respect common legal values.

6. It is important to note that all societies are plural and are constructed around their internal differences and that they continually generate new differences and new groups. Homogeneity or monoculturalism is a myth of European modernity that has caused State, nation, people, and culture (in the singular) to mean the same. Significantly, however, “plurality” as a descriptor does not imply a pluralist political orientation.
and principles that are shared by all in order to foster a cohesive, inclusive society; no specific consideration or acknowledgement is given to issues of diversity. Assimilation is based on the idea of monoculturality and of the full adoption (whether by submission or absorption) of the rules and values of the dominant society so that the minority group becomes indistinguishable. The model of cultural pluralism, which can be found in countries such as the United Kingdom, Holland, and Canada, is based on the acknowledgement and protection of cultural diversity. Depending on the country, though, cultural pluralism is practised with a greater or lesser emphasis placed on civic equality or on the separate consideration of minorities, or, to use Soysal's terms, this model is practised with a focus that is either more individualist or more corporatist.

Both perspectives have limits, and in practice, they combine, with increased pluralist or assimilationist degrees or tendencies, depending on the region or country. For example, authors such as Grillo (2001) speak of “weak” or “strong” multiculturalism. In the first case, cultural diversity is only recognized in the private sphere, whereas in the institutional public sphere (work, education, etc.), policies encouraging the assimilation of immigrants and ethnic minorities predominate. In the case of “strong” multiculturalism, there is a recognition of ethnic-cultural differences and communities in the public sphere and at the institutional level, such as official support for the first languages of immigrants or the real application of legislation concerning the right to religious freedom and worship. In the United Kingdom, which is an example of the former case, the main objective of immigration policy is the integration of the individual through equal opportunities and through legal measures preventing ethnic-racial discrimination. The result is that assimilation also predominates in the cultural sphere: Anyone who is not assimilated becomes more separated from the dominant society. In Canada, which is an example of the latter case, active support is given to ethnic communities, and the mainstream is more diverse (in fact, there is less of a sense of distinction between
minorities and the majority). People identify with the country and with the society as a whole, but without relinquishing other ethnic-cultural identity affiliations. It is worth asking, however, to what extent ethnic self-attachments and the compound forms of ethnic-cultural identity (e.g., Chinese-Canadian, Indian-Canadian) are a reflection of processes of ethnification, racialization, and social discrimination rather than of free choices within a social structure that is assumed to be horizontal.

**Limits and Trends**

Following the disturbances in the French *banlieues* in 2005, some claimed that the French assimilation model had failed and that France would have to acknowledge multiculturalism. The converse critique was made of the multicultural model following the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands and the 2006 London bombings. Certainly, both multiculturalism and assimilationism, in the strict sense of these terms, are in the process of being rethought.

On the one hand, the assimilationist perspective and the total abolition of cultural diversity beyond the private sphere imply a failure to acknowledge the complexity of plurality. If this perspective also fails in terms of social cohesion, equity, and the creation of a truly participatory political space, then the result is the marginalization and social exclusion of sections of the population. A clear example of this was the events of 2005 in suburban areas of French cities—the type of civil unrest that has occurred at various points over the decades and which has less to do with cultural

7. The 1995 French film *La Haine* (Hate), by director Mathieu Kassovitz, for example, is based on the riots that followed the death of a 16-year-old Zairean youth, Makomé Bowole, that occurred while he was being interrogated by the police. The same type of riots have been present in the French *banlieues* since the 1980s.
dissimilarity per se than with social disadvantage and exclusion. In other words, the principal instigating factors were the enforced social and spatial isolation (the segregation and ghettoization of a (low-income) population of immigrant origin, in turn distancing them from institutions and subjecting them to stigmatization); the continual cuts in spending on social services, such as on labour insertion or social housing programs; and ethnic discrimination within the job market. The urban violence was, therefore, a reaction born out of frustration with social, ethnified, and deculturalized marginalization, but it mistakenly became mired in culturalist interpretations. At the height of the 2007 French presidential campaign, the Conservative candidate Nicolas Sarkozy continually stressed (in speeches that suggested the idea of a “clash of civilizations”) that there was a direct link between immigration, cultural diversity, and social explosion in the French banlieues; in response, he championed a discourse of anti-immigration and pro-assimilation. To this end, he proposed the creation of a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity, based on the idea that “the French of not long ago” are undergoing an identity crisis regarding their republican values and that they are endangering the French national identity.

On the other hand, the “cultural mosaic” model can foster processes of essentialization and segregation, to the detriment of the fundamental principles of equality and social cohesion. The attacks on the multiculturalist perspective in recent years have been specifically aimed at its implicit essentialism and at the danger that the recognition of cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity may lead to “Balkanization” or to the creation of parallel societies, thereby limiting social cohesion (Steinberg 1981; Bauböck 1995, 1996, 2004; Vertovec 1996; Baumann 1999; Kymlicka 1995; Martiniello 1997; Parekh 2000; Grillo 2001; Carens 2000). Certainly, the policies of the right to/of difference can help to maintain or reproduce social inequalities and differential power and status relations – both between minorities and the majority, as well as between and within minority groups themselves. Some communities
may be disadvantaged in the multicultural model owing to the fact, for example, that certain groups have enjoyed more institutional resources according to their initial socio-economic levels and their privileged relationship with the State (as in the case of the treatment of Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong in Canada compared to those arriving from the People’s Republic of China; or in the case of Cubans in the United States, who, unlike other Latin minorities, were the beneficiaries of a “model minority” promotion policy, which extolled the good points of the capitalist model during the Cold War). Multicultural linguistic policies in pluricultural states might also contribute to the unequal treatment of different groups, as, for reasons relating to the country’s history or to a language’s economic-political power or its position in the global market, some minority languages may enjoy privileged positions compared to other minority languages. This is the case with Italian in Switzerland – in spite of the fact that the language is just as official as German and French, in practice, it does not have the same status; something similar occurs with the French language in Canada. Moreover, with respect to status differentials in multicultural societies, it would be very naïve of us to overlook the fact that cultural, ethnic, religious, and national identities are not simple frameworks of symbolic meaning but that they also represent ideologies that are used to grant power to some and to subordinate others. In this respect, there are many variants: from ethno-populism and the essentialist, stigmatizing overstating of differences, or cultural fundamentalism (Stolcke 1995; Vertovec 1996), to the deculturalization and political instrumentalization of difference (for example, of religion\(^8\)), which can be used to justify discriminatory practices in cultural terms.\(^9\)

8. On the politicizing or political instrumentalization of religion as applied to Islam, see Roy (2006).

All of these problems currently exist. Even so, the idea of multiculturality and pluralism still suffer from many distortions. In the first place, there is a tendency to interpret cultures as homogeneous entities, as fixed, immutable blocks, instead of seeing them as heterogeneous, changing constructions; this line of thought almost inevitably leads to the trap of finding a reductionist equivalence between multiculturality and segregation or ghettoization. Criticisms of multiculturalism by authors such as Sartori (2002) make this reductionist mistake. Starting with the idea of cultural vastness, Sartori argues that there are some immigrants that are easier to integrate than others and so that granting citizenship to non-integratables (Muslim immigrants are depicted as the embodiment of absolute “otherness,” here) would lead to social disintegration. In Sartori’s opinion, there is a “tolerance threshold” that seems to exist ontologically, and immigration implies a “superabundance of diversity,” an undesirable “excess of otherness” (Grillo and Pratt 2002). It is in this type of argument that, for example, Islam is confused with religious intransigence and that the religion, as a whole, and its practitioners, en bloc, are constructed as an opposing force to democracy. Secondly, with respect to multiculturalism, it is important to point out that differences do not necessarily imply inequalities and that the existence of different ethnic-cultural identities is compatible with social cohesion and equality. Likewise, not all segregation has the same causes or the same meanings. Authors such as Portes and Zhou (1993, 1994) and Brubaker (2001), who developed theories of “segmented assimilation,” have pointed out that ethnic communities can be a stronger engine of integration than unidirectional assimilation because they can offer more opportunities to immigrants than the open market system. “Segmented assimilation” theories, which came about as a criticism of classic “straight-line assimilation” theory (Gordon 1964), describe the different processes of the socio-cultural incorporation of immigrants and their descendants in plural contexts.
One of the forms of integration that has been observed is a pattern of rapid upward social mobility in parallel with the deliberate maintenance of ethnic values, rules, and behaviour (this is the case with Sikhs in the United Kingdom and with Chinese and Koreans in Toronto, Los Angeles, and Chicago). That is to say, ethnic minorities can choose their community links with the aim of obtaining social, cultural, and economic benefits associated with continued co-residence, beyond those benefits that are obtained in the initial adaptation period of immigration (Myles and Hou 2002: 6).\(^\text{10}\) In this case, then, pluralism would give rise to greater social justice than would be the case with pure assimilation. In any event, it seems clear that the shaping of a community through a scarcity of resources does not encourage integration.

In short, there are two reductionist poles to be avoided: One is what we could call the “Benetton effect,” or the trivialization of diversity, multiculturality, and miscegenation; while the other could be called the “ghetto effect,” or the abomination of any sign of pluralism, negatively interpreting it to mean segregation and a lack of cohesion.\(^\text{11}\) And it is truly difficult to criticize one extreme without flirting with the other.

\(^{10}\) In this context, as discussed by Myles and Hou (2002), it is important to differentiate between the following: a) enclaves of immigrants, or neighbourhoods of new immigrants of a low socio-economic level, at points in time immediately following their arrival (enforced segregation); b) ethnic communities, or neighbourhoods where the community provides benefits associated with co-residence beyond those that are obtained on arrival (voluntary and connected community-ism); and c) ghettos, when the enclave or ethnic community suffers exclusion from the majority society – that is, when social isolation and a lack of transversality take place (community-ism and exclusion).

\(^{11}\) This line of argument is developed in Rodríguez-García (2004).
Generally speaking, the current trend is to formulate management models that, adapted to the particularities of each country or region, reconcile cultural and identity diversity with social, economic, and political cohesion. In other words, the attempt is to grant immigrants and minorities the same civil rights and the same socio-economic opportunities as the majority and, at the same time, to value diversity, but with a critical approach — that is, not from a defensive position, but with criticism directed both at unequal power relations and at the creation of a fragmented society with closed communities. This type of approach is what Baumann proposes (1997) when he speaks of moving from a dominant discourse to a demiotic discourse of culture, understood as a process of interaction and multi-ethnicity, rather than in essentialist terms.

But how can we ensure that the defence of legitimate differences does not represent a limitation of equality and the perpetuation of class differences? Or, from a different perspective, how can we ensure that the defence of essential democratic principles does not limit the right to plurality (which is, in fact, a democratic principle and a fundamental universal and individual right)? And on what terms should a cultural community or minority be recognized? What are the prerequisites for acceding to differentiated community rights (e.g., language, density, or the size of a group)? Where are the limits for group recognition in a context of accommodation? Is it this tension between pluralism and democracy, between the right to/of difference (pluralism) and that of equality (non-discrimination), that represents the central point of the debate?

And here, we have to return to the two fundamental dimensions of the issue: the individual and the community. On the one hand, the individual level makes reference to access to citizenship rights; to standardization or compensation for disadvantages; and to equality of opportunities. This is the classic meaning of the rights of citizenship
– civil, political, and social – as expressed by Marshall (1950), who refers to equal access to resources such as housing, work, education, health care, and political participation and representation. Traditionally, the individual is the recipient here. On the other hand, the community dimension refers to the social and cultural rights of groups based on community links (linguistic, territorial, cultural, religious, etc.), the primary recipient of which is the group. The community level has traditionally been overlooked by the logic of liberalism, which is based on the economy and on the individual as an atomized being. For example, it is often overlooked that all immigrants are at the same time emigrants (Sayad 1998) and that this fact implies group and multi-dimensional connections on local and global scales. It seems obvious, therefore, that there are connections and aspects of diversity that need a public space, beyond the private sphere, such as in the case of linguistic diversity (the instrumental importance of maintaining linguistic links with communities of origin is disregarded, and this represents a disadvantage both to minority groups and to society as a whole) and religious belief/practice – not in terms of institutional orthodoxy, but within a neutral institutional framework that guarantees equality of treatment. As Kymlicka (1995) has pointed out, the issue is not so much whether minorities violate the neutrality of the State, but whether the State – which in practice is not culturally neutral – is unfair in its recognition of minorities and their rights. International legislation regarding the protection of the rights of ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities, such as the Vienna Declaration (1989) and the Copenhagen Declaration (1991), are a point of reference here. Expressed in another way, in a truly liberal context, community rights would be an extension or a condition of individual freedom and equality. In this way, the issues of cultural and community diversity and civic equality or social justice should not be separated, as, in reality, they are
interconnected. Furthermore, ethnic-cultural identities should be developed within a framework of social, political, and economic equality, instead of in a framework of exclusion and inequality, in order to prevent processes of segregation and exclusionary ethnification.

All this leads us to a bottom-up reformulation of citizenship as a central element in the processes of incorporation. Accommodation and interculturalism (an interactive process of living together in diversity, with the full participation and exchange of all members of society beyond that of mere recognition and coexistence) imply a change in the structure of citizenship as we know it today. In a context in which the processes of transnationalism, globalization, and localization all coexist, we must move forward by considering the infranational level (regional, local) and the supranational level (continental, multinational, or worldwide) of citizenship and redefine them in political, social, and cultural terms (Delanty 2000). That is to say, citizenship should include, in a full and real sense, all of the rights and obligations — individual, universal, and at the level of the community and the State — that identify the participation or intervention in public matters of a member of society.

Europe, however, has some very restrictive criteria that limit the attribution of full rights to many would-be citizens, which leads to social and political segmentation between citizens, foreigners, and denizens (Hammar 1990); between autochthonous and allochthonous individuals; between European Union members and non-members; and between legal residents and those with illegal status. Added to these restrictions are other factors used to determine pseudo-citizenship, such as origin, social class, sex, age, length of residence, and degree of integration achieved, together which serve to create further degrees of exclusion. It is clear that different levels of civic attachment may exist, depending on individuals’ particular circumstances and their links to the different levels of the political unit (state/provincial, federal, etc.).
But access to citizenship and the attribution of nationality\textsuperscript{12} should be made more accessible, and formulas should be found for extending rights to all residents – that is, more importance should be placed on the rights derived from residency (\textit{ius soli} and \textit{ius domicilii}). The failure to do so limits an individual’s full participation in the social and economic life of society (Brubaker 1989) and is more likely to produce consequences that will be negative for the society as a whole.

12. Generally speaking, a differentiation is made between the \textit{ attribution} of nationality (by \textit{jus soli} or \textit{jus sanguinis}) and the \textit{acquisition} of nationality (naturalization), which refers to people who have previously possessed the status of foreigner. In this latter case, immigrants change their nationality through different mechanisms. For example, nationality may be granted after a relatively long period of residence in the host country (e.g., three years in Canada; five years in France and in the United Kingdom; ten years in Germany, Belgium, and Spain [Spain, though, has reduced times in different circumstances, as in the case of people who are already married to Spanish nationals when they first apply for residency]). In most cases, applicants are required to be able to speak the official language and to know the basic history and the fundamental values of the host country. For example, countries such as France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark run integration programs to formalize the incorporation process; these programs require persons seeking nationality to attend language training courses and to acquire knowledge concerning the cultural, social, and economic aspects of the country. In other countries, generally in the classic countries of immigration (such as Canada), applicants for citizenship are required to pass an exam or a “citizenship test” that evaluates their knowledge of the country’s language, history, and society. However, this requisite is not equivalent to the coercive nature of European “integration programs,” whereby access to residence or renewal of residence is limited, and welfare benefits are cut and monetary fines are imposed should the applicants not pass or make satisfactory progress in the lengthy programs.
Proposals for new ways of conceiving citizenship and pluralism include “transnational,” “multicultural,” “differentiated,” and “neo-republican” citizenship (van Gusteren 1994). For example, authors such as Martiniello (1995, 1997) and Vertovec (1998, 1999) emphasize the need for a multicultural community citizenship within a multicultural democracy; Kymlicka (1995, 2003) argues in favour of a post-ethnic, flexible, and hybrid multiculturalism, such as the Quebec model; while Bauböck (1995, 1996, 2004) suggests deconstructing the identification between citizenship and nationality and argues that the best way of interpreting the impact of migration, globalization, and transnationalization on democratic citizenship is through the theorization of a transnational, rather than a multinational, civic citizenship that recognizes the superimposition or coexistence of diverse political affiliations and the tendency toward a “bottom-up” (i.e., not centralized, but with different levels and powers, from the local to the national level) federal cosmopolitanism. In keeping with this line of thought, Soysal (1994) has also argued for the growing importance of a “post-national” legislation model.13 Figure 1 attempts to summarize these ideas:

13. It must be taken into account, however, as Young (1995) has pointed out, that the notion of “universal citizenship” can homogenize aspects of diversity, limit dialogue and negotiation, favour privileged positions, and, therefore, lead to marginalization.
There is increasing consensus that the management of diversity in multicultural democracies should be a process of bidirectional adaptation or of mutual accommodation – that is to say, that change is also required in the structure of the majority society (Bauböck 1996, Zapata-Barrero 2004). Further, successful incorporation models recognize that integration does not consist of making individuals indistinguishable at all levels and that equality at a structural level (i.e., rights and obligations of citizenship) does not imply the elimination of differences that may coexist in the public space. In all cases, negotiation, within a democratic framework of real participation, will have to take place over which aspects of difference are compatible with the society and which are not, but without being paternalistic and without limiting the capacity for proposal, creation, and change among all the actors participating in the process. This type of management of diversity, without question, requires a large dose of maturity, as it must be capable
of dealing with the different problems and conflicts generated by the very process of integration. Because, once again, the reality of diversity is nothing like a Benetton advertisement.

Socio-cultural accommodation also involves a style of management that is comprehensive and more decentralized and autonomous, with a wider distribution of powers, functions, and authority throughout the different levels of government. In political terms, this outlook manifests as asymmetrical federalism. Federal models can be very different, ranging from Canada’s provincial model and Belgium’s model of communities and regions, to the länder (sovereign states) of Germany and Austria, to Switzerland’s regime of canton sovereignty (confederation of autonomous cantons). But the basic principle is to promote a model of intervention based on comprehensiveness, participation, coordination, and cooperation between different levels of government as well as between government administrators and social services. The notion of full participation, here, refers to the different actors’ involvement in the public processes of decision-making, rather than just to the delivery or the receipt of basic social welfare. And the local sphere (regions, cities, neighbourhoods), here, gains an increasing amount of importance in the development of strategies for managing immigration and diversity, as this is where most of the social action takes place and is transformed. The local institutional network (schools, associations, businesses, etc.) requires the powers and resources of the administration, and the governmental supports have to realize that at the local level, the realities are often as diverse as they are regionally. That is to say, different regions, municipalities, and neighbourhoods may need to establish management strategies adapted to their own particular characteristics. Furthermore, even though management has to be contextualized and flexible, capable of continually adapting to new needs, it must also be carried out using common parameters and in a coordinated manner. In short, successful management strategies must establish a balance between coordination and decentralization and between cohesion and flexibility.
The case of Canada continues to be a good example of the fact that social incorporation processes are more a problem of conception and management than of the volume or degree of diversity itself. While, once again, it cannot be expected that the “Canadian model,” as it is sometimes called, can or should be “transplanted” en bloc, this example is, nonetheless, useful for the purposes of self-critique and reflection. The fact is, Canada is often taken as a reference point because it seems to have been more successful in resolving the management of immigration and diversity. Canada is one of the countries that receives the most immigrants and has the greatest cultural diversity in the world. Almost 20 per cent of the population consists of immigrants (people born outside Canada), while in cities such as Toronto, the number rises to 45 per cent, and if people born in Canada to an immigrant parent are counted, the figure climbs to 75 per cent. However, neither immigration nor the official multicultural model appears to have been a problem – very much to the contrary, in fact. Canada is the country that has the best image in the world, according to a 2007 survey carried out by the BBC, in which dozens of thousands of people were interviewed in 27 different countries; meanwhile, Toronto, which is often defined as the most multicultural city in the world (“the world in a city”), is considered to be one of the five best cities in the world in which to live, according to the weekly publication The Economist (2007). In the first place, it should be pointed out that in Canada, the State is committed to playing an active part in the defence of cultural diversity and the rights of minorities, while, at the same time, promoting common values that encourage a sense of shared belonging, civic equality, and the fight against discrimination. That is to say, diversity and commonality are encompassed within one single shared frame of reference that enables social cohesion and of which the key element is citizenship. And significantly, multiculturalism in Canada does not only refer to cultural differences, but it also focuses, in general, on diversity and on groups who are traditionally discriminated against
for reasons of sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, and so forth. Respect for diversity of all types, therefore, becomes a central value that unifies citizens. In this way, the Canadian model presents and applies the idea of *difference within equality*, and thus it follows the line of transnational pluralism more than that of classic multiculturalism, the latter of which may have connotations of separation between communities or extreme relativism.

One crucial factor in the success of the Canadian model is that in Canada, the welfare state is a fundamental value. As a result, even though there is active control of immigration, social divisions, differential status, discrimination with respect to access to the job market, and other forms of social and ethnic stratification and discrimination, Canada is, nonetheless, one of the least segmented Western societies, and the difference between rich and poor and the correlation between socio-economic level and ethnic-racial or minority status in Canada is less pronounced in comparison to other Western democracies. Somehow, policies for accommodating diversity have been resolved with fewer conflicts, higher levels of public support, and higher degrees of comfort and security for minorities; these policies have also ensured greater possibilities for social mobility. Admittedly, Canada’s geographical isolation, which limits illegal immigration and enables greater control of flows, as well as the country’s continual need for labour, the flexibility of its job market, and the effectiveness of Canadian selection policies14 are all aspects that have determined the success of the “Canadian model.” But the model’s success – which is

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14. Since 1967, a point system has existed for voluntary immigrants based on criteria such as knowledge of the official languages, educational level, work experience and suitability of skills according to the job market, and prior contacts in the country. These criteria serve to equip the country with a pool of immigrants who have the
facing new challenges given the sharp increase in non-European immigration in recent decades and the current Conservative government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper – can also largely be explained by the fact, as previously mentioned, that the country has put the principles of diversity within equality into practice in its possibility of competing in the labour market and in fostering the country’s economic growth. There is also immigration based on policies of family reunification, as in the case of 30 per cent of the total number of immigrants, as well as immigration policies supporting refugees and asylum seekers, who represent almost 15 per cent of the people granted entry. In fact, Canada has one of the most open asylum policies in the world (although in recent years, greater restrictions have been imposed, such as the Safe Third Country agreement, signed in December of 2004), and significant resources are allocated to the training and education of refugees and immigrants without resources. In Toronto, for example, there are communities from countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia (owing to the enforced migrations following the Vietnam War), Nicaragua (following the Sandinista revolution and the guerrilla warfare initiated by the opposing Contra forces), El Salvador (as a result of the civil war), Chile (following the overthrow of the elected president Allende by the military regime of Pinochet), Rwanda (owing to the ethnic-political conflict between Hutus and Tutsis, and the ensuing slaughter, mostly of Tutsis, that took place), Sri Lanka (due to the ethnic-political conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese), Tibet (as a result of China’s repressive policies), Somalia and Sudan (owing to internal warfare and environmental disaster), Romania (due to Ceausescu’s communist dictatorship), Croatia (owing to the war in the former Yugoslavia), Iran (due to Khomeini’s fundamentalist regime), and Afghanistan (due to Soviet occupation and the civil war). Canada’s refugee policy represents an important difference with respect to other countries that also apply some form of a point system for voluntary immigrants, as in the case of the United Kingdom, where the selection criteria are not only very high, but also, the country does not carry out large-scale immigration policies.
management of immigration. These principles can be summarized as follows: the active promotion of plurality as well as of social cohesion (a key aspect of which is the [public] education system); welfarism; a large number of integration programs that promote access to education and labour; the relatively rapid acquisition of citizenship (in three years) and the possibility of full participation in the social, political, and cultural life of the country; a high level of management decentralization (where provinces and city councils possess the resources and the powers to adopt integration policies in accordance with the particular realities of the region or municipality); and a model based on strategies of transversality, participation, communication, and negotiation between government administrations and community and social services, a setup that also gives great importance to knowledge transfer between academics, policy-makers, and front-line community service workers. In other words, Canada is a country that actively promotes effective inclusion versus exclusion.

Significantly, underlying different management strategies are differences in conceptions and mentalities. Despite the internal differences that can be found both among European countries, reflected in the diverse models they have adopted, and among North American models – a topic that has previously been discussed in this article – there is, nonetheless, a commonality in the perspectives assumed either by “old world” or “new world” countries concerning what immigration and diversity represent. Perhaps the main difference is that the United States, Canada, and Australia15 are all relatively young countries that have experienced structural changes as a result of migrations over the past 100 years. And this reality has had an impact on shaping a view of immigration and diversity, and of how they should be managed, that is

15. For the case of Australia, see the work of Iredale (2006)
very different from the general European outlook. On the “old continent,” immigration and diversity are still generally seen as a problem, as something that represent a high cost, a potential loss of social and cultural rights, and a threat to national identity. Immigration is viewed as something that places the status quo in danger. As a result, Europe, in general, has held onto the 1970s conception of immigration as a temporary phenomenon: Immigrants are considered to be temporarily invited workers (guest workers) who must be cheap, costing the country as little as possible, because these immigrants’ contribution is valued as being nothing more than the circumstantial contribution of labour.

Moreover, each territory in Europe is viewed almost as though it were an already-constructed society with a fixed “socio-cultural nucleus,” into which one simply has to insert oneself. The idea of “preservation” resounds much more so than that of “change.” The following example may help to clarify this argument. In a publicity campaign run by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, the following image of Britishness was given (and it is one that has virtually been maintained to the present time): A white man wearing a suit and a bowler hat is shown with an equal sign (=) next to him followed by the word “British”; beside him, there is a black man also wearing a suit and a bowler hat, and the same symbol and wording appear. In contrast, in Canada, a similar traditional notion of what people should wear or how they should present in order to be considered “Canadian” does not exist, since the conception of what it means to be Canadian includes, or is even equivalent to, diversity itself. Yet because of the strong sense of a “core culture” that is endemic to the mentality of European nations, the idea that is transmitted to immigrants in Europe is, at best, that they are welcome but that they do not belong completely until they have assimilated. And there is a real fear on the part of policy-makers that immigrants will not achieve this assimilation. Meanwhile, on the flip side of the coin, immigrants, in many cases, do not really have the opportunity to assimilate because they are not regarded as having the same right to
belong fully to the civil society or to the nation and they are not granted full privileges. They, therefore, become segregated, thus fulfilling the prophecies of policy-makers. Clearly, if welcoming and integration policies are organized around these premises, whereby it is not deemed necessary by policy-makers to carry out any structural changes, then the full, or even functional, integration of immigrant populations is very unlikely to occur. Generally speaking, the policies of European countries are highly protectionist – they do not allow immigrants much leeway for action because no significant consideration has been given as to what these newcomers could offer or to the opportunities that they could provide for a country’s improvement and growth. And so, the result in Europe is a closed system.

In contrast to this, the changes produced in North American societies and cultures by migrations have been structural, and these changes have been deemed positive. Even though historically, North America has experienced periods of strong restriction on immigration, as well as racist and xenophobic policies (such as the anti-Chinese and anti-Jewish policies), and restrictions of a different type continue to exist – problems with recognizing foreign-earned professional credentials, for instance, which is particularly an issue in Canada – immigration is, nonetheless, conceived as a phenomenon that gives more than it takes away, as something with a beneficial social and economic impact. That is to say, rather than the central focus being placed upon a burdened State and what it will have to offer newcomers to the country, immigration, instead, is more often seen as representing an essential contribution to the host society and as a mutual opportunity. While the extent to which the United States and Canada are true meritocracies is, indeed, disputable, both “young” countries perpetuate this self-image and perceive themselves as countries “of becoming.” The classic idea of the “American dream” or of “making it in America” exemplifies this ideology or self-mythology well. As a result, the acquisition of citizenship, a “green light” for establishing roots and for maximizing
one’s opportunities in the host country, is generally encouraged. In Canada, for example, all of the political parties advocate pro-immigration policies, and as the policies of welcoming and settlement are very solid, recently arrived immigrants see Canadian society as a place in which they can develop and fully participate – economically, politically, socially, and culturally. Further, the maintenance of their own ethnic-cultural affiliations does not prevent immigrants in Canada or their children from developing a feeling of shared belonging or national identification. In general, there is not the same social climate of rejecting immigration and diversity that can be found in almost any country in Europe, where, from the very outset, the predominant policy is one of anti-immigration.

The result is that in Europe, the distance between the migration project and the reality is greater, even though in practice, immigrants tend to stay. In Canada, they stay, and, for the most part, happily so, and that is no trivial point; it is a fundamental social indicator. The “us versus them” dichotomy appears to be far less marked in Canada, and Canadian society is perceived as something that is in continual evolution thanks to immigration; or rather, it is viewed as a work-in-progress rather than as something that has already been completed. One example that reflects this point is the debate that took place in September of 2005 on Sharia law in the Canadian province of Ontario. Rather than the application of a parallel legal system, instead, the proposal was for the creation of a legal figure for the already existing religious mediators – imams and muftis (interpreters of Islam) – in family conflicts. That is to say, the training and preparation of possible mediators was proposed specifically to prevent abuses committed without legal guarantees or supervision. In the end, this gave rise to considerable public debate, and the provincial government ultimately decided to prohibit all forms of religious-based arbitration in Ontario. The important thing to stress here, though, is that, unlike in most countries, in Canada, this potentially inflammatory or automatically
vetoed subject can be discussed and negotiated, in a non-violent manner, and with the political engagement of all the different groups involved, and even with different sectors of the Canadian Muslim community feeling free to voice their disagreement with the viewpoints of their fellow Muslim compatriots. The reason for this is because apart from the numerical factor – there are some 700,000 Muslims in Canada – the fact of diversity is acknowledged by the government and by Canadian society at large, and there is consequently an openness to the idea that perhaps some aspects of jurisprudence should be negotiated and agreed on by consensus, though always within a framework of respect for liberal democratic values. The great difference in Canada, therefore, is how diversity is perceived and how its management is approached. In Europe, the policy of rejection through fear is still predominant, and fear, as filmmaker George Lucas would say, is the origin of the “dark side.”

Only recently has the idea begun to catch on in Europe that immigration has been an engine for social action, dynamism, and fundamental wealth for the development of its countries and regions. There is a growing awareness that immigration is not a temporary event and that establishing comprehensive policies that employ strategies of transversality, decentralization, bidirectionality, and interculturality will be of key importance in the management of immigration and diversity.

Spain and Catalonia

The speed at which Spain has changed from being a country of emigration to one of immigration is unprecedented in Europe’s demographic history. While in North European countries such as France and England, this change took place over several decades (between the 1950s and the 1970s), in the case of Spain, the panorama has changed radically in little more than five years. In fact, Spain is the country in the European Union that has experienced the greatest
increase in immigration on an uninterrupted basis since 1997, and in 2006, it was the country that received almost 45 per cent of the entire immigrant population that arrived in the EU. Furthermore, in the past six years, Spain has been second only to the United States in terms of intensity of migration flows on a world scale. And so, in spite of its slow start, since the year 2000, immigration has been a crucial item on the Spanish political agenda, making it clear that this trend is not a temporary phenomenon and that immigration is not merely a technical and an administrative matter, but rather a complex reality with structural effects (political, economic, demographic, and socio-cultural) that requires carefully thought-out management.

In the case of Spain, legislation on immigration, therefore, is very new, and the country is still at a very early stage in terms of designing a comprehensive policy. In fact, the lack of clearly defined objectives with respect to the model of “integration” that has been proposed, as in the Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010 (Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs 2007), runs parallel to the existence of many obstacles to immigrants’ access to basic civil rights that are, in theory, defended by law. The Plan clearly states from the outset the importance of integrating immigrants, and it advocates as its basic principles a comprehensive approach and transversality, citizenship, and equality, as well as interculturality, bidirectionality, mutual adaptation, and dialogue. Specifically, the Plan expresses the need to “guarantee both social cohesion based on shared constitutional principles and respect and the positive consideration of diversity.” It also explicitly negates “the possibility of simple assimilation according to the dominant cultural guidelines of the Spanish population” but adds that “the defence of diversity should not lead to cultural groups becoming isolated or to an ahistorical or acritical consideration of cultures.” The Plan also plainly states that “coexistence is based on the primacy of individual rights over group rights, on the respect for the plurality of options and of personal and group projects, and on the existence of a
non-denominational State that supports and promotes the effectiveness of said rights” as well as on the “support for cultural and religious expressions that respect national and European values, rights, and laws” (pp. 115-125). At the moment, in a context in which processes of internal (autonomic) multiculturality coexist alongside processes of multiculturality resulting from international immigration, it could be said that Spain’s integration model has been closer to French assimilationism than to pluralism and that the model to date has been more centred on limits and control than on welcoming the opportunities that the plurality and bidirectionality of the process represent. It remains to be seen, then, how the objectives of the Plan will be put into practice and whether the approach to immigration will continue to be more centred on control and assimilation (as it has been until now) or whether the model will move towards a more comprehensive and forward-looking vision of management.

In Catalonia – where the foreign population already totals one million people, representing almost 12 per cent of the total population – immigration policy has historically been more developed than in Spain as a whole, with a tendency toward the region having its own model, known as the “Catalan way of integration.” The Catalan perspective is not devised to be actively assimilationist or multiculturalist; instead, it is similar to the Quebec model: It purports to be inclusive, and it centres around education and learning the Catalan language as being the basic elements for integration and identification with the land. However, there is still a lack of awareness of the need for real structural changes as well as difficulties with putting the policy proposals into practice. For instance, the new Estatut of 2006, which makes reference to immigration in several of its articles (e.g., 42.6, 84.2m, 138, and 206.6), stops short in terms of actually legislating changes to the pre-existing Catalan model. Moreover, even though the Pla de ciutadania i immigració 2005-2008 of the Generalitat of Catalonia (a document that shares the basic common principles for integration that were approved
by the Council of the European Union in 2004) places emphasis on equality, social cohesion, and the expansion of the concept of citizenship to incorporate ideas of bidirectional integration, cultural pluralism, and interculturality (pp. 33-38), this same document constantly reinforces the idea of assimilating to the already-existing values and structures of the Catalan community. Although the document attempts to portray Catalan society as an evolving one, in which the contributions of immigrants are recognized, the policies that are outlined ultimately encourage the fading of these differences. Once again, the “multicultural” institutional approach is still rooted in a conception of cultural identity that limits the real processes and configurations of multiculturality. As a consequence, it appears that the Catalan model is also, deep down, oriented more toward assimilation than toward bidirectional accommodation.

It should be pointed out, however, that for the first time, the Pla de ciutadania i immigració 2005-2008 contains specific objectives toward a comprehensive immigration policy and that it not only proposes strategies but also legislates them. Some examples are the policy of a “first welcome” (e.g., welcoming protocols for schools); the implementation of a concrete social policy for access to health care, education, and housing; citizen coexistence and occupational training programs; the promotion of neighbourhood dynamization, with programs especially aimed at young people; Catalan courses and support for knowledge of mother tongues; the implementation of mediation, awareness, and non-discrimination programs; and the application of principles of interculturality in the business sector. And, of perhaps even greater importance, a fund of specific resources, allocated mostly to the education system and to local social services, now exists for carrying out welcoming and integration policies. That is to say, something fundamental has been set in motion? funds have been invested to ensure that programs for immigrants can be put into practice. Certainly, a lot is being done in our own environment,
especially in the government services of town and city councils and within the network of local associations, both of which are fundamental actors in these processes. Valuable experience has been gained by these initial steps taken in municipalities such as Barcelona, Manlleu, Madrid, Almeria, and Granada, the results of which will also be of great interest to those observing us from the outside. Now it is a question of continuing to act and of sharing experiences, exchanging knowledge, assessing needs, coordinating efforts, and evaluating what has worked most effectively. And all of that requires more resources and greater political action.

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Karl Marx said that every step of real movement is worth more than a dozen programs. We will have to take a great deal of steps in this area, but it will also be crucial for us to know in which direction, and how we should take them. Thus, just as important as it is to act, it is also essential to look in other directions, and from other perspectives, in order to examine and reflect on ourselves and to orient ourselves in a better way. It is in this context that we are compiling and presenting the contributions of John Biles and Lara Winnemore, on the one hand, and of Inés Michalowski, on the other, for the Migrations Program of the CIDOB Foundation. These contributions were made at the “European Seminar: Policies and Models of Welcoming,” held in Barcelona, Spain, in October 2006 at the CIDOB Foundation. The former article is an analysis of the Canadian multicultural model, describing both the legislative context and the powers and services that are offered by the different levels of administration and stressing the need for bidirectionality and the decentralization of management. The latter article is a comparative analysis of the conception and effectiveness of integration programs in three countries in Europe (Germany, France, and the Netherlands), evaluating in particular their programs for
reception and welcoming. Unquestionably, the detailed analysis of models and of experiences concerning the management of immigration in different countries and regions will be of invaluable assistance in the creation of improved strategies for our own context. For this reason, I am sure that this line of investigation developed by the CIDOB Foundation’s Migrations Program will be of great importance to the political agenda of both Catalonia in particular and Spain as a whole over the coming years.

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Canada's Two-Way Street Integration ModelWithout Its Stains, Strains and Growing Pains
John Biles and Lara Winnemore

Respect for diversity is now held as a cornerstone of the Canadian integration model and is cited consistently in public policy discourse as central to the sense of a common or shared Canadian identity. It has not always been the case: Canadian history is littered with public policy that cannot be reflected upon with anything but shame, including the internment of Japanese Canadians that was redressed in 1988 and the explicitly racist nature of immigration head taxes imposed on immigrants from China (redressed in 2006). A significant body of literature exists that chronicles these egregious moments in Canadian history (Adachi 1976; Ferguson 1975; Ward 1990). That said, Canadians and their governments have worked assiduously for generations to construct a more inclusive Canada. While the progress on this front has been uneven and much remains to be done, a remarkably inclusive and robust model has been developed. It is a model that has served Canada well as its population has diversified rapidly in the wake of immigration reforms in the 1960s and 1970s with the introduction of the famed “points system” that removed explicit racial and country-of-origin bias from the selection of immigrants to Canada.  

1. This paper has been published in Canadian Diversity/Diversité canadienne. Vol. 5, No.1 (Winter 2006). The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Metropolis Project, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, or the Government of Canada.

2. Citizenship and immigration policies historically made an explicit link between national identity and racial identity at least until the 1960s with the introduction of the points system in the 1967 Immigration Act when race no longer was a condition of entry or exclusion. The 1976 Immigration Act is held to have continued in removing bias from selection system, and introduced the idea of cultural diversity as a positive benefit of immigration.
The strength of this approach and its wide support can best be understood by looking at moments of “crisis” and how Canadians and their institutions have reacted. For example, the arrival of three shiploads of Chinese refugee claimants off the west coast of Canada in 1999, the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the SARS outbreak in Toronto in 2003, and the arrest of 17 terrorist suspects in Toronto in the summer of 2006. In each case public discourse was briefly tinged with intolerance and xenophobia, but in each instance the wider support for a multicultural and inclusive approach prevailed.\(^3\) This clearly situates Canada in a different space from many of the countries covered in relation to this issue, where a retreat from inclusive multicultural approaches can be seen.

Rather tellingly, in the Canadian context, political resolve remains strong. For example, in the wake of the arrests of 17 accused terrorists in Toronto in summer 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper reinforced the Canadian public policy position on multiculturalism when he noted that the arrests had:

led to some commentary to the effect that Canada’s open and culturally diverse society makes us a more vulnerable target for terrorist activity . . . I believe that exactly the opposite is true. Canada’s diversity, properly nurtured, is our great strength (Harper 2006).

This political support may simply be based on an understanding of Canadian demographics. The intersection of immigration and ethno-racial and religious diversity is a profound reality in Canada. At the time

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3. Despite the claims of some critics like political pundit and pollster Allan Gregg who claims that 75% of Canadians believe too many immigrants come to Canada (Gregg 2005), other polls find that 49% believe the right number, and 18% believe too few immigrants come to Canada (Ipsos Reid-2005). The later number is more in keeping with tracking polls as far back as 1988 (Biles 2006).
of the 2001 Census, 5.4 million or 18.4% of Canada’s population of 31 million were foreign-born. The visible minority population accounted for 13.4% percent of the Canadian population or 4 million people, which is an increase of 25% from 1996 to 2001 as compared to an increase of 4% for the overall Canadian population. Statistics Canada demographic projections suggest that by 2017, the visible minority population will increase to 20% of Canada’s total population.

Religious pluralism is also an increasingly important feature of the Canadian demographic landscape. For example, the Canadian Muslim population grew at a rate of 128.9% between 1991 and 2001. The 2017 demographic projections mentioned above estimate that adherents of religions other than Christianity will increase from 6.3% of the total population reported on the 2001 Census to between 9.2 and 11.2% of the total population in 2017 (GoC 2005b).

The rate of growth of diversity in Canada (Canadians listed more than 200 ethnic groups in their responses to the 2001 census question on ethnic ancestry) is due in large part to Canada’s relatively open immigration programme and shifting immigrant source countries over the past 20 years – which has contributed to the vast majority of recent immigrants being visible minorities. While the majority of immigrants to Canada prior to the mid 20th century were European in origin, increasingly, Canada has accepted immigrants from Asia, South and

4. Visible minority is a term used to refer to both immigrants and Canadian-born people of various non-European ethno-racial backgrounds. The term visible minority is defined in the Employment Equity Act as referring to “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour”. This category includes the following groups: Blacks, South Asians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Southeast Asians, Filipinos, Arabs and West Asians, Latin Americans, and Pacific Islanders.
Central America, the Middle East and Africa. In 2005, the top five source countries for immigrants were the People’s Republic of China (16.1%), India (12.6%), Philippines (6.7%), Pakistan (5.2%) and the United States (3.5%).

**Integration Paradigm**

The preferred model of immigrant integration in Canada is multiculturalism. Often described as what it is not – neither segregation nor assimilation – it is widely held that the Canadian integration process is a continuum that stretches from initial selection, settlement and adaptation through to and beyond formal acquisition of citizenship. From a public policy perspective, immigrant integration is described from a perspective of reciprocity. More than just helping a newcomer find a job and a place to live, integration in Canada is described as a “two-way street” requiring accommodation and adjustments, and rights and responsibilities, on the part of both newcomers and the host society.5

**Legislative/Constitutional Base**

The multicultural model of immigrant integration in Canada is enshrined in a comprehensive legislative and constitutional framework that expresses support for linguistic, religious, ethno-cultural and ethno-racial pluralism within the context of Canada’s commitment to individual rights. It is this framework that provides the impetus for the “two-way street” of integration described above.

5. For more on how federal settlement programs encourage the two-way street approach see Winnemore 2005.
The key pieces of legislation that define the Canadian approach to integration include the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988 and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) of 2001. Section 3 (1) c of the former notes that it is the policy of the Government of Canada to “promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation.” Thirteen years later this was echoed in Section 3 of the IRPA’s objectives: “(e) to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society.”

These two critical pieces of legislation are, of course, framed by the Constitution: Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), calls for the Charter to be interpreted “in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” Finally other key pieces of legislation include the Citizenship Act (1947 & 1977), the Canadian Human Rights Act (1977), the Employment Equity Act (1985 & 1995) and the Official Languages Act (1969 & 1995) which all support multiculturalism. Naturally, the entire legislative framework is also structured within international human rights agreements.

Delivery of Services

As a shared responsibility, integration programs and services follow as a logical consequence of the decision to admit someone to Canada.

6. Section 95 of the Constitution Act 1867, defines immigration as a shared jurisdiction between the federal government and the provincial governments.
Newcomer settlement and adaptation takes place across various sites of integration, such as housing, health, education and the labour market. As such, there are a range of federally and provincially funded settlement and integration programs and services provided to prospective immigrants and newcomers both pre- and post-arrival in Canada. While the federal government funds delivery of settlement services including orientation, mentoring and language training for adult immigrants, in Canada, jurisdiction for health, education and housing services falls under provincial jurisdiction. Furthermore, as immigrants live and work in cities and communities, municipalities often have a vested interest in planning for how to meet the needs of newcomers at the local level.

Given this multi-sectoral and multi-jurisdictional nature of integration in Canada, partnership with all levels of government, and with the private and NGO sectors, is essential for the successful integration of newcomers. Community-based immigrant and refugee-serving organizations are especially instrumental in assisting newcomers with their immediate and ongoing settlement needs since they are very sensitive to the needs of the local community as well as to the diverse cultural backgrounds and experiences that recent immigrants and refugees bring to Canada.

**Major Services**

While the Government of Canada’s immigration system seeks to select immigrants on the basis of human capital such as education and language skills, and thus attempts to minimize the need for settlement and integration services, there is, of course, no such thing as what one of our

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7. For a comprehensive discussion of the multiple sites of integration, see Biles and Mulholland, 2006.
colleagues has referred to as a “ready-to-wear immigrant.” The migration process is disruptive and settlement and integration is challenging. It is in the best interests of both immigrants and Canadian society as a whole that the disruption be minimized and the challenges be effectively met as rapidly as possible. Importantly, the responsibility for meeting these challenges is shared by newcomers and other Canadians.

To respond to these challenges, the Government of Canada has developed a suite of core settlement programmes consisting of the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP), the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC), and the Host program. These services are delivered through formal contribution agreements with a range of partners including community-based and NGOs, businesses, educational institutions and even other levels of government.

Settlement programming specific to refugees includes the Refugee Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP), an income support programme that also provides reception, temporary accommodation and basic orientation services specific to government assisted refugees, and the Private Sponsorship Program where groups in Canada take on responsibility for resettling refugees from abroad by providing the necessary financial, orientation and emotional support.\(^8\)

ISAP is targeted to meet the needs of the whole family, and funding allows for social and economic bridging services, such as translation and interpretation and job-search; orientation sessions in Canada and abroad; settlement support in schools for teachers, immigrant children and their parents; and funding for Enhanced Language Training, which provides higher levels of language training including job-specific language training in English or French, bridge to work assistance, including mentoring,

\(^8\) This includes Joint Assistance Sponsorship in which private sponsors and government share responsibilities.
work placement and other assistance in accessing the labour market. ISAP also funds activities that support the delivery of settlement programming such as research, conferences, settlement worker training and delivery tools for service providers and community partners.

While some orientation services funded by ISAP are available to newcomers pre-arrival through Canadian Orientation Abroad, pre-arrival orientation services are limited in their reach and substantive content. Critics have suggested that Canada needs to do more to inform prospective newcomers about life in Canada even before making the decision to migrate. Stakeholders have identified the lack of detailed and specific information available to prospective and new immigrants as one barrier to the successful integration of immigrants into the Canadian labour market and society. Through the 2005 Budget funding was provided for the development of an integrated, comprehensive, national immigration portal. The Going to Canada Immigration Portal is being developed in collaboration with the provinces and territories through the enhancement of the existing Going to Canada Web site.

The volunteer-based Host Program is designed to create connections among newcomers and established Canadians and permanent residents by matching newcomers with an in-Canada host (individual, youth, families) to support settlement and integration activities such as orientation, practice of new language skills, and enhancing economic and social networks. While Host is one of the most obvious settlement programmes that articulates the “two-way street” of integration by creating connections between hosts and newcomers, thereby engaging Canadians and established residents in the integration process itself, it could be doing more.

As a volunteer-based program that has historically been funded at less than approximately 2% of the federal settlement budget, challenges exist for service providers with respect to promotion, volunteer recruitment and retention, and wait lists with respect to matching
challenges. Through additional funding announced in the 2005 Federal Budget for Canada’s Action Plan against Racism, the Government of Canada’s new horizontal approach to eliminate barriers to opportunities for Canadians of all ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic backgrounds, CIC has committed to expand the Host Program to more children and youth, families and businesses.

LINC funds language instruction for adult newcomers in English or French, and includes delivery support and assessment services. It includes a child-minding component in order to encourage the participation of women, and flexible hours of instruction and a transportation allowance are also available. Unfortunately, the delivery of LINC is uneven across the country and even in the locations with the most advanced level of delivery only provides basic levels of language training.9 To further complicate the matter, the education of children is under provincial jurisdiction, so federal language training for newcomers to Canada is delivered solely to adult immigrants. English as a Second Language for newcomer children is provided by provincial governments through the education system.

According to the Parliamentary Main Estimates, in 2005 federal funding for immigrant integration programmes outside of Quebec included $44.7 million for ISAP programming, including Canadian Orientation Abroad, Settlement Workers in Schools activities, and Enhanced Language Training projects; $2.8 million for Host; $100.5 million for LINC; and $44.5 million for RAP. The Federal

9. Originally launched in 2003, the ELT initiative ($20M annually) addresses this issue to some regard, but it designed more to help immigrants acquire the level of language proficiency necessary to find and retain work commensurate with their level of skills and experience, and does not address the issue of uneven delivery across the country for basic levels of language training.
Government also provided $227.5 million for provincial agreements with BC, Manitoba and Quebec. ¹⁰

While eligibility for federally funded settlement programmes and services generally spans the first three years in Canada,¹¹ or until an immigrant becomes a Canadian citizen, it is not expected that a newcomer can be fully integrated and all settlement needs met after such a relatively short time in Canada. At the same time that public policy discourse describes citizenship as the “ultimate policy objective” of the integration program, it also recognizes that the integration process does not end at the official citizenship ceremony.

**Role of Naturalization and Citizenship**

Canadian citizenship means having legal status as a citizen of Canada as set out in the *Citizenship Act* (1977); sharing equally in the rights and responsibilities that belong to each Canadian, and taking an active part in Canadian society.¹²

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¹⁰. CIC has bilateral agreements for administration and delivery of settlement programs and services with provincial governments, British Columbia and Manitoba, and with Quebec via the Canada-Quebec Accord. In 2005, the Government of Canada also signed the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement. In Budget 2006, the Federal Government announced $230 million in funding to support implementation of the agreement with the province of Ontario, and an additional $77 million for provinces and territories outside of Ontario and Quebec to enhance settlement programming.

¹¹. Three years is the length of time for the residency requirement for citizenship, and has little to do with the length of time it takes to integrate.

¹². The acquisition of Canadian citizenship by naturalization accords only a few rights that are not enjoyed by any permanent resident. The right to vote, run for political office in federal and provincial elections; the right to hold certain public offices; and the right to hold a Canadian passport are among those accorded by acquisition of citizenship. There are also some residency restrictions for permanent residents under IRPA that are removed once naturalized.
Unlike the law in effect in Canada up to 1977, the current *Citizenship Act* allows a Canadian citizen to voluntarily acquire foreign nationality without automatically losing Canadian citizenship. Since February 15, 1977, a Canadian citizen may retain Canadian citizenship, unless he or she voluntarily applies to renounce it and the application is approved by a citizenship judge. The current Act thus makes it possible to have several citizenships and allegiances at the same time for an indefinite period.\(^{13}\)

In general, to become a Canadian citizen, applicants must be permanent residents who have lived in Canada for at least three of the four years prior to their application for citizenship. Applicants must be at least 18 years old and parents may apply on behalf of their minor children. People applying for a grant of citizenship must be able to speak English or French. They must also demonstrate knowledge of Canada, and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. This is evaluated with a written test or oral interview (hearing with a citizenship judge).

People may be prohibited from being granted citizenship if they were charged or convicted of certain crimes. As a policy, people over 55 years of age are exempt from the language and knowledge requirements. Minors must be permanent residents; they do not have to meet residence, language or knowledge requirements. The final step in becoming a Canadian citizen is to take the oath of citizenship. Applicants attend a citizenship ceremony where a citizenship judge administers the oath and presents each new Canadian with a Certificate of Canadian Citizenship.

\(^{13}\) While there are concerns expressed that multiple allegiances might imperil connections to Canada, there is no research to suggest that this is the case. Indeed, Jedwab finds that Canadian Muslims, often the group against whom the charge of mixed allegiances is presently most commonly leveled, reported higher levels of attachment to Canada than the general population: 83% of Muslims surveyed had a strong sense of belonging to Canada, while 79.4% of the general population reported that strong of an attachment (Jedwab 2006).
As CIC has responsibility for the administration of the *Citizenship Act*, the department also promotes the rights and responsibilities of citizenship to all Canadians, and established Canadians are also encouraged to reflect on these rights and responsibilities through citizenship re-affirmation ceremonies, special events and the production of teacher’s activity guides. In addition, the Institute for Canadian Citizenship is an independent not-for-profit organization that was announced in September 2005 as a legacy project in honour of former Governor General Adrienne Clarkson. One of the objectives of the ICC is to explore ways to help new Canadians understand the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, as well as what it means to be an active and engaged citizen in one’s community.

Federal public policy recognizes that the process of immigrant integration that facilitates attachment to the country and a sense of belonging can take many years. While CIC has the primary responsibility for settlement programmes during the first three years of the integration process, the department of Canadian Heritage also plays an important role in immigrant integration through responsibility for Canada’s multiculturalism policy and programmes at the federal level. Canadian Heritage takes up where CIC responsibility leaves off, through programmes that strengthen diversity, enhance capacity in ethno-cultural communities, and aim to foster substantive equality for all Canadians. As Biles and Mulholland have pointed out: “In some ways one could conceive of CIC’s role in the first three years to be working primarily with newcomers themselves to ensure successful integration, and Canadian Heritage works primarily on Canadian society to ensure that the two-way street model of integration is a success.” 14 (2006).

14. “Of course, CIC and other federal departments and agencies also work to ensure receptivity on the part of Canadians and their institutions, and Canadian Heritage does also work with newcomers and their communities to build capacity” (Biles and Mulholland, 2006). See also Winnemore, 2005 for a description of how CIC facilitates the two-way aspect of integration.
This integration process is nested within a broader Government of Canada approach to shared citizenship that is described in articles by Donaldson and Van Wyck and Lazar included in this issue. In broad brush strokes, this approach creates a dynamic Canadian identity that evolves over time and that embraces diversity and accompanying change rather than clinging to an autochthonous and never changing approach.

**Outcomes: Handling Stains, Strains and Growing Pains**

When looking at immigrant outcomes, there are questions as to whether or not the two-way street of integration is working. As with any integration model, there are the stains of injustice (real or perceived; past or present); the strains of a system that is not delivering (or does not appear to be delivering) the desired outcomes; and the growing pains that accompany not only an immigration program that wishes to bring in more newcomers, but also to encourage an ever increasing diversity of newcomers to settle in a wider range of locations than has typically been the case. It is our assertion that the Canadian model is working because of the commitment of Canadians and their governments to tackle all three in a spirit of reciprocity: newcomers must adapt, but so too must other Canadians.

An excellent example of this two-way approach is the willingness of the Government of Canada to reflect on past policy and to redress injustices. For example, the present government has worked to tackle one of the most prominently discussed historical biases in Canadian immigration history – the so-called “head tax” charged to Chinese immigrants during the first half of the 20th century. On 22 June 2006 the Prime Minister described this as a “grave injustice, and one we are morally obligated to acknowledge.” The Government of Canada will make symbolic payments to those required to pay the tax, and to the spouses of those who have died, as well as creating a fund for community projects designed to acknowledge the impact of past
warteime measures and immigration restrictions targeting ethno-cultural communities (GoC 2006).

Injustice can continue to stain present-day society. For example, racism remains a concern for many Canadians, especially Black Canadians who reported significantly higher levels of discrimination or unfair treatment than others: 32% of Black Canadians reported that they had been discriminated against or treated unfairly by others because of their ethno-cultural characteristics, compared to 21% of South Asian Canadians, and 18% of Chinese Canadians (GoC 2003). As a result, the Government of Canada launched a three-year initiative entitled Canada’s Action Plan Against Racism: A Canada for All with six key components: 1. Assist victims and groups vulnerable to racism and related forms of discrimination; 2. Develop forward-looking approaches to promote diversity and combat racism; 3. Strengthen the role of civil society; 4. Strengthen regional and international cooperation; 5. Educate children and youth on diversity and anti-racism; 6. Counter hate and bias (GoC 2005).

A third stain that is presently frequently mooted in Canadian public discourse is the question of profiling used by police and security agencies. While it is officially denied, and the absence of widespread statistics collected by these agencies makes it difficult to judge the extent of the practice, work by criminologist Scot Wortley and his colleagues do indicate that the Black community is subject to greater police surveillance and that members of the Black community are more likely to get caught when they do break the law (Wortley and Tanner 2004). Meanwhile, Muslim Canadians feel that they are often the subject of tighter than justified security surveillance (Khan and Saloojee 2003; Hamdani, Bhatti, and Munawar 2005).

Several strains have also emerged in the integration of newcomers in Canada in the past decade. As we discussed earlier, with the move to a stronger focus on the “human capital” model under the present immigration act (IRPA) the assumption was that selection of higher
education and language skills would lead to more flexible labour market participation (Tolley 2003). It is premature to ascertain whether this will, indeed, be the case since a sizeable backlog of applications means that only five years after the introduction of the new act are the first immigrants selected under its revised selection grid arriving in Canada. That said, we do know that poverty levels among immigrants have been rising, with 47% of recent immigrants living below the low-income cut-off line (Picot and Hou 2003). In addition, a new range of strains to emerge include complex issues such as foreign credential recognition and how to effectively gauge facility in a language.

Facility in one of Canada’s official languages (French or English) is key to participation in all aspects of life in Canada and remains one of the principle integration challenges. Acknowledging the importance of language to successful integration, more points were linked to language in the revised selection criteria flowing from the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’s regulations. However, this only applies to principal applicants and, in a limited manner, their spouses. Despite this requirement, the reality is that many newcomers, even with some fluency in English or French, lack the higher levels of language competence required to obtain employment in their chosen fields. The recently announced enhanced language training may help with this process. Additionally, those newcomers who arrive as refugees or through family sponsorship are likely to require language training to facilitate integration into Canadian society. An interesting emerging measure of the efficacy and reach of language programmes such as LINC is the assessment of language ability at time of citizenship acquisition. If LINC funds primarily basic language training, it could be expected that LINC participants would have achieved a competency level necessary to participate fully as citizens at the time of naturalization. Data from a study on this question will be available in the near future. This information should act as a guide to the necessary enhancements to settlement and integration programming funded at
the federal level by the announcement of additional settlement funding for provinces and territories outside of Ontario and Quebec in the 2006 Federal Budget.

On the other side of the two-way integration street, questions of citizenship and who has a right to Canadian citizenship have become increasingly common. This first erupted recently into Canadian public discourse surrounding the Khadr family, a family of Canadian Muslims who were implicated in al-Qaeda activities (Maclean’s 2006). More recently it has been making headlines because of the number of Canadian citizens in Lebanon when the most recent conflict began (Granatstein 2006; Savage 2006). Others have speculated on what would happen if China, Taiwan and Hong Kong were ever to become an international hot spot with 300,000 Canadians living overseas in these areas (Skelton 2006). This debate has gained little traction and falters on the same points as several recent attempts to revise the Citizenship Act – who should be empowered to revoke citizenship, on what basis, and within what parameters? (Garcea 2003)

Finally, a series of growing pains are increasingly apparent in Canada as the Government of Canada strives to both increase the number of immigrants to Canada and to encourage them to settle outside of major centres (especially Toronto, Vancouver and Montréal, but also increasingly Calgary). These changes raise questions of “absorptive capacity” and broaden the range of partners necessary to successfully integrate newcomers. For example, municipalities are becoming increasingly involved in the settlement and integration of newcomers. This runs the gamut from developing the expertise required to deliver municipal services to a more diverse population to formal agreements negotiated by the City of Winnipeg and the City of Toronto with their provincial governments and the federal government on immigration topics.

As Donaldson and Van Wyck point out in their article in this magazine, there is a complex interplay between Canada’s two official language communities and immigration. This relationship has historically been
quite antagonistic, but has more recently evolved in a collaborative fashion with the recognition that immigration is a key factor in the growth and vitality of Francophone communities outside Québec.

In order to help maintain the Francophone minority communities and enhance linguistic duality in Canada, a variety of initiatives have been taken to increase the number of French speaking immigrants that will settle in these communities across Canada. In March 2003, the Government of Canada released its *Action Plan for Official Languages* (Action Plan). The Action Plan revolved around three major areas: education, community development, and an exemplary public service. There was $751.3 million allocated to implement the Action Plan over five years. The Action Plan allocated $9 million over five years, and $2 million for subsequent years to CIC in order to initiate activities aimed at attracting, settling and integrating immigrants within Francophone communities outside Québec. Under this initiative to date, CIC established the basic infrastructure to foster immigration to Francophone minority communities.

This plan was updated in September 2006, when federal Minister of Immigration, the Honourable Monte Solberg along with the Honourable Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation and Minister for La Francophonie and Official Languages, launched the new *Strategic Plan to Foster Immigration to Francophone Minority Communities*. The key objective of the plan is to increase the percentage of French-speaking immigrants by 2008: In 2001, about 3.1% of immigrants were French-speaking people who immigrated to Francophone communities outside Québec. The Strategic Plan has a goal of raising this to a minimum of 4.4% of overall immigration by 2008. It proposes to increase, in particular, the number of French-

15. The plan is available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/plan-minorities.html
speaking economic class immigrants, and students in Francophone minority communities. The Plan also suggests these communities need to work in close partnership with federal, provincial and territorial governments to recruit people that meet their needs, and to help them succeed. It suggests strengthening a number of integration services, including language and skills training, community awareness and local support networks.

Each expansion in the Canadian immigration programmes, in the diversity within the newcomer population, or in the reception sites, strains the integration model that has become accustomed to newcomers clustering primarily in Canada’s largest cities. Alternative delivery models need to be developed, perfected and shared across jurisdictions. This shared expertise and knowledge across a wide range of players and jurisdictions strengthens the Canadian integration model and ensures that it will be robust enough to handle the inevitable crises of a globalized and unstable world.

**Conclusion**

As the experiences of many other immigrant-receiving societies covered in this issue indicate, the success of any given integration approach will only last as long as the model’s ability to address the stains, strains and growing pains with which it is faced. The Canadian approach has enjoyed success thus far as it has adapted to the challenges posed by mass migration without sacrificing the multicultural framework embedded in the Constitution and in a suite of legislation and policy at all levels of government. As long as Canadians and their governments continue to support an inclusive approach that encourages newcomers to become active and self reflective or critical citizens, then this success is likely to continue.
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Reception models in Germany, France and the Netherlands: Concept and effectiveness of integration programmes for newcomers

Ines Michalowski

Since the beginning of the 1990s, different European member states have developed integration programmes for newcomers in order to limit welfare-state related “costs of non-integration” of immigrants (Loeffelholz/Thränhardt, 1996). The control of these costs is related to a quick labour market integration of migrants which can be achieved through improving their qualifications. This contribution first analyzes the reasons for the creation of such programmes and then presents the precepts of the integration programmes in France, Germany and the Netherlands in more detail. Starting from the discussion of the effectiveness of the programmes, this paper will conclude with a discussion of whether and how far these programmes will continue to be considered a “winning strategy” in the field of integration policies.

Integration programmes as a response to the perception of a twofold crisis

Over recent years, the assumed “failure of integration” among migrants has featured prominently on the political agenda of many European countries. Indeed, this catch-all notion has come to designate a number of different facts and events such as ethnic segregation in the big cities, the resulting concentration of migrant children in certain schools, unsatisfying results of the second generation in the field of education, a lack of language skills even after a long period of residence in the host country, religious and cultural difference as well as the high unemployment rates among migrants and their dependence on welfare-
state provisions (Mahnig, 2001). In many European countries, at the start of the 21st century, failings of earlier integration policies have been identified as a major source for the perceived crisis of integration. The oil crisis of 1972-73 and the subsequent ban on recruiting foreign labour have often been identified as the moment where a true integration policy should have started but did not. Since this period, German integration policy has been viewed very critically and is often – sometimes described as the “guestworker rotation model” – seen as encouraging segregation more than integration. French and Dutch integration policies, on the other hand, were presented as models. Towards the end of the 1990s, however, these models were also criticised and became, as in Germany, part of the debate about a crisis of integration.

The Netherlands in particular has been confronted with a sudden end of their multicultural policy practised since the 1970s. Indeed, a growing fear of Islamist terror after September 11, the polarisation of the Dutch political system through the influence of Pim Fortuyn, his assassination in 2002 as well as the assassination of Islam-critic Theo van Gogh by an Islamist extremist in 2004 can be understood as the final steps towards the end of Dutch multiculturalism (Böcker/Groenendijk 2004; Entzinger 2002; Michalowski 2005). The “beginning of the end”, however, can be situated as early as the beginning of the 1990s when multicultural ideas already lost support among the Dutch population (Böcker/Thränhardt, 2003). In December 2002, the Dutch parliament established a commission, named after its president Stef Blok, which was supposed to identify the reasons for “the failure of Dutch integration policy” (Commissie Blok, 2004).1 A similar development also arose in France.

1. In January 2004, the commission presented its final report, a detailed and critical report on Dutch integration. In the public, however, it was discussed as being much to soft and positive.
and culminated in the suburban riots of autumn 2005. The French court of audit had already published a decidedly critical report in November 2004 about the reception of immigrants and the integration of the population with immigrant background (Cour des Comptes, 2004). A central tenet of this report was that French integration policies of the past 30 years had failed. In Germany, the critical assessment of the country’s integration policy by the “Süssmuth-Kommission“, a commission set up by the government in 2000 in order to develop a new immigration and integration policy, caused few surprises.

The commission, named after its president Rita Süssmuth, stated that Germany lacked a coherent and systematic integration policy and that, although some pragmatic ad-hoc solutions may have delivered some positive results, there was no sustainable improvement (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung 2001: 75). As a reaction to the perceived crisis of integration policy, the Netherlands, France and Germany – as well as Norway, Finland, Denmark, Austria and Belgian Flanders – have introduced state-driven integration programmes. However, the programmes are not only a response to the perceived deficit of integration; they are also linked to a perceived general crisis of the established social systems in the different countries. Hence, in all three countries the 1990s

2. Particularly for the German context it can be assumed that negative messages are more popular than positive ones. For example, several works of comparative research have shown that the lack of a global model of integration has not necessarily had a negative influence on the integration of immigrants in Germany but they have not necessarily managed to change the dominant discourse (cf. Werner, 1994; Doomernik, 1998; Bade/Bommes, 2001; Koopmans, 2001; Böcker/Thränhardt, 2003; Koopmans, 2005).
were not only a decade of a perceived integration crisis but also a decade when the idea of a declining inclusive capacity of the welfare state (Bommes, 2003) came to the fore.

This is also the context in which the growing requirement that immigrants learn the language, participate in the programme and integrate should be understood. Of course, the integration programmes can be interpreted as a “return of assimilation” (Alba/Nee 2004; Brubaker 2003; Esser 2004) especially because they put emphasis on the acquisition of linguistic and civic skills. Nonetheless, it can be argued that if immigrants are asked to make more efforts and acquire civic and linguistic skills, it encourages a smoother labour market integration, i.e. a socio-economic instead of a classic cultural assimilation (Brubaker, 2003), which is the main motive behind the creation of the programmes.

The concept of the programmes

Generally, integration programmes for newcomers consist of a language and a civic education course as well as an individual accompaniment by a so-called “case manager”. The programmes’ objective is to help migrants with the prospect of permanent residence to become economically independent. This objective is achieved through the training and guidance of the immigrant during the first months after his or her immigration. The idea is that the programme sets the pattern for a further successful integration process.

3. In the France, Germany and the Netherlands as well as in a couple of other European countries, this legal and permanent immigration is dominated by family reunification. In addition, among the target group of the programmes, there are also family members of recognised refugees and some labour migrants.
In the Netherlands, several attempts were made to introduce a state-driven integration measure until, finally, in 1998 the act on the integration of newcomers (\textit{wet inburgering nieuwkomers, WIN}) was introduced.\textsuperscript{4} This law foresaw a little less than 600 hours of language tuition (after the first evaluation this was rendered more flexible and varied between 400 and 800 hours), a so-called civic education course (\textit{maatschappij oriëntatie}), professional orientation and an individual accompaniment of the newcomer. The language and the civic education course ended with a test, but failing this test did not have any negative consequences for the migrant. As is the case in Germany and France today, the newcomer could be excused totally or partially from participation in the programme if s/he had sufficient language skills or any other good reason not to participate. In other circumstances, if they refused to participate in the programme, they could be fined by the relevant local authority.

Defining the content of the programme has not been easy and provoked some debate in the Netherlands. With regard to the content of the civic education course, a conflict arose between the ministry for education and research and the Dutch parliament because the ministry, which had contracted out the design of the curriculum to a private consultancy firm, accepted a division of the curriculum into one part called “need to know” that mainly contained practical information about every day life in the Netherlands and another part called “nice to

\textsuperscript{4} It is difficult to translate the Dutch notion of “inburgering” with all the different political connotations it has gained over the last years. While in the beginning, the term mainly expressed the idea that newcomers undergo a first period of adaptation and settlement, the political notion of the term now not only designates the process itself but also the policy intervention that is aiming at supplying the migrant with competences relevant for integration.
know” (thus not obligatory) which contained information about Dutch norms and values, for example the tolerance of homosexuality. Many parliamentarians rejected this division of the curriculum and demanded a stronger stance on norms and values. In the end, a compromise was found when some basic principles of politeness in Dutch society were included into the programme.

There were other, less intense, conflicts over the content of the language course: the participants in the language course were supposed to reach a level of language skills sufficient for everyday or even professional life, which in the latter case corresponded approximately to level B1 or B2 of the Common European Reference Framework for Languages. Critics, however, noted that the number of hours allotted to attain this level of language skills was not sufficient, a view later vindicated by the evaluation of the Dutch programme in 2002. As we shall see, the former Dutch integration programme was replaced in January 2007 by an alternative strategy, which sought to privatise the integration process.

In France, the existing measures for the reception and integration of newcomers have been and still are, although considerably extended since 2006, less extensive than the Dutch and the German ones. The centrepiece of the French measures are the so-called reception platforms (plate-forme d’accueil) that are organised on the local level and last for half a day. These platforms bring together all newcomers that have arrived in a French department (département) and offer them general

5. Until recently, the Netherlands used their own system for the assessment of language skills, called CITO-levels. This system contained levels from 0 to 5 and while level 2 referred to skills sufficient for every day social life, skills of at least level 3 were deemed necessary for professional life. The “translation” of these CITO-levels into the levels of the European reference framework has been difficult but the higher level 3 has been approximately referred to the level B1 or B2.
information about life in France and the first administrative steps they need to take. They are also invited to sign an individual integration contract. This contract was recently introduced and was included as part of the new act on immigration and integration passed on 24 July, 2006. The reception and integration contract is proposed to each newcomer at the end of an individual interview conducted by staff of the new French agency for the reception of foreigners and for migration (ANAEM). During this interview, the personal living situation of each newcomer is analyzed in order to identify particular needs and difficulties. Furthermore, the newcomer is offered a language test in order to measure their language skills and find a corresponding language course. If the newcomer shows particular difficulties, the help of a social worker specialised in migration can be offered.

The integration contract that is offered to every newcomer comprises between 200 and 500 hours of language tuition. Recently the French government introduced a new language diploma (DILF) situated at the level A1.1, thus below level A1 of the Common European Reference Framework for Languages. With the introduction of this language diploma, it is the first time that France required not only oral but also written language skills. Furthermore, the integration contract entails six hours (one day) of civic education with information about the political and administrative system in France, about French history and also about the rights and duties of citizens in France. Furthermore, the newcomer may take a course focused on the issues of housing, education, work and health. In principle, the newcomer is free to sign the integration contract. However, since the new law on immigration and integration came into force, the immigrant has to provide proof of their “republican integration”

6. Before the introduction of this diploma, newcomers were only supposed to acquire oral language skills which are also the only language skills required at naturalisation.
in order to obtain a permanent residency permit. The signature of the reception and integration contract is considered sufficient proof of this republican integration.

In Germany, a state integration programme for newcomers has been offered since the new law on immigration (Zuwanderungsgesetz) entered into force in January 2005. Even though such integration programmes for newcomers are not completely new in Germany, this was the first time that such a programme had been opened to different categories of newcomers. Hitherto, it had been open exclusively been to ethnic Germans (Spätaussiedler). With the introduction of the new programme, all categories of newcomers and especially family migrants have been defined as target groups of the new measure. Because of the delay caused by four years of political debate, the introduction of the German integration measure has been asynchronous compared to the Netherlands and France. While France introduced the first measure in 1998, which went through profound change in the ensuing years, and while the Netherlands was planning to abandon its programme created in 1998, Germany just started to introduce its programme. The general content of the German programme resembles the French and the Dutch one: the programme foresees 600 hours of language tuition and 30 hours of civic education. The civic education course focuses on three big issues: German history (from 1871 until today with a contemporary chapter on Germany as a country of immigration), politics and the political system in Germany as well as culture (including a general reflection on cultural difference). “Successful participation” in the language course is considered a general condition for the acquisition of a permanent residency permit and, following the executive order of the immigration act7, such a “successful participation” is defined as the

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level B1 of the Common European Reference Framework for Languages.

This seems to be a rather ambitious goal, given the limited number of hours of language teaching. Newcomers who refuse to participate in the integration programme face not only financial sanctions such as the reduction of social benefits or fines, but also with sanctions related to the acquisition of a (permanent) residency permit in Germany. Furthermore, and distinct from the two other countries, the participants in Germany have to contribute directly to the costs of the integration courses by paying 1 per hour to the language course provider. However, an exemption is possible for immigrants without sufficient income. All other costs are covered by the federal state that, like in France, also runs the programmes on the local level via a new national agency for migration and refugees (BAMF).

Effectiveness

In all three countries, the evaluations have revealed the rather limited effectiveness of the integration programmes. Hence, the evaluation of the Dutch integration programme undertaken in 2001 and published a year later (Regioplan, 2002) has shown that 60% of all participants failed to reach the target level of language skills and instead only reached the CITO-level 0 or 1. One reason why the goals have not been reached is clearly that they have been too ambitious, given the high percentage of low-skilled immigrants. Indeed, mainly only high-skilled migrants managed to reach the stated goals within the number of hours financed (approximately 550 hours). As a result, the number of hours of language tuition was made more flexible, ranging from 400 to 800 hours, depending in need. In fact, the share of participants who received at least 600 hours of language tuition has risen from 14% in 2001 to almost 50% in 2004 (Significant, 2005: 44, table 21; Piers Groep, 2004: 65). Although this extension allowed more participants to make at least some visible progress by reaching the level 1 (out of 5 not
counting level 0), the number of immigrants who reached the goal of level 2 or higher increased only marginally (see table 1):

Table 1. Cito-Levels reached in Dutch as a foreign language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level 0</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2 or higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>27% (own calculations)</td>
<td>29% (own calculations)</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Regioplan (2002: 106); Piers Groep (2004); Significant (2004; 2005; 2006); own calculations.

Another objection to the effectiveness of the programme was the high dropout rate. Yet, it has to be mentioned that dropout rates differ in the evaluation and the official statistics. This was obviously due to an ambiguous definition of the fact itself as well as to incomplete data (Schönwälder/Söhn et al. 2005: 13-14). Hence, dropout rates vary between 13% in the official evaluation (Regioplan, 2002: 91, 97) and 20% in an inter-ministerial study (IBO, 2002: 4) while the official statistics collected by the municipalities (Piers Groep, 2002: 58) indicate dropout rates among newcomers who were obliged to show up for the initial evaluation of their integration needs 33% (1999), 20% (2000) and 16% (2001). The most recent publication of data collected by the municipalities, however, showed a significant and rather inexplicable, sudden reduction of dropout rates to 8% after one year of participation in the programme (Significant, 2006: 31); another critical point is the reorientation after the programme to follow-up activities, particularly on the labour market. In principle, the labour market integration of the immigrant is supposed to be a central objective of the integration programme but the Regioplan evaluation (2002) has shown that even though 50% of the participants are redirected to a follow-up
activity, in about 80% of these cases, this follow-up activity is only another language course (often within the same institution). Following the Regioplan evaluation, this means that only one quarter of all newcomers are redirected towards an employment centre or another agent in the field of labour market integration. The inter-ministerial working group also stated that only 6% of the former participants were orientated towards the labour market after completing the programme.

The evaluation of the French programme has concentrated more on quantitative aspects than on qualitative aspects. Hence, there is no comparable information available about the level of language skills reached by the participants of the integration course. On the contrary, what has been assessed is how many newcomers finally participated in the language course after having passed the different previous steps. The evaluation of the French measure before the introduction of the reception and integration contract\(^8\) (C3E Eureval/FASILD, 2004: 45) has shown that only 16% of all newcomers for whom the need for language tuition has been identified actually started a language course within a given period. Furthermore, the evaluation predicted that if dropout rates in these language courses were the same as in other language courses, another 30-50% might drop out after having started the language course (C3E-Eureval/FASILD, 2004: 45).

Compared to these high French and rather high Dutch dropout rates, the rate cited in the recent German evaluation (Ramboll Management/Bundesministerium des Innern, 2006: 52) of 2.4% seems to be very low. However, the authors of the evaluation admit that the controlling system does not allow for registering dropout because

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8. For the time being, there is no evaluation published on the effectiveness of the reception and integration contract. However, since the reception contract contains sanctions related to residence it can be expected that dropout rates have been lowered significantly.
In theory, 100 hours is the minimum that a newcomer obliged to take part in the programme has to attend and this is why, in theory, people who have attended at least 100 hours might have finished the course. Indeed, there is no reliable data on the level of language skills reached by the participants of the programme because the final assessment test is not obligatory and there is not one clear variable such as “has finished the programme”. Thus, in order to make a statement about the effectiveness of the programme, the final share of people who took the test and reached level B1 can be related to several other subgroups which one might suppose to represent the entity of participants who finished the programme (cf. table 2):

Table 2. Participants in the German integration courses at different stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute numbers</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% of participants with B1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>322,311</td>
<td>Participants entitled to participate</td>
<td>9/21/2006</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219,973</td>
<td>Participants starting the programme</td>
<td>9/21/2006</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>Participants receiving at least 100 hours</td>
<td>9/21/2006</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,700</td>
<td>Participants finishing the civic education course</td>
<td>Midyear 2006</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58,602</td>
<td>Participants receiving 600 hours of language course</td>
<td>9/21/2006</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43,809</td>
<td>Participants taking the final language test</td>
<td>8/31/2006</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,996</td>
<td>Participants reaching the level B1</td>
<td>8/31/2006</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ramboll (2006: 34; 54-55)

The authors of the German evaluation compare the subgroup of participants who have reached the level B1 to other subgroups of

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9. In theory, 100 hours is the minimum that a newcomer obliged to take part in the programme has to attend and this is why, in theory, people who have attended at least 100 hours might have finished the course.
participants that might be an estimation of the number of people who actually finished the course and thus might have been able to take the test (but maybe refused to do so since their language skills were insufficient for the level B1\textsuperscript{10}). A very reasonable measure would be the number of participants who have finished the civic education course since it is anticipated that this course takes place after the language course. In this case, 38.4\% of all participants having finished the course would have reached the level B1. Another possibility is to assess the number of successful tests to the number of persons having received 600 hours of language tuition, but the authors of the evaluation state that the statistical system is incapable to measure those who have finished the programme in less than 600 hours. This is why a share of 52.8\% of all former participants having reached level B1 seems too high. It can rather be assumed that the share of people who reached B1 corresponds approximately to the results in the Netherlands.

In general, the evaluations themselves have to be viewed in a critical light because many assess the effectiveness of a programme by comparing the results with rather narrowly defined political goals. Since the evaluations are carried out without control groups\textsuperscript{11} they can

\textsuperscript{10} It has to be noted that the current German test at the end of the programme only gives information about whether or not a person managed to reach the level B1. Other levels below B1 such as A2 cannot be measured, so that every person not reaching the level B1 fails the test. This is why language teachers rather discourage participants with a lower level of language skills to take the test.

\textsuperscript{11} Setting up a control group would be a very difficult and costly task since a control group ideally does not differ from the target group except for the participation in the programme. However, migrants with the same characteristics as the target group would in most cases be part of the target group and therefore be obliged to participate in the programme.
hardly make any statements about the added value of the programmes. Furthermore, the evaluations are mostly based on existent data and dependent on the quality of this data which can be compromised through the bad collection of statistics but also through incompatible or inadequate language tests. In the Netherlands, for instance, the evaluation observed that a significant number of language course participants seemed to regress rather than progress by participating in the programme since their final language test results were worse than the initial ones. The authors of the Dutch evaluation explained this paradox by pointing to an incompatibility between the kind of language tests used for the initial and the final assessment (cf. Schönwälder/Söhn et al. 2005). Nonetheless, the test results in language training remain a central criterion for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the programmes while other aspects such as the acquisition of knowledge about the host society or a faster integration into the labour market are hardly taken into consideration. Indeed, the acquisition of language skills seems to be the most tangible aspect of progress in integration but the evaluations show that it is particularly difficult for a state to control and steer the individual integration process. Very often, expectations about what might be possible have been higher than the actual results.

Indeed, when introduced, the programmes were supposed to render the individual integration process more efficient. For instance, the programmes promised better management of the individual migrant, greater efficiency and thereby the reduction of “costs of non-integration” (Loeffelholz/Thränhardt, 1996). In order to achieve these objectives, the programmes have developed a high level of administration of the individual integration process. This is different from local programmes and initiatives that are rooted in the immediate surroundings of the immigrant, options that might reach the target group through low-threshold offers in schools, associations and religious institutions. Local initiatives might react directly to the needs of the
migrants and vary from one municipality to another. The integration programmes, on the other hand, aim at establishing a common standard. Such a standard will guarantee the same measures to all legal and permanent immigrants all over the country. This requires also the establishment of a standardised administrative procedure and this is why the state integration programme sees standardisation first and only adapts to individual needs and local characteristics at a later stage. Therefore, from a conceptual point of view, an efficient integration programme is supposed to deliver first of all standardisation and differentiation only as far as possible.

One example is a common curriculum intended to ensure that all participating migrants learn the same things. Nonetheless, the Dutch evaluation has shown that a different initial qualification is more decisive for the final result than a common curriculum, which means that a standardised programme does not necessarily lead to standardised results. The programmes have revealed too ambitious linguistic goals that the majority of the immigrants were unable to reach. Furthermore, the evaluations could not demonstrate that the participation in the programme enhanced the immigrants’ chances on the labour market and the Dutch evaluation even showed that the majority of the participants who finished the first programme started another language course. This suggests there is a vicious circle of permanent qualification for the labour market that has also been described for the long-term unemployed: if a person is not able to prove his or her qualities by showing recent practical experience on the labour market, this person will have fewer chances to get employment, will be unable to maintain or construct relevant networks and will again have fewer chances to get employed. Since neither the language skills nor the labour market integration of immigrants who participated in the programmes increases dramatically in the short term, the Dutch government (2003 until 2007) has come to consider them a doubtful social investment.
A social welfare state calculus and the further development of the programmes

At a time when the welfare state in Europe is undergoing a major overhaul, costly measures that cannot be shown to be effective need to be morally justified if they are to be continued. Currently, integration programmes are still expanding in Europe but the Netherlands was the first European country to decide to abolish the programme introduced in 1998. One might see some sort of “democratic impatience” (Penninx/Vermeulen, 1994) behind this strategic change but also more fundamental decisions that are not only taken with regard to immigrants but also with regard to other fields of the social welfare state. After a long phase of extension of the social welfare state from the 1950s until the middle of the 1970s, welfare cutbacks have become a major issue over the past 20 years. This is particularly true for the three countries cited here, because in all these three countries recent reforms of the welfare state have led to reduction, not expansion, of welfare recipients. This shrinking capacity of the welfare state (Bommes, 2003) affect immigrants and non-immigrants alike (Bommes, 2003; Mohr, 2005).

Members of both groups, and especially the unemployed, are increasingly seen in terms of how to reintegrate them into the labour force through training or a growing obligation to work for less money or below one’s qualifications. The justifications for introducing such measures vary only slightly between immigrants and non-immigrants which also becomes evident through the use of the same motto “assist and require” (Fördern und Fordern) for both, long-term unemployed and newcomer immigrants in Germany. This is not very surprising because both are risk groups with supposedly inadequate or insufficient qualifications and a relatively high likelihood of becoming dependent on social welfare. This should be counteracted through special assistance on the one hand and reasonable requirements on the other hand. Thus,
there is no systematic difference between measures for long-term unemployed and immigrants. In practice, however, there are some special sanctions for immigrants that are related to their right of stay and residence and an over-representation of migrants in structurally weak positions. This is why migrants are particularly affected by the restructuring of the social security system and other elements of the welfare state (Mohr, 2005: 393).

From the point of view of the State, there are two main ways of improving the level of skills among their population: training on the one hand and selection on the other. The high interdependency between the achieved level of language skills and the initial level of qualification that has been observed in the Netherlands has cast the effectiveness and thus the option of training into doubt. Instead of qualifying migrants in a lengthy and expensive procedure, the Netherlands has introduced a strategy of selection: since 15 March 2006, when the new law on integration in the country of origin (wet inburgering in het buitenland) came into force candidates for permanent and regular immigration such as family members of foreigners already settled in the Netherlands\footnote{For a critical juridical assessment of the possibility to restrict family reunification see Kees Groenendijk (2005) and Anne Walter/Albrecht Weber (2003). However, refugees are explicitly excluded of this regulation, cf. the European directive on family reunification (2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003) and on the status of long-term residents (2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003).} have to pass a civic education and language test of 500 words (level “A1 minus”, thus below A1) in order to obtain an immigration visa. This test can be passed in the Dutch embassy or consulate of the country of origin and consists of a 10-minute telephone call with a computer located in the Netherlands and equipped with a voice-recognition programme. The prospective immigrant has to prove they have a basic knowledge of the Dutch language.
and Dutch society. However, there are no courses financed by the Dutch state in order to prepare the immigrants for this test. In order to prepare for the test, the candidate can buy a training package (price: 63.90 ) which contains material for language training and a two-hour video on life in the Netherlands, available in eight languages. This new instrument of selection is specially addressed to (unqualified) family migrants and, more generally to “non-Western immigrants” since the integration of labour migrants does not seem to be problematic, nor does the integration of immigrants from developed nations such as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or Japan.

In a second step, the Netherlands also introduced a new law on the first integration in the Netherlands (nieuwe wet inburgering) which came into force in January 2007 and foresees that only immigrants who managed to acquire Dutch language skills to level A2 without the financial or organisational help of the state will obtain a permanent residence permit. Exceptions are made for immigrants who are particularly needy and, furthermore, all immigrants who managed to acquire language skills to level A2 within a period of three years may ask for a 70% refund of their costs from the Dutch state (maximum 3,000 ). Although this possibility is an exception to the general principle, it is obvious that the privatisation of the integration process has been one of the major goals of the previous Dutch government.14

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13. Dutch statistics distinguish between autochthones (both parents are born in the Netherlands) and allochthones (at least one parent is born outside the Netherlands). Furthermore, a distinction is made between Western and non-Western immigrants (cf. Swiączny, 2005).

14. However, the new Dutch government (in which the liberal party is no more represented) announces in its coalition accord dated 7 February 2007 the re-establishment of an integration programme.
Such a step towards the privatisation of the integration process cannot be observed in the two other countries although participants of an integration course in Germany are asked to contribute 1 per hour to their classes. Thus, for the time being a total privatisation of the costs and organisation of integration in the host country is neither on the French nor on the German agenda, in fact both countries are expanding and improving their measures. Germany is particularly interested in language tests in the country of origin. Germany already uses such tests for specific groups of immigrants such as ethnic Germans (Spätaussiedler) from the former Eastern bloc even though these language tests in the countries of origin take place under slightly different conditions since the German state offers German language courses in the regions of origin of the ethnic Germans. Recently, though, a debate has been started about the introduction of language tests (level A1) for family migrants in their country of origin. Such a test should be prepared without the help of the German state. In France, there is also a clear tendency towards better qualified immigrants. In July 2005 the French governing party UMP organised a conference entitled “une immigration choisie, une intégration réussie” – “a selected immigration, a successful integration”, a clear desire to attract highly-qualified immigrants. In addition, the then French interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy announced that he wanted significantly to reduce family migration within the coming years. However, introducing language tests in the country of origin as a barrier to family migration does not seem to be a winning strategy in France since, because of colonial migration, 66% (2005) of all permanent and legal immigrants are francophone upon arrival.

15. Again, if an immigrant does not have the resources necessary, the state will cover the total costs.
Recapitulating, one can say that all three countries compared here try to tackle integration problems by establishing a stronger link between integration and immigration (de Heer, 2004), i.e. by trying to select more qualified immigrants who are supposed to integrate more easily (into the labour market). Such a strategy should help to reduce expenses of the social welfare state. However, it is not clear today, whether a strategy of selection, hand in hand with a strategy of privatising the costs of integration (then presented as a personal investment into human capital) will be pursued in the future. Indeed, such a strategy assumes that the State defines some crucial criteria of integration which an applicant for immigration or for permanent residence would have to fulfil without the help of the State. Since the language (and civic education tests) can represent a serious hurdle to immigration and permanent settlement of family migrants, there are numerous juridical restrictions to the full application of such a strategy. Generally speaking, it would make more sense to open up the channel of labour migration in order to unburden the channel of family reunification (often the only channel of permanent legal immigration that is possible) and to apply criteria of qualification to these migrants.

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