JOINT Effectiveness Checklist for EU Foreign and Security Policy in Conflict and Crisis Situations

Kristina Kausch and Oliver Gnad
Abstract
The JOINT Effectiveness Checklist provides a comparatively simple framework for policy-makers and researchers to analyse the effectiveness of the EU’s response to conflicts and crises. It adds value to existing evaluation tools by a) assessing effectiveness relative to the level of difficulty of the policy environment, and b) adapting and further developing existing standard policy assessment criteria/indicators specifically to the requirements of the multi-actor/multi-layered/multi-sector nature of the EU foreign and security policy.

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Introduction

As the European Union aims to be a coherent actor in world affairs, the JOINT Effectiveness Checklist provides EU policy-makers and researchers with a simple tool to systematically assess the effectiveness of EU foreign and security policy (EUFSP) in a given conflict or crisis. It does so by taking into account that the EU as a 27-member partly supranational body is a sui generis type of actor in a predominantly nation-state driven international system. Therefore, when referring to EUFSP, this tool refers to the full body of European external action, including both EU and member states external policies.

European foreign and security policy does not happen in a vacuum. The framework conditions which EUFSP actors encounter in a given conflict or crisis situation differs in their level of difficulty and substantially affect the prospects of policy impact. The framing environment that conditions the impact potential of EUFSP therefore constitutes the first step of analysis of the Checklist. In the second step, the Checklist measures the effectiveness of EUFSP relative to stated objectives and aims by means of a catalogue of assessment criteria and indicators which can be applied to any conflict or crisis. “Effectiveness” in this context is understood as the product of consistency, impact and sustainability.

The Checklist is a practical tool for policy-makers and analysts to conduct an indicative trend analysis that can provide a tentative yet substantiated snapshot of the main strengths and weaknesses, challenges and opportunities of EU foreign and security policy in a given conflict or crisis. The Checklist is meant to steer, adapt and improve policy processes in order to increase EUFSP effectiveness on the ground rather than provide exact measurement of input, output and outcome of policies. With its two-pronged approach, the Checklist tool allows for both swift indicative assessment and tentative trend-building over time, as well as for indicative comparisons of EU responses to different conflicts. The checklist is a trend indicator, not a comprehensive evaluation tool, and as such is meant to

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1 In the JOINT project we use a slightly different definition of “sustainability” than in standard evaluation lingo. Whereas in OECD/DAC evaluation schemes “sustainability” is being understood as the extent to which the net benefits of an intervention continue – or are likely to continue – over time, JOINT rather looks at the ongoing commitment of EUFSP to reach its declared objectives with an in-build capability to adapt to a changing environment.
supplement and not replace regular in-depth monitoring and evaluation tools of EUFSP.

1. Methodology

Methodologically sound concepts to measure foreign and security policy impact are scarce, both in academia and among practitioners. Notable exceptions are the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ *Evaluation Policy and Guidelines for Evaluations* and the *European Foreign Policy Scorecard*, published annually between 2011 and 2016 by a European think tank, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Since the ECFR Scorecard was meant to be a rating instrument, it was not used as a point of reference for the JOINT Checklist. Yet it provided useful insights into the muddy waters of policy impact assessment methodology.

Importantly, in a first step, it needs to be clarified what a policy assessment tool can and what it cannot deliver. The ECFR Scorecard team argued that “there is no quantitative tool that can adequately capture performance in foreign policy” as “[d]iplomacy is more often about managing problems than fixing them, biding time, choosing the worst of two evils, finding an exit strategy, saving face, etc.”

This approach, however, reflects the aspiration of rating the quality of EUFSP (via benchmarking, indexing or scoring) as more or less “good”.

The JOINT Checklist takes a different approach: it does not seek to rate performance. Instead, it aims to assess the effectiveness (consistency, impact and sustainability) of EUFSP in comparison to stated objectives, invested resources, capacities and framework conditions during a given period or moment in time.

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1.1 A hybrid evaluation and review tool

To make the best use of the JOINT Checklist, it is important to understand the differences between monitoring, review and evaluation.

Monitoring is an instrument of internal management. It measures the progress of planned operations and activities designed to achieve larger policy objectives based on a pre-established set of indicators. For evaluation, monitoring is indispensable as it provides the data set for it.

A review is an instrument – periodic or ad hoc – to assess the performance and the results of an intervention. It is a policy analysis tool that helps decision-makers to adjust goals, policies and interventions to changes on the ground or in the political environment. It provides a bird-view to put interventions into perspective.

The Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) – considered the gold standard of policy impact evaluation – defines evaluation as an “assessment [...] of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results.” Its aim is “to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, [...] efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.” Evaluations aim to provide a causal link between an intervention and changes on the ground. In short: evaluation is about attribution. Therefore, one of the key objectives of evaluations is to gain insights for necessary adjustments of interventions in order to increase the intervention impact.

We have designed JOINT Checklist as a hybrid instrument: It is both a review and an evaluation kit as it is positioned at the interface of actual policy implementation evaluation and long-term policy impact review.

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1.2 Concepts

JOINT Checklist’s main point of reference is the Dutch Foreign Ministry’s evaluation framework. It is based on the OECD/DAC Principles,5 which rest on five key criteria: consistency, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance and sustainability. Even though the JOINT Checklist refers to these commonly accepted international standards of policy evaluation, it has widened these concepts in order to adapt evaluation parameters of development policy to foreign and security policy. Weaving its own conceptual framework of contextual factors (internal contestation, regional fragmentation, multipolar competition) into the evaluation framework, the JOINT Checklist is able to depict the specific level of complexity, context and difficulty in which EU policy actors develop and implement EUFSP.

1.3 Attribution gap

The difficulty to establish a causal relationship between policy intervention and impact – the attribution gap – is methodologically challenging. As EUFSP does not take place in a vacuum, constituting a causal link between European policies on the one hand and effectiveness on the other is problematic. Moreover, goals that are important to the EU can be met by other actors without any meaningful EU engagement. By a similar token, EU objectives can be undermined despite coherent and sustained EU efforts. The ECFR Scorecard dealt with the attribution gap pragmatically: it deemed Europeans to be successful if their objectives were met (“not penalised for having been helped by circumstances”).6 For this reason, the ECFR Scorecard spoke of “outcome”, rather than “result” or “impact”, which suggest a causal link between EU policies and a change of situation on the ground. JOINT follows this example in assessing “effectiveness” against pre-stated policy objectives, not as a causal relationship between input and impact.

Conversely, policy analysts also need to take note of counterfactual evidence: how to measure what the EU is not doing? In the absence of meaningful action, what

5 OECD, Applying Evaluation Criteria Thoughtfully, cit. This OECD framework rests on the foundation of OECD/DAC’s groundbreaking work on policy evaluation in the field of development cooperation, published in the early 1990s (the so-called “DAC Principles” of 1991).

6 ECFR, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010, cit., p. 131.
could have happened or changed if the EU had taken action? Or if it had intervened in a different manner?

These considerations lead to another key question: the leverage of the EU or any constellation of EU actors in a given foreign and security context. The notion that a European engagement could by itself fix a problem is often – if not always – illusory. In a world that is defined by a high degree of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity causal feedback loops are hard to establish – hence attribution, by the sheer nature of foreign and security policy, remains a vague concept.

1.4 Developing meaningful indicators

The indicators contained in the Checklist were developed according to a thorough process. First, through qualitative interviews with JOINT’s case study authors, we gathered a first raw collection of possible indicators for each of the three criteria (consistency, impact, sustainability). By looking for reiterative patterns in the qualitative data from the nine JOINT case studies, we developed a set of independent (de-contextualised) indicators that were applicable to all nine case studies, and potentially to any crises or conflict in the future. Second, after an exchange with JOINT consortium experts, we generated an aggregated list of assessment criteria. Third, the aggregated data were complemented and refined by the results of a literature review, including key resources from established monitoring and evaluation authorities.

Measuring the impact and effectiveness of EUFSP in a single instrument faces many difficulties. One of the main obstacles relates to context and the comparability of different foreign policies settings: ending armed conflicts, negotiating nuclear non-proliferation arrangements, managing migration, enhancing post-conflict justice not only rely on different EUFSP toolkits but are also bound by quite different qualities of public discourse within the 27 EU member states. In short: A set of criteria for assessing impact and effectiveness to end the civil war in Syria differ considerably from EUFSP objectives (and a set of criteria for assessing impact and effectiveness) to conclude the negotiation of a nuclear non-proliferation agreement with Iran. Yet, it was our aim to design a useful instrument to assess EUFSP in all these different environments without falling into the banality trap.
Another challenge refers to the fact that the assessment of “success”, “impact”, “effectiveness” or “sustainability” is likely to lead to different results depending on the moment or time period of assessment. Since diplomatic crises can morph into a full-fledged violent conflict, a hot war into a frozen conflict, and conflicting parties can be reconciled, all analysis is time- and context-bound. What might be considered a success at one time can turn into an outright failure as contexts and policy goals change. This has profound impact on the development and selection of indicators to measure the effectiveness of EUPSP. While contexts and policy goals change over time, indicators need to be reliable, stable and consistent. If not, measuring progress would be impossible.

Literature on indicators list five key criteria for meaningful indicators, which must be:

- **observable** – indicators need to be observed and reported through a reliable source;
- **consistent** – data collection must be consistent using comparable methods over time;
- **stable** – an indicator must be stable over time to allow comparisons and track events;
- **relevant** – an indicator must be relevant to the issue at stake, i.e., it needs to measure a causal relationship (input–output–outcome causality);
- **specific** – an indicator should measure only one item at the time;
- **measurable** – indicators need to come with a yardstick, i.e., they need to be quantifiable (counts, percentages, proportions or ratios).

All indicators of the JOINT Effectiveness Checklist have been evaluated against these criteria to ensure assessment quality.

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2. Checklist user guide

The JOINT Checklist uses a three-step approach to support EU policy-makers and analysts in their effort to pursue an assessment of an effective common foreign and security policy: a baseline conflict analysis (1) which serves as the base for the Checklist assessment (2), the results of which is then graphically visualised (3).

2.1 Step 1 – Baseline conflict analysis: Getting the context right

An assessment of the effectiveness of EUFSP must rest on a common understanding of the conflict at hand; only then can the EU’s response be meaningfully assessed. A baseline conflict analysis that is in line with the European External Action Service’s 2020 Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action, is a preliminary step to the use of the Checklist tool. In case no up-to-date baseline conflict analysis is available at EU institutional level, at least a rough overview of the conflict or crisis at stake should be produced to serve as common ground for any further analysis of EUFSP effectiveness.

With its 2020 Guidance Note, the EEAS has defined a common standard for EUFSP conflict analyses. The guideline helps to develop a structured analysis that offers key insights into conflict dynamics, the risks of violent conflict, key drivers and triggers of conflict, stakeholders involved and an outlook on the future development of the conflict (scenarios). For most conflicts, EU institutions and agencies may already have produced a thorough conflict analysis that adheres to EEAS Guidance Note’s standards (joint, integrated, evidence-based, timely and recurrent). Where such conflict analyses are not at hand, JOINT Checklist provides a simple-to-use grid to quickly produce such a baseline analysis.

Whereas standard analytical frameworks primarily look at conflicts from a bird-eye perspective, a JOINT Checklist Baseline Analysis also takes stock of the conditioning environment, both within and outside the EU. This environment is captured by three sets of contextual factors that often work as constraints on EUFSP: internal

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(intra-EU) contestation, regional fragmentation and multipolar competition. JOINT defines the three constraining factors as follows:

- **Internal contestation** refers to intra-European disputes (among EU member states but also in domestic debates) about fundamental norms, long-standing positions or established practices of EUFSP.
- **Regional fragmentation** refers to the erosion or collapse of state authorities as well as their ability to set and enforce rules of engagement within regions, states and communities.
- **Multipolar competition** refers to the degree to which global or regional powers approach crisis and conflict management with divergent views and with competing definitions of what might be an acceptable state or solution.

Combined, these constraining factors constitute the political and operational ecosystem in which EUFSP is being developed and implemented – in other words, the level of difficulty in which EU conflict management efforts take place. JOINT integrates them into the conflict analysis which then can serve as a baseline analysis to underpin the assessment of EUFSP effectiveness in a given crisis or conflict.

**Questionnaire for baseline conflict analysis**

1. **Profile:** What is the context that shapes conflict?
   - Is there a history of conflict? (e.g., when? For how long? Conventional conflict or insurgency? How many people killed and displaced? Who is targeted? Methods of violence? Where?)
   - What political, economic, social and environmental institutions and structures have shaped conflict? (e.g., elections, reform processes, economic growth, ...)

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10 Our baseline conflict analysis uses the analytical grid of the Conflict Analysis Topic Guide of the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) of the University of Birmingham (May 2017, https://gsdrc.org/?p=67127). This four-step analytical grid to assess the conflict is complemented by a fifth step provided by the JOINT project which analyses the international setting of the conflict. By working through the questionnaire, an analyst can quickly collect and interpret information on four key criteria of a crisis or conflict: the context of the conflict (profile), the actors that shape the conflict, the structural causes of a conflict as well as its dynamics. The five points will allow the drafting of a nuanced baseline conflict analysis that assesses not only the conflict itself but also the regional and international framework environment in which it takes place.
inequality, employment, social groups and composition, demographics and resource exploitation)

2. **Actors**: Who are the actors that influence conflict?
   - Who are the main actors? (e.g., the military, leaders and commanders of non-state armed groups, criminal groups).
   - What are their interests, concerns, goals, hopes, fears, strategies, positions, preferences, worldviews, expectations and motivations? (e.g. autonomy, inequality between groups ('horizontal inequality'), political power, ethno-nationalist, reparations).
   - What power do they have, how do they exert power, what resources or support do they have, are they vulnerable? (e.g., local legitimacy through provision of security, power over corrupt justice institutions, weapons and capacity to damage infrastructure).
   - What are their incentives and disincentives for conflict and peace? (e.g., benefiting or losing from the war economy, prestige, retribution for historic grievances).
   - What capacities do they have to affect the context?
   - Who could be considered spoilers? What divides people? Who exercises leadership and how? (e.g., economic beneficiaries of conflict, criminal groups, opposition leader).
   - What could be considered capacities for peace? Are there groups calling for non-violence? What connects people across conflict lines? How do people cooperate? Who exercises leadership for peace and how? (e.g., civil society, religious authorities, local justice mechanisms).
   - What are the relationships between actors, what are the trends, what is the strategic balance between actors (who is ‘winning’)? (e.g., conflictual, cooperative or business relationships).

3. **Causes**: What causes conflict?
   - What are the structural causes of conflict? (e.g., competing territorial claims, unequal land distribution, political exclusion, poor governance, impunity, lack of state authority).
   - What are the proximate causes of conflict? (e.g., arms proliferation, illicit criminal networks, emergence of self-defence non-state armed actors, overspill of conflict from a neighbouring country, natural resource discoveries).
4. *Dynamics*: What are the current conflict dynamics/trends?

- What are the current conflict trends? What are the recent changes in behaviour? (e.g., conflict acts have increased but the number of deaths has decreased; political violence has intensified around local elections; defence spending has increased; paramilitaries have started running in local elections).
- Which factors of the conflict profile, actors and causes reinforce or undermine each other? Which factors balance or mitigate others? (e.g., horizontal economic and political inequalities can increase the risk of conflict; uncertainty about succession of the president strengthens party factionalism; cash for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration fuels small arms proliferation).
- What triggers conflict? (e.g., elections, economic and environmental shocks, economic crash, an assassination, coup, food price increases, a corruption scandal).
- What scenarios can be developed? (e.g., best-case scenario: a peace agreement is signed quickly and the conflict parties implement a ceasefire; worst-case scenario: local politicians mobilise along ethnic lines in the run-up to elections and political violence and riots increase where groups meet).

5. *Framework conditions for EU intervention*: As EUFSP takes place in an international environment shaped – not exclusively, but decisively – by internal contestation, regional fragmentation and multipolar competition, a thorough baseline analysis needs to assess how these factors mould the context of the conflict at hand:

5.1 *Internal contestation*: Intra-European dissent about EUFSP norms, positions and practices.

- To which degree do EU member states pursue multiple objectives so that their order of priority remains unclear or disputed?
- How do voting patterns in EU decision-making bodies, such as the European Council or the Foreign Affairs Council, reflect contestation of the EU consensus on the conflict?
- To which degree does alignment or divergence in policy positions among member states indicate internal contestation?
- To which degree does the formation and dissolution of coalitions among member states on specific foreign and security policy issues relevant to the conflict/crisis indicate contestation?
• Does the use of veto power by member states within EU decision-making processes highlight areas of contestation?
• To which degree do variations among member states in engagement and implementation of the EU policy consensus on the conflict indicate contestation of EU policy goals?
• Internal contestation can also emanate from civil society. How does public opinion polling within member states indicate disagreement with EU engagement and policy goals on the conflict?
• By a similar token, to which degree does analysis of media coverage (assessing the presence, intensity and leaning of debates on the conflict and the EU’s engagement therein) indicate contestation?

5.2 Regional fragmentation: State authorities’ monopoly over means of violence and their ability to set and enforce rules of engagement erodes or collapses.
• What is the frequency, intensity and geographic scope of security incidents, such as armed conflicts, insurgencies or terrorist attacks in the country/region? Do they indicate the erosion of state authority?
• How developed is state capacity? Government control over territory, the functioning of state institutions, the provision of public services, or the ability to enforce law and order can be indicators of state capacity.
• How developed is the rule of law within the region? Indicators: levels of corruption, judicial independence, respect for human rights, and the enforcement of legal frameworks.
• How many internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees are originating from this region? High levels of displacement can be indicative of conflicts, instability, and weak state authority.
• What is public perception of state authority and the quality of governance? Indicators: trust in state institutions, perceptions of security, and the ability of the state to address local concerns.
• What is the assessment of international organisations? Utilising qualitative reports from international organisations, such as the United Nations or NGOs, can help measure regional fragmentation, as these reports often assess the political, social, and security dynamics within a region and provide insights into the erosion or collapse of state authority.
• What is the assessment of conflict mapping data, such as conflict databases or conflict event data? These data sources track the occurrence and characteristics
of conflicts, including the actors involved, the nature of violence, and the geographic scope of the conflicts.

5.3 Multipolar competition: Global or regional powers involvement in and management of a crisis or conflict.

- What is the amount of defence spending by countries as a percentage of their GDP or in absolute terms? Higher military expenditures can indicate a focus on building military capabilities and potential competition with other states.
- What is the level of arms sales (imports and exports) in the region? Increased arms sales can indicate efforts to enhance military capabilities and this influence/intensify multipolar competition.
- How do trade relations (bilateral trade flows and economic interdependencies) between countries affect competition dynamics? Greater economic interactions, such as high trade volumes and investments, may indicate competition for markets and economic influence.
- Similarly, how do flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), their amount and direction between countries, reflect efforts to gain economic footholds and strategic advantages in other countries?
- Examine the formation of alliances and partnerships between states. Track the number and strength of alliances, military cooperation agreements, and strategic partnerships as indicators of alignment and competition.
- What influence do key international competitors have in international organisations? Influence and voting patterns of countries in bodies like the United Nations, the World Bank, or regional organisations condition their ability to shape global norms and policies.
- What is the frequency and severity of cybersecurity attacks and cyber espionage attributed to different states? Increased cyber incidents can reflect efforts to gain advantages in information warfare and intelligence gathering.
- To which degree are key international players involved in space exploration and satellite launches? Greater activity and success in space – the number and success rate of space missions and satellite launches – can indicate competition for technological superiority and military capabilities.
- Are there any significant territorial disputes, border clashes, or proxy conflicts involving multiple states? Heightened conflicts can indicate competition over resources, influence, or regional dominance.
- How are key international players perceived globally. Polls can indicate positive
or negative perceptions which can reflect competition for soft power and influence.

2.2 Step 2 – Checklist: Assessing effectiveness

With the Baseline Analysis in mind, the JOINT Checklist looks at three key parameters to assess the effectiveness of EUFSP: consistency, impact and sustainability. We define these parameters as follows:

- **Consistency** is the extent to which EUFSP actors (EU institutions and member states) coordinate actions and/or carry out policies that reinforce (not undermine) one another and aim for the same objectives.\(^{11}\)
- **Impact** relates to changes in the situation on the ground which are in line with formulated EU objectives and ideally traceable to EU action or inaction.
- **Sustainability** of EU engagement with an in-built capacity for generating consensus on policy objectives and adapting instruments to changing circumstances.

The Checklist provides a universally applicable scheme to assess EUFSP performance in any given crisis or conflict (see tables 1-3 below). Each of these EUFSP key parameters (consistency, impact, sustainability) are defined by different criteria using a set of indicators and qualifiers to provide a qualitative estimate on the degree of fulfilment of each indicator – a bespoke four-point scheme that allows to translate qualitative assessments into a quantifiable system: the highest rating (3) equals the perfect fulfilment of an indicator, the lowest (1) non-performance. If the indicator is not applicable in a particular EUFSP context, analysts fill in “0” to indicate that the indicator is irrelevant. The scheme feeds the visualisation tool (see Figures 1-3 below).

\(^{11}\) Dilemma: There might be a coherent policy in place, and resources to implement policies but with no results on the ground. So, only a holistic and integrated evaluation of all factors will give an indication about the interplay of different parameters and condition in producing desired EUFSP outcomes.
Table 1 | Assessment criterion: “Consistency”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Criteria and indicators</th>
<th>Qualifiers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU strategic and institutional level</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Situation assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>Degree to which the EU has a shared assessment of the conflict/crisis situation, the main actors and challenges.</td>
<td>3. Recent EU situation assessment adopted / policy documents and statement consistently reflect shared assessment; 2. Outdated EU situation assessment / moderate inconsistencies in policy documents and statements reflect some divergences in situation assessment; 1. No EU situation assessment adopted / policy documents and statements reflect significant divergences in situation assessment among EU institutions and/or member states; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.2</td>
<td>Discussion of EU strategic interest among EU-member states</td>
<td>3. Member states discuss EU strategic interest in relation to the conflict early on and in-depth; 2. Member states discuss EU strategic interest late and/or only superficially; 1. Member states do not/barely discuss EU interests, or only after the window for EU intervention has closed; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>EU strategic interests</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.1</td>
<td>Discussion of EU strategic interest among EU-member states</td>
<td>3. Member states discuss EU strategic interest in relation to the conflict early on and in-depth; 2. Member states discuss EU strategic interest late and/or only superficially; 1. Member states do not/barely discuss EU interests, or only after the window for EU intervention has closed; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<td>1.2.2</td>
<td>Formal consensus on shared strategy</td>
<td>3. EU adopts shared strategy document; 2. EU strategy document is outdated, or EU shared strategy is not adopted in writing; 1. EU member states disagree on strategy and adopt separate strategy documents; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3</td>
<td>EU statements on significant developments in the conflict</td>
<td>3. EU issues strong statements on all significant developments; 2. EU issues statements only on some significant developments and/or statements lack substance; 1. EU fails to issue statements on most or all significant developments; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.4</td>
<td>Compatibility of EU principles and values with EU strategic interests</td>
<td>3. EU interests (declared or implicit) are fully or mostly in line with declared EU values; 2. EU interests (declared or implicit) are partially in line, partially at odds with EU declared values; 1. EU interests (declared or implicit) directly contradict and/or undermine EU declared values; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<td>1.2.5</td>
<td>Sense of urgency / call to action</td>
<td>3. Political momentum fosters a sense of urgency among key EU actors that facilitates swift consensus-building on the conflict; 2. Political momentum does not produce an imminent sense of urgency shared by all member states alike; 1. Political momentum in the EU is not favourable to swift consensus-building on the conflict; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>EU policies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3.1</td>
<td>Europeanisation of conflict dossier at Council level</td>
<td>3. The European Council assumes the leadership of EU policy on the conflict; 2. EU Council is involved but European policy is effectively led by one or several member states; 1. Member states assume the full European leadership vis-à-vis the conflict; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<td>1.3.2</td>
<td>Agreement on EU-institutional lead (High Representative/Vice-President, Presidency, Neighbourhood Commissioner)</td>
<td>3. Member states agree on the institutional lead; 2. Member states different priorities on institutional lead triggers friction; 1. Member states disagree on the institutional lead; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3.3</td>
<td>Key policy objectives declared in an EU policy document; Implementation of EU policy consensus through EU institutions</td>
<td>3. Key policy objectives are fully and unequivocally stated in an EU policy document; 2. Written policy objectives are informal or not fully developed; 1. Policy objectives are not formulated in writing; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<td>1.3.4</td>
<td>EU policy objectives in line with multilateral organizations relevant to the conflict</td>
<td>3. EU policy objectives are fully in line with those of multilateral organizations that are relevant to the conflict; 2. EU policy objectives are partially in line with those of multilateral organizations; 1. EU policy objectives are not in line with those of multilateral organizations; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3.5</td>
<td>Quality of policy instruments</td>
<td>3. Policy instruments to reach the declared objectives are clearly defined, including responsibilities, timing, resources and processes; 2. Policy instruments are only partially defined, including in responsibilities, timing, resources and processes; 1. Policy instruments are not well defined, displaying significant shortcomings in responsibilities, timing, resources and/or processes; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3.6</td>
<td>Consensus among EU-member states regarding the best diplomatic channel/institution to lead EU engagement on the conflict</td>
<td>3. Member states agree on the best diplomatic channel/institution to lead EU engagement on the conflict; 2. Member states prefer different diplomatic channel/institutions to lead EU engagement on the conflict, but are able to compromise; 1. Member states do not reach agreement on the best diplomatic channel/institution to lead EU engagement on the conflict; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>Integrated approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4.1 Impact of other EU sectoral / geographical policies on the conflict</td>
<td>3. EU policies in other sectors/policy areas/regions support EU conflict objectives and strategy; 2. EU policies in other sectors/policy areas/regions do not meaningfully impact EU conflict objectives and strategy; 1. EU policies in other sectors/policy areas/regions undermine EU conflict objectives and strategy; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<td>1.4.2 EU ability to compartmentalise policy in case of deadlock on specific policy items</td>
<td>3. Member states agree on need for and terms of compartmentalisation; 2. Member states agree on need for but not on terms of compartmentalisation; 1. Member states disagree on need for compartmentalisation; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<th>1.5</th>
<th>Compensation of EU-27 consensus deficits</th>
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<td>1.5.1 EU-member states ad hoc/lead groups (e.g. E3, E5 Visegrad, Med, Weimar, Minsk, Normandy) effectively steer EU policy on conflict in case of lack of EU-27 consensus</td>
<td>3. Ad hoc/lead groups are given space to effectively steer policy; 2. Ad hoc/lead groups are not allowed sufficient space but are not opposed; 1. Ad hoc/lead groups compete with each other and with member states; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.2 EU institutions effectively drive EU policy toward conflict in absence of EU-27 consensus</td>
<td>3. EU institutions are given the necessary space, competencies and resources to effectively steer policy; 2. EU institutions are not given the necessary space, competency and resources to steer policy but are not actively being obstructed; 1. Member states and/or peer institutions actively obstruct EU institutions’ ability to steer policy; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>EU member states level</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>EU-member states interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 Degree of EU empowerment by member states</td>
<td>3. Member states are fully empowering the EU as the prime channel for diplomacy on the conflict; 2. Member states are divided on the EU as prime channel and are ambiguous/partial in their empowerment; 1. Some member states actively oppose and/or undermine EU empowerment as the prime channel for diplomacy on the conflict; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 Member states national interests</td>
<td>3. EU-member states national interests favourable to EU engagement and approach on the conflict; 2. EU-member states national interests ambiguous/unclear; 1. EU-member states national interests opposed to EU engagement and approach on the conflict; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>Member states domestic affairs and electoral cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>Member states’ commitment to engage in the conflict in sync with EU objectives/strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5</td>
<td>Member states’ capacity to engage in the conflict in support of EU objectives/strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2.2 | EU-member states policies |
| 2.2.1 | Compatibility of EU-member states’ policies with EU policy | 3. Member states’ policies are fully in line with EU policy; 2. Member states’ policies are only partially in line with EU policy; 1. Member states’ policies undermine EU policy; 0. Indicator not applicable |
| 2.2.2 | Compatibility of member states’ bilateral cooperations / partnerships with EU policy consensus | 3. Member states’ bilateral partnerships/cooperation are fully in line with EU policy; 2. Member states’ bilateral partnership/cooperation are only partially in line with EU policy; 1. Member states’ bilateral partnership/cooperation are undermining EU policy; 0. Indicator not applicable |
| 2.2.3 | Member states’ participation in EU instruments/missions (e.g. EULEX) | 3. EU instruments/missions relevant to the conflict muster abundant member states’ participation; 2. EU instruments/missions relevant to the conflict muster limited but viable member states’ participation; 1. EU instruments/missions fail to muster sufficient member states’ participation; 0. Indicator not applicable |
| 2.2.4 | Member states’ diplomatic engagements in line with EU policy consensus | 3. Member states’ diplomacy fully in line with EU policy consensus; 2. Member states’ diplomacy only partially in line with EU policy consensus; 1. Member states’ diplomacy undermining EU policy consensus; 0. Indicator not applicable |
| 2.2.5 | Impact of member states bilateral sectoral / geographical policies on the conflict | 3. Member states sectoral / geographical policies support EU policy toward the conflict; 2. Member states sectoral geographical policies do not significantly impact EU toward the conflict; 1. Member states sectoral / geographical policies undermine EU policy toward the conflict; 0. Indicator not applicable |
| 2.2.6 | Compatibility of member states’ support to conflict parties with EU policy | 3. Member states’ support to conflict parties in line with EU policy; 2. Member states’ support to conflict parties without impact EU policy; 1. Member states’ support to conflict parties undermining EU policy; 0. Indicator not applicable |
| 2.2.7 | Bilateral trade-offs / concessions | 3. Member states-EU consensus supported strengthened by member states’ trade-offs/concessions in other policy domains; 2. Member states-EU consensus unaffected by member states’ trade-offs/concessions in other domains; 1. Member states-EU consensus undermined by member states’ trade-offs/concessions in other domains; 0. Indicator not applicable |

### 2.3 Public diplomacy

#### 2.3.1 Public opinion in conflict country

| 3. Public opinion in conflict country favourable to the EU/member states and their role in the conflict; 2. Public opinion in conflict country indifferent to the EU/member states and their role in the conflict; 1. Public opinion in conflict country critical of the EU/member states and their role in the conflict; 0. Indicator not applicable |

#### 2.3.2 Public opinion in EU member states

| 3. Public opinion in member states favourable to the EU/member states and their role in the conflict; 2. Public opinion in member states indifferent to the EU/member states and their role in the conflict; 1. Public opinion in member states critical of the EU/member states and their role in the conflict; 0. Indicator not applicable |

#### 2.3.3 Member states’ public diplomacy

| 3. Member states’ public diplomacy on conflict in support of EU policy consensus; 2. Member states’ public diplomacy on conflict neutral vis-à-vis EU policy consensus; 1. Member states’ public diplomacy on conflict incompatible with EU policy consensus; 0. Indicator not applicable |

### 3 Global governance level

#### 3.1 Diplomatic channels

#### 3.1.1 Choice of diplomatic channel / institution / fora to lead EU engagement on the conflict

| 3. EU consensus on preferred diplomatic channel / institution / forum to lead EU engagement on the conflict; 2. Divergent member states’ views on preferred diplomatic channel / institution / forum stalls effective EU policy; 1. Strongly divergent member states’ views on preferred diplomatic channel / institution / forum undermine EU policy; 0. Indicator not applicable |
### 3.1.2 EU/member states’ role in multilateral ad-hoc groupings

3. Member states create / join multilateral ad-hoc groupings that prepare, complement or strengthen the role of the EU;  
2. Member states do not create / join multilateral ad-hoc groupings, or these have no impact on the role of the EU;  
1. Member states create / join multilateral ad-hoc groupings that undermine the role of the EU;  
0. Indicator not applicable

### 3.2 International law

#### 3.2.1 Compatibility of EU policy with international law and norms

3. Conformity of EU policy with international laws and norms is not put into question;  
2. Conformity of EU policy with international laws and norms is put into question by judicial means;  
1. A competent court declares incompatibility of EU policy with international law and norms;  
0. Indicator not applicable

### Table 2 | Assessment criterion: “Impact”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Criteria and indicators</th>
<th>Qualifiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Relationship of conflict parties with EU</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td><strong>Relationship of conflict parties with EU</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1.1.1| EU/NATO membership / association / accession candidate status of conflict party | 3. Conflict party is member/institutionally associated with EU/NATO;  
2. Conflict party is seeking institutional association membership with EU/NATO;  
1. No conflict party is seeking membership / institutional association with EU/NATO;  
0. Indicator not applicable |
| 1.1.2| Wide and deep econ/pol/soc/tech ties between the EU and one/more of the conflict parties | 3. Extensive econ/pol/soc/tech ties between EU and conflict party;  
2. Moderate econ/pol/soc/tech ties between EU and conflict party;  
1. Very limited or no econ/pol/soc/tech ties between EU and conflict party;  
0. Indicator not applicable |
| 1.1.3| Security partnerships with conflict parties / third actors | 3. Security partnership between EU/NATO and conflict party or associated third party;  
2. Conflict parties have no security partnership with third parties;  
1. Security partnership between conflict party and associated third party in opposition to EU/NATO interests;  
0. Indicator not applicable |
| 1.1.4| Formal alignment of conflict parties with EUFSP positions | 3. Conflict party frequently aligns with EUFSP positions;  
2. Conflict party remains neutral vis-à-vis EUFSP positions;  
1. Conflict party opposes EUFSP positions;  
0. Indicator not applicable |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>EU Influence on conflict parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td><strong>EU direct influence on conflict parties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>EU direct political/diplomatic influence on conflict parties (i.e., by stopping EU association/accession prospects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. EU has strong, direct political levers to influence behaviour of conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. EU has moderate political levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. EU has no direct political levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>EU direct economic influence on conflict parties (i.e., through blockade of shipments, freezing of EU financial instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. EU has strong, direct economic levers to influence behaviour of conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. EU has moderate economic levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. EU has no direct economic levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>EU direct military influence on conflict parties (i.e., through military intervention)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. EU has strong, direct military levers to influence behaviour of conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. EU has moderate direct military levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. EU has no direct military levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>EU direct cultural/soft power influence on conflict parties (i.e., through visa repeals for citizens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. EU has strong, direct cultural/soft power levers to influence behaviour of conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. EU has moderate cultural/soft power levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. EU has no direct cultural/soft power levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5</td>
<td>EU directly providing humanitarian aid (i.e., shelter, food, water, medicine, finances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. EU is the most important provider of humanitarian to conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. EU is one among many providers of humanitarian aid to conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. EU does not provide humanitarian aid to conflict parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td><strong>EU indirect influence on conflict parties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>EU indirect political influence on conflict parties (i.e., through UN resolution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. EU has strong, indirect political levers to influence behaviour of conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. EU has moderate indirect political levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. EU has no political levers to influence conflict parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>EU indirect economic influence on conflict parties (i.e., through economic sanctions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. EU has strong indirect economic levers to influence behaviour of conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. EU has moderate indirect economic levers to influence conflict party/parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. EU has no economic levers to influence conflict parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3</td>
<td>EU indirect military influence on conflict parties (i.e., through weapon deliveries); Incentives are attractive enough to bring all conflict parties to the negotiation table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4</td>
<td>EU indirect cultural / soft power influence on conflict parties (i.e., through exclusion of sports team from Olympic games)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU influence on relevant regional and international actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>EU leverage on key regional and international actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1</td>
<td>EU direct or indirect leverage on key regional and international actors / stakeholders (i.e., withdrawal of financial resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2</td>
<td>Compatibility of EU cooperation with conflict parties / key international stakeholders with other EU strategic interests not directly related to the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3</td>
<td>EU/member states’ willingness to actively employ its leverage on conflict parties / international stakeholders when this may negatively affect another strategic EU/member states’ interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.4</td>
<td>Presence of EU allies/ regional/multilateral organizations who actively support EU policy goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.1.5 Effective co-ordination and division of labour with EU allies/regional/multilateral organizations aligned with EU policy goals

3. Regular and efficient level of exchange and policy co-ordination between EU and regional/international/multilateral allies;
2. Ad hoc/infrequent exchanges and limited efficiency of policy co-ordination between EU and regional/international/multilateral allies;
1. Insufficient or no exchange and/or inefficient policy co-ordination between EU and regional/international/multilateral allies;
0. Indicator not applicable

### 3.2 Involvement and impact of spoilers (actors opposed to EU policy goals)

#### 3.2.1 Presence and activity of spoilers

3. Spoilers are absent or inefficient in their interventions;
2. Spoilers are present but their ability to derail EU policy goals is limited;
1. Spoilers are present and are actively and efficiently working against EU policy goals;
0. Indicator not applicable

#### 3.2.2 Effective co-ordination and consensus within EU to minimise impact of spoilers

3. Member states and EU institutions efficiently co-ordinate to minimise impact of spoilers;
2. Member states and EU institutions co-ordination to minimise impact of spoilers bears mixed results;
1. Member states and EU institutions’ co-ordination efforts are inefficient, do not produce the expected results, and/or some member states act as spoilers;
0. Indicator not applicable

#### 3.2.3 Co-ordination with allied regional/multilateral organisations to minimise impact of spoilers

3. EU efficiently co-ordinates with regional/international/multilateral partners to minimise impact of spoilers;
2. EU co-ordination with regional/international/multilateral partners to minimise impact of spoilers bears mixed results;
1. EU co-ordination efforts with regional/international/multilateral partners are non-existence or inefficient, and/or some regional/international/multilateral partners act as spoilers;
0. Indicator not applicable

### 4 EU as conflict mediator

#### 4.1 EU as conflict mediator

#### 4.1.1 EU conflict mediation initiative

3. EU launches/leads an effective conflict mediation initiative/channel;
2. EU participates in an effective conflict mediation initiative launched/led by others;
1. There is no conflict mediation initiative, or the EU does not take part in it / The EU takes part, but the initiative fails;
0. Indicator not applicable

#### 4.1.2 EU standing / reputation among conflict parties

3. EU is respected and/or accepted as potential mediator by all conflict parties;
2. The EU is respected but not considered a potential mediator by all conflict parties;
1. The EU is not respected / rejected as potential mediator;
0. Indicator not applicable
### 4.1.3 Contestation of EU role by other actor’s diplomatic initiatives (EU-member states, non-EU-member states)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU mediation initiative/role faces no competition and is widely welcomed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EU mediation initiative/role faces competition from parallel initiatives/contenders;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Parallel mediation initiatives undermine EU role as mediator and/or the success of its mediation efforts;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.1.4 Existence of a final settlement proposal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>There is a final settlement proposal that is being considered by all conflict parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A final settlement proposal is being developed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>There is no final settlement proposal being developed / the proposal is rejected by one or all parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.1.5 Agreement on technical issues / protocol / Addendum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>There is broad agreement on technical details among conflict parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Some of the technical details are controversial;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Most of the technical details are controversial;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5 EU inaction

#### 5.1 EU inaction

##### 5.1.1 Absence or low level of EU action impacts the conflict (negatively, positively)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU inaction has positive effect on conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EU inaction has no effect on the conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU inaction has negative effect on the conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

##### 5.1.2 Impact of EU inaction on conflict actors’ interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU inaction invites positive interventions / deters negative interventions from conflict actors;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EU deters conflict actors in some cases / softens negative action by conflict actors;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU inaction triggers negative action / fails to deter negative interventions from conflict actors;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

##### 5.1.3 Impact of EU inaction on third parties interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU inaction motivates third parties to engage on conflict in line with EU policy goals;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EU inaction creates a vacuum that invites third parties, both in line and against EU foreign policy goals;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU inaction creates a vacuum that triggers intervention of third parties opposed to EU policy goals;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6 Human security impact

#### 6.1 Effects of EU policy on human security

##### 6.1.1 Environmental impact of EU policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU/member states’ policy has measurable positive impact in environmental indicators;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EU/member states’ policy has no measurable impact in environmental indicators / no causality can be established;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU/member states’ policy has measurable negative impact in environmental indicators;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 | Assessment criterion: “Sustainability”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Criteria and indicators</th>
<th>Qualifiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>EU ability to uphold commitment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>EU ability to sustain efforts over time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>Commitment by EU/member states to provide reconstruction aid, security, technical cooperation, mediate processes of national reconciliation, including necessary resources</td>
<td>3_Strong, solid commitment, including resources and implementation; 2_Partial commitment, including moderate availability of resources and/or partial implementation; 1_Low level of commitment, including lack of resources, faltering implementation; 0_Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2</td>
<td>Commitment of EU to help attract aid, loans, investment, and other material and non-material support for post-conflict period from third party actors</td>
<td>3_Strong commitment and strong follow-up; 2_Partial commitment and/or partial follow-up; 1_Low commitment and/or low follow-up; 0_Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3</td>
<td>Degree to which EU is able – in capacity and resources – to respond with sustained commitment at all points of the conflict cycle (prevention, conflict, settlement)</td>
<td>3_Sufficient capacity and resources; 2_Partial availability of capacities/resources; 1 Insufficient capacities/resources; 0_Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4</td>
<td>Degree to which EU is able – in political will and backing – to respond with sustained commitment at all points of the conflict cycle (prevention, conflict, settlement)</td>
<td>3. Sufficient political will and backing; 2. Limited political will and backing; 1. Insufficient political will and backing; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.5</td>
<td>Co-ordination mechanisms / procedures between sectors, instruments and branches of government/ EU institutions</td>
<td>3. Mostly effective co-ordination mechanisms; 2. Partially effective co-ordination mechanisms; 1. Inexistent or ineffective co-ordination mechanisms; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>EU ability to adapt to changing circumstances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1</td>
<td>Regular review of conflict situation assessment / regional and global context analysis</td>
<td>3. Frequent, periodic situation assessment; 2. Infrequent / ad hoc situation assessment; 1. No established frequency/regularity for situation assessment; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2</td>
<td>Regular review of and adjustment of EU policies (policies)</td>
<td>3. Frequent, periodic review of policy; 2. Infrequent / ad hoc review of policy; 1. No established frequency/regularity for policy review; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3</td>
<td>Regular review and adjustment of diplomatic channels (communication)</td>
<td>3. Frequent, periodic review of channels; 2. Infrequent / ad hoc review of channels; 1. No established frequency/regularity for reviewing channels/fora; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.4</td>
<td>Regular review and adjustment of interventions and measures (operations)</td>
<td>3. Frequent, periodic review of operations; 2. Infrequent / ad hoc review of operations; 1. No established frequency/regularity for reviewing operations; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.5</td>
<td>Regular impact assessment of on-going EU policy across all sectors and institutions (integrated approach to conflicts and crises)</td>
<td>3. Frequent, periodic impact assessment; 2. Infrequent / ad hoc impact assessment; 1. No established frequency/regularity for impact assessment; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.6</td>
<td>Impact of change in government in EU member states, conflict state government or key third-party actors</td>
<td>3. Low vulnerability of policy to government changes; 2. Medium vulnerability of policy to government changes; 1. High vulnerability of policy to government changes; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>International alignment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Multilateral alignment (e.g. UN, regional organisations)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>EU policy joint/co-ordinated with relevant multilateral agencies (e.g. UN)</td>
<td>3. High level of co-ordination; 2. Medium level of co-ordination; 1. Low level of co-ordination; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>EU policy joint/co-ordinated with regional organisations</td>
<td>3. High level of co-ordination; 2. Medium level of co-ordination; 1. Low level of co-ordination; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Other actors’ ability/ willingness to uphold commitment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Commitment of third parties aligned with EU policy objectives to provide reconstruction aid, security, technical cooperation, mediate processes of national reconciliation</td>
<td>3. Strong, solid commitment, including resources and implementation; 2. Partial commitment, including moderate availability of resources and/or partial implementation; 1. Low level of commitment, including lack of resources, faltering implementation; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>Commitment of third parties aligned with EU policy objectives to help attract aid, loans, investment, and other material and non-material support for post-conflict period from third party actors</td>
<td>3. Strong commitment and strong follow-up; 2. Partial commitment and/or partial follow-up; 1. Low commitment and/or low follow-up; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Local / regional ownership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Local ownership / commitment of conflict parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1</td>
<td>Local ownership of conflict resolution path supported by EU</td>
<td>3. Strong local ownership; 2. Mixed; divided local ownership; 1. Low local ownership; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2</td>
<td>Inclusivity of conflict resolution path supported by EU</td>
<td>3. Conflict resolution mechanism supported by EU is fully inclusive and facilitates national reconciliation; 2. Conflict resolution mechanism supported by EU is nominally inclusive but fails to prevent marginalising/disadvantaging/humiliating certain groups/factions; 1. Conflict resolution mechanism supported by EU produces winners and losers, marginalising/disadvantaging/humiliating the latter; 0. Indicator not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 Step 3 – Visualisation: Grasping complexity

Once the Checklist criteria grid has been filled out, coding each indicator from 1-3 (or “0” if an indicator does not apply), the tool will automatically produce a *spider graph*, which is particularly apt to help digest mass data through visualisation. The graph will show the *degree of fulfilment* of pre-defined qualitative parameters in a single graph for the effectiveness of EUFSP (composed of the core pillars consistency, impact and sustainability).

Fulfilment of a criteria is being indexed by the highest rating scheme (3), non-performance with the lowest (1); if an indicator is not relevant for a particular assessment, this is specified by a “0”. Based on this multi-step qualifying scheme for each indicator, the visualisation tool summarises the values of each category and determines an average that is being used for the visualisation in the spider graph.\(^\text{12}\)

Hence, the fuller a spider graph is filled by the grey area, the more consistent, impactful, and sustainable EUFSP is. Comparing graphs over time allows analysts and policy-makers alike to recognise change over time which in turn eases adaptation of policies and measures in a constantly changing environment.

In this, the tool should be taken for what it is – and what it is not. It is not an objective yardstick to measure EUFSP performance, success or outcomes. It should be seen as a communicative aide for analysts and policy-makers to assess EUFSP against proclaimed objectives by providing a common analytical framework and shared lexicon. Critically, the tool is inherently prone to improvement, especially if turned into a web-based, open source tool susceptible to testing, constant refinement and upgrading.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\) The assessments tool is based on MS Excel but can be exported into any other compatible digital format. JOINT aims at setting up a web-based open source tool that could be used by academia, think tanks and practitioners of EUFSP free of charge.

\(^{13}\) At the time of writing, the authors and JOINT coordinating institution IAI are looking into options to make the Checklist a web-based tool to enable testing and widespread usage.
Figure 1 | Simulation of spider graph “EUFSP consistency” in a given crisis/conflict

Figure 2 | Simulation of spider graph “EUFSP impact” in a given crisis/conflict
Annotated bibliography

The state of the art on approaches to measure EUFSP and defining of realistic evaluation criteria for a more effective EUFSP shows research gaps in two respects. On the one hand, there is a lack of a unified definitional delimitation and precision regarding what might constitute evaluation criteria for EUFSP in general. As a consequence, no substantial efforts have been made – at least not within the scientific community – to set up a generally applicable conceptual framework (not to speak of actual catalogues) to measure the impact of EUFSP. Academic debates on measuring the effectiveness of EUFSP are rather concerned with theoretical and methodological questions than on actually trying to assess the consistency, impact and sustainability of EUFSP.¹⁴

¹⁴ The only exceptions being the ECFR Foreign Policy Scorecard and the Dutch Foreign Ministries adaptation of the OECD/DAC evaluation framework which we briefly discuss in our introduction and that we consider to be a tool of applied social sciences rather than a scientific approach to measuring the impact of EUFSP.
The sources presented here shed light on methodological approaches, their applicability and weaknesses, and undertake a concretisation of concepts. What they all have in common is that they argue formally and theoretically, but do not undertake actual operationalisations or comparisons. Although indicators for measuring effective EUFSP are listed in some places, only the aforementioned large-scale project of the ECFR undertakes a qualitative comprehensive evaluation. In sum, while the literature reflects legitimate deliberations on measuring and evaluating EUFSP, these are rather unrealistic in implementation and may have weak explanatory power despite enormous amounts of data. The multiple pleas for the application of different methods invalidate themselves by the lack of practical implementations.

An example of this is the work of Bjurulf et al., which suggests using a triangulation approach to achieve a reliable cause-effect result in impact evaluation. It discusses the combination of different methods, such as process-tracing, generic controls and contribution analysis, to evaluate interventions and their impact.\(^{15}\)

Casier chooses a more EU-specific focus when examining the EU role in the context of neighbourhood policy. He concludes that there is too strong a focus on intended EU policies in the study and measurement of the success of foreign policy, whereas the influence of unintended policies and the structure of the actual target countries should be at the forefront of effectiveness analyses. Accordingly, research should focus more on the interplay of policy side effects and intended EU influences.\(^{16}\) The analysis draws on the EU’s regional strategy to increase stability and the participatory cost-benefit calculations of EU neighbouring states.

While Casier and other authors tend to present approaches of retrospective or ongoing evaluation, Chigas and Woodrov examine preventive requirements that can more systematically capture and compare the longer-term impact of peacebuilding programmes on existing and violent conflicts. These include comprehensive conflict analysis, precise naming of the target project, project

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planning, and communicative linkage.\textsuperscript{17}

Delahais and Toulemonde formulate a pragmatic approach to applying the principles of theory-based evaluation: by assessing random causality chains from beginning to end, they report whether the intended changes have occurred or not and identify the main contribution to the changes.\textsuperscript{18} Using case studies from development aid, agriculture, employment and governance, Delahais and Toulemonde aim at assessing the impact of policy interventions through the so-called Contribution Analysis methodology. Due to the overwhelming complexity of these assessments (six-step approach plus storytelling), we considered this tool as not practicable enough for JOINT purposes – even though it addresses thoroughly the key challenge of attributing impact to concrete policy interventions (input–output–outcome–impact).

Driskens and van Schaik take a step back in their analysis and examine the fundamental challenges to the coherence assessment of EU foreign policy. They scrutinise (by then) new institutional frameworks and complexities created by the Lisbon Treaty through the EEAS and the diplomatic corps of the 27 member states. The paper serves as a reference for the difficult measurability of EU policy coherence and at the same time shows that the hurdles are more target-oriented and definitional than methodological.\textsuperscript{19}

Gutner et al. provide answers to the reasons for a more effective and better performance of international organisations.\textsuperscript{20} They undertake the important analytical work of delineating conceptual criteria and distinguish, for example, between performance and effectiveness. However, the chapter is more conceptual in character, so it does not address more concrete or specific indicators, but


merely proposes a framework that highlights on relevant aspects of international organisations performance.

ECFR, on the other hand, developed the European Foreign Policy Scorecard in 2011 to provide a systematic annual assessment of Europe’s performance in its dealings with the rest of the world.\(^1\) Here, a team of forty researchers examined and ranked the collective performance of all EU actors, not just that of a particular institution or country. Europe was assessed based on themes, which are divided into sixty-five components and given scores based on unity, resources and results/impact. Leaders, supporters and laggards were then categorised. The ECFR Scorecard is one of the most comprehensive and relevant approaches for the later stages of the JOINT Project. It is one of the few research efforts that builds definitions and names clear indicators. In addition, it assesses them in a structured way and provides some kind of measurement. However, the scorecard does not use quantitative data (e.g., Human Development Index), but only grades given by observers (e.g., Freedom House). This approach makes such a complex large-scale assessment possible in the first place but weakens its ability to have results verified/rebutted. There is always something subjective attached to the evaluation of indicators and the comparability of problems is also only possible to a limited extent.

An article by Jørgensen from 2013 deals with the EU’s engagement in multilateral institutions, examining how the EU seeks to shape international institutions and how it operates within them. The article refers to the measurement of the EU’s “performance” as an actor in multilateral contexts, again less about the substantive operationalisation of foreign policy indicators than about conceptual approaches, i.e., the meaning of performance and how it can be understood as a concept.\(^2\) Two years earlier, Jørgensen and other authors published an article on EU performance in international institutions.\(^3\) The focus was on EU performance in multilateral negotiations in international institutions and the underlying performance concept,

\(^{21}\) ECFR, *European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010*, cit.


which was divided into four core elements: effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and financial/ resource viability.\textsuperscript{24} It was concluded that measuring the four core elements poses many problems and that the policy objectives are often so broad that they are almost meaningless for an evaluation. Proving causality is one of the biggest hurdles.

A 2010 paper by Kleistra and van Willingen raised the question of whether multilateral diplomacy can be evaluated through performance-based models and how performance should be measured in complex, multilateral decision-making arenas.\textsuperscript{25} Various methods were weighed, including performance-based evaluation models used in the context of the new public administration. They were not seen as useful for evaluating diplomacy, although there was a greater demand for better data on the implementation of policy objectives. However, systematic data on diplomacy objectives, costs and outcomes are difficult to collect, especially since government interventions in foreign policy usually follow value judgements and political expediency. Foreign policy goals are long-term, general and vague, and decision-making takes place through negotiations, which are too complex to be classified in an input-output model. The authors nevertheless named four requirements for forms of successful intervention: connectedness, i.e., the degree of conformity of an intervention with the political goals as formulated in a country’s foreign policy; responsiveness (is an intervention suitable for achieving a consensus of opinion?); timeliness (is the intervention carried out at a favourable time?); scope: radius of action, directness and involvement. Instruments of intervention listed included participation in meetings, conducting a demarche and supporting proposals. The examples listed highlight the vagueness of the indicators and the difficulty of measuring them.

Five years later, Kleistra and van Willingen published another paper on the evaluation of diplomacy and the challenges associated with it. Methodologically, like other works, they referred to attribution and contribution analyses and


emphasised the importance of the definitional distinction of study categories such as effectiveness, performance and impact. Again, this article features an academic rather than a practical approach, thereby limiting its applicability for policy practitioners.

In one of the earliest works on the subject of EU foreign policy instruments by Smith, a different approach was taken to assessing EU foreign policy. Unlike other works, Smith did not use conceptual categories such as effectiveness or performance, but identified four foreign policy instruments, namely propaganda, diplomacy, economics and military. His analysis focused more on how these instruments are used and to what extent they can be measured positively or negatively. Examples of positive measurement are the support of countries through aid or the granting of loans, which can be seen as positive, while negative examples include the withdrawal of agreements or the imposition of embargoes. Smith’s approach is more normative compared to other works and less an attempt at objective evaluation. White, on the other hand, reflects on different methodologies and the extent to which the success of their application relies on a common definitional basis of indicators and objects of study. He explains that methodological debates are meaningless unless they agree on a common starting point.

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