Promoting policy coherence: Lessons learned in EU development cooperation

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List of Acronyms

3Cs  Coordination, complementarity and coherence
CAP  EU Common Agricultural Policy
CBDR  Common but differentiated responsibility
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies
CONCORD  European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development
DAC  OECD Development Assistance Committee
DG CLIMA  EU Directorate-General Climate Action
DG DEVCO  EU Directorate General for International Partnerships and Development
DG ENVI  EU Directorate-General Environment
EC  European Community
ECDPM  European Centre for Development Policy Management
EEAS  European External Action Service
EP  European Parliament
EU  European Union
IFIs  International finance institutions
INDCs  Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
ODA  Official development assistance (as defined by the OECD DAC)
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OJ  Official Journal of the European Union
PCD  Policy coherence for development
PCSD  Policy coherence for sustainable development
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals
SEI  Stockholm Environment Institute
SYKE  The Finnish Environment Institute
SWD  Staff Working Document (of the European Commission)
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the European Union</td>
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<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
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Acknowledgements

In drafting this paper I have drawn extensively on work ECDPM has done on policy coherence for over three decades. In doing so I hope I have done justice to my colleagues’ ideas and thinking on the topic. In the last five years the on-going debate taking place in the Policy coherence Community of Practice run by ECDPM with regular participants from a number of EU member states foreign ministries and Switzerland, the European Commission’s DG DEVCO and the OECD PCD Unit has also been an important source of inspiration and encouragement on deepening our thinking on promoting policy coherence. More specifically I would like to thank various colleagues for the very useful comments they have made on the different drafts of this paper. Exchanges with the members of the CASCADES WP6 group: Magnus Benzie and Katy Harris of SEI (Stockholm), Paula Kivimaa and Mikael Hilden of SYKE (Helsinki) who were less familiar with PCD has been particularly stimulating for the questions they have asked and the new perspectives they have brought to the discussion. My colleagues at ECDPM on the other hand, by now well versed in policy coherences issues, have, as always, provided many constructive suggestions (Fabien Tondel, Hanne Knaepen, Volker Hauck and Martin Ronceray) and advised on and helped with different aspects of the production process (Valeria Pintus, Tilly Bogataj-De Coninck). The final responsibility for the contents, however, rests with me.

James Mackie

Maastricht, 21 September 2020
Policy coherence for development, or PCD, refers to the need for multiple policies from different sectors to work in unison rather than in opposition to each other, if international development is to be achieved. In Europe the argument for PCD was based on the recognition that EU efforts on development cooperation were often contradicted or undermined by other EU policies, both internal as much as external, to the extent that the EU was effectively taking back with one hand what it had given with the other. In some severe cases the EU was even taking back more than it gave. Thus for instance, while on the one hand the EU was funding development projects to support agriculture production projects in Africa, on the other, its trade policies and domestic agriculture subsidy policies in Europe were encouraging the dumping of cheap subsidised food on African markets thereby undercutting local producers competing in the same markets. The impact of European development aid was therefore being negated by its trade and agriculture policies.

This note first outlines how the concept of PCD developed in European development policy circles and what measures the EU and its member states took to promote policy coherence since it was first written into the EU Treaty in 1992. The practical experience gained over these nearly 30 years is of course of wider relevance in good policy making and not just in development cooperation. This became particularly apparent with the agreement on the UN’s 2030 Agenda in 2015 that saw the introduction of the new concept of PCSD or policy coherence for sustainable development that recognised the wider relevance of policy coherence across the whole integrated policy package of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. The note will also cover this latest, global chapter in the history of efforts to promote policy coherence and see how the EU has responded, notably with the Better Regulation package of the Juncker Commission and in the work on the Von der Leyen Commission Green Deal. The note will conclude with potential lessons on promoting policy coherence for EU policy making for coping with the cascading effects of climate change.

The Briefing Note is written as part of the Horizon2020 CASCADES project which looks into the effects of climate change beyond Europe and the impact these might have in Europe. Among other approaches it is hoped the project will use a policy coherence analysis to deliver a cross-sectoral and cross-scale assessment of cascading climate risks and formulate policy recommendations for European resilience and the governance of cascading risks. The Note is intended to contribute to the CASCADES thinking and recommendations, on how to reduce in-coherences between policies in different sectors, improve synergies and resolve trade-offs identified by the CASCADES analytical framework. Some key points specifically for the CASCADES project are summarised in the text box below (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Twelve pointers on policy coherence for CASCADES

This paper seeks to demonstrate that in formulating policy recommendations to address cascading climate risks the CASCADES project can build on European experience of promoting policy coherence. In particular, the project team can usefully keep in mind:

1. Climate change policy is rooted in the Paris Climate Agreement. This was agreed in 2015 in the UN along with the 2030 Agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals and the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action on Financing for Development. This package of three UN agreements provide the international multilateral framework in which EU policy responses to cascading climate risks need to be situated.

2. Among its Means of Implementation, the 2030 Agenda introduces the concept of PCSD or policy coherence for sustainable development, that underpins the integrated policy approach required to promote the SDGs and address climate change.

3. The EU has extensive experience of promoting policy coherence in the transboundary effects of its different policies that dates back several decades. CASCADES’ recommendations can usefully build on this experience.

4. The CASCADES project’s three pillars – trade, security and development, and finance – are traditionally areas of policy intersection for the EU where major in-coherences have emerged in the past. For this reason, they are among the strategic challenges for policy coherence that EU Council Conclusions already identified in 2005 and 2009.

5. They are strategic in nature partly because not addressing policy in-coherences that emerge between them, can increase the cascading risks for Europe including climate risks.

6. Equally, they are strategic because the EU has strong external interests in trade, security and finance. As a result, the proponents of these sectors in EU policy circles command considerable political weight. CASCADES recommendations need to take this live political economy context into account. Careful attention to policy coherence using a transparent, well-informed and robust approach can help.

7. Promoting policy coherence is inevitably political and therefore has to include a robust arbitration mechanism that can adjudicate on trade-offs between different policy interests whenever it has not been possible to identify win-win solutions and synergies. In many policy making contexts this is best done at the level of ‘centre-of-government’ – that is by the prime minister and cabinet or equivalent.

8. At the operational level creating a ‘PCSD system’ as described in the paper (c.f. Figure 5) and involving various elements and mechanisms, adapted to each policy-making context, and including a clear locus of authority with robust arbitration powers, can provide the tools to promote policy coherence.

9. Among the PCSD System’s other tools, ex-ante impact assessments are key for identifying cascading risks as well as for considering how they can be addressed in policy terms, providing they are well designed and effectively carried out.

10. An important element of addressing cascading climate risks into Europe, and one over which the EU has only indirect agency, will be to cooperate with other countries to encourage them to promote policy coherence in their own policies with an eye to reducing negative transboundary effects that might create cascading climate risks for Europe.

11. Achieving such international cooperation, will depend on the continued existence of the well-functioning multilateral system out of which the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda emerged. CASCADES recommendations therefore also need to address the support from Europe required to maintain the health of the multilateral system.

12. Policy ownership for cascading climate risks has not yet been designated in the EU context. However, in the Commission at least, it would seem that the past work of the first VP Frans Timmermans on the Better Regulation Package that places considerable emphasis on policy coherence and his new responsibility for the Green Deal, would make him a strong candidate for this new area of policy. CASCADES work should carefully consider whether this would indeed be advisable and what it would take for him along with the Secretariat General to perform this role effectively.
Lessons learned from policy coherence for development in the EU

Background: six stages of EU PCD

Policy coherence for development rose to prominence as an issue in the EU with its inclusion as one of the ‘3Cs’ (coordination, complementarity and coherence) in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Article. 178). These three principles were to be applied by member states as well as the Commission in their support for international development. Inevitably perhaps, active uptake and implementation of these principles took some time, and while a few member states started to echo their adherence to the policy coherence idea in policy statements, it was not till the end of the decade and into the 2000s that a majority followed suit. Taking active steps to establish mechanisms to promote PCD followed with a couple of years lag (Mackie et al. 2007).

No doubt political pressure from the European NGO sector had some impact on this process. In their contribution to a 1999 OECD publication on the role of NGOs in development (Smillie et al., eds 1999) Randel and German talk about European NGOs’ campaign on beef dumping in West Africa and how “NGO campaigns on coherence have become one of the success stories of the sector.” The beef dumping campaign led to a number of other similar sector campaigns looking at the negative impact in Africa of EU subsidies under such policies as the Common Agriculture Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy.

The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was an important influence on the uptake of PCD by donors. The first traces of this can be seen in their historic report Shaping the 21st Century, from May 1996 which briefly mentions the need to address policy coherence. A couple of years later DAC Peer Reviews started to pick the issue up (e.g. DAC peer review of the UK, 1997) and by the early 2000s this had become a standard chapter heading in each peer review report. The DAC Guidelines for Poverty Reduction (2001) situated the importance of promoting PCD in the context of rapid globalisation and the growing effect of many different rich country policies on developing countries: “Globalisation requires OECD governments, more than ever before, to take account of the broader development objectives in all policies and external relationships.” (OECD DAC, 2001, p.91). It concludes with a recommendation to its members to strengthen institutional capacity for policy coherence.

There were also some efforts in academic circles to develop the conceptual thinking around the principle (Hoebink 1999, Picciotto 2005, Ashoff 2005, Carbone 2008) and identify different types of coherence. The most useful of these was the distinction made between horizontal coherence and vertical coherence, where horizontal coherence was that between different policy areas of the same government and vertical coherence was that between different levels of government within the same policy area. The example referred to above of the relationship between the EU’s development policy and its

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1 The other two principles derive from the fact that development cooperation is a ‘shared competence’ in the EU in that member states continue to run their own bilateral programmes alongside the EU one that the fund jointly. So ‘Coordination’ refers to the need for member states and the union to coordinate their development cooperation programmes with each other, and ‘Complementarity’ to the need to take this coordination further to try and avoid duplication in their development cooperation programmes but rather to develop some level division of labour.

2 Art 178, EC Treaty, 1992: “... the Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 177 (on development cooperation) in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.”

3 The DAC, as with OECD committees in other policy sectors, exists to share experience between OECD member states and promote best practice in development cooperation and assistance.
Lessons learned from policy coherence for development in the EU

Agriculture policy would be an example of horizontal coherence, whereas for vertical coherence a good example is the policy on debt and structural adjustment adopted by the international finance institutions (IFIs), the EU and member states in the 1980s and 1990s: the more each level of governance (IFIS, EU, bilateral donors) follows the same approach, that is the more vertically coherent they are, the more likely they are to be effective (Hoebink 1999).

Putting the principle of promoting policy coherence into practice in the EU can really be dated to the Council Conclusions in May 2005 which identified a list of 12 priority policy areas, in which greater levels of PCD should be sought. Four years later in 2009, the Council revisited this decision in the face of the enormity of the task the list represented and whittled it down to five ‘strategic challenges’: (i) trade and finance, (ii) climate change, (iii) food security, (iv) migration and (v) security and development, where, it was hoped, better progress could be made. Another important decision in 2005 was the institution of a periodic EU report on PCD to track progress made by the EU as a whole by covering not just actions by the Commission but also by other EU institutions and by Member States. The first of these reports appeared in 2007. In this period policy coherence for development also started to feature increasingly prominently in EU development policy and notably in the Union’s prime development policy document, the 2005 European Consensus on Development. The Consensus, endorsed by the Commission, EU Parliament and European member states devotes a whole section to PCD, underlining the importance of the principle and recommitting the EU to pursuing PCD in the areas stipulated in the Council Conclusions.

A study by the think tank CEPS (Egenhofer et al 2006) at the time argued that the Council had played a significant role in promoting PCD particularly in setting up the overall framework provided by the 2005 Council Conclusions referred to above. Moreover, when individual member states holding the rotating EU presidency used it proactively, they were able to encourage council formations to factor PCD considerations into their policy work. In areas of community competences, on the other hand, the main role had to be played by the Commission. The following table summarises the main phases the EU went through in developing that theory and practice of promoting PCD.

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4 Council’s 12 priority areas for PCD (GAERC, May 2005): Trade, Environment, Climate Change, Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Social dimensions of Globalisation, Migration, Employment & decent work, Research & innovation, Information society, Transport & energy

5 During their six-month presidency of the EU council each member state in turn enjoys the chance to influence the EU agenda and push certain issues or approaches by guiding the discussion in the council and its working groups in various ways. These might include by tabling papers, setting the agendas of meetings, calling extraordinary meetings and drawing the conclusions of discussions.

6 The EU’s policy and regulatory work at its most basic is structured around two principles: (i) the intergovernmental approach, where the member states retain sovereignty over the policy domains (e.g. external relations), but agree to cooperate closely with inputs from the European Commission; and (ii) the community approach where they agree to pool their sovereignty in certain domains (e.g. external trade, agriculture) and give the lead responsibility, or ‘competence’, to the Commission. The role of the Commission is therefore much stronger in the latter than in the former.
### Figure 2: Phases in the debate on PCD in the EU

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<th>Period</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Up to 1992</td>
<td>First reflections</td>
<td>Debates on consistency in European external policies and first thoughts on PCD provides basis for articles in Maastricht Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1992 -1999</td>
<td>Making the case</td>
<td>Treaty of Maastricht articles prompt highlighting of incoherence cases by NGOs and debates on concepts and definitions. Importance of PCD was increasingly picked up in broader international circles. Yet concrete institutional progress in Europe is slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Early 2000s</td>
<td>Wider recognition &amp; search for solutions</td>
<td>OECD/DAC Peer Review system starts to cover PCD. Issue picked up in MDGs. Donors start to establish PCD mechanisms of their own, with PCD statements, PCD assessment systems and coordinating committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Mid 2000s</td>
<td>Experimentation and knowledge sharing</td>
<td>More systematic and widespread attention paid to PCD. EU governments seeking to learn lessons from first experiences of PCD. May 2005 Council Conclusions on 12 areas for PCD. European Consensus on Development reiterates high-level political commitment</td>
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Source: Updated table based on Mackie et al (2007) and Gregersen, Mackie & Torres (2016, ECDPM DP197)
Lessons learned from policy coherence for development in the EU

First mechanisms to promote PCD

A 2007 ECDPM study (Mackie et al 2007) for the EU Heads of Evaluation work on the ‘3Cs’ studied the approach taken by different EU member states and EU institutions7 to promoting PCD. The study concludes that it is not just one measure that will promote PCD, but rather that it is useful to establish a ‘PCD system’ that combines a number of complementary mechanisms including: (i) policy statements of intent (ii) internal institutional mechanisms and (iii) knowledge inputs. In other words, promoting PCD needs first clear leadership and a consensus on what is sought; second mechanisms to bring ideas together and resolve differences such as consultations procedures, champions, coordinating bodies and decision-making systems; and finally, knowledge both ex-ante impact assessment studies and ex-post such as monitoring and evaluation. This system also operates within a context characterised by political forces and parliamentary scrutiny, non-state actor pressures advocating particular interests, knowledge communities providing academic insights and a particular approach to governance. This can be represented graphically in the diagram in Figure 3. Talking about a ‘system’ may sound complex, but when one looks at how government policy making moves forward one realises that policy improvements emerge not just from one isolated action but rather through the interaction between different debates and actors. The point of using a system analysis is therefore to identify what elements and actors need to interact and recognise that if you miss out one part of the system progress will be slower and more fragmented.

Figure 3: A PCD system

Source: Mackie et al 2007

7 Mackie et al 2007, included case studies of PCD mechanisms used in Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the European Parliament and the European Commission Interservice Consultation system.
The core aim of the system is of course that different government departments dealing with different policy sectors do not act in isolated silos, but communicate between each other on a regular basis and at all levels from junior officials preparing policies to senior officials finalising them and up to ministers taking policy decisions. At the same time, as pursuing PCD is complex because it involves mustering expertise from various domains and balancing different interests between stakeholders, it typically advances in incremental steps. The institutional mechanisms need to interact with the contextual elements just outlined, so there is a clear sense of direction, adequate inputs of expertise and proper debate and scrutiny to build up political consensus on difficult choices and trade-offs and achieve satisfactory policy compromises.

ECDPM studies over the decade from 2005 to 2015 documented how EU member states and EU institutions employed sets of mechanisms to promote policy coherence that conform closely to this PCD system (Galeazzi et al 2013). Some governments also established specialised PCD units within ministries to identify policy incoherence issues and help policy makers improve coherence (Engel et al 2009). Others explored indicators on which to base PCD monitoring systems though with mixed success (van Seters et al, 2015) given that there is no direct way of measuring more or less coherence between policies. How these mechanisms were deployed over time is also well illustrated in the long-term and highly politicised effort required to promote policy coherence in the more than two decades long struggle to tackle policy incoherence between the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and food security in Africa (Engel et al 2013).

Assessing the practice of policy coherence for development

At the EU institutional level, the decade from the 2005 publication of the European Consensus on Development, that reiterated the importance of PCD, up to 2015 and the UN agreement on the 2030 Agenda, saw the regular publication an EU PCD Report every two years from 2007 to 2015 (five in total).

The five PCD Reports vary considerably in their approach and detail but they were typically organised around the Council’s 12 priority areas and the five more focussed strategic challenges. Faced with the lack of a means to measure policy coherence and no specific quantitative indicators, they rely heavily on narrative examples of how PCD has been enhanced and of the mechanisms used. These cover the efforts made by all the EU

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8 Galeazzi et al 2013 with examples from Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden. These countries typically put in place a policy statement with a specific reference to policy coherence and saw it as a whole-of-government responsibility, with Sweden taking this furthest through their Global Development Bill. To operationalise this commitment there was more variety, but the Netherlands and Germany both established PCD units in the MFA, all of them organised a variety of mechanisms for inter-ministry coordination at both political and officials levels and sought to encourage PCD to become part of the administrative and policy making culture of the government.

9 Engel et al, 2009

See also OECD Peer Review of the Netherlands, 2006

10 Van Seters et al 2015, with examples of attempts to develop PCD indicator systems in Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and the European Commission

11 A gap of several years then followed as the EU took stock of the implications of the 2030 Agenda and the next PCD report was only published in 2019.

12 The difficulties involved in identifying indicators for measuring progress on policy coherence has attracted considerable attention (van Seters et al, DP171, 2015) and is now being looked into by UNEP which is charged within the UN system to propose a way forward for measuring progress on Target 14 (PCSD) of SDG17 (partnerships and means of implementation) in the context of monitoring of the 2030 Agenda.
Lessons learned from policy coherence for development in the EU

member states and institutions based on completed self-reporting voluntary questionnaires returned to DG DEVCO. The result is a detailed catalogue of a multitude of policy adjustments made across the EU to improve policy coherence for development with many interesting examples of both what was achieved and how this was done. In each report an attempt is also made to identify areas for improvement sector by sector. Perhaps the best way to read these reports is thematically and together, that is focussing on one of the Council’s five priority areas and then seeing how the narrative evolves from report to report over the whole decade. What primarily emerges from such a reading is that promoting PCD is an on-going task that takes time but, over a medium-term time scale in particular, it does achieve results. A case in point was the decade long process of making the EU’s Common Agriculture Policy more coherent with the EU’s development policy. Improvements are achieved through incremental policy change with the occasional step change breakthrough, but even then, over time new issues emerge and further policy adjustments are required.

The European NGO umbrella CONCORD Europe’s 2017 study (CONCORD, 2017) of EU PCD efforts focusses particularly on the use of ex-ante impact assessments for promoting PCD as provided for in the Juncker Commission’s Better Regulation Package and Regulatory Scrutiny Board. It accepted that “impact assessments are in principle a powerful tool for ensuring that the negative impacts of EU policies on developing countries are minimised and their positive impacts maximised”. But reviewing actual EU practice in one year, 2016, it concluded that only 24% of impact assessments looked in sufficient depth into the impact on developing countries and that this score should be much higher.

The OECD DAC 2018 Peer Review of the EU (OECD, 2018b) talks positively about the political commitment the EU has shown and the efforts it has made to promote policy coherence for development. However, it also highlights challenges in implementing impact assessments that cover PCD properly and talks about the need to make adjustments to bring the approach in line with the 2030 Agenda framework.

One independent assessment of what was achieved by these efforts is provided by an evaluation commissioned by DG DEVCO into the EU’s approach to PCD that covers the period of 2009-2016. The evaluation team concluded that the EU had played a lead role on PCD and its approach to promoting PCD was relevant for the period covered, but needed to be adapted to the new SDG paradigm. In terms of the mechanisms used to promote PCD the evaluation highlighted positive features such as the biennial EU PCD reports and the use of ex-ante impact assessments, but also identified lacunae relating to lack of common understanding of the approach, inconsistent use of agreed mechanisms, variable levels of staff awareness and some lack of leadership at certain points. The evaluation pointed to the difficulties involved in assessing results of efforts

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13 In the field of Food Security one such breakthrough in this period was the 2013 Reform of the CAP so as to eliminate export subsidies and its price distorting effects. The build-up to this is recorded in the 2007, 2009 and 2011 PCD reports. The impact assessment that was done for the reform and the agreement reached in 2013 Reform are then explained in the 2013 PCD report. Finally, the 2015 PCD report (p.6) states that the CAP now provides “… support to EU farmers and rural communities in a manner that does not distort markets or trade” and records some of the results in the reduction of export subsidies. At the same time, among the key challenges ahead it does list the need for some further simplifications of the CAP and for monitoring impact over time. However, the reports also have their limitations and, in this case for example, no mention is made of the reintroduction of ‘voluntary coupled support’ in the 2013 Reform which in effect partly reversed the decline in the CAP’s market-distorting support and indeed provoked criticism in non-official circles (Engel et al 2013).

14 Núñez-Borja et al, 2018
to promote PCD due primarily to the difficulties in demonstrating causality arising from these efforts among all the numerous drivers of change in developing countries.

Nevertheless, on the impact of the PCD approach the evaluators, using country case studies and specific policies, did conclude that impact is positive albeit relatively limited. The study also makes a number of recommendations on (i) improvements to clarifying the EU’s commitment to PCD, (ii) adapting mechanisms and resources, (iii) making PCD outputs more explicit and possible monitoring, and finally (iv) enhancing the role of EU Delegations particularly in highlighting areas of incoherence and monitoring impact of policy improvements.

In sum the EU gets generally lauded for its intentions and approach to PCD, but could do better in putting this into practice. In terms of actual effect on improving policies that have an impact on developing countries, the record does show some positive changes in certain policy areas (e.g. on the CAP) over time, but given the difficulties of demonstrating causality and the lack of counterfactuals it remains tough to demonstrate strong impact in a conclusive manner.
Implementing policy coherence

EU Institutional provisions

As already indicated the provision for policy coherence for development was introduced into the EU Treaty in Maastricht in 1992. Thereafter it remained unchanged until the Lisbon Treaty which came into force in 2010. Article 208 of the Treaty (TFEU, 2009) strengthens the EU’s commitment to policy coherence and indeed establishes it as a legal obligation: “The inclusion of PCD in its fundamental law sets the EU apart on the international stage” (EU PCD Report 2013, p.19). The article, which still provides the legal basis for promoting PCD in the Union reads:

“[t]he Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries” (Article 208, TFEU 2009)

The Juncker Commission from 2014 to 2019 presided over a period where a number of new elements were introduced in the European policy coherence debate. The agreement on the UN 2030 Agenda with its use of the concept of PCSD or ‘policy coherence for sustainable development’ was a first important milestone that fundamentally changed the debate on policy coherence as we shall in the next section. The 2030 Agenda prompted the EU to issue a radically revised new European Consensus on Development in 2017. It reiterates the commitment to PCD but now casting it as a contribution to PCSD.

Under the guidance of Vice-President Timmermans the Juncker Commission also made a major effort to streamline EU policy-making by introducing the Better Regulation Package consisting of a set of Guidelines (SWD[2015]111 and updated in 2017 [SWD(2017)350]) and a Toolbox with a series of chapters (‘tools’) covering specific issues. The Toolbox cites policy coherence as one of the basic principles (Tool #1). Thereafter coherence features clearly as a key concern in the advice provided for designing and conducting ex-ante impact assessments, which are one of the most important tools advocated in the package (Chapters 2 and 3 of the Toolbox). A specific section (Tool #34) is devoted to policy towards Developing Countries where again a concern for promoting policy coherence features prominently.

For policy coherence purposes, probably the most important element of the Better Regulation package is the weight it attaches to the use of ex-ante impact assessment (Keijzer 2010), which, if done properly - something that is not always the case (CONCORD

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25 Improving the quality of EU policy-making was a pledge made by the Juncker Commission when it was established in 2014 to ensure its legislation better serves the people it affects. To put this into effect the First Vice-President of the Commission, Frans Timmermans, was put in charge of coordinating what was called the ‘better regulation’ effort across the whole Commission.

16 Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #34 offers EU policy makers suggestions on how to factor in PCD, with a checklist of questions on potential impacts of a proposed new policy on developing countries and with examples of mitigating measures that can be adopted to reduce negative social, environmental and economic spill-overs. The tool is not mandatory but it outlines steps to conduct a thorough PCD impact assessment if incoherence is likely to arise. https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation-why-and-how/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en
Lessons learned from policy coherence for development in the EU (2017 and 2018) - are among the most useful technical tools employed to promote policy coherence. It is therefore noteworthy that the European Commission now insists that an impact assessment has to be done before any new policy proposal reaches the College of Commissioners for a decision. Better Regulation continues to be part of the modus operandi of the Von der Leyen Commission, not least because VP Timmermans remains in office and is now responsible for the EU Green Deal, a key overarching policy of the new Commission. The Green Deal seeks to “put the SDGs at the heart of EU policy making and action” (European Commission, COM[2019]614, p.3) and has policy coherence running through it as a golden thread in the way it advocates that all areas of policy need to be linked. The Communication also cites the Better Regulation package as a key instrument to push policy making into achieving one of the first precepts of policy coherence, that is to “do no harm” (p.19).

From PCD to PCSD

Since 2015 the dominant framework for EU international cooperation has been the UN’s 2030 Agenda. The EU invested considerable energy into the 3-year debate leading up the conclusion of the final agreement of the 2030 Agenda, with both DG DEVCO and DG ENVI taking joint active ownership of orchestrating the EU input. Policy coherence was a major element of that discussion17 both in Europe and at the international level. As a result, SDG17 includes a target (17:14) on promoting ‘policy coherence for sustainable development’ or PCSD. This extends the concern for policy coherence to the global stage where it moves beyond the limited responsibility of donors seeking to ensure that their development assistance is not undermined by other policies of their own governments, to a universal concern with well-integrated policy making. Policies to promote any single SDGs should not undermine the achievement of all the other SDGs.

Goal 17 target 14 is picked up in the new European Consensus for Development issued in 2017 which is constructed around the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. It reaffirms strongly the EU’s commitment to policy coherence arguing that PCD is not replaced by PCSD (policy coherence for sustainable development) but rather is one contribution to this wider concept of PCSD as explained below. It also argues that the general principle of policy coherence needs to be widely applied stating that “Given the universality of the 2030 Agenda, the EU and its Member States will also encourage other countries to assess the impact of their own policies on the achievement of the SDGs, including in developing countries.” (para 112)

In other words, Europe, as well as paying attention to the impact of its own policies abroad, would be looking to other countries to also look at the impact their policies could have on Europe.

The 2030 Agenda thus introduces a new chapter to the discussion on policy coherence recognising as it does the multiple dimensions of the concept. This can be usefully represented in the four-quadrant diagram in Figure 4. The four dimensions18 are:

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17 See the discussion on PCD and Main Messages 6 and 10 in the ERD2013 or European Report on Development 2013: Post-2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future, European Union/ ODI+IE+ECOPM
18 This analysis can of course be pushed further if one wants to recognise other levels of government such as sub-state authorities, that is for instance regions, districts or municipalities, the principles involved remain essentially the same
A. National-national - That is the coherence of different domestic policies with each other

B. National-International - The impact of domestic policies externally - which is what PCD focusses on - but can also be applied in reverse: third country policies impact on Europe.

C. International-National - The coherence of international policies with domestic policies

D. International-International - The coherence of different international policies with each other

This diagram is to be read from the perspective of a given country, thus National policies are those a country decides and implements internally and over which it has full agency. International policies, on the other hand, are the external policies of this same country, but over these it has only partial agency as while they can be formulated at home, their implementation is only possible to the extent other countries/governments accept them or to the extent that they are agreed in international debate or fora. The diagram thus refers to different types of horizontal coherence (c.f. section 2 above), that is between policies from different sectors across the same level of government, and not to vertical coherence, that is between different levels of government19.

Figure 4: The multiple dimensions of policy coherence

![Diagram of policy coherence]

Source: ECDPM

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19 Examples of vertical coherence would include whether a government sought to align its policies with an internationally agreed policy such as the 2030 Agenda, or whether a sub-national authority aligned its policies in any sector with those agreed in the same policy sector at the national level. Seeking to visually include vertical coherence in the quadrant diagram would make it unduly complicated.
Lessons learned from policy coherence for development in the EU

PCSD as a concept is also more complex than PCD for another reason, that is as a result of the term ‘sustainable development’ used in the 2030 Agenda being understood to mean something different than ‘development’ as associated more with the MDGs. While the latter focused essentially on social development and poverty reduction, the new term is seen to have three pillars: environmental, economic and social. In promoting PCSD therefore one is not just arguing for coherence with social development policies as in PCD, but also for coherence with environmental and economic policies. We can therefore conceive of PCSD as being ‘multi-directional’ rather than ‘uni-directional’ as was the case with PCD (Mackie et al 2017).

In sum, the 2030 Agenda relies heavily on a highly integrated policy approach involving coherence between policies at different levels (national, international and indeed local – i.e. vertical coherence) and between sectors (broadly: environmental, economic and social – i.e. horizontal coherence). PCSD is thus a very wide ranging, multi-directional principle. The whole conceptual frame of the 2030 Agenda is thus to achieve well integrated and coherent policy-making that recognises the wider impact of all policies beyond the immediate effect that they are individually intended to achieve.

European governments are adjusting to this new framework with new procedures and structures as shown in the next section of this paper. The OECD has also revised its guidelines on policy coherence and more countries around the world, and not just among the OECD countries, are picking up on the value of promoting policy coherence. From being a largely European and specifically international development sector way of thinking, policy coherence is now, as a result of the 2030 Agenda, attracting attention in far wider governance and policy circles both geographically and in policy sector terms.

At the same time, it is important to recognise that the idea to ensure that coexisting policies in different sectors do not undermine each other and are ideally mutually supportive is not unique to the traditional development cooperation sector. In the environmental sector policy makers have long been keen to ensure that all policies take environmental considerations into account and have used ideas such as ‘mainstreaming’ and tools such as environmental impact assessments. Economists are also used to thinking of coherence by applying nexus thinking: seeking the most balanced outcome of a new policy by varying different inputs in their models. Governance thinkers also stress the importance of ‘whole-of-government’ approaches or ‘joined-up-government’ to ensure that all new policies are carefully calibrated to fit with other policies.

Despite the greater challenge involved in this new policy framework created by the 2030 Agenda and the greater complexity of the PCSD concept, putting it into practice should therefore not be a question of starting from scratch but rather one of building on these different traditions.

The tools to be used in promoting PCSD can draw on this rich history both in PCD and in other approaches to integrated policy making. Thus the ‘PCD system’ discussed above can be developed into a ‘PCSD system’ (Figure 5) as proposed in ECDPM’s more recent paper on Policy Coherence and the 2030 Agenda (Mackie et al 2017). Within a PCSD system one of the key differences with PCD is to recognise the importance of ‘champions’ for the different policy sectors that one is trying to reconcile. Each sector champion has a dual role of both advocating for their own policy on the one hand and a mission to seek solutions with counterpart ‘sector champions’ for other policies, that resolve differences and where possible build on synergies. Ultimately of course policy
Lessons learned from policy coherence for development in the EU

Coherence is a political issue as there are interests of many different stakeholders involved. It may therefore not always be possible to resolve all differences with win-win solution. If so a question of balancing trade-offs will then arise and the system will require a clear and agreed framework or process for arbitration or adjudication between them.

Figure 5: Building a policy coherence for sustainable development system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY COHERENCE SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRAMEWORK</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear legal and/or political statement of intent—to provide guidance and legitimise efforts in thematic areas and to coordinate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated political leader(s)—to have a clear locus for responsibility, decision and arbitration trade-offs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MECHANISMS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandated sector champions spearheading policy coherence as a group and within their own institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations, coordination and consensus-building structures between policy sectors, communities and interest groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making processes ensuring transparency of policy options and trade-offs, and empowering sector champions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical capacity to assess policy options and conduct ex-ante impact assessment (within and outside government).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring processes with measurable indicators that check policy coherence, and ex-post evaluations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge management feeding back lessons learned into decision making and ensuring institutional memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACCOUNTABILITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies rooted in the existing political economy of decision making to incentivise maximised contributions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular open reporting encouraging public scrutiny and peer review and pressure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ elaboration, based on Mackie et al, 2017.

This framework is also echoed in the OECD’s concept of Eight Building Blocks for PCSD (Figure 6) many of which can be recognised in the four headings of the PCSD system presented above. The OECD’s work is based on research into the experiences of its members and observers from which it has derived this generic model intended to help governments hope to build up or improve the framework they need to promote PCSD.
As earlier with PCD, the OECD has been an important platform for promoting PCSD and developing the conceptual thinking on policy coherence and its implementation. This is reflected in its recently revised Council Recommendation on PCSD (OECD 2019) that concisely summarises the main measures that governments can take to promote PCSD. Among other things it also echoes the formulation of the EU’s European Consensus of 2017 that PCD is a contribution to PCSD.

**Promoting policy coherence for sustainable development in practice**

In practical terms the key change in structures/procedure that is being seen across Europe is probably the recognition that final responsibility for PCSD should move to a centre-of-government level (OECD 2019) and cannot just be kept in a single line ministry. Though there are, of course, different ways of doing this depending on each country’s traditions of government.

As PCSD covers all government portfolios, ensuring its promotion actually happens and resolving the inevitable trade-offs that emerge has to be a matter of the head of government and his/her cabinet. Various countries such as Finland have thus shifted responsibility for policy coherence out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it was...
previously housed as PCD and moved it to the prime minister’s office (Zetter et al 2019) where it is managed by a National Commission on Sustainable Development (van Seters et al 2020). Similarly France has a General Commissariat for Sustainable Development under the Prime Minister’s office (van Seters et al 2020) and in Germany the State Secretaries Committee composed of representatives of all ministries has a standing working group on sustainable development chaired by the Federal Chancellery (van Seters et al 2020; OECD 2018; see also the OECD website20). Sweden, building on the government’s experience with the Bill on Global Development dating back to 2003, have located SDG coordination, including PCSD, in another very central ministry that is under the Minister for Public Administration in the Ministry of Finance supported by an interdepartmental coordination mechanism (OECD 2018). For the European Commission the introduction of the Better Regulation package in 2015, managed by the Secretariat General which has responsibility for coordination across the Commission, also has this effect, though a small PCD unit has nevertheless still been maintained in DG DEVCO, thereby reflecting that PCD remains important and should be seen as ‘a contribution to PCSD’ as expressed in the new European Consensus on Development of 2017.

**Good enough coherence**

One other practical lesson to learn, this time from the world of good governance promotion (Grindle 2004), is that policy coherence is never perfect but always relative. As recognised in the OECD’s 8 Building Blocks promoting policy coherence is both a very political process and a long-term one. Political involvement is crucial to setting priorities and arbitrating between different positions, yet debates that lead to higher degrees of policy coherence usually last well beyond the four or five year mandate of the average government or politician. This can discourage politicians21 from advocating policy coherence as strongly as it might need, something that is also compounded by the fact that policy coherence promotion (especially by civil society) can be disruptive, exposing parts of government to unwelcome attention or forcing them to change course.

The political nature of promoting policy coherence means that it is useful to employ some level of political economy analysis in working towards solutions in a given set of circumstance, so as to understand the interests of different stakeholders and the dis/incentives operating below the surface. Equally the on-going nature of the process means that realistically it is useful to conceive of the process as an iterative series of successive improvements that can go on for many years. During each step or round of discussion coherence can be pushed further, a certain level can be achieved and concretised in agreements, but perhaps not as much as would be ideal. The agreements reached are then revisited sometime later, perhaps only after several years, when new factors have come into play22 and the interests of stakeholders may have shifted and a new level of policy coherence can be achieved. Thus, for promoters of policy coherence rather than hoping to reach an unattainable state of ‘perfect’ coherence, it is better to

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20 This page on the OECD website is also a good source on how governments have tackled the issue in different ways: [https://www.oecd.org/gov/pcsd/pcsd-country-profiles.htm](https://www.oecd.org/gov/pcsd/pcsd-country-profiles.htm)

21 That is, politicians don’t easily see an immediate return in promoting policy coherence and therefore are often not convinced it will help their re-election chances.

22 Changes in the global context can be very important for policy coherence. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic has shone new light on incoherence in the trade of medical supplies (Tondel & Ahairwe 2020). Equally, for instance, new research on the policy coherence causes of illicit financial flows that have a major negative impact on domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries, may foster a new round of discussion that leads to further incremental improvements on government controls on multinational corporations and tax regime shopping.
think in terms of achieving ‘good enough coherence’ at each stage and then move on to other challenges where efforts towards greater policy coherence can be more productive (Vanheukelom et al 2018).

**In sum**

Policy coherence as a concept is here to stay. With the 2030 Agenda, PCSD is now recognised in global governance as a ‘Means of Implementation’ and a key element for delivering the SDGs at the global level and to be pursued by all governments. The EU has over 25 years of experience of seeking to promote policy coherence in relation to one policy domain: that is development cooperation, where the debate has focussed around ensuring that other aspects of EU policy do not undermine and negate the effectiveness of the funds spent on ODA. As Europeans, it is logical for us to make use of this experience as we tackle our own implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

In particular we have learnt that promoting policy coherence can work although it is a long-haul and uphill struggle and that different stakeholders can and do need to play a role. There are certainly aspects that do not always work smoothly as they should (e.g. ex-ante impact assessment), but there are also quite some useful guiding principles and lessons learnt to build on. While there is now formal international recognition, we also know practice lags behind policy decisions. Promoting policy coherence remains a challenge and there will always be a need for more effort and difficult political compromises.

Moreover, it is not just EU policy incoherence that affects other countries, but also the other way round, that is, other countries’ policies that affect sustainable development in the EU. So, the EU needs others to also adopt measures to promote policy coherence. More mutual recognition and observance of this would be beneficial for the EU. In effect, in the field of climate change that concerns CASCADES, this is what INDCs (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) are at least in part about - getting all states to accept that their policies on emissions can affect others and provide a basis for discussion with others.
What lessons to learn for CASCADES?

What does policy coherence mean for CASCADES?

Climate change is a global challenge which the Paris Climate Agreement states all countries need to tackle both domestically and internationally. For Europe to focus on specifically climate risks cascading inwards from beyond its borders is a relatively novel policy challenge. That in itself raises the spectre that old mistakes might be repeated. Yet in some fields, the EU does have a record of looking at the transboundary effects of its own policies cascading ‘outwards’ rather than ‘inwards’. While the direction of influence may be different, the nature of transboundary effects is the same and the tools to tackle them remain relevant. Thus, the EU experience in promoting PCD and latterly PCSD, offers a number of lessons on policy coherence for the CASCADES programme:

1. First, on the subject matter itself CASCADES is specifically concerned with the impact that climate change elsewhere in the world can have on the EU. The transmission belts for this impact can be in many domains, and in all three pillars of sustainable development. For instance, they can be social (e.g. migration, conflict), economic (e.g. trading patterns, loss of investments) or environmental (e.g. large-scale forest fires, loss of global biodiversity). CASCADES’ three focus areas: that is Trade and supply chains, Security and development-related and Financial, figure prominently among the most direct inter-connectors. They also span the three pillars of the 2030 Agenda concept of sustainable development, thereby clearly pointing to the need to find coherent policy solutions in the different sectors they touch. Thus, for example, migration pressures on Europe (a very vivid and immediate cascading impact) can indeed be brought on by climate change pressures (environmental pillar), but the key push factors are often a loss of livelihoods (economic pillar) combined with poor resilience and social vulnerability, that also create social tensions and conflicts, even rising to security issues (social pillar). The policy solutions to tackle such a complex package of issues are therefore not just environmental, but also need to involve social and economic measures all of which need to be coherent with each other. This is a first important point: policy coherence is a key issue for CASCADES.

2. A second implication for CASCADES is that these policy coherence solutions cannot just be found or resolved by Europe. In many cases they need to be tackled in the first instance by the national and local authorities concerned outside Europe, possibly, but not necessarily, with European support, and may indeed also be impacted on by more or less conducive international policy frameworks and conditions.

3. A third point from the experience of EU of PCD is that if in-coherences between policies are not tackled, policy implementation becomes less effective and in the

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23 CASCADES plans to develop a conceptual framework that helps identify cascading climate impacts and risk pathways that affect Europe: [https://www.cascades.eu/topic/risk-overview/](https://www.cascades.eu/topic/risk-overview/)
worst cases this can lead to a worsening of the situation that the policies were intended to address. The whole point about developing a concern for PCD was that European development officials (at both EU and member state levels) felt their work was being undermined and even negated by the ‘development-insensitive’ policies of their own governments or the EU in other sectors such as trade or agriculture.

4. A fourth lesson from the PCD experience is that building policy coherence is a long-term and essentially un-ending effort. It is always possible to go on improving policy coherence and our approach to promoting it needs to factor that in by expecting to work in an iterative and repetitive way accepting that at each stage in the process ‘good enough coherence’ is a valid interim objective. Making policy for tackling cascading climate change effects on Europe will be the same.

5. A fifth important point is that promoting policy coherence is political. Each policy in each sector has its backers and interest groups pushing for a particular course of action and arguing that their view should be dominant. A commitment to coherence with other policies in other sectors puts limits on how far each policy can go and each interest can be satisfied. Finding win-win solutions that will please all stakeholders in each policy sector is frequently difficult and it is often the case that there will be losers as well as winners. Technical tools and administrative mechanisms to find coherent policy solutions can go so far to build a consensus, but in the end some level of arbitration is likely to be needed. Policy coherence mechanisms can help making the process to reach the decision point more transparent and democratic, but ultimately established political decision-making institutions will need to take over for the final step.

6. In terms of who should take policy ownership for cascading climate risks, the lesson from the European and OECD experience of promoting policy coherence is that it is ideally a ‘centre-of-government’ function. In line with this at the EU level, the Commission’s embracing policy coherence in the Better Regulation Package under President Juncker as well as its recent decision to launch the Green Deal under President Von der Leyen, both of which have fallen under the responsibility of First VP Timmermans, it would see appropriate that he should be in the lead supported by the Commission’s Secretariat General. All Commission DGs, such as DEVCO, CLIMA and ENV as well as the EEAS will of course need to contribute to the effort under this leadership.

7. Finally, in more operational terms, the proposal to establish a ‘PCSD system’ as outlined in Figure 5 above, and/or use the similar OECD building blocks for PCSD (Figure 6) is something that CASCADES can take on board as one of its policy recommendations. CASCADES can also use these tools itself to analyse cascading risks of climate change and develop specific policy recommendations for tackling the risks the project decides to focus on.

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24 This need not necessarily be establishing a system from scratch. Rather it is more likely that it is built using a combination of whatever components already exist in the governance context being considered and then filling in gaps where necessary components might not yet exist. The point about using the concept of a ‘system’ is that it is made up of a set of components that all need to be present if the system is to operate effectively. The PCSD system can obviously also be created at different levels of governance or can encompass only a few key policy sectors if that is more effective in a particular context.
Selecting key policy focuses

Beyond these immediate lessons to be built on, it will be important for CASCADES to focus in on particular cascading climate risks that can be addressed with policy recommendations. The thematic and general policy analyses in CASCADES (WPs 3 to 6) are expected to identify particular, critical policy coherence issues, for which the template for reaching policy coherent solutions laid out in this paper could provide guidance.

In considering what CASCADES’ policy focus should be it can first be useful to look at using the four quadrants model (Fig. 3) taken from the point of view of the EU. First **Quadrant C on International-National** is particularly important: that is the international policies of the EU that it agrees with other governments elsewhere in the world which can have an impact on Europe. The question that arises is whether the EU has sufficient international influence to ensure that these policies are beneficial for the EU and do not have a negative impact on the EU’s own internal policies. The EU would therefore welcome it if other governments could adopt policies that are coherent with EU internal policies and more broadly with the SDG framework that the EU and all other governments have adopted. One of the objectives of the EU and its member states foreign policy should therefore be to persuade our international partners to adopt such policies.

**Quadrant D on International-International** is also important: the policies adopted at the international level of global governance should be coherent with each other and the achievement of the SDGs. Our European governments and the EU itself are active players in global fora and are therefore in a position to promote this type of policy coherence and this should be a clear objective.

**Quadrants A (National-National) and B (National International)** on the other hand are about the coherence of policies that we adopt in Europe. Quadrant B is the mirror image of Quadrant C and if Europe want partner governments to adopt policies that are coherent with our policy objectives (Quadrant C) we can expect them to demand reciprocity (albeit consistent with the CBDR principle) on our side (Quadrant B). So, it is important to go on promoting PCD which is part of Quadrant B. But it is also important to look at the coherence of our internal policies (Quadrant A) because if the EU does not get this right they can ultimately also have a negative impact externally and that will not help the EU in getting our international partners to adopt policies that we favour for our own needs. Thus, for instance, while the coherence of EU consumption patterns with our environment policy as promoted through circular economy policies is important for us internally in Europe, ultimately not tackling such issues at home can also create negative effects beyond Europe. Climate risks can cascade across borders and policy domains – and as the measures taken to adapt to their effects can also have wide-reaching implications (that could undermine policies in other domains and jurisdictions), effective governance of the risks requires a coherent and multilateral approach.

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25 **CBDR**, or ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ is a concept used in the 1992 Rio Declaration on sustainable development to denote that developed countries have a historical responsibility for much global environmental degradation and therefore have a greater responsibility to find solutions than other countries. The 2030 Agenda has a commitment to universality, that is it applies to all countries, but also an acceptance of the need for differentiation in the manner and responsibility of each country to contribute to its achievement. The relationship between this and the older CBDR principle is discussed in an ECDPM discussion paper (No. 173) from 2015 (Knoll et al 2015).
In other words, the policy measures Europe is interested in for tackling climate change are found in all four quadrants of the diagram and it is not just our internal policies inside Europe that we need to make more coherent to tackle climate change, but it is also European external policies. Overall, when climate change effects cascade into Europe we need policy responses, that are:

- Progressive internal policies that mitigate our impact on climate change as well as adaptation policies to protect the EU against its effects. These need to be coherent amongst themselves so as to result in optimised impacts in the EU.

- But we also need to be proactive about mitigating the impact we have externally and in encouraging other countries around the world to both adopt climate mitigation policies and promote policy coherence among all their policies so as to lessen the negative effects of these policies on the EU.

**How should we promote PCSD?**

The short answer to operationalising coherence is that each European government and the EU itself should seek to build a tailored PCSD system as described in Figure 5 and/or follow the OECD’s 8 Building Blocks as in Figure 6. To a large extent, as indicated above, this is already starting to happen though it needs to go further. This can be done using the PCSD framework, or with other framings if these are more useful in particular contexts. Setting up a PCSD system in each policy-making context is valuable. Within these systems ex-ante impact assessment will help us identify cascading climate risks and the other parts of the system will help produce policy responses. At the same time, whatever the existing best practices that are built on, it is imperative to include a sound political economy analysis, to understand the stakeholder interests, in the decisions being made. Promoting policy coherence is, as already indicated, inevitably political, so it important to have a good grasp of the different stakeholder interests before policy decisions are taken.

Inside the EU we need to promote policy coherence on the PCSD model and adapt it flexibly to context specific variations, to benefit ourselves, but partly also to encourage the same policy behaviour in other states. This then underlines the importance of international dialogue, or in other words ‘climate diplomacy’ in both bilateral and multilateral spheres (Iacobuta G et al 2019, ETTG), as well as the provision of adequate funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation at the international level to which the EU should contribute. The EU thus also needs to support the multilateral institutions that promote this dialogue, encourage adherence to agreed principles and support for the global public good they represent. All states need to work together to achieve policy coherence at the global level.
However, while policy coherence efforts have been extensively tested in European and OECD countries, this has not yet happened so much elsewhere or at least not framed in this way. There is thus a research gap on non-EU policy coherence systems and mechanisms and how they are evolving. The framing required to move forward may be different as the European PCD history is very much cast in terms of EU impacts on poorer countries to which the EU also provides ODA. So a different narrative, that is likely to be more about promoting the efficiency and effectiveness benefits of coherent policy, or set out in terms of contributions to achieving the 2030 Agenda, rather than about North-South development cooperation may be more useful and appropriate.
Conclusions

The EU policy response to cascading effects of climate change on Europe needs to be sophisticated and well-integrated, in line with the approach of the 2030 Agenda. A lot of this sophistication has to do with the coherence between different policies and the need to proactively promote and optimise policy coherence in order to achieve the well-integrated policy package the implementation of the 2030 Agenda requires. This is not something new. Policy makers have experience of doing this and are also familiar with the negative consequences of incoherence. Much inspiration can be drawn from the way policy coherence has been promoted and managed in the past. Such experience exists in the EU external relations field, but it also exists in other fields though it is often called by other names. With climate change effects cascading into Europe, the EU will need to have policy responses that both (i) promote policy coherences inside the EU, and (ii) encourage other states to also promote policy coherence so as ultimately to reduce negative impacts on the EU. The 2030 Agenda with its recognition of the importance of PCSD, and the related Paris Climate Agreement and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction provide the framework to engage in such an international dialogue.
Lessons learned from policy coherence for development in the EU

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