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**Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
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Following two decades of instability, Algeria is experiencing slow recovery. The relative stability that prevailed from 1965 to the late 1980s under the FLN's one-party rule was shattered in October 1988 when a spontaneous upheaval swept through the country. The events compelled the regime to initiate liberal reforms and to change the Constitution. The liberalization resulted in the emergence of a multiparty system that saw the proliferation of political parties whose ideologies spanned through the entire political spectrum, from radical to moderate Islamist, liberal to far Left, and nationalist to Trotskyite. Optimism characterized Algerian society due to public debate, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. The period 1989-1992 witnessed important changes at all levels, but primarily in the political realm. The economic system, too, began changing with the move from a socialist economy to one more in tune with capitalism and globalization. Algeria moved even closer to the West and displayed great pragmatism in its foreign policy which contrasted with its revolutionary rhetoric of the past.

However, the opening of the system resulted in the emergence of radical Islamist factions, which regrouped under the quite popular Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS won the municipal elections in June 1990, which did not worry the authorities too much. However, the overwhelming FIS victory in the first round of the legislative elections of December 1991 alarmed secular parties and the military. Thus, in January 1992, the authorities annulled the elections and eventually banned the FIS. Soon after, a period of instability set in, resulting in bloody civil unrest. The country became

isolated: Algeria's diplomacy was proved ineffective in convincing the outside world that Islamist armed groups, not the regime, were the real culprits. The military fought a savage guerrilla, with little or no international assistance. The armed forces combated terrorist groups with inadequate equipment and inexperienced troops made up mostly of conscripts. The military also suffered from an arms embargo since most outsiders refused to take side in what they considered a domestic conflict, while Algerian authorities tried to convince them that this war was part of international terrorism. During that decade tens of thousands of Algerians, mostly innocent civilians; Algerians referred to that decade as the "red decade," because of its bloody character and the gruesome massacres perpetrated against isolated villages.

But, by the late 1990s, Algeria progressively regained an unmistakable degree of stability, the military having negotiated in September 1997 a deal with the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the major armed group. But, the military did not succeed in brokering a similar surrender from the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) and its successor the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), allied with al-Qaeda and which still perpetrates to this day sporadic terrorist attacks, mainly in the northeastern parts of the country.

Despite the controversy that surrounded his election in April 1999, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika soon gained popularity thanks to the various reforms that he announced. He also succeeded in revamping Algeria's abroad following his numerous trips overseas; his experience as Algeria's foreign minister (1965-1979) played a considerable role in convincing foreign governments that Algeria had recovered from the crisis and that the reforms the government initiated will bring peace and stability, necessary conditions for foreign direct investments.

Bouteflika succeeded in consolidating his rule, especially after his reelection in April 2004. No one disputed the regularity of the presidential election in 2004, although one might argue that Bouteflika benefited from all the instruments of State power, including the national media, to guarantee his reelection. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Bouteflika enjoys a high degree of popularity, particularly, in the rural areas. By and large, Algerians

supported Bouteflika's Civil Concord in 1999 and the National Reconciliation of 2005. However, power struggles at the height of the State complicated Bouteflika's consolidation of power. The old guard of the military, also known as *le pouvoir*, who often interfered in politics, sought to prevent Bouteflika's reelection. But, the support he obtained from the head of the Intelligence Services (DRS), General-Major Mohamed Mediene, known as "Tewfik," tilted the balance in favor of Bouteflika, who then succeeded in removing the majority of the military's old guard from power and replaced them with younger, less politicized officers. On July 5, 2006, Tewfik was promoted, along with two other Gen.-Majors, to the rank of Lieutenant General,¹ a rank that had been held only by Mohamed Lamari until his resignation in summer 2004 following Bouteflika's reelection. Although the professionalization of the National Popular Army (ANP) began in the late 1990s, Bouteflika is making that professionalization a reality. His former chief of staff, Larbi Belkheir, who served as the informal liaison between the old guard of the military establishment and the presidency was appointed ambassador to Morocco; while some observers thought that this appointment aimed at improving Algerian-Moroccan relations, in reality, Bouteflika decided to keep the influential Belkheir away from the center of power. The civilianization of power has not, however, meant greater democratization. Indeed, today, power is concentrated in the presidency with parliament playing a minor role.

Despite his authoritarianism, Bouteflika enjoys great recognition in the country, especially in the rural areas and cities outside the capital Algiers. His sudden, serious illness in November 2005 and the surgery he underwent in Paris worried the population a great deal. His triumphant return to the country on December 31, 2005, when tens of thousands of people welcomed him back, demonstrated Bouteflika's popularity. Algerians appreciated Bouteflika's efforts to end the bloodshed in the country. In September 2005, a referendum approved the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, offering amnesty to Islamists except for those who committed murderers, rapes, and those who put bombs in public places. However, the law provided exemption for security forces from prosecution for crimes committed in the 1990s, and compensation for families of victims

of violence and the disappeared. Although the measure did not provide for accountability for the disappeared or for truth-telling about the role of the security forces—which the law clearly forbids—the Charter may not only help in the reduction of violence but may also keep the military away from politics. Undoubtedly, the population credits Bouteflika with bringing peace and stability to the country. There is also no doubt that the president is credited with bringing down unemployment—though it still remains high—increasing the population’s purchasing power, and initiating important domestic investments: \$60 billion for the period 2005-09. Algerians see in Bouteflika the man who succeeded in revamping Algeria’s image abroad.

The Year 2006 in Review

The year 2006 has been quite rich in events; although the year began with a number of uncertainties, such as the health of the president or the implementation of the Charter of Peace and National Reconciliation, it ended on a number of positive notes. This section provides a detailed analysis of a number of events that took place in Algeria in 2006.

Politics

The current head of the government Abdelaziz Belkhadem is a close collaborator of President Bouteflika. Belkhadem, former head of the National Assembly before its dissolution in January 1992, was known as a *barbafèlene*, i.e., a member of the FLN close to the Islamists. He has cleansed the FLN of dissidents and has succeeded in eliciting the FLN’s support for the president. The FLN, which gained the majority in the parliament in 2002, is expected to strengthen even further that majority during the legislative election in May 2007 at the expense of the RND, whose president, former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, and a heavyweight in the political system and close to the military establishment, has often been perceived as a rival to the president. In fact, he was forced to resign in May 2006 for a variety of complex reasons, but primarily because of his apparent opposition to changing the Constitution, a change whose purpose is to extend the presidential mandate from five to seven years or even to multiply the number of mandates, thus opening the way for Bouteflika to

serve for a longer term. Although the revision of the constitution, supported by Abdelaziz Belkhadem and the FLN, has been postponed, the change is likely to be materialized in 2007. Undoubtedly, the resignation of Ouyahia resulted from the power struggle at the summit of the state. If ideology played any role in the change, it indicated that Bouteflika preferred to have a prime minister who is closer to his views and those of moderate Islamists than Ouyahia, notorious "eradicator." Bouteflika no longer needed the support of Ouyahia, head of the RND but also a favorite of the intelligence services (DRS). The RND, created in 1997 with the strong backing of the military, was meant to serve as the party of President Liamine Zeroual (1994-1999). This partly explains why Bouteflika preferred to have to his side his closest ally Belkhadem, who tailored the FLN to Bouteflika's needs and who shares many of his views.

Sickness of Bouteflika

Probably the major event of the first quarter of the year was Bouteflika's sickness. Indeed, the president was practically absent from the political scene. The secrecy surrounding his illness accelerated the incredible rumors surrounding his health. The most worrying rumor was the incapacity of the president to continue his mandate until 2009. The official media sought to alleviate the population's fears by reading the president's correspondence as a make-believe that he was working from his office. The government's ministers' unconvincing denials failed to put an end to the rumors. Not until the summer or even autumn, following Bouteflika's more public appearances and his travels abroad, did those rumors end. The president himself declared in November 2006 that, "I had been seriously ill but thank God I have recovered beautifully." What should be noted is that the recovery of the president came as a relief to the policymakers and population alike. The absence of the president from the political scene revealed a power vacuum even if the institutions continued to function normally. The question arose in Algeria as well as abroad concerning the president's succession in case of death. While his recovery was a relief for all, the sickness of the president had one major consequence: the

postponement of the revision of the Constitution and referendum on the (revised) Constitution that was to take place before year's end.

Revision of the Constitution

Revision of the Constitution (1996) topped the political agenda in 2006. The FLN launched the idea without the president making any comment on this subject. In July, he announced that the referendum of the revised constitution would take place before the year ended. However, the authorities remained silent on the subject thereafter. Most keen observers advanced two hypotheses: 1/ Given that Bouteflika's health deteriorated again in summer 2006, there was no need to revise the constitution whose main goal was to tailor it to Bouteflika so he could serve an additional mandate after his second term ended in 2009. Thus, why change the constitution for a president who maybe dying. 2/ There was strong opposition even at the heights of power regarding the revision of the constitution. Apparently, some officials feared that tailoring the constitution the way Tunisians and Egyptians have to accommodate their authoritarian presidents would tarnish Algeria's image. Whatever the truth, revision of the constitution has simply been postponed, not abandoned, which means that it might happen in 2007.

National Reconciliation

The other important event that dominated political life relates to the issue of National Reconciliation, which Bouteflika, with support from various political parties, has fought for since his first mandate as president. The president, despite opposition from the families of the victims of terrorism, saw this policy as the only initiative capable of stopping the bloodshed in the country and bringing back civil peace and stability. Opponents of the policy perceived the National Reconciliation, which the population supported overwhelmingly in the September 2005 referendum, argued that the law has cleared the security forces from abuses they committed during the years of conflict and has not resolved the question of the disappeared. Human rights groups inside and outside the country also criticized the law because it did not bring in any justice. Human rights organizations and

families alike criticized the incapacity of the National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (CNCPPDH) to investigate and expose the perpetrators behind the disappearances and to hold them legally accountable. There is however consensus that without the end of the bloodshed and civil peace, there could be no prospect for socioeconomic development.

Although the president of the CNCPPDH Farouk Ksentini believes that the Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation had only a 70% success, it nonetheless has had positive results. He asserted that 6,146 cases of disappeared had been treated as of August 2006 and hundreds of terrorists had surrendered to the state authorities. Even if the deadline for the application of the clemency law was set for 31 August 2006, Bouteflika accepted its *de facto* extension, declaring on 26 December that the "doors of reconciliation" remains open, thus allowing terrorists who wish to surrender and benefit from the amnesty law. Furthermore, by the end of 2006, the *Wilayate* [regional] Commissions had, according to Bouteflika, treated 80,000 dossiers of families affected by the "national tragedy." In his view, their problems have found their resolution in conformity with and respect for the law. This means the granting of compensation as well as other financial and social support from the state. Started in September 2006, the compensatory measures have thus far targeted about 42,000 families, according to the Minister in charge of National Solidarity and Employment Djamel Ould-Abbes. It should be pointed out that the needy families of those who died as part of the insurgency are also concerned by state assistance.² The law also applies to those condemned Algerian Islamists who found refuge abroad. The case that received most media attention was that of former FIS leader Rabah Kebir, exiled in Germany, who returned to Algeria in September to take advantage of the law.

Not only in Algeria were questions raised about the National Reconciliation policy; some European countries raised great concerns about the terrorists who were pardoned for fear that they might come to Europe to carry out their militant activities there. According to many sources, the French security authorities requested that Algeria provide the names of 2,629 individuals who were freed in Algeria under the amnesty law. Apparently,

Algeria did provide such a list.³ There are fears in Algeria that many of those amnestied or exempted from pursuits would renew with terrorism as dozens (some argue hundreds) have already done so.

Again, whatever its numerous flaws, the implementation of the Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation has contributed to the return of normality in Algeria. Unfortunately, it did not bring an end to terrorist activities in the country. Despite the determination and the overall effectiveness of the security forces (police, army, gendarmerie, and state-sponsored defense groups), the remaining armed groups have not been completely eradicated. The *Salafi Group for Predication and Combat* (GSPC), whose leader Abdelmalek Droukdel alias "Abou Mossaâb Abdelouadoud" reiterated the group's allegiance to al-Qaeda in September. Thereafter, the group changed its name to *Al-Qaeda Organization of the Islamic Maghreb*. The GSPC still represents a threat to society and to industrial facilities, as the attack on 13 December foreign workers of Brown Root and Condor (BRC) illustrates. The group, which has cells overseas, mainly in Europe, still operates in eastern Algeria and in the far south, as well as in parts of the neighboring Sahel. The continued existence of this threat has had the double effect of the maintenance of the state of emergency in Algeria, proclaimed in spring 1992, and the United States decision to launch a multilateral security system in the region (the Pan-Sahel Initiative, then the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership, TSCTP) and to establish a presence in the region.⁴

In 2006, Bouteflika vowed that the government will conduct the war on terrorism until its definitive eradication.

Corruption

Corruption is a topic that also dominated the news in 2006. Indeed, the media, state authorities, political parties, as well as the general population denounced the widespread corruption that has pervaded the economic sphere. The Khalifa affair revealed the incredible degree of corruption. Although not all the main actors are yet known and the court case, which began in 2007, has not yet revealed all the real underpinnings, Algerians of all walks of life already knew that tremendous corruption allowed Khalifa to

enrich itself so fast. In the public's eyes, the participation of high officials in this corruption made no doubt. In December, the president of Transparency International Huguette Labelled declared in Algiers that corruption is also widespread in political circles, an observation that Algerian researchers, managers, union members and others have corroborated in the case of Algeria. The losses incurred by the Algerian economy largely explain this denunciation of corruption. Despite slight progress from 2005 to 2006, Algeria still ranked high among the most corrupt countries at the 84th rank out of 163; in 2005, it ranked 97th. Algerians have become aware that corruption is one of the main impediments to foreign direct investments, which explains the decision to combat it. The authorities brought to justice some *walis* accused of corruption; they also imprisoned bankers who embezzled money. But, a lot of work remains to be done in the area of corruption, a phenomenon which has taken unbelievable proportions with the liberalization of the economy. The bids for public holdings, for example, are still opaque.

Military: Professionalization, Modernization, and International Cooperation

In 2006, there were signs that the ANP continued its professionalization, which in fact had begun under Lieutenant-General Mohamed Lamari. The spokespersons of the military indicated that they did not wish to do police work, although they remained committed to the war on terrorism. The military also entered cooperation agreements with NATO, France, Russia, and the United States, among others. An analysis of the military reveals a number of points. First, the military remains committed to the war on terrorism. It continues to conduct major operations to dislodge the remaining armed groups. The military has been at the forefront on the war on terrorism. The ambivalence of politicians regarding the most effective means to combat terrorism led to dissensions in the military, similar to those among civilians, between eradicators and conciliators. But, most importantly, and this is the second point, the degeneration of the political situation in the 1990s and its consequences convinced the military leadership that the Armed Forces should gradually withdraw from politics

and focus on their constitutional prerogatives, national defense. The military authorities presented before the Parliament the new status of members of the Armed Forces. Third, professionalization of the military also meant the adaptation and revamping of the military's equipment. In the 1990s, the military was confronted with guerrilla warfare for which it was ill-prepared and ill-equipped. Furthermore, the quasi-embargo imposed by Europe and the United States, coupled with the near-financial bankruptcy of the country, compelled the ANP to fight the war on terrorism with inadequate means. In March 2006, Algeria renegotiated its \$7.5-billion debt with Russia; the tradeoff for the debt forgiveness was the purchase of Russian weaponry in the amount of \$4.7 billion. This certainly will allow the modernization of the ANP's equipment, some of which is obsolete. Moscow will supply 40 Mig-29 and 25 Soukhoï aircraft, as well as 16 Yak-130 training planes, 40 tanks, and 8 S-300 PMU missile systems. Although the ANP's equipment is primarily of Russian origin, the ANP has sought to diversify its supplies. The United States and France are also eager to sell certain types of weapons to Algeria. Fourth, this professionalization and modernization was also necessitated by the new regional and international environment. Indeed, the ANP now has considerable contacts with NATO, participates in Peacekeeping missions, and partakes in joint maneuvers with French, American, and NATO forces. In 2006, the ANP has been particularly active in such endeavors. In particular, its Navy has collaborates with other navies in the Mediterranean.

Economic Development

Algeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2006 reached close to \$100 billion, with a GDP growth rate of 5.6%. The per capita GDP (in 2005) was at \$7,189. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* expects Algeria's GDP growth rate to accelerate in 2007, reaching 6.8%. The breakdown of the various economic activities is as follows: Industry represents 61% of GDP, services 29%, and agriculture 10%. With respect to trade, the estimates for exports in 2006 are evaluated at \$55.6 billion (f.o.b.), primarily in oil, natural gas, and petroleum products. The US accounted for 23.5% of Algeria's exports, Italy 16.7%, France 11.4%, and Spain 11.25%. Algeria's imports amounted

to \$27.6 billion, primarily in capital goods, food and beverages, and consumer goods. These imports came mostly from France 22.6%, Italy 8.53%, Germany 6.9%, US 6.15%, China 5.02%, Spain 4.85%, Japan 3.65%, Argentina 3.2%, and Turkey 3.24%.⁵ While the overall macroeconomic picture looked good in 2006, major problems persisted due primarily to the sellout of public companies in the context of privatization. This of course engendered greater unemployment. The hydrocarbons revenues reached remarkable levels, but the problem is that much of the revenues were used for repayment of the debt but also for imports. In 2005-06, owing to huge hydrocarbons revenues and impressive external reserves (estimated at \$80 billion at the end of 2006), Algeria made the strategic decision of repaying its external debt. The authorities renegotiated the debt with the Paris Club and the London Club in May and September 2005, respectively. The government made early debt repayments of \$10.5 billion, including reimbursements to Paris and London Club creditors; this helped reduce the debt from 17% of external debt-to-GDP ratio in 2005 to 4% at the end of 2006 and 12% of the year's export revenues. Today, Algeria's external debt is less than \$5 billion. As a comparison, in 1994, the total external debt was close to \$30 billion, corresponding to 70% of the country's GDP. In 2004, the debt was still high, corresponding to 26.4% of GDP.⁶ Inflation, too, was brought down from 30% in 1995 to 3% ten years later.

The total public debt (domestic and external) represented approximately 15% of GDP in 2006; this is quite extraordinary if one recalls that it amounted to 99% of GDP in 1995, 57% in 2001, and 40% in 2003.⁷

The main fear of course is that Algeria remains a one-commodity producer; thus, its economy is dependent upon the price and demand of oil. Although this commodity may be finite, the national oil company Sonatrach alone made 18 new discoveries in 2006. Given the importance of oil, it is not surprising that Algerians decided in July to reverse the law on hydrocarbons voted in April 2005 on the liberalization of the oil sector, which had allowed foreign ownership a minimum of 70%. The new law, voted in October in 2006 compels Sonatrach to have the majority share (51%) in all contracts relating to research, exploitation, and refinery. In addition, an amendment to the law passed in October also imposes a tax from 5-50% on exceptional

non-taxable benefits to be applied to partnership contracts when the price of oil surpasses \$30 a barrel; this would represent additional revenue to the state between 1 and 2 billion dollars a year.

In 2006, exports outside the hydrocarbons sector represented only 2,19% of the volume of global exports (\$1,11 billion), although this represented a growth of 22,6% compared to 2005. This amount covered only 19 days of Algeria's total imports. The non-hydrocarbons products (raw products, consumption goods...) were exported mainly to the European Union, where the following five countries received the major share (88%): France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium).⁸

At the end of 2006, Algerian authorities emphasized the need to lessen dependence on hydrocarbons. They decided to launch a debate on a new industrial strategy to begin in 2007. In the meantime and, in order to avoid social conflicts resulting from the liberalization process, an Economic and Social Pact (Government, private sector, and the national trade union, UGTA) was signed in October; the main argument behind this pact is that in order to give time for the reforms to bear fruit, and to ignite the economy, an understanding between all parties concerned must be found so that the reforms are not undermined. Simply put, this means that workers must refrain from going on strike, to creating "social tensions" in any sectors of the industry, or to demand raises in salary, all for a four-year period.

Foreign Affairs

The year 2006 has been rich in diplomatic activities. Indeed, the overall security in the country, the high oil revenues, and the potentially lucrative business contracts, allowed Algeria to rejuvenate its diplomacy. Furthermore, the 5-year plan, during which the state has committed to spend \$100 billion to revamp all sectors of the economy and to rebuild the infrastructure (roads, highways, water supply lines, housing, etc.), has obviously made the country more attractive. The capacity of the country to import industrial and agricultural goods as well as weaponry could not leave outsiders indifferent. Furthermore, Algeria's adherence and effective participation in the global war on terrorism has provided the country with a great degree of credibility. Algeria, which, in the 1990s lost its place on the

international stage, made a formidable comeback. Although this resurrection began in early 2000, the year 2006 represented a kind of apogee. The country is involved in most important security partnerships as well as all types of international initiatives. With the exception of its tense relationship with Morocco and, to a lesser degree with France, in 2006 Algeria strengthened ties with the United States (visits of numerous high officials, including Ronald Rumsfeld in February), reaffirmed its strategic partnership with Russia (Putin's visit in March), and signed a strategic partnership with China (Bouteflika's visit to China in November), to cite but a few important diplomatic events. The frozen conflict in Western Sahara remains one of the obstacles to better relations with Morocco. It has also had a negative impact on Spanish-Algerian relations as seen during Jose Luis Zapatero's visit to Algiers in December. In 2006, Algerian and France were hoping to sign a Treaty of Friendship; however, France's refusal to accede to Algeria's demand to apologize for the crimes it committed during colonization has poisoned relations between the two countries.

In general, what transpired in 2006 is that Algeria is seeking to diversify its relations at all levels in order to avoid becoming dependent on any. This is reminiscent of the nonaligned policy that Algeria pursued consistently in the 1970s.

Society

Safety, jobs, and health care represented some of the major preoccupations for Algerians. They welcomed the demise of terrorism in the main cities and now enjoy being able to go out at night, eat in restaurants, and go shopping without the fear of being killed in blind bombings. However, while terrorism has on the main been vanquished, new societal problems have emerged, which have posed serious problems for the gendarmerie, the police, and border guards. With the emergence of a new wealthy class, kidnappings, an unknown phenomenon in the past, have now become frequent. Although most kidnapped were released after ransoms were paid, there were also tragic cases. The use of drugs, including hard drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, has been widespread and is now reaching juveniles in secondary schools. The socioeconomic problems have seen the rise of prostitution but

also of abortions. There is also evidence that many of the former terrorist groups have now become bandits who rob banks or pos offices. Contraband and trafficking along the borders has also increased.

The government has pledged to fight these phenomena, some of which unknown until now, which have created a sense of insecurity in the streets of big cities. This has also compelled the police and gendarmerie to develop scientific investigation techniques. Members of the police and the gendarmerie are undergoing training in the best schools in the United States and Europe.

In conclusion, one can say that Algeria in 2006, despite some drawbacks, is doing relatively well. There are many positive signs and should the authorities decide to pursue the fight on corruption, to allow greater citizens' participation in the political system, and push the socioeconomic and political reforms further, the country will gain in stature regionally and internationally. Should the authorities use oil revenues rationally and invest in productive sectors, not only will economic growth ensue but Algeria may also begin to stop relying on hydrocarbons as their main source of prosperity.

Endnotes

¹ Mounir B., "L'ANP a trois nouveaux généraux de corps d'armée," Liberté, July 5, 2006.

² Presidential Decree no. 06-94 (28 February 2006) concerning state aid to needy families affected by the involvement of their relatives in terrorism.

³ Mustapha Rachidiou, « L'Algérie aurait livré à la France la liste des islamistes graciés en 2006-L'UE ne veut pas des repentis, El Watan, January 17, 2007.

⁴ See, Yahia H. Zoubir, "La política estadounidense en el Magreb: ¿a la conquista de una nueva región?"

<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/275.asp>

⁵ These figures are taken from, US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Algeria, February 2007,

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/8005.htm>

⁶ Banque d'Algérie, Evolution de la dette extérieure de l'Algérie 1994-2004.

Available at: <http://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/docs2.htm>

⁷ These figures are in, Samira Imadalou, "Avec la politique de désendettement adoptée par l'Algérie-La dette est tombée de 15,5 à 4,7 milliards de dollars" La Tribune, December 28, 2006.

⁸ "Les exportations hors hydrocarbures marginales en 2006,"

<http://www.lesoirdalgerie.com/articles/2007/03/26/article.php?sid=51364&cid=2>