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Reports

Confidence and security-building measures in the Mediterranean: a practical proposal for the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona process
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CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL FOR THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS

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“On the twelfth of June, 1812, the forces of Western Europe crossed the Russian frontier and war began, that is, an event took place opposed to human reason and to human nature. Millions of men perpetrated against one another such innumerable crimes, frauds, treacheries, thefts, forgeries, issues of false money, burglaries, incendiarisms, and murders as in whole centuries are not recorded in the annals of all the law courts of the world, but which those who committed them did not at the time regard as being crimes.” (War and Peace, Leo Tolstoy)

The goal of this paper is to briefly review the theory and practice of Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM's) regimes in Europe in the past three decades (since the approval of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and the creation of the CSCE, later OSCE), and to evaluate the possibilities of building similar regimes for the whole of the Mediterranean region. Larger issues of confidence and security as well as the institutional and diplomatic arrangements to cope with new and emerging threats are also dealt with, especially regarding the EU and NATO strategies and instruments. The paper ends with an outline of three possible scenarios for CSBM's regimes in the Mediterranean region within different frameworks, which are intended to help contribute to the discussion about alternative strategies and their implications.

I. Preliminary remarks on war, security and confidence

“War is the continuation of politics by other means”, Clausewitz once wrote. According to Tolstoy's opening phrase in this paper, war can be said to be the intensification of crimes and wrongs committed in a short period of time, so that the intensity of harm and injustices –both felt and perpetrated– is enormously higher than in normal times. Do these or other classical definitions of war help us understand the challenges that the world is facing as far as the security of individuals and states is concerned?

Since the UN forged the term of human security in 1994, this concept has become increasingly used in the international community. Nowadays, international actors use the term human security to refer to freedom from fear and freedom from want, without which a safe environment for a healthy life cannot be assured. Human security is also about the security of individuals as opposed to the security of states. Not that states do not matter any more; rather, states have a renewed responsibility to ensure that each one of their citizens can be said to live free from fear and free from want –probably a much harder task than before.

In addition, international and regional organizations are starting to review what they consider to be the most important threats to security in the 21st Century. In this sense, the EU issued its European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003, which identifies as the new threats: terrorism, failed states, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also issued a new official document on “Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century” in December 2003. According to the OSCE, these new threats are inter-state and intra-state conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, discrimination and intolerance, threats of economic nature (economic and social disparities, lack of rule of law, weak governance, corruption, widespread poverty and high unemployment), environmental threats (unsustainable use of resources, mismanagement of wastes, pollution and ecological disasters), and threats of a politico-military nature (accumulation of conventional weaponry, illicit transfer of arms, and proliferation of WMD).

A number of high level commissions and panels working for national governments as well as international organizations have created new visions and strategies that try to adapt the use of force to the realities and needs of today. Most notably, the Government of Canada commissioned a document in 2001 on the “responsibility to protect”, which deals with the duties of governments to protect individuals, and identifies a series of criteria for intervention in third countries when their governments are not meeting this responsibility. More recently, the UN has presented the result of the *High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, a document that deals with the “shared responsibility for a more secure world”. These works emphasize the need for the international community to engage in countering threats to security not only affecting citizens as individuals in a particular country, but human beings as such across the world.

If we use the human security approach, we have to conclude that confidence linked to security in the international arena is not so much related to what states perceive other states’ behavior to be, but rather to the trust of citizens as individuals in a secure future, in which they are free from fear and from want. In a similar way, according to the European Security Strategy, confidence would be related to the new threats identified, and in particular, the trust of European citizens as individuals that terrorism, failed states, organized crime and WMD are being dealt with and are a priority concern of national and European governments. The same can be said as far as the threats identified by OSCE are concerned.

II. Building confidence and security and the new threats to security

Building confidence and security in order to set the conditions for peace and avoid war and violence (that jeopardize the freedom and security of individuals) has long been one of the goals of multilateral institutions such as the EU, NATO, OSCE and others, as well as the cornerstone of a variety of multilateral treaties and politically-binding documents. When talking about building confidence and security, we have to refer especially to the regimes developed by the CSCE/OSCE, both in the area of CSBM's as in arms control and reduction. It has traditionally been accepted that confidence and security building measures are those intended to reduce the danger of armed conflict, to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activities, and thus to contribute to stability. CSBM's regarding conventional forces in Europe have primarily been adopted in the context of CSCE/OSCE, while measures dealing with nuclear forces (both strategic and sub-strategic) have been dealt with either in international treaties (e.g. the NPT) or through bilateral agreements (this has been the case especially of nuclear arms reduction).

Some of the new threats identified have led organizations to restate or redesign their strategies to combat those threats to security. The EU, following the European Security Strategy, was supposed to enshrine the new European vision for security in the constitutional treaty. This treaty is –or, rather, would have been– an enabling text for the common foreign and defense policy, that is, the provisions contained in the Constitution do not hinder the development of this policy (as opposed to the treaties approved since the Maastricht Treaty). One of the decisions taken by the EU was to create a “terrorism czar” and a special department to deal with this new threat.

NATO, an essential consultative forum for its members on all aspects of their defense and security, approved in 1999 the Strategic Concept, “committed to contribute actively to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as confidence and security-building measures.” NATO is also developing new programs to fight against the new threats to security. OSCE's counter- terrorism activities “focus, *inter alia*, on border security and management, policing, the combating of trafficking and suppression of terrorist financing”, according to the OSCE Strategy to Address “Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century”. The same is true for myriad other areas now more directly related to security, such as immigration policies, tolerance and non-discrimination policies, and so forth.

III. CSBM's and the OSCE

Confidence and security building measures is the term that has been used in the last 30 years to refer to a set of principles and practices that a number of state actors have agreed upon in order to improve security and cooperation among them and among their populations. The term is usually associated with the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975, adopted by the then Conference for the Security and Cooperation in

Europe. The signatories of this Act, a politically-binding document, were the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The Helsinki Final Act came at a time when the world was still divided by the Iron Curtain, and the risk of nuclear attacks between super-powers was a menace. Its content was partly addressed at creating the conditions for a more secure international environment, one in which actors would acknowledge their responsibility to promote understanding and cooperation between nations, and at the same time respect state sovereignty. In practice, it was meant to reduce the tensions between the two blocks by having states share information about their military plans, capabilities and activities. The set of CSBM's negotiated and agreed upon in 1975 have been revised and broadened in several documents, the last of which is the Vienna Document 1999, currently in force. This document, and the previous versions of CSBM's, have to be seen as the maximum level of military cooperation that all the OSCE participating states are willing to accept. One has to bear in mind that OSCE was not built around a common political arrangement and that all decisions require the consensus of 55 states, among which there are countries which have tensions and conflicts with each other, such as Russia and Georgia or Armenia and Azerbaijan.

During the 1990's, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, several important agreements have been reached by the OSCE, although the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act has always been praised and renewed. The Paris Charter for a New Europe confirmed the need to maintain the then CSCE after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the regimes created, in order to guarantee security in Europe. Other relevant innovations in that decade include: (i) the signature and ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990, which established limitations to conventional arms in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, with a definition of quotas according to different groupings of countries, always under the two-block logic, and which are still in force awaiting the ratification by OSCE states of the revised version of the treaty which redraws borders associated to quotas along state lines; (ii) the update of the regime of CSBM's (the last of which is the Vienna Document 1999), including increased openness and the reduction of thresholds on account of the lower level of military activity in Europe and the changes in military and defense technology; (iii) the signature in 1992 and later ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies, which establishes the regime for the conduct of observation flights by OSCE countries over other OSCE countries, including the technology to be used and the system of passive and active quotas; (iv) the creation of the Forum for Security Cooperation in 1992, and the establishment of Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings to overview the application of the Vienna Document 1999; (v) the approval of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security in 1994, which calls for civilian control over armed forces, respect of the international humanitarian law and proportionate and adequate use of force; (vi) the creation of a Communications Network that allows participant countries to share online the information required by the CSBM's regime; and (vii) the regionalization of CSBM's, encouraged by the Vienna Document 1999, and which has seen a rise in the interest in sub-regional and bilateral agreements among states that have tensions, such as the Black Sea agreement.

The issue of sub-regional and bilateral CSBM's and similar agreements is not new. Thus, France and Germany signed the Treaty of the Elysée back in 1963, covering a wide range of areas, including strong security cooperation. Turkey and Greece also have agreements in several areas aimed at increasing confidence between the two countries. The 5+5 Agreement can also be considered as a sub-regional arrangement to increase security and exchange information and visits between 5 European and 5 Southern Mediterranean countries.

The increased transparency and confidence in the OSCE area, together with the changes in threats to security, have brought new tools to the forefront. Thus, the control on small arms and light weapons (which account for most deaths in violent conflicts and are widely used in organized crime) is a priority for OSCE countries. This implies regulating manufacturing, marking and record-keeping (in order to be able to trace these weapons), establishing common export criteria and controls, managing stockpiles and eliminating surpluses, and the reductions of these arms on the field, in areas of conflict. CSBM's in areas not included in the traditional definition are also being developed, and the concept is now even extending to intrastate relations. This is the case, for instance, of confidence-building measures in certain OSCE countries between the police forces and the population.

An important aspect in the work of OSCE is the collaboration with other regional security organizations. The Istanbul Charter for European Security 1999 created, among other things, the Platform for Cooperative Security to encourage this objective. In this sense, OSCE and NATO have a fluid cooperation, including sharing notes, mutual invitations and other mechanisms. The Annual Security Reviews are usually attended by OSCE participating states, by NATO and by OSCE partners. Relations with the EU, and particularly with its defense and security administration, are not so developed as with NATO. Political will in the EU has not allowed so far a deeper relation. As an example of this, a recent initiative of OSCE to develop a joint OSCE-EU-NATO dialog with Mediterranean partners has not succeeded.

IV. Security and confidence in the Mediterranean region

This section deals with the security pillar of the three main Mediterranean dialogs or partnerships currently in place: the Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP) of the EU (a.k.a. Barcelona Process), NATO's Mediterranean Dialog and OSCE's Mediterranean Dialog.

The Euromediterranean Partnership

EU Mediterranean partners are ten in number: Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Syria. The year 20056 was marked by the Tenth Anniversary of the Barcelona Process, which provided a yet again missed opportunity to review the political and security pillar within the EMP of the EU, one that has not yielded the expected results. The Communication of the

Commission on the Tenth Anniversary of the EMP, when addressing the political and security pillar of the Barcelona Process, identifies the following partnership-building measures that are already up and running: the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, the Malta Diplomatic Seminars, co-operation in Civil Protection and Disaster Management, and the EUROMESCO network of foreign policy institutes. The Anna Lindh Foundation is also considered to be partnership-building measure, although it is usually under the social pillar.

Negotiations to develop and adopt a Euromediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability started with the Barcelona Process, although, according to a working paper of the Euromed Secretariat, "since 2001, due to Arab/Israeli tension, the pace of negotiations of [the Charter] has decreased, but Ministers have reaffirmed their commitment to the aim of adopting the Charter as soon as the political situation allows."

The relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partners have been institutionalized and managed through the Association Agreements which the EU has signed with each partner (the Syrian agreement awaiting signature). Financial instruments until this date have been under the MEDA programs. The Association Agreements include as the first of their aims to "provide an appropriate framework for political dialog". The political provisions contained in these agreements (except the one with Palestine, which does not include a political chapter) state that the agreements are "based on respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights" and that a regular political and security dialog between the EU and partner countries is established in order –amongst other things– to facilitate rapprochement or develop a mutual understanding and an increasing convergence of positions on international issues and to contribute to consolidating security and stability in the region. In the case of the Association Agreement with Israel, article 5.1 establishes that political dialog shall take place by, (d) providing regular information to Israel on issues relating to common foreign and security policy, which shall be reciprocated. The agreements also contain provisions regarding dialog between the European Parliament and national parliaments in partner countries. In addition, they include articles related to cooperation in order to prevent and fight organized crime (one of the new threats identified by the European Security Strategy) as well as to prevent and control illegal immigration and readmission following extradition. Finally, the agreements signed with Algeria and Egypt include an article establishing that parties shall cooperate in the fight against terrorism, focusing in particular on exchange of information on means and methods used to counter terrorism, exchange experience in respect to terrorism prevention, and joint research and studies in the area of terrorism prevention.

It is commonly accepted that cooperation between Southern Mediterranean ("co-operation South-South") countries lags behind the level of cooperation reached by the EU and each individual country. This is true of economic integration in the region and also of security cooperation.

NATO's Mediterranean Dialog

The partners of the Mediterranean Dialog of NATO are seven countries: Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria and Mauritania. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004 was adopted in order to “undertake a new initiative in the broader Middle East region to further contribute to long-term global and regional security and stability while complementing other international efforts.” In the field of confidence-building, article 7b talks about the promotion of military-to-military cooperation.

NATO regularly cooperates with OSCE in matters related to the Mediterranean region, through meetings, exchange of information, verifications, and other instruments.

Regarding confidence and security-building measures, the NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997 includes a regime of CSBM's.

The OSCE Mediterranean Dialog

There are several instruments within OSCE that address Mediterranean security issues. The Mediterranean Contact Group is the main forum for these matters: its members are OSCE participant states as well as the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

In addition, these partners participate in meetings of the Permanent Council of the OSCE, as well as in the Forum for Security Cooperation. The Sofia Ministerial Council decision includes furthering dialogue and co-operation with the Partners for Co-operation and exploring the scope of a wider sharing of OSCE norms, principles and commitments with others. Note should be taken also on the considerations of the delegations of the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation for the attention of the members of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, which stress the need for further cooperation and for voluntary implementation by partners of OSCE norms, principles, commitments and values. Finally, guides of best practices in the implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Affairs have been translated into Arabic and several partners, as well as other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, have shown an interest in these case studies.

Some actors and some declarations point out that the time has come for a stronger collaboration between OSCE and its Mediterranean partners, including the implementation of CSBM's. It might also be reasonable to enlarge this partnership, particularly bearing in mind that the Barcelona Process includes nearly double as many partners. However, the OSCE approach is never an aggressive one and decisions are always taken by consensus. This means that a piece-meal strategy might be the best suited to the region. Although partners are already invited to several fora and meetings as observers, and some OSCE participants have even invited them to take part in visits and military exercises, not all of them seize these opportunities, nor have they ratified all international conventions dealing with the new threats.

A Mediterranean Seminar on Addressing Threats to Security in the 21st Century was held in November 2004 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, which served as a forum for the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation to exchange views on the matter. In this seminar, several proposals were made in the field of regional security, including the creation of a Mediterranean conflict prevention center, a regional code of conduct, and a permanent security forum in the region.

V. CSBM's at a crossroads?

Some of the pressing issues concerning CSBM's regimes in general and with Southern Mediterranean countries in particular are: If the concept of security is changing and shifting towards what is now called human security, with an emphasis on individual security, are CSBM's still of any use? Is confidence possible between two countries when one of them is acting against human rights or the rights of minorities? In view of political declarations calling for an increased spending in defense in Europe, are CSBM's and treaties that limit armament an obstacle for adapting European capabilities to the new threats? Some voices have expressed a desire for a new wave of CSBM's in the 21st Century, one which includes measures related to information on human rights protection in each country. Be it as it may, CSBM's as they are currently conceived seem to be of great importance in maintaining the long and complicated process of confidence-building among countries with different security concerns and priorities.

CSBM's and the revised version of the CFE represent a lowering of the threshold for armaments of different types. However, the limits established are still compatible with an increase in defense budgets in Europe, and particularly with the development and procurement of more modern defense and security technology and knowledge. It is true, nonetheless, that transforming certain politically-binding documents into legally-binding treaties (for instance, the small weapons agreement within the OSCE) is a difficult task, often vetoed by a number of countries.

VI. Developing a CSBM's regime model for the Mediterranean

In adapting the CSBM's doctrine to the Mediterranean area and carving a realistic and effective system of measures to increase confidence and security, a number of strategic issues need to be addressed, some of which are interconnected. We assume that if modeled (which is not the goal of this paper), it would most probably be shown that these variables have an impact in the outcome. These variables are:

Type of conflict. CSBM's can be designed in a context of active warfare (e.g. Israel-Arab conflict) or in one of latent conflict that represents a real threat (as was the case with the CSCE during the Cold War).

Balance of forces and political clout. The opposing parties in a CSBM's regime can be of comparable importance and have an equivalent might in the international sphere, as was the case of the

CSCE, or, as far as military force, India and Pakistan. However, in other cases the actors are unbalanced, and this might account for less effectiveness in the CSBM's arrangements because it is harder to achieve trust and confidence.

Number of actors. The main actors that are willing to increase confidence and security among themselves should be identified. In the case of the CSCE and later the OSCE, the actors were, originally, the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the former USSR republics that achieved independence also joined this institutional body and ratified its norms. In the case of the Barcelona Process, the actors are the EU-members and the 10 Mediterranean partners. In other CSBM's arrangements there are fewer actors, as is the case in a number of bilateral agreements: Turkey and Greece, India and Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, and others. It is plausible that bilateral CSBM's agreements are less effective than multilateral ones, since there is less collective pressure to comply. This has happened in the past between India and Pakistan.

Type of actors. We assume that actors should be public institutions of states willing to set up a scheme of CSBM's, but we ought not to take for granted that these actors are necessarily national governments. Legitimate actors can also be supra-state institutions (e.g. institutions within the UN system or EU bodies like Europol), or institutions other than governments, such as parliaments. This last possibility would be particularly appropriate from the point of view of the human security approach, which emphasizes security of individuals.

Degree of integration between the participants. The degree of integration and the existence of different "sides" or of strong ties between two or more of the actors can lead to different "geographies" or "speeds" of CSBM's. Thus, for instance, within the OSCE NATO members do not carry out inspection visits among each other, although they have a right to do so. In the case of the Barcelona Process, one side is formed by a group of states that share common political, economic, social and cultural systems and principles, while the states in the other side share a language and culture but do not generally have useful cooperative schemes among themselves.

Institutional framework. CSBM's have to be part of an institutional framework, be it a covenant-like document or an organization. Several possibilities come to mind: the CSBM's scheme is set up in the framework of a new institutional body (as was the case with the CSCE, created by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act); the CSBM's scheme is set up within an already existing organization (e.g. within the EU's EMP), or the CSBM's scheme is set up within the framework of several existing organizations (e.g. EU, NATO and the OSCE, or a combination thereof).

"Reason why" and related expectations. It is not a minor issue to identify the main purpose of a scheme of CSBM's, in other words, its "reason why". The range of possible purposes and expectations are best considered and understood as questions: Are these measures supposed to help prepare the path for a permanent solution of a long-standing conflict between the actors? Are they, on the contrary, bound to

deepen confidence and trust among actors that have already a history of cooperation? Is the outcome of such a scheme of CSBM's going to directly meet its goals? How important are the expected results to the overall security needs of its actors and their constituencies?

VII. Options for the Mediterranean

In this section we consider three alternative scenarios that can help us visualize what a viable CSBM's regime in the Mediterranean region could look like and some of its implications. It is important to note that these scenarios are *hypothetical* and are only intended to help visualize possible developments on the basis of realistic considerations.

Scenario 1

The EU and its 10 Mediterranean partners take the lead in the implementation of a CSBM's regime. Initially, though, participation in this regime is not compulsory, but those partners who do choose to participate have more favorable conditions under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument and other financing programs of the EU. This regime is part of the EU's Barcelona Process, and negotiations are launched at a Special Summit on Mediterranean Security in Cyprus in 2006.

The CSBM's regime is not part of the Association Agreement, but rather a separate multilateral document, the Euromediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. However, this regime leverages on the provisions contained in the Association Agreements signed between the EU and partner countries, which mention political dialog, security cooperation and dialog between the European Parliament and national parliaments.

The Charter negotiations, which began in 1997 but were hostage to the Middle East peace process, have resumed thanks to a lessening in the tensions following the Gaza withdrawal and further developments. In addition, full plenipotentiary diplomats and decision-makers from the EMP countries have now taken over responsibility in the negotiations and a Charter is finally approved by the countries involved.

The Charter includes:

1. A definition of common security threats
2. A code of conduct on police, intelligence and military aspects of security that sets forth principles guiding the role of these communities in democratic societies.
3. A set of CSBM's in the areas of policing, intelligence and armed forces based on the exchange of information and access to government plans and policies dealing with main security threats (terrorism, organized crime, failed states and WMD). This includes: annual exchange of information on resources, plans, expenditures and forecasts in areas of government related to main security threats; information on

movements of military forces; intelligence-sharing that is relevant to other countries' security concerns; access to police and military premises; exchanges of police, intelligence and military officers, as well as workshops and "diplomatic seminars".

The detail of CSBM's concerning police services, intelligence and armed forces would be decided in Ministerial Meetings involving Ministers of Interior, Justice, Defense and Foreign Affairs of the countries involved.

The follow-up mechanism for the implementation of this regime would be a competence of the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. A special Commission of this body would have to approve every year the Annual Report on the Progress of the provisions contained in the Euromediterranean Peace and Stability Charter. In addition, and within the framework of the dialog between the European Parliament and national parliaments of partner countries, a special commission formed by members of these bodies has to give its opinion on the aforementioned progress. Funding for this regime should come from the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

Scenario 2

The CSBM's for the region are set up as part of OSCE's Mediterranean Dialog. Cooperation of OSCE participants with Mediterranean partners already started in 1975, but has seen substantial improvements in the past decade. A Mediterranean Contact Group was created in 1994, and nowadays partners can take part in meetings of the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). In accordance with the Charter of Paris (1990), the Helsinki Document 1992 and the Budapest Document 1994, cooperation with this region is an essential issue for OSCE. Decision 571 of the FSC encouraged the extension of the OSCE acquis to other countries, and some of the Mediterranean partners have adopted some of the measures included in the "menu" that is available for them. Therefore, a step further has been taken in order to establish a regime of CSBM's among European and Southern Mediterranean countries.

The set of CSBM's contained in this regime is adopted by OSCE countries and its Mediterranean partners in Cairo in 2007, and includes measures in the same areas as the Vienna Document 1999 (although measures themselves are less ambitious). The Palestinian Authority, which has not participated in the OSCE, is given observer status in the framework of this cooperation agreement. Measures are taken in the following areas:

1. Annual exchange of military information: information on military forces, data relating to major weapon and equipment systems, information on plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems
2. Defense planning: exchange of information, clarification, review and dialog

3. Risk reduction: mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities, voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities
4. Contacts: visits to air bases, military contacts and cooperation, military cooperation (joint exercises), demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems
5. Prior notification of certain military activities
6. Observation of certain military activities
7. Annual calendars
8. Constraining provisions
9. Compliance and verification: inspection, evaluation,

The CSBM's regime also establishes a timeline including periodical revisions and additions such as measures concerning police strategies and policies in participant countries, building on the OSCE police-related activities set by the Istanbul Charter for European Security 1999 (police monitoring in order to ensure non-discrimination procedures and police training in order to improve capabilities, skills and respect for human rights, as well as multicultural police forces).

A Conflict Prevention Center is opened in Tunisia to deal with confidence and security-building training, assessment of the measures contained in the Cairo Document 2007.

The Document containing CSBM's calls for the initiation of a process that will eventually lead to a formal treaty signed by participating states and partners.

Scenario 3

A Conference on Security in the Euromediterranean Region (CSEMR) is convened, under the auspices of the UN as well as the EU, the OSCE, NATO and their Mediterranean Partners, in order to address the most pressing issues of security in the region. This Conference is made possible by the window of opportunity that Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 has opened in the Middle East conflict. It is also inspired by the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), an initiative negotiated by Asian countries (including Turkey, Russia, Iran, China, and others) and promoted by Kazakhstan which has resulted in a catalog of measures adopted by the CICA Ministers of Foreign Affairs in October 1994 in Almaty¹. [This Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures (CICA) is actually in place.]

The CSEMR is created in Barcelona in 2006 under the leadership of Egypt and Morocco, and an agreement is adopted by participating countries at a meeting in Barcelona in 2009, giving birth to the

Barcelona Final Act, signed by the 25 EU members, the United States, Canada, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and all 10 Southern Mediterranean partners of the Barcelona Process.

Negotiations leading to the consensual adoption of this Act have been difficult at times, but progress in democratization in the region and bilateral agreements signed by some of the countries concerned (Morocco and Algeria, as well as Egypt and Israel) have enabled a catalog of measures more ambitious than the one agreed by CICA –which does not mention human rights–, for instance including election-monitoring.

VIII. Note on sources

This paper is based on documents, declarations and treaties that can be found in the following websites :

www.osce.org

www.nato.int

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/

The author has also incorporated inputs from a variety of published works. In addition, the author has also met with officials at the OSCE Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Center, and with members of the delegations to the OSCE of France, Greece, Morocco, Spain, Turkey, and the US.

1. This Conference is actually in place