

4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

CFSP & ESDP from a Mediterranean perspective

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COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP) AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP) FROM A MEDITERRANEAN PERSPECTIVE

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First of all, I wish to thank the Spanish Authorities for their invitation and the opportunity they offered me to discuss, in the stimulating professional context of this Seminar, the theme of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), with special reference to the Mediterranean Region. My thanks go also to the CIDOB Foundation, organising this important event together with the Spanish Ministry of Defence.

I understand that, this year, in the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, this Seminar is given the special purpose to contribute to promotion of security and stability in the Mediterranean area, through mutual understanding and transparency in the relations between the EU and NATO Member States, and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. This co-operative and inclusive approach appears to me to perfectly fit into the European Security Strategy (ESS) conceptual framework and, more specifically, to be fully in line with the concrete objectives the EU is striving to achieve. This is one of the main reasons why I believe that what I am going to say in relation to the EU Security and Defence Policy can provide some useful informative and operative contributions to your work in the Seminar. Of course, I will very much concentrate on the military side of the theme, where, as Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), my competences and responsibilities mostly lay.

I will open my conversation with some quick introductory remarks on the Barcelona Process, to move then to an overview of the CFSP and ESDP basic organisation. The key features of the ESS and their relation with the emerging geo-strategic environment in the era of globalisation will follow. Keeping this information in mind, we will be able to elaborate on the military component of the Strategy and briefly address its impact on the ESDP military capabilities. Then, I will illustrate the first two relevant capabilities of the new EU course –the Battle Group and the Civil-Military Cell– and shortly address the ESDP chain of command. At this moment, we will be able to focus on the status and perspectives of co-operation between the EU Member States and the Mediterranean Partners in the area of security and defence. I am going to conclude this conversation with some reflections of mine that you may want to consider, in the context of the information I provide, in the course of the work of the Seminar.

Let me start then recalling that the aim of the Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP), which is also called “Barcelona Process”, is to create peace, stability and development in a region, the Mediterranean basin, which is of vital strategic importance for Europe.

As you certainly know, the EMP focuses on three main objectives, also called Chapters or Baskets:

- Chapter 1: Political and Security Partnership, which consists in the creation of an area of peace and stability based on the principle of human rights and democracy.
- Chapter 2: Economic and Financial Partnership, the creation of an area of shared prosperity through the progressive establishment of free trade between the EU and its Mediterranean partners and amongst the partners themselves.
- Chapter 3: Cultural, Social and Human Partnership, the improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the development of a free and flourishing civil society.

By combining all three chapters into one comprehensive policy, the Union acknowledged the fact that financial, economic, cultural, and security issues cannot be effectively tackled separately. Such a multidimensional approach of the EMP is a key feature of this initiative, and, we will need to take it fully into account in our discussion, even though, as I said, we will be mostly concentrating on Chapter 1, the Political and Security Partnership.

We turn now to some basic information concerning the EU structure in support of CFSP and ESDP.

The policy and direction of the ESDP, which is a subset of the CFSP, are ultimately provided by the European Council. The Council is composed of the Heads of State or Government and of the President of the EU Commission. Down the line is the Council of the EU, where Member States are represented at ministerial level. The Ministers of the Foreign Affairs gather every month within the Council for General Affairs and External Relations (GAERC), which is the decision making body for the CFSP and ESDP.

Political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations are provided through the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This body is composed of Ambassadors, permanent representatives from the Member States, and meets twice a week. The PSC monitors the international situation and contributes to the formulation of policies. In the event of a crisis, it plays a central role in defining a coherent EU response and is also responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the military response.

Then we have the EUMC that is a collegial body composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, routinely represented by their Military Representatives. The Committee is the highest military body established within the Council and is co-ordinated by a permanent Chairman, myself.

The EUMC's mission is to provide the PSC, either at request or on its own initiative, with military advice and recommendations on all military matters. It works on the basis of consensus as the primary forum for military consultation and co-operation among the EU Member States in all the fields of common interest, first of all, in those related to development of structures and capabilities. In fact, let me stress that the identification and prioritisation of military requirements are fundamental responsibilities of the CHODs and, by extension, they constitute very key tasks of the EUMC.

Being the top element of the EU's military organisation, the Committee has also a leading role and directing functions in crisis management situations as well as in operations.

The Committee is supported by the European Union Military Staff. The EUMS, composed of approximately 200 elements detached by the Member States, provides military expertise to all Council bodies dealing with the ESDP, but it has also got significant operational incumbencies. More specifically, the Military Staff has got the mission to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, including the identification of national and multinational forces, and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the Military Committee.

These are the key elements of the CFSP and ESDP Organisation. How they play and operate in today's and, possibly, in the future world is dictated by the European Security Strategy and the assumptions on which it lays.

The emerging geo-strategic environment in the era of globalisation is characterised by opportunities, on one side, and risks, on the other one. Opportunities –the favourable face of globalisation– come from the spread of democracy and market economy, which, in turn, would reinforce and speed-up overall human development across the planet. Risks –the threatening face of globalisation– are generated by a wide range of possible negative events and situations: natural and man-made disasters, epidemic diseases, organised crime activities, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), states' failure, intrastate conflicts, interstate regional conflicts, terrorism, etc.. Most of these risks are not new in their nature. However, in the last years, their effects have gained unprecedented dynamics and scale, and so their impact on society has dramatically increased. The working mechanisms of globalisation use the new information and communications technologies and the world-wide transportation means available today and take the forms of trans-national entities, mostly organised into networks. These same mechanisms, while promoting and supporting democracy and development, can also be easily exploited by threats in a particularly aggressive and pervasive way, or, at least, function as powerful amplifiers of natural and man-made disasters.

This is the kind of geo-strategic environment where 21st Century sovereign states must operate, doing their best to take the opportunities and face the risks brought about by trans-national entities, relying only on their national authority, which is, of course, limited by the borders of their physical territories. Now, if a state decides to defend itself by closing its frontiers to globalisation, it may manage, perhaps, to keep out some of the risks, but it will certainly remain marginalised from the virtuous circle

of global development and prosperity. Therefore, borders must be kept open, and this will definitely take both the favourable and threatening faces of globalisation, as well as a portion of the frontline of their harsh confrontation, inside each state, within its national sovereign space. Hence, the more democratic and open a state is, the more well-suited it will be to profit from the immense opportunities of globalisation, but also the more exposed it will be to global threats.

Yet, there is not much of a choice here: openness is the only option available in practise, especially for states as the EU Members, which are democracies, strongly interdependent and already well integrated in the emerging globalised environment. I would say that they are “fully connected” to this new common asset for democracy and prosperity. So, openness is an absolute must; and co-operation among states for a collegial global governance is the only possible option for the future. If we look again at the EU states, we realise that, as all democracies, they have no interest in fighting other states and keeping them out of the globalised environment, because this would reduce their “connectivity” and the opportunities of development that it produces. On the contrary, the EU states should have the common goal of promoting their own model and, in any case, associating to it those states that progressively, through the rules of democracy and free choice, get convinced of the great reciprocal advantage of co-operation.

This inclusive approach has a decisive impact on the EU perspective for security and defence. Such an inclusive model associates instead of excluding. So, a third state is not seen as a potential enemy to be kept out of our friendly environment and from which we need to defend ourselves. This is the excluding vision of defence. Security, instead, must be inclusive. More and more states must then be involved in the resolution of the common security problem, while they become themselves active parts of a common globalised environment.

These are the assumptions, significance and scope of the ESS, approved by the European Council in December 2003: “A secure Europe in a better world”. The Strategy stresses the key factor of leverage consisting in the strong interdependence between security and development, on which a decisive effort can be exercised to stimulate development through security. Another pillar of the Strategy is co-operation aimed at creating an “effective multilateralism”, through which the EU and other international organisations, like the United Nations, NATO, the African Union, etc., should work together for the common purpose of stabilising and improving the global environment. But this effective multilateralism should also involve all other kinds of organisations of the civil society and, obviously and importantly, single “isolated” states. To summarize, key mechanisms of the ESS are those of inclusiveness, co-operation and effective multilateralism, security and development interdependence.

The essence of the interdependence of security and development is that, if, through a timely military deployment, a certain critical level of security can be achieved, then this not only may generate in the area some kind of spontaneous recovery from the crisis but it will also permit and support across time and space the deliberate application to the local situation of the further components of the strategy devoted to institution and

economy building. The expected result is the activation of a virtuous loop generated by security and development proceeding together. In this perspective, security is a precondition for development, while real and lasting security cannot be achieved without development. In other terms, especially if development is not limited to its economic dimension, it is development that produces security in the long run, but it cannot even be attempted, if security is not in place. So, security comes first, but –this is really important– only as a component, though key to the overall effort, I would say the “spearhead” of a more comprehensive multidisciplinary approach, where the military is only one of the several instruments of an integrated synergistic strategy of development. As such a virtuous loop progresses, the military commitment in the area is reduced and replaced by local institutional security structures. In our scheme of intervention, globalisation acts as an accelerator for the spread of democracy and market economy, and therefore as a human development facilitator. Yet, at the same time, it functions also as a threat multiplier, and thus it works against security. These are key factors for developing suited military capabilities and properly structuring intervening forces.

The implementation of the ESS in the emerging geo-strategic scenario does not imply defending from a conventional enemy at our borders, as it was the case at the time of the Cold War. Therefore, we do not have to face millions of soldiers, equipped with thousands of tanks and aircrafts and supported by a huge fleet. On the contrary, we need to neutralise subtle and diffused trans-national threats, organised into networks and equipped with unconventional weapons and tactics. The key guiding principle for EU interventions is “think globally and act locally”, as the European Security Strategy reads. This implies that the EU military model organisation is to be centred on knowledge, which, in military terms, is produced by the synergistic combination of information, intelligence, planning and command and control. This will allow the EU to have a constant operational vision of the common globalised environment, which, in turn, will permit to timely identify potential areas of crisis for preventive intervention and, in any case, will facilitate rapid response, whenever necessary. Knowledge, as defined, will also allow for adoption of the multidisciplinary strategy most appropriate to the crisis, with a balanced selection, tailoring and integration of its different components, including the military one.

In short, the EU needs joint forces, perhaps limited in number, but of high quality and readiness, and capable of rapid and decisive interventions at the right place and time for the implementation of a multidisciplinary strategy that pursues human development while establishing or re-establishing stable connections between the area of crisis and the common globalised environment of democracy and market economy. This key concept of quality and integration is reinforced and can be facilitated by a smart implementation of those which are well known as the principles of the “single set of forces” and “the pooling of capabilities” –or “the basket”, as I use to call it.

So, the ESS has dictated a new full set of military requirements, which have been elaborated into a short-to-medium term objective, the Headline Goal 2010. By that time, 2010, the Member States plan to be able to respond with rapid, coherent and decisive action to the whole

spectrum of crisis management operations, ranging from humanitarian and rescue missions, to peace-keeping, combat in crisis management and peace-enforcing, but including also joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in fighting terrorism and security sector reform. The EU should be able to act before a crisis occurs; preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU should retain the capability of conducting concurrent operations, thus sustaining several theatres simultaneously at different levels of engagement.

In accordance with such an innovative approach, a new generation of ready deployable units is emerging: the Battle Groups. The Battle Group is a specific form of rapid response capability, an integrated force, with a national or multinational composition, able to conduct complete missions of short duration, from 30 to 120 days, or to be committed as the entry force for operations of longer timescale. A Battle Group is able to start its mission in the assigned operational theatre within 10 days from the moment the political decision is taken. Battle Groups are to be seen as the spearheads of a full fledged Rapid Response package, from which they are inseparable. In addition to rapid deployable units, a Rapid Response package includes an appropriate command and control organisation, as well as all the necessary force multipliers and enablers, up to the decision making structure at the political level, with the relevant EU collegial and respective Member States national institutions.

Each of the components of an EU Rapid Response package must match adequate requirements to be fully supportive of the leading element, the Battle Group. In particular –and this is what I call the other side of the Battle Group medal– the EU political decision making system must be able to produce unambiguous and complete direction as quick as the Battle Group can react. On the 1st January 2005, an initial Battle Group capability has been activated. Full Operational Capability will be achieved in 2007.

As we said, among the capabilities that the new strategy requires, those related to sharing of information and elaboration of knowledge, as well as those devoted to planning and command and control are particularly significant across all chain of command, from the politico-strategic to the tactical level. As I have mentioned several times, these capabilities should be given a multidisciplinary configuration, which should be incorporated into proper organisational structures able to translate a strategic concept into an effective operational reality. This is now very successfully being actuated, for the first time, in Operation *Althea* in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, as you know, the EU took over from NATO on the 2 December 2004.

In the central organisational structure of the ESDP, the first nucleus of this emerging EU peculiar capability is the Civil-Military Cell, recently established as a functional component of the EUMS and the appropriate Secretariat DGs, under the Direction General of the EUMS. The Cell's main functions consist in civil-military planning at strategic and operational level, activation of an EU Operation Centre, qualified augmentation of Member State Operation Headquarters (OHQ's), and liaison with NATO command and control organisation. This last function will make a significant contribution to the further improvement of the permanent co-operation agreements between the EU and NATO, as defined in 2002 through the so-called *Berlin Plus*.

This leads us to the EU Command and Control Organisation. As you know, the EU concept foresees two levels of military command above the Service Component Level (Land, Maritime, and Air) HQ's: the Operation HQ, located in a Member State, and the Force HQ, deployed in Theatre. Both HQ's are normally provided by Member States, except when the EU works in co-operation with NATO and employs, under the *Berlin Plus* agreements, NATO assets and capabilities, and, in particular, the Command and Control Organisation, which the Alliance is permanently provided with. This is the case, for instance, of operation *Althea* in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The military line of command, which has on top the Operation Commander, is strategically directed, at the political level, by the collegial will of the Political and Security Committee. The Military Committee provides the PSC with its military advice on decisions to be taken.

This concludes my overview of the CFSP and ESDP key capabilities that need to be taken into account for the development of co-operation in the context of the Euromediterranean Partnership. I should not omit to say, though, that the ESDP has recently got an additional strong actor, which is going to play a very significant role in the field of military capabilities development, and this is obviously the European Defence Agency.

The mission of the Agency is to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve the EU's defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future. To this end, the Agency will work for the development of defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, the promotion and enhancement of European armaments co-operation, the strengthening of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB), the creation of an internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) and the enhancement of Research and Technology (R&T). Now, we can build on the platform of information that I have structured so far, in order to address, more specifically, the status and perspectives of co-operation under the Euromediterranean Partnership framework in the field of security and defence.

The organisation I have illustrated was only established in the very early years of this century. Therefore, CFSP and ESDP are quite young instruments in the EU tool-box, and, of course, even younger is their integration in the Barcelona Process. In this perspective, we may say that the results achieved so far in this area should, in any case, be considered more than satisfactory. In these few years, the political and security dialogue has been pursued at regular and ad hoc meetings of Senior Officials of the Barcelona Process. Meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee with Mediterranean Partners on ESDP matters have also taken place. Moreover, an important Seminar on this subject has been held in June 2005 in Athens. The EU-Mediterranean Partners Crisis Management Seminar (Athens, 27-29 June 2005) provided a useful opportunity to engage in substantive dialogue and enhance mutual understanding on civilian and military crisis management between the EU and Mediterranean Partners, *inter alia* by exchanging views on crisis management procedures, best practices and legal aspects, as well as the development of civilian and military capabilities.

In addition, work on implementation of political reforms, co-operation on human rights and democratisation proceeds in line with the commitments entered into, under the Association Agreements and in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, to which the Mediterranean Partners are also associated. The basic principle supporting all these activities and initiatives is that developing the area of security and defence in a Union enlarged at 25 Members, in the global perspective designed by the European Security Strategy, cannot neglect the fundamental need to improve and reinforce security and stability in the Mediterranean basin. And this can be achieved only through a stricter and more effective co-operation within the Euromediterranean Partnership.

I believe I do not need to touch on the geo-strategic reasons why co-operation in the Mediterranean is vital. Instead, I think it useful to take some minutes to illustrate the current and possible areas for CFSP and ESDP co-operation, which are numerous and all important. Counter-terrorism, notably aimed at preventing financing and recruitment, has recently got particular importance and will hopefully be further extended and deepened. Other significant areas of co-operation are those related to non-proliferation of WMD, drug trafficking, organised crime and illegal migration. Civil protection, notably in the context of a natural disaster situation, is also an area where working together will produce an interesting enhancement of current capabilities.

Yet, most of these areas imply a capacity of EU Member States and Mediterranean Partners to be able to work together in civilian and military crisis management operations and exercises, at political as well as at operational level (military and civilian). For this important issue of future Mediterranean Partner participation in ESDP operations much is still to be done, but, in a positive perspective, we need to recall that Morocco and Turkey have participated in Operation *Althea* in Bosnia-Herzegovina since it commenced on 2 December 2004, and that Turkey is also participating in EU civil crisis management operations (EUPM, EUPOL Proxima and EUPOL Kinshasa). Now, if we refer back to all possible areas of co-operation and compare them to the opportunities and risks I have listed when I introduced the European Security Strategy, we realise that they are almost coincident. This observation generates some interesting thoughts.

The need for an integrated approach to these risks and challenges is fully recognised and integration is meant to be pursued according to two complementary perspectives. This means that those risks and challenges not only should be faced through a multidisciplinary strategy, involving all necessary components –diplomatic, economic, social, military, etc.– but also need to be seen and solved as the different aspects of a single complex and multifaceted problem of social growth and development, since, if not the causes, at least the roots of different phenomena may be the same. And, obviously, it is at the very roots of the problems that a multidisciplinary strategy of intervention must aim, if co-operation is to be successful. This is a general principle, but it holds especially well for the Mediterranean basin, where this closed sea has acted for tens of centuries as a bridge between peoples on the southern, eastern and northern banks, making, through wars, commerce and migrations, several of their cultural and social characters quite similar. Moreover, the coincidence of

the opportunities and risks considered by the European Security Strategy and the possible areas of co-operation in the euromediterranean context underlines the point that EU Member States and Mediterranean Partners are mostly facing the same set of security and defence problems, even though, in some cases, from different perspectives. If this is obvious, as I firmly believe, it should also be quite obvious that the Barcelona Process success must be seen as a fundamental objective in the implementation of the ESS.

